


*Jewish
Political
Studies*



The Transformation of American Jewish Politics

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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FOREWORD

WHATEVER THE TRUTH of the old saw about American Jews being just like other Americans only more so, it certainly does not apply in the political sphere, where a distinctive Jewish pattern is evident. Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab have pointed to the "political hyperactivism" of American Jews, their disproportionate involvement in the political process as expert professionals, volunteers, and, in recent years, candidates for office. Moreover, Jewish voters show a remarkable propensity for liberal politics, a propensity that cannot be predicted on the basis of their relatively high socioeconomic status. In addition, the organized Jewish community expends enormous effort and energy in advancing favored political causes, such as support for Israel and aid to Soviet Jewry.

The existing scholarly literature on the political life of American Jews has certain limitations. In the first place, a good part of the material is dated and needs to be made current. Second -- and more important -- there are not enough studies with analytic depth, exploring not only the "whats" of Jewish political behavior but also the "whys." Why, for example, do American Jews cling tenaciously to political liberalism even as the country as a whole moves in a more conservative direction? Why do Jewish organizations pursue an activist political agenda in relation to Congress and the White House? More generally, why do American Jews gravitate to politics as a sphere of activity?

To suggest answers to these and other important questions

about the role that American Jews play in the political life of the nation, the American Jewish Committee has initiated the Jewish Political Studies series. The first publication in the series is Peter Medding's *The Transformation of American Jewish Politics*, which points to the emergence of a "Pluralist Politics of Group Survival" as the key to the political behavior of American Jewry as a community.

David Singer, *Director*
Information and Research Services

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN JEWISH POLITICS

AMERICAN JEWRY has recently undergone a fundamental political transformation. Less than three decades ago it was politically weak and unimportant. Today, it is widely perceived to be a significant and influential force, and public discussion of Jewish political power is commonplace. Issues of direct and immediate concern to Jews figure prominently on the American political agenda, engaging the ongoing attention of the Administration, Congress, and the media. Jewishness has become politically relevant, and a new pattern of Jewish politics has evolved.

Much has been written about Jewish voting behavior and political attitudes, but little is known about how American Jews as a group act politically. Yet it is in precisely this sphere that the transformation has been greatest. In analyzing and explaining these developments we shall focus upon how American Jewry pursues its basic concerns: consolidating and improving Jewish social, economic and cultural status in America; enhancing relations between the United States and Israel; and ensuring Jewish survival.¹

THE BASIC GROUP CONCERNS OF AMERICAN JEWS

Social, Economic and Cultural Status

American Jews believe that to conserve and enhance their status in American society they must defend it from two major hostile

pressures -- the threat of anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination; and the threat of Christianity, that is, the incorporation into American public life of Christian symbols, practices and values.

Even though discrimination and prejudice against Jews in America have declined, especially since 1960, their continuing manifestations and the experience of Jewish history make Jews feel that anti-Semitism is as endemic in America as in other Western societies. However benign conditions seem and however open the institutional structures of society are, American Jews do not feel truly secure because things can get worse, particularly if economic and social conditions deteriorate.²

American Jews perceive a second threat to their group status in the pressure of Christian America. Christianity is the formative cultural system for the vast majority of Americans, in terms of both values and emotions. In this sense, Jews see American society as Christian, despite the formal constitutional guarantees aimed at ensuring the state's religious neutrality.

Indeed, for American Jews, Christianity is not merely the religion of the majority of their fellow Americans -- a relatively neutral aspect of social diversity -- but is rather a fundamental feature of their own status definition. Jews reject Christianity at the rational level as essentially false, and even more strongly at the affective level as the theological source of a long history of anti-Semitism and persecution. They define their Jewishness in terms of its separateness from, and rejection of, Christianity. To be Jewish in America means, among other things, not to be Christian.

This translates politically into a strong commitment to the separation of church and state. While many other Americans share this conviction, its meaning for American Jews is fundamentally different. No other identifiable group in America has a greater investment in separation than the Jews. For them -- but not for others -- the separation of church and state constitutes and defines their individual and group status in American society, because to breach separation is to Christianize America, relegating the Jews to second-class citizenship. A prime concern of Jewish politics in America is ensuring that this does not occur by maintaining a society that is neutral in matters of religious affiliation.

America may be the most tolerant, welcoming, pluralistic, and opportunity-laden society in Jewish history. Jews may be freer, more accepted, more integrated and more successful there than in any other country in the Diaspora. Yet the threats of anti-Semitism and Christianity continue to jeopardize Jewish equality. As a result, Jews suffer from a permanent sense of insecurity and vulnerability that is heightened by the fact that they have come so far, and have so much to lose. Much of their political activity seeks to overcome these threats.

Relations with Israel

Like other ethnic Americans who maintain a sense of national, linguistic and cultural identification with their homeland, American Jews care deeply about Israel. At first, this concern was tinged with ambivalence. In the 1950s support for Israel was accompanied by a distinct sense of separateness and distance, as well as some apprehension that too close an identification might harm Jewish status in America. Eventually, however, commitment to Israel became a central element in American Jewish identification and self-definition, and a focal point of its organizational and political activity. This process has gone so far that today, the future strength and vitality of American Jewish life are thought to be dependent upon Israel.³

American Jewish pride in Israel has focused particularly on the existence of sovereign Jewish political power, which contrasts so dramatically with the situation of Jewry during the Holocaust. Israel also enhanced Jewish status in America by placing American Jews in the same category as other ethnic groups which have homelands to which they relate, instead of being treated as a dispersed and rootless people. That Israel was a progressive, democratic, pioneering, egalitarian society, embodying universal prophetic moral values, and at the same time was self-reliant and courageous and had proved that Jews could fight to defend themselves against much greater odds, added to their enhanced status in America and reinforced their positive self-image. Israel, then, is a prime focus of American Jewish self-worth and shared identity, simultaneously affirming common roots, individual personality needs, and collective aspirations. For American Jews, peoplehood, with Israel at its core, represents extended familism.

Caring for Israel, supporting it, involvement in its life and its problems, are as self-evident to Jews as caring and concern for one's family.

But the dominant element in American Jews' relations with Israel since the end of the 1960s has been concern with its security, which has to a great extent become dependent upon the political, economic and military assistance of the United States. Their primary aim, therefore, has been to ensure American support for Israel. Any indication of a weakening of that support generates anxiety and apprehension.

The Elemental Issue of Survival

These two ethnic concerns -- ensuring equality and support for Israel -- spill over into the third -- Jewish survival. The concern with status in America is set against a long history of anti-Semitic persecution, culminating in the Holocaust. The constant threat to Israel's security evokes similar fears about the physical survival of its Jews, as well as doubts about the future of American Jewry should Israel go under.

For about a generation after the Holocaust, its meaning as a historical event had little impact upon the political behavior of American Jewry.⁴ By the mid-1960s, however, it began to have an effect. In 1967, when a beleaguered Israel faced a battle for survival just prior to the Six-Day War, it was dramatically imprinted on the consciousness of American Jews. Established in order to provide a safe haven for Jews from the ineradicable evils of anti-Semitism, by some twist of historic irony the independent Jewish state suddenly seemed the likely scene of a second Holocaust. And once more, the Jews appeared to stand alone.

Neither the swift Israeli military victory of 1967 nor the slower, more costly success of 1973 weakened the influence of the felt analogy with the Holocaust. American Jews recognized that Israel's survival was permanently in question, since the loss of one war meant the annihilation of its Jewish inhabitants. As a result, concern with survival came to pervade American Jewry's collective identity, affecting its perception of its status and role in American society and becoming the central focus of American Jewish politics.⁵

The Liberal Politics of Individual Rights

Jewish group politics in the 1950s and 1960s was informed by a political conception that may be characterized as the Liberal Politics of Individual Rights. It reflected American Jewish concern at that time with securing social, economic and cultural status in America.

Confronting considerable discrimination, the major organizations of American Jewry sought conditions which would enable Jews fully to enter American society as equal citizens. From the end of World War II until about the mid-1960s, the problem confronting Jews in America was understood in individual terms -- the full integration of individual Jews into society. The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC) put it this way:

The overall objectives of Jewish community relations are to protect and promote equal rights and opportunities and to create conditions that contribute to the vitality of Jewish living. . . . These opportunities can be realized only in a society in which all persons are secure, whatever their religion, race or origin. . . . Freedom of individual conscience is a basic tenet of American democracy. The right of each person to worship God in his own way is the keystone in one of the major arches of our national edifice of personal liberties. Government must protect this right by protecting each in the pursuit of his conscience and by otherwise remaining aloof from religious matters.⁶

Jews perceived established and advantaged groups -- business, religious, academic, and social elites -- as the major source of anti-Jewish prejudice. Their discriminatory activities, however, ran counter to the liberal and egalitarian values Jews found in the Constitution. In seeking to right such wrongs, therefore, Jews sought to have America live up to, and practice, its own highest ideals.

American Jews manifested support for these ideals in elections and in public-opinion surveys. They preferred the Democrats -- in presidential elections by margins of 18 to 36 percentage points more than the population at large, and in

congressional elections by even more. Such stable Jewish partisan loyalty was closely associated with strong support for liberal political, social, economic, moral and cultural values. Identification between liberalism and Jewishness was very high. To be sure, some Jews voted Republican, but even they tended to support the liberal ideals, viewing Republican candidates such as Eisenhower as liberals. What distinguished them from Jews who voted Democrat was not, therefore, opposition to liberalism, but greater social integration with non-Jews.⁷

This political pattern dominated because it provided individual Jews and the organized Jewish community in America with a coherent worldview that simultaneously met particular Jewish ethnic concerns and more universal goals. It joined together the American Creed, liberal ideals, Jewish values, Jewish partisan affiliations, and Jewish coalition partners in the belief that the achievement of individual liberal goals would necessarily satisfy Jewish concerns. Jews allied with others in a universal struggle for a better society for all, as exemplified in Jewish support for the civil rights movement.

The coherence of this political approach began to disintegrate at the end of the 1960s due to the impact of ethnic pluralism, whose two main features were the legitimization of claims upon American society in group terms, and the rise of public and militant ethnic assertiveness. The resulting change in the focus of American Jewish politics is evident in the striking contrast between the NJCRAC statement of the 1950s cited above and another statement by the same organization in the 1980s:

Jewish community relations activities are directed toward enhancement of conditions conducive to secure and creative Jewish living. Such conditions can be achieved only within a societal framework committed to the principles of democratic pluralism; to freedom of religion, thought and expression; equal rights, justice and opportunity; and within a climate in which differences among groups are accepted and respected, with each free to cultivate its own distinctive values while participating fully in the general life of the society. . . . The Jewish community has always been profoundly aware that maintaining a firm line of separation between church and state is essential to religious freedom and the

religious voluntarism which foster the creative and distinctive survival of diverse religious groups, such as our own.⁸

The societal legitimation of distinctive group values and diversity reinforced and heightened American Jews' already growing particularistic group concerns with Israel and with Jewish survival, and the urgency of these issues tended to overshadow their universalistic sentiments. In addition, direct conflicts of economic interest between Jews and other ethnic groups weakened or broke up traditional coalition arrangements; erstwhile liberal and ethnic allies became political opponents.

To be sure, American Jews as individuals did not move far from their previous pattern of political attitudes and partisan loyalties. But as a group they developed a new pattern of Jewish politics -- the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival.

THE PLURALIST POLITICS OF GROUP SURVIVAL

The Group Demand for Power

The main features of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival are well captured in the following excerpts from an address to the 1985 Annual Policy Conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC):

Forty years ago -- April, 1945 -- we had failed. We didn't know then the extent of our failure, but we knew we had failed. And, for many of us . . . that failure has haunted us and driven us and provided us with the internal fuel needed to create a politically active people pledged to survival. . . .

In our modern world, Jews have been torn between a desire for maximum integration in the general culture on the one hand and the will for Jewish survival on the other. But the aftermath of the Holocaust, the creation of the State of Israel, and then, in 1967 and 1973, the experience of almost losing what it took the murders of six million to create, drove home the urgency of putting Jewish survival first. I believe that today we recognize that if we fail to utilize our political power we may be

overwhelmed by our adversaries throughout the world. We understand that if that happens, Jewish existence itself is endangered. . . .

As we have bitterly learned, it is when we assume too low a profile and fail to develop economic and political power, that we are perceived as having no vital societal role. That is what makes us dispensable -- that is what made Polish Jewry dispensable in the 1930s. *NEVER AGAIN*...

The specter of *dual loyalty* still haunts our community. . . . But here, in this country of ours, we ought not be shy about our interest in Israel. This is a pluralistic society and our survival here is dependent upon that pluralism. . . . Our concern for Israel does not erase our concern for America's domestic policies nor, in fact, does it mean that we do not have such concerns. . . . We care to the depths of our souls about what happens to both the United States and Israel--that caring is not inconsistent -- it is not un-American -- and *it is not dual loyalty*. It is part of democracy.⁹

The primacy accorded group survival -- focused upon, but not confined to Israel -- leads directly to a group demand for political power as the only way to ensure that survival. Such power is made possible by the pluralism of American society and its democratic political system.

The group demand for power that lies at the heart of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival requires American Jewry as a group actively to participate in the making of public policy on those matters that affect it. This gives the community an input into the decision-making process, gaining it some influence over the content and direction of political outcomes. Power can be exercised without occupying public office or possessing formal authority, but it does require organization and ongoing involvement in the political process.

Integrating the Jewish and American Political Agendas

A distinctive feature of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival and a striking indication of its interaction with the political system is the integration of the Jewish political agenda and

organizational framework into the mainstream of American politics. Jewish issues have become part of the warp and woof of America's routine political agenda. Jewish concerns have become Americanized. They are adopted, promoted, shaped, and responded to by leading American political figures, including the president, cabinet members, key Administration officials and congressional leaders, and not just by Jews.

The most important Jewish concern embedded in American politics is Israel. There has been a marked increase in the level of American foreign aid and defense assistance to Israel, and such appropriations have become regular items on the congressional docket. This tendency is reinforced by the United States' continuing role as Israel's main source of military supplies, and by its increasingly active part in Middle East peacemaking since 1967. Israel has become important in both congressional and presidential politics and its problems receive disproportionate media coverage.

Soviet Jewry is a second significant Jewish concern demanding political and executive decisions at the highest level. Jewish political activity has succeeded in making it part of the more general question of human rights in the Soviet Union and a litmus test of Soviet behavior in the larger context of American-Soviet relations. Soviet Jewry's right to emigrate and its freedom to maintain its cultural and religious life in the Soviet Union have been major items of discussion at recent summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev, and between the American secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister. The issue has been dramatically highlighted by such symbolic gestures as Secretary Shultz's seder with refuseniks at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, and President Reagan's meetings with prominent refuseniks such as Natan Sharansky after their release.

Such actions are in no small measure the outcome of discussions by American Jewish leaders with the president and secretary of state, and with State Department officials, reinforced by similar contacts with Congress. Indeed, a broad bipartisan Congressional Coalition for Soviet Jews established in the 99th Congress keeps members and their staffs informed on the latest developments in the Soviet Union, and there is even a group of Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry.

Commemorating the Holocaust in American public life has

also become interwoven with the domestic American political agenda, although in a somewhat more sporadic manner. Thus we have seen the establishment of the President's Commission on the Holocaust (now called the United States Holocaust Memorial Council) and a decision to build a United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. The Holocaust issue erupted into major public controversy in 1985 when President Reagan announced his intention to visit the German military cemetery at Bitburg and place a wreath there honoring the war dead of both countries. His refusal to change these plans after it became known that SS officers were buried there raised the question of America's relationship to the victims of the Holocaust, on the one hand, and their Nazi oppressors, on the other.

Israel, Soviet Jewry and Bitburg also illustrate the militant public self-assertiveness of American Jews that characterizes the new Jewish politics. The Soviet Jewry Mobilization Rally of December 6, 1987, on the Washington Mall, attended by some 250,000 American Jews and a large number of government officials and presidential candidates, was the most dramatic example in a long string of public Jewish rallies for such causes. It was distinguished, to be sure, by its national scope, the extent of Jewish political mobilization, the sophistication of organizational coordination, the scale of the media coverage, and the public impact.

Jews as Insiders and Professionals: AIPAC

Before the advent of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival, American Jewry made sporadic representations to the White House and Congress, leaving the political arena when the issue was resolved, to return to its regular internal ethnic pursuits until the next critical issue arose. Now, the Jewish organizations and professionals are insiders in American politics. For them, the political process is a day-to-day operation, highly sophisticated, fast-moving and fluid, subject to short-term and shifting coalitions and alliances, as well as to longer-term loyalties. To keep abreast of politics under such conditions necessitates full-time, skilled, professional organization, both in Washington and across the country, that is able to keep on top of complicated and sometimes obscure legislative maneuvers. It must be capable

of dealing with a whole range of complex policy questions that often demand a high level of scientific or technological expertise, a grasp of politics that comes only with direct and intimate political experience, and the capacity to make decisions quickly in the light of these considerations. This is no game for amateurs.

The single most striking illustration of American Jewish adjustment to the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival is AIPAC. Attempts to muster American support for Israel were initiated by I. L. Kenen in the early 1950s through the American Zionist Council. Although it registered with Congress as a domestic American lobby, pro-Arab and State Department circles exerted pressure upon it to register as an agent of a foreign government. This pressure led in 1954 to the establishment of an independent, separately funded entity, the American Zionist Council on Public Affairs, which in 1959 changed its name to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in order to gain the support of non-Zionists.¹⁰ Its goal has not changed: "promoting strong and consistently close relations between our country and Israel."¹¹

Today AIPAC has a nationwide grass-roots membership of over 50,000, and its budget has grown dramatically. So has its professional staff: between 1975 and 1985 its full-time Washington staff increased over fivefold to reach 70. AIPAC has a high-level academic research and information service, as well as legislative lobbyists who closely monitor all congressional activity that relates to Israel.

This is no small task. An AIPAC report presented to its 1987 policy conference lists 47 separate items relating to Israel that it was monitoring through the various stages of the congressional process.¹² AIPAC must, then, maintain constant familiarity with the congressional agenda and ongoing cooperation with congressional staff members in order to receive relevant information early. This follows the established pattern in Congress whereby a considerable amount of activity is transacted by the staff, with elected representatives brought in only at the last stages, when a decision or a vote is required.¹³

The transformation of AIPAC into a Washington insider is epitomized in the different career patterns of the three leaders it has had since its inception. Its founder, I. L. Kenen, previously served as an official of the American Zionist movement. His

successor, Morris J. Amitay, had worked for the State Department as a foreign service officer, and subsequently served as a legislative aide to Senator Abraham Ribicoff. He was succeeded at AIPAC by the current executive director, Thomas Dine, who had been a Peace Corps volunteer and then worked in the Senate for ten years as an aide to Senators Edward Kennedy, Edmund Muskie and Frank Church. Before coming to AIPAC he had no known Jewish affiliations and few even knew that he was Jewish. Similarly, many people who have served as AIPAC lobbyists had previously worked as congressional aides and have gone back to such work, or established themselves as private lobbyists after leaving AIPAC. Here, too, AIPAC differs little from the many Washington-based lobbying and consulting firms whose staff members follow the same career pattern.¹⁴

To supplement its Washington lobbying, AIPAC uses grass-roots organization in congressional districts to mobilize "key contacts" -- AIPAC members who have direct and prompt access to congressmen and senators through political, professional or personal connections. Such lobbying also takes place when AIPAC members happen to be in Washington, most notably during the annual AIPAC Policy Conference, when 1500 or more activists meet with their representatives in Congress. This pattern has been copied by many other Jewish agencies, which organize missions to Washington for their local or regional groups, or hold national meetings there. In each case the scenario is repeated: Jews from all over the country meet with their congressmen and senators and make them aware of the Jewish political agenda.

The process also works the other way: legislators and senior cabinet members attend and address AIPAC's Policy Conference. In 1987, 307 legislators were there, including 86 senators (48 Democrats and 38 Republicans) and 221 representatives (134 Democrats and 87 Republicans). During presidential primary season, most candidates attend, make their views on Israel known, and contact potential campaign contributors. Such meetings are common also in major cities (particularly New York) where Jewish community relations councils host functions with leading politicians and candidates. This is, in some cases, an expression of gratitude for past support on issues of Jewish concern, but often it also serves to introduce candidates to the

Jewish community. Even congressional candidates will make the rounds of such Jewish organizational events -- often very distant from their constituencies -- in order to make themselves and their views known to American Jewry.

Political Action Committees (PACs)

The Pluralist Politics of Group Survival is also integrated into the rhythm of the American political system through an extensive network of PACs (political action committees) which maximize Jewish electoral influence. Currently, approximately 80 PACs seek to generate congressional support for Israel by raising funds and allocating them to candidates who have supported, or are pledged to support, pro-Israel policies. The largest and most significant of these is NATPAC, situated in Washington, which is nationally organized; most of the others are local.¹⁵

In all, pro-Israel PACs raised \$6.2 million in the 1985-86 electoral cycle, and contributed about \$3.2 million to candidates for Congress. This represents approximately 2.9 percent of total giving by PACs in 1986 and less than 1 percent of the cost of electing a Congress (\$450 million). But the significance of the pro-Israel PACs is greater than these proportions indicate. First, although the maximum that each PAC can contribute to a candidate is \$5,000, PACs tend to concentrate on specific candidates in crucial races, particularly in the Senate, thereby magnifying the PAC impact. Thus, for example, the leading recipient of pro-Israel PAC money got over \$200,000 in 1986. Second, PAC contributions to candidates are only part of the total picture. The same candidate may for the same reasons attract individual contributions and personal independent expenditures. Third, because Democrats generally are less well-funded than Republicans, the traditional liberal Jewish pro-Israel contribution can be crucial. According to one analysis, it assisted the Democrats in unseating six incumbent Senate Republicans in 1986, despite the fact that the latter outspent the Democratic challengers by margins as wide as two to one. Pro-Israel PACs, then, helped shift control of the Senate from the Republicans to the Democrats.¹⁶

The recent proliferation of PACs has facilitated the development of the new pattern of Jewish political activity. By

limiting the amount of money that individuals may contribute to electoral expenses, whether to candidates, parties, or PACs, and limiting also the amounts that PACs may contribute to candidates, the electoral laws have lessened, but not eliminated, the influence of large contributions by very wealthy individuals, which used to be a prominent aspect of Jewish involvement in American politics. At the same time, these laws confer a relative advantage upon those who can mobilize many small contributions, such as the existing Jewish fund-raising network which specializes in soliciting contributions from many individuals. This network is thus available to tap political contributions for the promotion of Jewish concerns.

PACs reinforce the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival in three ways. First, they integrate the organized Jewish community structure into the ongoing operations of the American political system by giving the group a direct say in the electoral process as voters, contributors and activists. Second, they directly mobilize large numbers of Jews into politics as individuals. The process may begin with a campaign contribution, but it often leads to campaign activity, lobbying, party membership, and so forth. Third, the laws that structure PAC activities make the new pattern of Jewish politics truly national. The focus on concerns that can be met only in Washington and the possibility of supporting candidates anywhere in the country based on their positions on issues give American Jews influence even in states and districts where there are few Jews. This also forces Jewish organizations to think more along national lines and less in terms of their own organizational, local or regional interests. One obvious manifestation is the increasing tendency of Jewish organizations and umbrella bodies to open Washington offices.

Jews and Jewish Issues in Congress

The Jewish members of Congress constitute a particularly significant element of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival. These individuals meet the community's demand for power -- the desire for control over policy on matters of ethnic concern -- by directly participating in the policy-making process. They also symbolize Jewish achievement of insider status in the political

system. Particularly striking has been the numerical increase of such officeholders. In 1971 there were 12 Jewish members of the House of Representatives and two Jewish senators, but by 1989 this had increased to 31 Jewish House members -- many from districts without any appreciable Jewish constituencies -- and eight Jewish senators. Moreover, there has been a degree of partisan realignment among them. In the past, the great majority were Democrats, but recently about a quarter have been Republicans.

What is more, the Jewish members of Congress today generally have deep, strong and public Jewish commitments that are integral to their political style and their conception of their roles. A survey in the mid-1970s of the 24 Jewish members of the 94th Congress found most of them actively and openly identified with the Jewish community. They publicly adopted and pursued Jewish interests. Not surprisingly, they were more sympathetic to Israel than their non-Jewish colleagues; in fact, their views about the Arab-Israeli conflict were well within the mainstream of opinion in the organized American Jewish community. For that reason one scholar describes them as an "in-house lobby" for Israel.¹⁷

A more extensive and detailed survey in 1986/87 of the Jewish members of the 99th Congress showed a similar pattern.¹⁸ It demonstrated that almost all of them attached great importance to their Jewishness and were highly committed to Israel. Sixty percent had a background of leadership and strong organizational involvement in the Jewish community before their election, and five out of six belonged to a synagogue or temple both before election and currently. About nine in ten observed some Jewish rituals (Passover seder and Hanukkah candles were the most popular) and stayed home from work on the High Holidays. All contributed to the UJA/Federation and subscribed to a Jewish periodical. About eight out of ten said that all or most of their closest friends were Jewish. About three-quarters of these congressmen believed that being Jewish had a positive impact on their political careers, and only one perceived a negative effect. Close to a third reported that they had become more Jewish and more positive about Israel since their election: none reported a weakening of these commitments. All had visited Israel -- about half of them for the first time after their

election -- and regarded issues specially affecting Jews as important elements in their congressional careers. About half reported that such issues sometimes created conflict in their fulfillment of their congressional roles, but none felt that this conflict was constant or even usual. They tended to resolve such conflicts through informal consultations with each other, and with Jewish organizational leaders.

Unlike the black and Hispanic members of Congress, Jewish members do not have a formal caucus. On the one hand, this indicates the high degree of consensus among them on Jewish concerns and the effectiveness of informal consultation, which preempts the need for a formal caucus. On the other hand, it reflects the belief of Jewish congressmen that they should fulfill their public role in a manner that broadly integrates general and Jewish interests and confirms the balance between them, a strategy that would be disturbed by a formal Jewish caucus. As one put it, "It would be an unwanted element, unfortunately; others are expected to have a caucus, we are not." It could, another believed, "harm Jewish interests by narrowing rather than broadening congressional support of Jewish causes." According to a third legislator, there is a "fear of anti-Semitism." Overall, however, Jewish congressmen believe that there is less anti-Semitism in Congress than in the United States as a whole: just over a third agreed that there is "little or no anti-Semitism in the United States today" but nearly three-quarters found little or none among members of Congress.

These Jewish commitments of Jewish members of Congress help maintain congressional support for Israel. By and large, since congressmen are overloaded with work, they concentrate on areas that interest them and on matters for which they are responsible. On other subjects they tend to be guided by congressmen who are considered experts, irrespective of party. Two groups that are particularly influential on matters affecting Israel are the Jewish members of Congress and the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- particularly its Middle East subcommittee. There is significant overlap between the two groups: in 1984, 30 percent of the Middle East subcommittee was Jewish, and by 1987 this had risen to 38 percent.

Congressional support for Israel is reinforced by the electoral impact of identifiable Jewish communities in over 380

congressional districts. Though Jews are only a very small proportion of the electorate, their commitment to Israel is intense, and well mobilized by AIPAC. What is more, public opinion polls generally indicate greater sympathy and support for Israel than for the Arabs, and very little outright opposition to Israel. Under such conditions, members of Congress stand to benefit greatly by supporting Israel, and to gain nothing -- if not lose a great deal -- by opposing it.¹⁹

The success of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival in generating and maintaining congressional support for Israel must be set within a broader context of factors that encourage effective Jewish political activity. Over 80 percent of Jewish members of the 99th Congress said that three factors -- "shared moral and democratic values," "Israel as a strategic asset," and "shared foreign policy interests and objectives: Israel as an ally" -- were very important in determining American support for Israel. These factors were marked higher than "considerable sympathy within the American public," "the activities of AIPAC and the Israel lobby," "the electoral significance of Jews and campaign financing," and "sympathy for Jews because of the Holocaust."²⁰

Creating Community Consensus

AIPAC can pursue its policies effectively only if its views are within the parameters of Jewish community consensus, which in practice means that they must be closely coordinated with those of other major organizations, especially the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Until recently, there was a division of function between them: the Presidents' Conference represented the view of the organized Jewish community on Israel to the White House and the executive branch, whereas AIPAC worked through Congress to promote strong and close relations between Israel and the United States.

To ensure the necessary coordination, AIPAC is a member of the Presidents' Conference. Even more significantly, it has in recent years widened its own executive committee to include the top leaders of major national Jewish organizations, many of whom also sit on the Presidents' Conference and on the executive bodies of other leading umbrella organizations such as the

Council of Jewish Federations, NJCRAC, and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. Some are also well-known leaders, donors and fund-raisers in large Jewish communities. This overlapping of organizational leadership, the close collaboration between AIPAC's professionals and lay officers in formulating major policy decisions, and good informal relations between them and the lay and professional leaders of the major agencies and umbrella organizations, make AIPAC representative of the community and provide it widespread American Jewish support.

The system does not always work, however, and, on occasion, sudden changes of policy by AIPAC have caught other major Jewish organizations (and members of Congress) unawares, leaving them committed to policies that AIPAC no longer supported. This occurred in March 1986 over a proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia.²¹ Whatever the substantive justification for AIPAC's sudden change of heart, a number of Jewish leaders and organizations felt aggrieved that they had not been consulted prior to the decision, which was made after Secretary of State Shultz promised AIPAC executive director Tom Dine and some AIPAC officers that the Administration would attempt no further arms sales to Saudi Arabia that year. These problems of insufficient consultation and of policy differences were aired in October 1988 in a letter to the head of AIPAC from the three major community relations agencies, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League.²²

AIPAC has, in recent years, extended its formal and informal ties with the Administration, particularly with the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council. Meetings are often initiated, not by AIPAC, but by government officials: rather than American Jewry making representations to the Administration, the Secretary of State might meet with the AIPAC executive director in an attempt to persuade him to moderate AIPAC opposition to certain Administration proposals, thus increasing the chances of congressional approval. Similarly, the Administration might use the promise of significant foreign aid to Israel as part of a larger overall foreign aid bill to help overcome congressional opposition to unpopular aspects of the total package.

Strategic, defense, trade, communications and other

relationships between the United States and Israel have widened and deepened. Much of it is now expressed in written agreements, and put into practice on a day-to-day basis by various Administration departments. There is, then, a need for an ongoing watch to spot policy proposals that might threaten or endanger these relationships, and to search out initiatives that might improve and extend them. To this end, AIPAC in 1987 established a new department to build and maintain links with the Administration and with the Republican party that controlled it. This department was staffed, in the main, by professionals whose career backgrounds included employment in, or close relations with, the Administration. This extension of formal AIPAC-Administration relationships marks a new stage in the continuing professionalization of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival. At the same time, it led to tensions within AIPAC that culminated in the resignation at the end of 1988 of the head of its Legislative Division.

Dual Loyalties, Divided Loyalties and Single Loyalty

Another aspect of policy coordination is the process of consultation and cooperation with representatives of Israel, both in Washington and in Jerusalem. Contact with official Israeli representatives ensures that, in seeking and maintaining American support for Israel and in lobbying for strong relations between the two countries, American Jews and their organizations -- particularly the Presidents' Conference and AIPAC -- know the views of the Israeli government. It is simply self-defeating for American Jews to promote policies that conflict with those of that country.

Of course, there may be differences between the two communities, particularly in regard to what is feasible on the American political scene. But these must be worked out first, before action is taken, through clear and frank discussion, so that American Jewish organizations and Israel know where each other stands. The American Jewish input into this process is considerable, and Israel has learned a lot from the professional practitioners of the new Jewish politics about the realities of American politics. Thus American Jewry makes an independent contribution, exerting influence upon the Israeli government at

both the substantive and the tactical levels. American Jewish organizations are not, as they are sometimes perceived, simply another conduit for the Israeli government. A recent example was the question of Israel's relations with South Africa, where American Jewish views had a significant impact on Israel's decision to cut back its ties with that country.

A distinctive characteristic of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival is that its practitioners are less sensitive to the fear of being charged with dual loyalty than were Jewish leaders in the 1950s, so that contacts with Israeli officials have become routine and open.²³ This largely reflects a greater overall receptivity of the American political system to the involvement of foreign governments and their diplomatic representatives in the policy-making process. Officials of many countries, particularly allies of the United States, commonly discuss issues of common interest with members of Congress and their staffs. Similarly, it is not uncommon for American citizens -- especially those with ethnic ties -- to promote concerns that involve their ethnic homelands. Neither is it uncommon for American citizens to be retained as paid lobbyists on behalf of foreign governments.

Thus issues necessitating a choice between the interests of two countries friendly to the United States may pit groups of Americans against each other, as in the Administration proposal to supply AWACs to Saudi Arabia in 1981. The battle to gain congressional approval put the White House and the Administration, paid lobbyists for Saudi Arabia, oil companies, other major corporations and Arab-American groups on one side, with AIPAC and the major Jewish organizations on the other.

What is clear in the case of the AWACs -- and in other proposed arms sales to Arab countries -- is that for the Jewish practitioners of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival there is a clear distinction between dual loyalties and divided loyalties. American Jews, concerned for their ethnic homeland, act to promote its interests by securing it American support, in the belief that America's foreign policy and defense requirements are best served by such support. Ties to Israel do not create divided loyalties that set off American Jews from America: to the contrary, they provide American Jews with an opportunity to weld these two loyalties into one. In the new pattern of Jewish politics, dual loyalty has been replaced by a single integrated

concern for strong American-Israeli relations.

The Pluralist Politics of Group Survival assumes an Israel that upholds democratic and moral values shared by the United States. If that assumption is ever perceived to be mistaken, the capacity of American Jews to weld the two loyalties together will be undermined.

The Broader Agenda, Coalitions and Issue Networks

Although Israel and other international Jewish issues capture the most prominence, the agenda of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival is as much concerned with pluralist politics as with group survival. This is based on the assumption that healthy democratic pluralism in the United States will advance Jewish security. In addition, involvement in a host of domestic political issues creates relationships of mutual support and understanding with other groups that can be later utilized to gain support for Jewish group concerns, particularly the survival issues. Such activity also provides avenues of access to groups and individuals otherwise relatively inaccessible to Jews.

Many Jewish organizations actively pursue a broad political agenda in the national capital, and in state capitals and major cities as well. Prominent among these are the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, NJCRAC, the Council of Jewish Federations and the major synagogue and religious bodies, many of which maintain Washington offices in addition to their national offices, which are usually situated in New York.

Thus the organized Jewish community addresses many issues that are not directly related to Jewish survival. *On the Issues*, a December 1988 publication of the American Jewish Committee, describes that agency's "multi-issue agenda" based on AJC testimony to the Democratic and Republican platform committees in 1988. It includes specific policy recommendations on human rights, South Africa, separation of church and state, civil rights and civil liberties, poverty, family policy, energy, immigration and acculturation, public education and campaign finance reform. Even more detailed positions are presented in NJCRAC's 1988/89 *Joint Program Plan* on these matters, as well as on the housing crisis, long-term care for the elderly, the minimum wage, the

right to reproductive choice, broadcast deregulation, and AIDS.

There are regular informal consultations among the professionals working for Jewish organizations in Washington at which they discuss ideas and tactics. These sessions are helpful in keeping the major organizations and leaders in touch with developments in the capital and making them aware of the positions of their sister organizations, thus helping build and strengthen community consensus. On particularly complex or critical issues, these informal discussions are widened to involve others on the Washington political scene.

One result, then, of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival has been the formation of loose but extensive issue networks on major Jewish group concerns, and their integration into the larger issue networks that have recently become significant features of American politics.²⁴ An issue network cuts across all the formal structures to bring together individuals and groups that are particularly concerned with an issue area. Involvement in such a network constitutes participation in the policy-making process and represents insider status.

Thus the pro-Israel community includes members of Congress, their staffs, some White House and Administration officials, leaders and professionals in Jewish organizations, academics, journalists, policy planners who work for think tanks like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, lobbyists, PAC officials, party-affiliated bodies such as the National Jewish Coalition, and more. They intersect, in turn, with independent bodies such as the Brookings Institution, with those promoting pro-Arab policies, and with groups concerned with general foreign policy and security questions to form a Middle East network. Similarly, one can identify a Soviet Jewry issue network. Both it and the pro-Israel network will intersect or overlap at one time or another with networks concerned with U.S.-Soviet relations, human rights, and South Africa, to name but a few.

Ideological Differentiation

Somewhat paradoxically, the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival has encouraged the ideological differentiation of American Jewry.

The older Liberal Politics of Individual Rights was believed to provide answers to the problems of the Jews as a group by

solving those of all individuals. There was, then, no need to ask, "Is it good for Jews?" While Jews had collective concerns, these were to be promoted in terms of what was good for all Americans, and not in separate group terms.

The rise of ethnic pluralism led to the recognition that the protection of ethnic concerns was a matter for groups, and, what is more, would be determined by the outcome of political competition between them. Ethnic politics is based upon the expectation of group conflict rather than the harmonious resolution of concerns in terms of individual rights and the general interest. American Jews, in common with other ethnic groups, began to pursue their concerns in a more openly particularistic manner. "Is it good for the Jews?" was now a legitimate and realistic question, one that became urgent and inescapable when Israel and Jewish survival became the focal points of the Jewish political agenda.

As a result, while forging an impressive consensus on their major ethnic concerns, American Jews have become more and more divided on other political questions. Although the majority are still to be found on the liberal and Democratic side of the political divide, there are now significant groups of politically active Jews who express ideological support for conservatism and the Republican party on Jewish grounds as well as on general grounds.

Particularly prominent is a small but influential group of Jews, mainly academics, intellectuals and writers, who have taken a leading role in the formulation of neoconservatism. Jewish neoconservatism is the mirror image of Jewish liberalism: it seeks answers for Jewish ethnic concerns in broad general political principles that are applied to the whole spectrum of issues on the American political agenda.

Neoconservatives are generally characterized by a liberal past and a continuing allegiance to older liberal principles which, in their view, have been radicalized and betrayed. Thus, neoconservatives oppose affirmative action programs as reverse discrimination; take a hard line toward communism and the Soviet Union; advocate increased American defense expenditure and support monetarist economic policies. Overall, they tend to sympathize with the Reagan Administration. On Jewish issues, they are particularly disturbed by anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli

feeling on the Left, among some Democrats -- mainly blacks and other minorities -- and among pro-Arab and pro-Third World groups. They anchor their concern for Israel's security and survival in a strong American defense posture and in hardline policies on arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union, which they see as the enemy of the free world, and particularly of Israel.

A very different conservative trend has affected Orthodox Jews, particularly the ultra-Orthodox of New York City. Here the catalyst is opposition to liberalism in personal morality -- abortion, homosexuality, pornography, the sexual revolution, the permissive society -- which threatens fundamental Jewish religious values. Indeed, it may also stem from a deep-seated rejection of modernity and secularism as a whole. The massive electoral support in these circles for Reagan in 1980 and 1984 was more a matter of religious conservatism than of Republican partisanship; in congressional, state and local politics, these Jews generally remain Democrats.

Jewish Republicanism took root institutionally in the 1980s with the formation of the National Jewish Coalition. It sought to channel Jewish conservatism -- and President Reagan's popularity -- into steady ideological, financial, organizational and electoral support for the Republican party, in the hope of making it the majority party within the Jewish community. Its leaders expected, as a result, to increase support for Jewish concerns among Republican politicians and cement Jewish links with the Reagan Administration.

The current ideological differentiation within American Jewry has also led to conflicting perceptions of Jewish political interest. For example, does strict separation of church and state continue to serve Jewish interests? Although Jews generally oppose attempts to Christianize America, the Orthodox community, which runs an extensive network of Jewish day schools, supports various forms of government aid to parochial schools, such as tuition tax credits. Their spokesmen argue that a rigid interpretation of the establishment clause banning direct and indirect governmental financial assistance to private religious schools conflicts with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise, since it makes the provision of traditional Jewish education extremely difficult.

Ultra-Orthodox groups, motivated by traditional Jewish

values, have joined like-minded Christian groups in active opposition to the liberal position on abortion, gay rights, and constitutional protection of pornography. Some have expressed support for silent prayer in public schools, on the ground that religion in general has positive effects on society. One Hasidic group has sought to use public property for the display of a religious symbol, the Hanukkah menorah, thereby breaking ranks with the major Jewish organizations that oppose such public displays of religious symbols. The extent of disagreement over what is the Jewish interest on such issues is illustrated by the decision of the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee to litigate against displays of menorahs on public property.

Quite aside from Orthodox/non-Orthodox disagreements, conflicting perceptions of Jewish interest also figure in differences over affirmative action. Does the Jewish interest still lie in support for equality of opportunity as measured by the old liberal standard of individual merit, which enabled Jews to overcome discrimination and quotas that excluded them? How should Jews react to programs that seek to end discrimination against minorities and undo the accumulated effect of past wrongs by departing from individual merit criteria and giving preference on the basis of group membership? How should Jews react to the possibility that preference for less qualified people on group grounds in the name of social justice and equality might disadvantage some Jews personally and directly? Yet, even if individuals are disadvantaged in the short term, might not these programs be supported because of a longer-term Jewish interest in a society free of all discrimination and the benefit to Jews of resolving the social and economic problems that produce much anti-Semitism?

Most Jews respond by supporting what they consider economic and social justice through affirmative action programs, but not quotas. Some on the political left support more radical programs including quotas, while others on the right adhere rigidly to the standard of individual achievement, opposing all affirmative action initiatives. Each of these responses is framed in terms of both what is good for American society and what is good for Jews.

New Threats, New Allies, Split Coalitions

The new pattern of Jewish politics makes relations with other groups more complex. When the Liberal Politics of Individual Rights prevailed, American Jews participated in broad liberal coalitions sharing common goals and aspirations with other groups on a range of issues; those who opposed any of their concerns were generally on the other side of the political divide on most other issues, too. But the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival has generated internally conflicted, or split, coalitions. On some issues, American Jews find themselves in partnership with groups that, on other issues, reject basic Jewish ethnic concerns. Managing such split coalitions poses constant tensions and dilemmas. It is one thing to disagree with others, but partial rejection by coalition partners is an entirely different political experience. This has occurred recently in Jewish relations with blacks, Protestants and Catholics.

Since the mid-1960s, black-Jewish relations have deteriorated significantly. Growing black anti-Semitism has found public expression in statements by some black leaders. A 1982 survey of American anti-Semitism found that the mean level of anti-Semitism among blacks had risen since 1964 -- it had fallen among whites -- and in 1981 was 20 percent higher than among whites.²⁵ Studies of Jewish opinion indicate that American Jews are keenly aware of black anti-Semitism.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of American Jews support vigorous enforcement of civil rights and antidiscrimination laws, social welfare programs to improve the situation of blacks and other minority groups, and initiatives to improve black-Jewish relations. The efforts of a number of major Jewish organizations to accomplish these objectives are made difficult by overwhelming Jewish opposition to quotas and preferential hiring, policies supported by most blacks.²⁶

Jewish-black cooperation is further set back by the widespread Jewish perception that blacks are not particularly sympathetic to Israel, and are much more likely than whites to think that Israel is not a reliable ally and that American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the U.S.²⁷ Israel's relations with South Africa also hurt its standing in the black community.

Jewish apprehensions about blacks have been reinforced by

the prominence and political success of the symbolic leader of American blacks, the Rev. Jesse Jackson. His own publicly quoted remarks, and his refusal to denounce or disassociate himself from the outspoken anti-Semitism of the Rev. Louis Farrakhan and other blacks, have led to a widespread Jewish perception that he is anti-Semitic. His denials, actions in favor of Soviet Jewry, dialogues with Jewish organizations and the presence of Jews on his campaign staff have not managed to dispel this image. In the 1984 National Survey of American Jews, 74 percent thought "that Jesse Jackson is anti-Semitic" and only 8 percent said that he was not. This, together with his pro-PLO views and widely publicized meetings with Yasser Arafat, are understood by Jews as a direct threat. The vast majority of American Jews are extremely uneasy about Jackson's influence within the Democratic party at the head of a potentially broad liberal coalition of blacks, other minorities and whites.

In seeking, nevertheless, to maintain what they can of the old alliance with blacks by supporting their claims to social and economic justice, American Jews act partly out of shared values, but also out of the need for defense and self-protection. Black anti-Semitism threatens Jews from below. Their socioeconomic disadvantage makes blacks available for mobilization by demagogic political leaders if economic and social conditions worsen, with the Jews as targets for outbreaks of urban disorder and violence.

Alliances with some major American Christian groups have also been impeded by the latter's approach to basic Jewish concerns. Any lack of sympathy for Israel and its survival on the part of Christians is, for many Jews, indistinguishable from anti-Semitic prejudice. Thus relations between American Jews and American Catholics are affected by the Vatican's refusal to grant Israel diplomatic recognition. Similarly, American Jews have since 1967 been disturbed by the indifference of some leading mainline liberal Protestant bodies to threats to Israel's survival, which recall for these Jews Christian silence during the Holocaust.

A second complication in Christian-Jewish coalition-building comes from the pressure for a Christian America. Many of the Evangelicals associated with this movement strongly support Israel, seeing it as part of an overall divine plan. Yet these very Christians are among the most determined opponents of the

separation of church and state, and of a liberal, pluralist, open and secular society -- all of which Jews espouse. Nevertheless -- as is the case with blacks -- the major Jewish organizations seek to maintain a dialogue and form stable alliances with Christians. Some Jewish agencies relate specifically to those denominations with political and social outlooks roughly comparable to their own. Others engage in the pursuit of common interests with Christians on such matters as welfare, housing, and assistance for the poor and aged, thereby avoiding areas of disagreement. Jews seek these coalitions not only to move toward policy agreement, but also in the hope that they may eventually lead Christians toward greater understanding of Jewish concerns. But until this occurs, the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival will be characterized by many split coalitions involving only partial and temporary cooperation with other groups. Maintaining such arrangements is fraught with the constant tension of avoiding sensitive issues and of handling disappointed expectations.

Conclusion: The Problem of Politics Without Authority

American Jews remain fiercely united around the principle that no single body speaks for the entire community. Thus, while the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival has somewhat rationalized and unified the top levels of the American Jewish communal structure, the lines of authority remain more implicit than explicit, and exist more in informal organizational arrangements than in formal agreements or institutional structures. Furthermore, not only does American Jewry have no formal authority, but it also lacks a defined membership, clear boundaries and agreed-upon methods for choosing leaders. It has no mechanisms for reaching binding decisions, for setting priorities, or for penalizing dissidents.

So far, this informal and unstructured process for reaching decisions has held up, largely because of the community's strong consensus on key issues such as Israel. But what will happen if disagreements emerge within American Jewry over the policies of the Israeli government? Already there is controversy over whether American Jewish organizations and leaders have a right to disagree with Israel's course, whether it is prudent to express such disagreements publicly in the United States instead of

privately to Israeli leaders, and whether the answers to these questions would be any different if the Israeli government itself were united rather than divided.

The American Jewish community may not be able to settle such problems. How will dissension among American Jews over Israeli policies affect the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival? On the one hand, a variety of American Jewish opinion about Israeli actions may signal the further Americanization of Jewish concerns, adding Israel to the list of political issues about which Jews can disagree. Indeed, such dissent may buttress claims for greater American support for the Jewish state by showing that American Jews reach their pro-Israel position through mutual discussion and persuasion, not automatic, unthinking reactions.

On the other hand, failure to resolve this and similar questions could very well undermine the capacity for united political action to secure Israel's survival upon which the new pattern of Jewish politics is based. Could the network of Jewish institutions in the United States maintain its effectiveness if different groups sought to persuade Congress and the Administration to adopt opposing policies? Such a development could mean the end of the Pluralist Politics of Group Survival.

NOTES

1. According to John Higham, such concerns are common to most ethnic groups in America. See his "Introduction: The Forms of Ethnic Leadership," in John Higham, ed., *Ethnic Leadership in America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 4.
2. Steven M. Cohen's studies for the AJC consistently show that between two-thirds and three-quarters of American Jews believe that "anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews."
3. Peter Y. Medding, "Segmented Ethnicity and the New Politics," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 26-48.
4. Leon A. Jick, "The Holocaust: Its Use and Abuse within the American Public," *Yad Vashem Studies* 14 (1981): 303-318; Stephen J. Whitfield, "The Holocaust and the American Jewish Intellectual," *Judaism* 28 (1979): 391-401.

5. For a more detailed analysis of the development of Holocaust consciousness and the question of Jewish survival, see Medding, "Segmented Ethnicity," pp. 26-45.
6. *Joint Program Plan*, 1953, pp. 3, 21. This is the annual statement by NJCRAC setting out the full spectrum of political and social issues confronting American Jews, with guidelines and recommendations for action. It is the most comprehensive and authoritative statement of the political agenda of the organized Jewish community in America, as NJCRAC is the umbrella body of 11 national and 111 local Jewish community relations bodies. Until 1971 it was known as the National Community Relations Advisory Council.
7. Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), ch. 6.
8. *Joint Program Plan*, 1984/5, pp. 3, 29.
9. Unpublished typescript made available by the speaker, Arthur Chotin, who was then a key AIPAC official.
10. See I. L. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981) for a personal history of AIPAC's early years by its founder and long-time executive officer.
11. AIPAC Policy Statement, *Near East Report*, April 29, 1985.
12. AIPAC *Congressional Report*, May 17, 1987, mimeo.
13. See Michael J. Malbin, *Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1980) for a critical analysis of the pivotal and growing role of congressional staffs.
14. Ibid.
15. On PACs see Larry J. Sabato, *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
16. All the data in this paragraph are derived from Herbert E. Alexander, "Pro-Israel PACs: A Small Part of a Large Movement," paper for International Conference on the Domestic Determinants of U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Tel Aviv University, 1987, 19 pp. The citation is from p. 6. He also indicates that the total number of such PACs is hard to determine, and may be as high as 90.
17. Marvin C. Feuerwerker, *Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969-1976* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 97.

18. This was conducted by the present author with the assistance of the Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University. A mail questionnaire was sent to all Jewish members of the 99th Congress in December 1986, with follow-ups in 1987. As a result of electoral defeat, retirement and death, the total possible return was 34. Of these 19 responded. No clear pattern could be detected among the nonrespondents as far as their known Jewish affiliations could be ascertained.

19. Feuerwerger, *Congress and Israel*, pp. 77-90.

20. Feuerwerger's survey of all members of the 94th Congress reached similar findings, emphasizing Israel's democratic character, the tradition of friendship between the two countries, shared foreign policy interests, and public awareness of the Holocaust.

21. See AIPAC 1986 *Legislative Report*, pp. 13-16 for a detailed analysis of the long congressional battle, the successful whittling down by AIPAC of the size of the arms package, and the continuing congressional opposition to the president's proposals even after they had been whittled down and even after AIPAC (backed by the Presidents' Conference, NJCRAC and ADL) decided not to fight because "Israel would not be significantly threatened by the proposed package," a "major fight against this sale was not worth the expenditure of political capital," "and given the marginal threat of the weapons involved, an effort against the missiles alone would not be worth risking the overall favorable state of U.S.-Israel relations." The president eventually succeeded in overriding the congressional veto after tremendous personal pressure on senators and congressmen, including an attempt to get Jewish leaders to lobby senators in support of the sale.

22. *New York Times*, October 12, 1988.

23. See Ben Bradlee, Jr., "Israel's Lobby," *Boston Globe Magazine*, April 29, 1984, pp. 8, 9, 64, 66, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78, 80, 82; William J. Lanouette, "The Many Faces of the Jewish Lobby in America," *National Journal*, May 13, 1978, pp. 748-759; Wolf Blitzer, "The AIPAC Formula," *Moment* 6 (November 1981): 22-28.

24. Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, *The New American Political System* (Washington: A.E.I., 1981), pp. 87-123.

25. See Gregory Martire and Ruth Clark, *Anti-Semitism in the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 42.

26. Steven M. Cohen, *The National Survey of American Jews*, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, published by the American Jewish Committee.
27. See, for example, David Singer and Renae Cohen, *Probing Public Sentiment on Israel and American Jews: The February 1987 Roper Poll*, and *In the Wake of the Palestinian Uprising: Findings of the April 1988 Roper Poll*, both published by the American Jewish Committee.