

Congregation, Community, and Continuity: Denominational Affiliation as an Indicator of Jewish Identity

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In a recent philosophical work, David Novak argues that it is naive, if not futile, to root Jewish particularism, survival and continuity in the modern world in secularism. As he puts it, the utter naivete of this confusion of biology and history should be quickly apparent. For even Jewish secularism seems to be committed to the survival of the Jewish people. But Jewish survival could necessarily be maintained by means of this model only if one were operating on the premise of an Aristotelian-type biology, which posits the permanence of species. Since Darwin, though, no reputable biologist has held this view. Species wax and wane in response to the process of natural selection. Hence, to assume that the Jews are like a natural species presents no grounds for assuming Jewish survival, or even arguing against assimilation, when either individual or collective survival seems to warrant it (Novak, 1995, p. 19).

This paper examines the question sociologically, rather than philosophically, by looking at the relationship between Jewish religious affiliation and a variety of manifestations of Jewish identity and identification. For the purposes of this paper, I present data on two groups: baby boomers, that is, those born between 1946–1964, and those who were born between 1926–1945. From the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), I have selected all respondents who identified themselves as Jewish by religion. Those who, in 1990, were between the ages 26–44 are the baby boomers, and those who were between the ages 45–64 are termed the “pre-World War II cohort.” Both samples were weighted, so they represent almost 1,700,000 Jewish baby boomers and more than 830,000 Jews in the pre-World War II cohort. I have also examined the responses of the baby boomers denominationally. What follows are their responses to questions relating to Israel, followed by their responses to related matters.

Respondents were asked how many times they had been to Israel. When the responses of the two groups are compared, we see (Table 1) that a higher percentage of the baby boomers were never in Israel (75.3%) than among the pre-World War II cohort (69.6%). By itself, this may not be all that significant, since it is possible that by the time the baby boomers reach the age of the older cohort, they will have traveled to Israel at least as frequently as the older group does today. This seems rather reasonable to assume, since at least toward the end of the period of 45–64 years of age, children are usually married and out of the house, allowing for greater time and resources for travel, including travel to Israel.

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF TIMES BEEN TO ISRAEL, BY AGE

Times	Ages 26-44	Ages 45-64
Once	12.8	18.8
Twice	4.8	5.2
Three times	1.9	1.4
4-9 times	3.3	2.9
10+ times	0.4	1.8
Born in Israel	1.4	0.6
Never	75.3	69.6
Total	100.0	100.0

However, the comparative responses with respect to emotional attachment to Israel suggest that something more serious is involved.

Table 2 indicates that American Jews in the pre-World War II cohort are significantly more emotionally attached to Israel than are the baby boomers. A higher percentage of the baby boomers feel not attached, and lower percentages feel either very or extremely attached to Israel.

TABLE 2. EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL, BY AGE

Attachment	Ages 26-44	Ages 45-64
Not attached	24.2	14.9
Somewhat attached	47.0	37.1
Very attached	18.2	32.2
Extremely attached	10.6	15.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Moreover, as Table 3 indicates, emotional attachment to Israel varies considerably with denominational affiliation. Specifically, Reform and unaffiliated Jews, who are the increasing majority of America's Jews, have significantly weaker emotional ties to Israel than do Conservative or Orthodox baby boomers.

TABLE 3. EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL OF JEWISH BABY BOOMERS, BY DENOMINATION

Attachment	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Not attached	8.1	20.1	24.2	48.6
Somewhat attached	18.5	41.4	58.8	44.2
Very attached	28.6	25.6	13.8	7.2
Extremely attached	44.8	12.9	3.3	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In brief, then, the mainstay of the contemporary American Jewish community has significantly weaker ties with Israel than their predecessors. This may be the reason for the apparent readiness of contemporary America's Jews to consent to much more public criticism of Israel than were their predecessors. The Conservative movement's Statement of Principles is one striking example. And on the individual denominational level, Gerald Bubis and Steven Cohen (1984), in a survey of American Jewish leaders, found widespread agreement with the statement "Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish Community Centers." Among the Orthodox, 42 percent of the rabbis and communal workers agreed; among the Conservative, 62 percent of the rabbis and 63 percent of the communal workers agreed; and among the Reform, 82 percent of the rabbis and 74 percent of the communal workers agreed. Cohen also found widespread criticism of Israel among American Jewish leaders on a number of specific issues, including Israel's stance toward the P.L.O., the settlements on the West Bank and the issue of "Who is a Jew?" For example, a clear majority (59%) stated that the Arabs on the West Bank are being treated unfairly, and "As many as 77 percent affirmed that they have privately criticized 'Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising'."

Of course, one might argue that the Bubis and Cohen survey was conducted when Likud was in power, and American Jewry's acceptance of public criticism of Israel was simply a manifestation of the general degree of discomfort which America's Jews had with the Likud. Their political liberalism is well documented, and thus it is understandable that the democratic socialist tradition of the Labor party was much more appealing than the assertive nationalism of Likud.

Be that as it may for the attitudes of the leadership of American Jewry, comparative responses to other questions in the NJPS suggest that this does not quite explain the growing weakness of American Jewry's emotional attachment to Israel. The NJPS data reveal, for example, that Jewish baby boomers are not so likely to be active in American Jewish organizational life or even to be members of American Jewish organizations. As can be seen in Table 4, slightly fewer baby boomers volunteered for Jewish organizations during the previous year than did those in the pre-World War II cohort.

TABLE 4. VOLUNTEERING FOR A JEWISH ORGANIZATION DURING PAST 12 MONTHS, BY AGE

Volunteering	Ages 26–44	Ages 45–64
Yes	21.7	23.3
No	78.3	76.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Here, too, there is a strong relationship between the variable, volunteering in Jewish organizations, and denominational affiliation, as indicated in Table 5.

TABLE 5. BABY BOOMERS' PAST YEAR'S VOLUNTEERING FOR JEWISH ORGANIZATION, BY DENOMINATION

Volunteering	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Yes	69.5	25.5	15.3	14.4
No	30.5	74.5	84.7	85.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Perhaps this difference between the baby boomers and the pre-World War II cohort is by itself not very significant, given that percentage-wise it is very small, and also because of the aforementioned likelihood that those in the pre-World War II cohort have more time and resources free to afford involvement in volunteer organizational work.

However, as Table 6 indicates, among the baby boomers a significantly high percentage belongs to no Jewish organizations at all. For a community that is known to be one of joiners, such a high percentage of non-members starkly delineates the distinction between the Jewish population of America and the American Jewish community. Furthermore, the significant decline in organizational membership appears to fit into a pattern of decline in which emotional attachment to Israel is an interrelated component.

TABLE 6. NUMBER OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH RESPONDENT BELONGS, BY AGE

Jewish organizations	Ages 26–44	Ages 45–64
None	72.0	64.7
One	16.5	18.8
Two	7.1	5.7
Three or more	4.4	10.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Since there has historically been a correlation between denomination and socioeconomic status among America's Jews, with the Reform having the highest status and the Orthodox the lowest, and since the more religiously-traditional Jews pay a higher percentage of their incomes to synagogues and Jewish schools, one might have expected that more traditional Jews would belong to fewer organizations than less traditional Jews, or that there would be no relationship between denomination and number of Jewish organizations to which one belongs. Yet, as Table 7 indicates, the trend seen previously continues here as well.

TABLE 7. BABY BOOMERS: NUMBER OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS RESPONDENT BELONGS TO, BY DENOMINATION

Organizations	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
None	53.6	68.1	75.0	83.5
One	6.2	19.9	14.7	16.5
Two or more	40.3	12.0	10.3	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Lest it be assumed that the decline in affiliation among baby boomers, as compared to those in the pre-World War II cohort, is related only to secular organizations and not religious ones, Table 8 shows the comparative rates of synagogue membership.

TABLE 8. CURRENT SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP BY ANYONE IN HOUSEHOLD, BY AGE OF RESPONDENT

Membership	Ages 26-44	Ages 45-64
Yes	34.9	45.8
No	65.1	54.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Predictably, rates of synagogue membership vary denominationally, with the Orthodox having the highest rates and the unaffiliated, the lowest.

TABLE 9. BABY BOOMERS: HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS CURRENT SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP, BY DENOMINATION

Membership	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Yes	77.2	44.4	28.8	11.5
No	22.8	55.6	71.2	89.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The lower rates of synagogue membership among baby boomers are one more component in the emerging pattern. Similar differences are found when patterns of

ritual observance are examined. Nor are those differences limited only to the formal organizational sphere. They manifest themselves in friendship patterns. As can be seen in Table 10, baby boomers have a significantly lower percentage who state that all or most of their closest friends are Jewish (33.3%) than do those in the pre-World War II cohort, among whom more than half (50.6%) do.

Just as the trend of weaker identificational patterns among baby boomers, as compared to the pre-World War II cohort, persists, so too does the trend of a denominational relationship persist. The one unusual distinction in the denominational patterns is the higher proportion of the Orthodox who said that none of their closest friends are Jewish than did even the unaffiliated. The explanation for this is not clear; however this deviant finding is a minor one, and the overall trend remains clear.

TABLE 10. JEWISHNESS OF CLOSEST FRIENDS, BY AGE

Jewish friends	Ages 26–44	Ages 45–64
None Jewish	6.3	5.2
Few or some Jewish	60.4	44.1
Most Jewish	24.3	34.2
All Jewish	9.0	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0

TABLE 11. BABY BOOMERS' CLOSEST FRIENDS JEWISHNESS, BY DENOMINATION

Jewish friends	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
None	8.9	5.2	6.4	7.7
Few or Some	9.7	55.1	70.1	68.3
Most	27.3	30.2	19.7	24.1
All	54.1	9.5	3.7	—
Total	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.1

The relationship between income and denomination still clearly exists, much more so than does the relationship between educational status and denomination. There is a gap of approximately \$10,000 between the family incomes of Orthodox and Conservative, as well as between Conservative and Reform baby boomers, with the Reform having a mean family income of approximately \$68,000. Almost two-thirds of the Orthodox baby boomers reported combined annual family incomes of less \$45,000, whereas half of the Conservatives and 42.5 percent of the Reform did. Since the Orthodox have more children than do the Conservative and Reform, this means that the economic constraints are even greater than the bare data indicate. The lower income of the Orthodox, combined with their larger

families, means they have considerably less disposable income than do the others. In addition, their ideological commitments compel them to join synagogues at a higher rate than others, as indicated above, to send their children to private day schools, as well as to contribute to a variety of other Jewish communal institutions. Thus there is ample evidence that the Orthodox are disproportionately affected by what has been called, "the high cost of Jewish living" (Meir and Hostein, 1992; Chiswick, 1994).

TABLE 12. 1989 HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO JEWISH CHARITIES, BY DENOMINATION

Contributions	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Yes	80.5	56.4	43.5	25.4
No	19.5	43.6	56.5	74.6

TABLE 13. 1989 HOUSEHOLD JEWISH CHARITY CONTRIBUTIONS, BY DENOMINATION

Contributions	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Under \$100	3.3	32.2	40.5	51.1
\$100-499	22.6	44.9	36.3	37.1
\$500-999	17.4	9.0	7.9	11.9
\$1,000-4,999	34.7	6.0	5.8	—
\$5,000-9,999	8.8	1.1	—	—
\$10,000+	1.9	.7	.5	—
Don't know	9.5	3.2	6.0	—
Refused	1.8	2.8	2.9	—

TABLE 14. 1989 HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO NON-JEWISH CHARITIES, BY DENOMINATION

Contributions	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Yes	56.8	67.7	70.0	74.8
No	43.2	32.3	30.0	25.2

TABLE 15. 1989 HOUSEHOLD NON-JEWISH CHARITY CONTRIBUTIONS, BY DENOMINATION

Contributions	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated
Under \$100	42.0	38.6	33.6	39.4
\$100-499	25.3	49.6	41.9	51.1
\$500-999	11.9	5.9	9.3	1.9
\$1,000-4,999	—	3.0	5.0	7.5
\$5,000-9,999	—	—	.5	—
\$10,000+	—	—	.4	—
Don't know	18.2	1.6	7.5	—
Refused	2.6	1.2	1.8	—

When we look at the current denominational identification of those respondents who stated that they were raised Orthodox, we find that 35.2 percent are now Orthodox, 44.6 percent are Conservative, and 18.2 percent are Reform. Among those who stated that they were raised Conservative, 58.8 percent are Conservative, .9 percent are Orthodox, 26.0 percent are Reform, 2.3 percent are Reconstructionist, and most of the rest are unaffiliated. Of those stating that they were raised Reform, 3.9 percent are Conservative, 87.9 percent are Reform, none are Orthodox, .7 percent are Reconstructionist, and most of the rest are unaffiliated. In other words, from the perspective of the denomination in which the respondent was raised, Reform is the strongest and Orthodox the weakest since the latter has the highest dropout rate while the former has the lowest.

From another perspective, however, the opposite is true. If we look at the respondent's current denominational affiliation and compare it with the denomination in which he or she was raised, we find that it is the Orthodox who have the highest rate of retention and Reform the lowest. Thus, 78.2 percent of those who currently identify as Orthodox state that they were raised Orthodox, as compared to 68.1 percent of those identifying with Conservative stating that they were raised Conservative, and 64.8 percent of those identifying as Reform stating that they were raised Reform.

Since the figures on denomination raised indicate only a diminution of Orthodoxy, with none of the Conservative or Reform becoming Orthodox, it is surprising and puzzling that 22.2 percent of the current Orthodox were not raised Orthodox. What is even more surprising is that the data indicate that fully 10.5 percent of those who currently identify as Orthodox Jews were raised as non-Jews, 7.1 percent as Christians and 3.4 percent as "Other Religion." No other known source indicates such a high proportion of Orthodox Jews as being converts.

Also, the figures on denomination raised are surprising in light of the publicity given to the phenomenon of *baalei teshuva*, or returnees (Danzger, 1989; Davidman, 1991). From where are they "returning," if not from Conservative and Reform. Also, since the data on the percentage stating that they were raised

Orthodox reveal a picture so drastically different from that perceived by communal workers, including rabbis, in the Orthodox community, it would appear that further investigation is needed into just what the respondents meant when they stated that they were raised Orthodox. Did that mean that they were raised as observant in the Orthodox definition of the term or did they mean that they attended an Orthodox synagogue? The two are very different. Many of the latter may have been part of what Marshall Sklare termed the "non-observant Orthodox," that is, those who are heterodox in personal behavior but who, when occasionally joining in public worship, do so in accordance with traditional patterns (Sklare, 1972, p.46).

It is important to note that the denominational patterns in the New York Metropolitan Area are quite different from the national ones. New York has a much higher proportion of Orthodox and is generally more traditional. There, almost twice as many, 61.3 percent as compared to 35.2 percent nationally of those who were raised Orthodox are now Orthodox. Among the Conservative the difference is not as great, 60.3 percent as compared to the national 58.8 percent of those who were raised Conservative are now Conservative. For the Reform, the drop is even greater in New York than nationally; 78.6, as compared to the national 87.9 percent of those who were raised Reform are now Reform.

Finally, when we look at mate selection and intermarriage patterns, we find very interesting denominational variations. Let me make it clear that, when I say "intermarriage", I mean mixed marriages, Jews married to non-Jews who have not converted to Judaism (Table 16).

Perhaps surprisingly, we find a lower rate of intermarriage among those raised non-affiliated than among the Reform and Conservative. It should be emphasized that these figures are based on responses to the question, "Referring to Jewish religious denominations, were you raised Conservative, Orthodox, Reform, Reconstructionist, or something else?" Very probably, many respondents answered in terms of the type of synagogue or temple their parents went to, but that is really not the same as denomination raised. For example, there are many people who, if and when they go to a synagogue, go to a Conservative synagogue but are not actually Conservative Jews, just as there are many who, if and when they go to a synagogue, go to an Orthodox synagogue but are not actually Orthodox Jews. Perhaps the lower rate of intermarriage among the unaffiliated is related to this phenomenon as well.

TABLE 16. PERCENT BABY BOOMERS MARRIED WITH JEWISH SPOUSES, BY DENOMINATION

Denomination	Percent
Orthodox	75.9
Conservative	48.2
Reform	41.9
Unaffiliated	55.5

In sum then, it appears that what we are dealing with is rather pervasive, and is indicative of a decline of both Jewish identity and Jewish identification. Despite

the optimistic pronouncements of various "transformationist" social scientists during the 1980s, the NJPS data appear to confirm the deepest fears of the "assimilationists". Although it will almost unquestionably survive into the distant future, it seems at least as unquestionable that the group that does survive will be a rather small one. Nor should this be very surprising to anyone familiar with religious and ethnic group patterns in American society. The data presented indicate that although American Jewry is not about to disappear in the foreseeable future, it is undergoing a process similar to what a number of researchers have found for American Catholics, namely that there has been a significant decline in their attachments to the church and its doctrines, and that, especially among the young, Catholic identity is increasingly a matter of personal choice entailing rather amorphous "feelings." This is undoubtedly part of the "culture shift" in modern societies in which the "post-modern" sectors are privatized and personalized, and the individual subjectively chooses with which ones, when, and to what extent to identify.

In terms of the ethnic component as well, the patterns of America's Jews do not appear to be unique. For example, Richard A. Alba (1985; 1990) found that Italian and other European-Americans are in "the twilight of ethnicity", and the social significance of ethnicity is becoming increasingly irrelevant, that is, it has less and less significance in terms of socio-economics, language, and mate selection. Interestingly, this seems to suggest that when the public ideology in America was that of the melting pot, the reality was cultural pluralism, and now that the ideology is cultural pluralism, the reality has become the melting pot. The NJPS data seem to lend further support to Alba's conclusion that "The general outlines of symbolic ethnicity offer a far better fit to the emerging nature of ethnic identity — essentially in the desire to retain a sense of being ethnic, but without any deep commitment to ethnic social ties or behaviors."

The empirical evidence, therefore, appears to corroborate the assertion by Novak about the non-viability of secular Jewishness, with which we began. There is further evidence in its support in a recent analytical survey by Bernard Wasserstein of European Jewry after World War II. His book documents the assimilation and disappearance of Jews in Western Europe and concludes with the challenging question as to whether Jews can survive in an open society. As he puts it, "In multicultural, pluralist Western Europe, the Jew is no longer obliged to efface his Jewishness. This very fact has a *disintegrative* effect on Jews no longer bound by religious, cultural or political ties to their Jewishness" (p. 281; emphasis in original). Wasserstein appears to be pessimistic about the ability of Diaspora Jews to create a real secular culture of their own, and he ends with the observation that other groups of Jews, notably those of Kai-feng, China, have disappeared completely precisely because their host society was so open to them. Wasserstein does not predict the imminent disappearance of European Jewry, but he does see it as a long-term process.

With respect to American Jewry, Charles Bronfman recently summed up its condition in the following manner:

Our problem is not that of feeling alienation and rejection in the Diaspora. On the contrary, the feeling is that North America is our

only home. We have completely assimilated into American and Canadian society. We are flesh of its flesh. Its culture is our culture. We are not a minority; we are an integral part of the majority. Under such ideal conditions, you need an especially strong national desire to guard your Judaism.... (Plotzker, 1997, p. 18).

Bronfman's assessment of the situation contains no explicit forecast of the future of American Jewry. There are some observers who staunchly assert that although the evidence of assimilation is clear, the future of American Jewry is brighter than ever. As they view it, we are living in a "post-modern" society, which is an entirely different situation than was the case in earlier times. As one critic puts it,

I belong to the 'optimist' camp of survivalists; but I go beyond the camp of the "survivalists," beyond the "transformationists"...into what I call a new "post modernist" position. This position is seemingly contradictory: Jews will continue to intermarry and assimilate yet they will grow and flourish. Surprisingly, both can occur *at the same time* in this post-modernist world; powerful assimilation into American society yet strong and powerful pride in all things Jewish. The growth of the *Tikkun*, feminist, and chavurot movements; the strong support and rallying behind Israel, and the vitality of Jewish institutions from synagogues to old-age homes belie all the theories that Jews are melting away or that anti-Semitism is increasing and thus making Jews "hide" their identity (Porter, 1996).

There is at least one part of this argument that appears to be supported by empirical evidence, namely, that there have been dramatic shifts and cultural changes as advanced societies have become "post-materialist." The evidence derives from a massive study by Ronald Inglehart (1990; 1997). For the past thirty years, Inglehart has been engaged in a cross-national study of economic, social and cultural change, and his findings indicate that advanced industrialization brings with it a whole set of values. In brief, he distinguishes between what he terms "materialist" and "postmaterialist" values. The former, which are characteristic of economically and otherwise less secure societies, are values which emphasize material security. In the area of politics, these would focus on such needs as strong leaders and order. In the realm of economics, the values emphasize economic growth and strong motivation for individual achievement. In the area of sexuality and family norms, the emphasis would be on the maximization of reproduction within the two-parent family. And within the realm of religion, the emphasis is on a higher power and absolute rules. As societies advance economically, there is a shift to postmaterialist values, manifested in a declining respect for authority and increased mass participation; an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality of life concerns; a increasing emphasis on meaningful work; greater choice in the area of sexual norms; declining confidence in established religious

institutions as well as declining rates of church attendance; and an increasing contemplation of the purpose and meaning of life.¹

American Jews are often disproportionately represented among the leaders of movements representing postmaterialist values, and America's Jews as a whole overwhelmingly subscribe to postmaterialist values. The political liberalism of American Jews has been consistently documented during the second half of this century and, despite perennial prediction of its disappearance, it remains clear. Indeed, less than 10 years ago, a *Los Angeles Times* survey found that for about 60 percent of America's Jews, "a commitment to social justice" was the most important aspect of their Jewish identity. A recent survey of America-Jewish opinion sponsored by the American Jewish Committee found that 60 percent of those surveyed thought that "abortion should be legal under any circumstances," and 33 percent felt it should be "legal only certain circumstances." America's Jews strongly support gay rights, are disproportionately involved with ecology and other postmaterialist movements, as well as self-help and a variety of spiritualist and quasi-mystical organizations.

In the recent American Jewish Committee survey, the percentage of those who identified "being part of the Jewish people" as the quality most important for their own personal Jewish identity (47 percent) was considerably higher than those who identified it as "a commitment to social justice" (18 percent). Nevertheless, this is still less than half of America's Jews, and there is no indication of how they operationalize that desire to be part of the Jewish people, let alone incorporate it into their life style so that it can be transmitted to their children. It would appear that despite the expressed strong feelings about being Jewish, for many American Jews there is little basis for anticipating that the Jewish identity which they say is important to them — and I believe it is — will prevent the diminution of the American Jewish population both qualitatively and quantitatively. Jews in so-called "post-modern society" will either have to come up with radically new techniques of Jewish socialization, or face the prospect of a continually shrinking Jewish population with all of the implications that this entails. Personally, I certainly do not anticipate the imminent disappearance of American Jewry, but I find it very difficult to be very optimistic about its long-term staying power as the kind of American Jewish community that we knew in the 20th century.

¹ Parenthetically, the rise of fundamentalism does not disprove this thesis. Rather, it should be seen as reaction to the growth of postmaterialism. In most advanced societies, fundamentalists are a minority and can, at best, slow down some of the impact of postmaterialism, but they do not seem to be able to stop it. It may be predicted that the greater the size of the fundamentalist constituency in a given society, the more they will be able to impact on consequences of postmaterialism in that society. In Israel where, because of a variety of factors, such as the Arab-Israel conflict and the whole process of aliya in which there was a disproportion of those who arrived from developing countries, fundamentalism plays a much greater role. This may impact on the growing divide between American Jewry and Israel because America's Jews have such a different relationship with postmaterialistic culture.

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