

MYTHS AND FACTS FOR CAMPAIGNERS AND PLANNERS

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INTRODUCTION

That statistics can lie is a truism. Our concern here is not with lying, but with the degree to which statistics and other kinds of research can, inadvertently as well as deliberately, create myths about our society which then take on a life of their own.

Myths are very important to every society. They help to support it and its underlying ideologies. However, when these myths are built on a false foundation they may mislead us, or help to maintain ideologies which need re-examination, or be destructive to society. Today's social myths tend not to be built on poetry and folk tales, but on the pseudo-scientific base which impresses us—charts, tables and statistics based on "research." Should reports of these research efforts find their way into *The New York Times*, they then become enshrined as fact and become the building blocks for myths about society. A number of those myths affect the Jewish community and can seriously mislead planners and campaigners in their efforts to build effective programs.

We will illustrate the point by taking an example, not from Jewish society, but

from the general society in the United States. We often read that our Social Security and Medicare systems are doomed to bankruptcy because the aged are so much larger a percentage of the total population than they used to be. People argue that while there were once ten able bodied adults for every person 65 years or older in society, by the year 2000 there will be barely more than two able bodied adults for every person over 65. Therefore, it is argued, there will be fewer working people called on to support more dependent people, and our support system will be bankrupt.

This myth is based on a reality—the growing number and percentage of elderly in our society. But it ignores several other things. It ignores the increasing number of women in the work force which increases the number of contributors to the Social Security and Medicare systems. It ignores the improved health and working capacity of the elderly. Most important, it ignores the fact that along with the growth of the elderly population has come a concomitant decline in the birth rate, and therefore in the number of dependent children per 100 adults.

It turns out that if one combines the number of children between the ages of 0 and 16, and the number of adults 65 years and over, and takes the total of these two, one finds that in 1900 there were 84 such

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people for each 100 adults between the ages of 18 and 65, but in 1950 there were only 69, and in the year 2000, we expect that there will be only 64. There are actually proportionally fewer dependents that the working people in our society will need to support (privately and publicly) in the year 2000 than there were 100 years ago. Thus does a myth develop—the inability of society to support its dependents. It is a myth based on fact. But without the suitable analysis and background it is actually false. For now we're concerned about such myths in the Jewish community, which we fear abound. We will deal with several of them, and discuss what seem to us to be their ideological underpinnings and their fallacies.

1. *The Myth of American Jewish Disinterest in Israel*

One can pick up an editorial in the Anglo-Jewish press, listen to a speaker on the Jewish circuit, or sit in on a planning discussion and hear that adults from only 16 percent of American Jewish households have ever visited Israel. The myth is based on the findings of the National Jewish Population Study of 1971 and was probably accurate in 1971. But 1971 was a long time ago. Each year more American Jewish adults visit Israel, and consistently the population studies that have been done of various Jewish communities and nationally in recent years suggest that by now 40 percent or close to 40 percent of American Jewish households have an adult who has visited Israel at least once. This is a remarkably high proportion, one in which we can take pride. But the 16 percent myth persists.

Now this myth is particularly instructive on two accounts. First, what difference does it make? We want to encourage more people to visit Israel anyway, and if we are just a little bit hyperbolic about how bad the need is, what harm is there? Well, the harm can be very great. Depending on whether 16 percent or 40 percent of American Jewish households have visited

Israel at least once, one might undertake vastly different marketing strategies for more tourism by American Jews.

If the lower figure were true, one might want to pound away at American Jews, playing on their guilt, doing everything possible to get those people to begin a groundswell of Israel visitations. If, however, the higher figure is true, one might want to develop a marketing strategy based on "get on the bandwagon," "join your friends who've done this," "make a second visit," etc. In other words, for planning purposes, it makes a great deal of difference if we allow ourselves to be tied to a myth which has no base in reality.

The second point that this myth illustrates is the ideological basis of myths. It is no accident that in spite of the availability of evidence, of letters of correction that have been written, the Israel Ministry of Tourism and some leaders in the Jewish community continue to believe in, and spread information using, the old 16 percent figure. (Most recently, the Minister of Tourism was quoted as saying 25 percent.) Myths die hard. They die harder when there is a large group with a stake in them. In this case, many Israelis have a need to believe that Diaspora Jewry doesn't really care about Israel. Therefore, their instinct is to go with the lower figure. But mythology subverts our efforts at effective planning and we must rise above it.

2. *The Myth That "The Well Is Running Dry"*

Based on secondary analysis of the Boston population studies of 1965 and 1975, Steven Cohen and Paul Ritterband raised the question of "will the well run dry." They noted that there seemed to be a decline in the proportion of those people classed as entrepreneurs and an increase in the proportion of Jewish professionals. Since entrepreneurs are normally the best givers to Jewish philanthropy and the source of the super-rich, perhaps we were

seeing a leveling of Jewish wealth in North America. As a result, Federations would have to retool their campaigns for a more broad based level of giving, and perhaps we ought to recognize that there were fewer resources that we could count on.

This interesting bit of investigation was immediately seized on by everyone who was looking for an easy rationalization for poor campaign results, and we began to see in the first paragraphs of papers "in this age of shrinking resources" or "since resources are leveling off." The speculation quickly became accepted as fact. *Nothing could be further from the truth.*

First, the apparent decline in entrepreneurship in the Boston survey from 1965 to 1975 could be largely due to the decline of "mom and pop" stores rather than any decline in the super wealthy.

Second, Jews continue to be disproportionately represented among the entrepreneurial and super-wealthy groups of America. One need only look at the recent list of the *Forbes* 400 to be convinced of that.

Third, Federation penetration of this super-rich group is so small percentage-wise that even if that group had declined, there would still be a vast fundraising job ahead of us before we exhausted the potential or the "well ran dry."

Fourth, family fortunes do not disappear. The professors and the professionals who are the children of the super-wealthy still maintain and manage the family foundations and fortunes which their elders earned.

Fifth, the surveys themselves may be misleading. The person who in a survey reports being a manager rather than an entrepreneur may be the senior partner in an investment banking firm doing lots of entrepreneurial work and earning \$8 or \$10 million dollars a year. The person who reports his profession as lawyer may receive 90 percent of his annual income from his real estate holdings and the person who reports being a doctor may

receive 90 percent of his annual income from his part ownership of a medical supply house.

Now none of this suggests that there are not serious problems in campaigning. The super-wealthy Jews may be different from the super-wealthy of a generation ago, more mobile, not the sons and daughters of the families we know. These problems could be discussed at length. But the well is *not* running dry, and to focus on this is to misunderstand our problem and therefore to fail to come up with the proper solutions.

The myth becomes the first refuge of the inadequate and incompetent campaigner. Here, again, we see where there was a pseudo-scientific base to the myth, and a good ideological reason (that is to explain away poor campaigns) to adopt it, and thus do myths become "facts".

3. *The Myth of the Mass of Jewish Uneducated and Unaffiliated*

We have all heard repeated, perhaps even disseminated, these myths: "Half or more of Jewish children receive no Jewish education." "About half of the adult population is unaffiliated." These myths, too, have their roots in sound data. At any given point in time, there are probably no more than half of the Jewish children 6 to 17 receiving a Jewish education. Formal synagogue affiliation at any point in time may also include less than 50 percent of Jewish households.

But these facts can be very deceptive as Steven M. Cohen pointed out in his excellent recent article.¹ Most Jewish teenagers do not receive a Jewish education and many Jewish children do not begin their Jewish education until they are 7, 8 or 9. So if you take a snapshot at any given moment, you may catch only 50

1. Steven M. Cohen, "Outreach to the Marginally Affiliated: Evidence and Implications for Policymakers in Jewish Education," *This Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (1985), pp. 147-157.

percent of the children in Jewish educational programs. Over time, however most studies show that at least two-thirds, and in some communities 80 to 90 percent, of the Jewish children do cross the threshold of some Jewish educational institution at some point in their childhood.

Now this is not to suggest that everything is wonderful in Jewish education. Jewish education may be shallow, may turn many children off, and it may even be true to say that 50 percent or more of our Jewish children grow up Jewishly illiterate. But whatever the quality of the educational experience, there is a vast difference in planning strategies depending on whether you have a "high affiliation" or a "low affiliation" perspective.

If half of our children never cross the threshold of a Jewish educational institution, we have to focus on outreach and recruitment. If on the other hand 80 or 90 percent of our children are enrolled in school at one time or another, we may want to focus on the quality of the education they receive, on programs that make parents partners in the educational process, on retention, or on expanding the impact of the educational experience through informal educational opportunities.

The same general principle applies to Jewish affiliation. An examination of congregational membership patterns shows low affiliation among families without school age children but relatively high levels among those with children in school. While on the whole, congregational affiliation may be below fifty percent at any moment in time, it clearly corresponds to life cycle events such as the birth of a child or school enrollment so that *over time* far more than 50 percent of Jewish families affiliate with a congregation.

If one looks at affiliation in the Jewish community as a whole, whether it be with B'nai B'rith, Hadassah, a synagogue, or any Jewish institution, the figure is still higher. While affiliation may be low in certain communities or among specific

subgroups of the Jewish population, and while in some cases that affiliation may be very shallow or, in Cohen's terms, marginal, it may very well be that on the whole over 85 percent of Jewish adults do affiliate with some Jewish institution over their lifetime.

These divergent ways of looking at the demographic data also produce radically different community planning strategies. The low affiliation scenario might dictate community-wide outreach strategies that focus on the unaffiliated and that involve "knocking on doors"—an extremely labor intensive, and expensive approach. On the other hand, the high marginal affiliation scenario suggests focusing community resources on the marginally affiliated and on those institutions that most frequently serve as gateways to Jewish life for this group—primarily congregations and Jewish community centers. Whatever the preferred strategy, the fact is that most Jews do affiliate, and we have been convinced by little bits of data to believe differently. That too fits the ideology of the doomsayers—those who feel that North American Jewry is going to hell in a basket. It is most destructive to sound planning.

4. The Myth That a Little Jewish Education Is Worse Than None

In the 70's, some studies were popularized which tended to demonstrate that people who had no Jewish education were at a low level of Jewish identity while people with over 1,000 or 3,000 hours (depending on the study) of Jewish education tended to be highly identified Jewishly. But, paradoxically, these studies also seemed to show that if one received less than 3,000 or 1,000 hours of Jewish education totally, not only did Jewish education do no good at all, but the people who had that small amount of Jewish education appeared on the whole to be *less* identified Jewishly than those who had no Jewish education at all.

Even though this finding flies in the

face of reason it became highly popularized. It tended to feed the rationale for the then new Federation funding of day schools since day schools seemed to be the only institutions which gave the kind of quality Jewish education which made a difference.

It turns out on re-examination that it may be that common sense had more to say to us than these findings. Among those counted may have been many traditional women, who in their youth, had no formal Jewish education. (In prior generations, many girls were not given formal Jewish schooling.) When one eliminates this group it turns out that no Jewish education is the *least* effective, that a lot of Jewish education helps Jewish identity a *lot*, and, of course, a little Jewish education helps Jewish identity a *little*.

This is a very crucial finding because we dare not write off the great middle group of Jewish children who do get a limited Jewish education. While day schools continue to provide optimal Jewish education, we should not despair of improving the quality, time and content of Jewish supplementary schools to where they do a little more good than they are doing now. It is not hopeless, and our reliance on limited data may have led us astray.

5. The Myth of Exaggerated Jewish Poverty

We approach this with some trepidation. We certainly would not want to be misunderstood as arguing that there is no Jewish poverty or that Federations should not help the poor. The "rediscovery" of Jewish poverty was helpful to the Jewish community. But neither should it be exaggerated. The fact is that most Jewish poverty is among the elderly. There is every indication that the elderly in surveys tend to underreport or not report income from entitlements, from investments, and from children. Similarly many elderly are in one-person households and may be homeowners. A single person with a paid up mortgage and an income of \$9,000 a

year is not rich, but is not poor in the same sense that a rent paying apartment dwelling family of 3 or 4 is poor with that same income.

Suprisingly, when this issue was discussed with someone in a large city Federation, he said "What's the difference if we do exaggerate? Don't we want to encourage our leadership to do something about Jewish poverty?" Of course we do, but straying from the truth may even be counter-productive in that regard.

If the problem is so vast and overwhelming, then we may have to throw up our hands and hope for the best from government. If the problem is really small enough to be manageable, then the Federations may be motivated to do more rather than less for the Jewish poor. Our commitment to the truth really is what should motivate us here rather than our reliance on mythology or our desire to join the game of ethnic groups in America, each vying to see how oppressed they can prove they are.

Generalizing about Jewish poverty may also retard helpful programs because Jewish communal poverty seems to be linked to the specific economic challenges facing particular groups like the frail elderly, the chronically mentally ill, the mentally retarded, the handicapped, single parent families and the white collar unemployed.

Each of these challenges obviously requires its own specialized study process and attention to meet the very different needs of each of these target populations. Each of these categories tend to be masked in most population studies because each individual component tends to be statistically insignificant, and therefore ignored.

Exaggerating Jewish poverty may also be a way to avoid the challenges that grow out of Jewish wealth. Most Jews today have and, if current trends continue, more Jews twenty years from now will have significant economic resources and will increasingly choose services based on personal preference. This will create major

new challenges for our system of service. In this environment, agencies must find ways to deal with the challenges of wealth as well as poverty by pricing and marketing services for those who can afford to pay for service while at the same time marketing and targeting services for those who are unable to pay.

Marketing only to those who can't afford to pay for service will eliminate an important segment of the Jewish community from access to agency services; it will leave an important group (probably a significant majority of the American Jewish community) separated from the community building role that our agencies can and must play; it will also reduce the potential income to social agencies and raise per capita costs, ultimately undermining the quality of agency service.

Learning to serve all well, without excluding the poor, will require great resources for Federation agencies and an understanding of the dynamics of wealth as well as poverty in the Jewish community. Lay leaders have to learn to identify with community building as a Federation and agency goal.

Our campaigns need to market the value of contributing to services for all. How to do this while not neglecting the poor and near poor, and how to serve the lower middle class, are the real challenges to our future. Myths that we are like every other American group may distract us from this task and impede the quality of services for all Jews.

6. *The Various Myths About the Jewish Birth Rate*

Here is where we have seen mythology on both sides of the fence. When Elihu Bergman's article appeared in *Midstream* in 1977 suggesting the possibility of only 10,000 American Jews remaining by the year 2076, the sheer drama of the projection led to its being picked up and quoted in *The New York Times* and becoming the kind of "fact" that it becomes very difficult to shake. We were

among the first to criticize these prophecies of doom.

In some of the foregoing discussion we have suggested and others have popularized the notion that our numbers may not be decreasing at all, that the Jewish optimistic projection of our demographic future may be equally groundless and may be an equally destructive myth.

Calvin Goldscheider and Steven Cohen have suggested and others have popularized the notion that our numbers may not be decreasing at all, that the Jewish birthrate may be at or above replacement levels. This is not the place for a detailed and lengthy rebuttal.

However, planners and campaigners should know that most serious students of demography feel that this notion is groundless and an exercise in wishful thinking. Even the data from which Calvin Goldscheider makes his optimistic projections really indicate a fertility rate of 1.9—not disastrous, but still below replacement level.

Briefly, the American white fertility rate since the early 1970's has been below replacement level and the American Jewish birthrate has generally hovered at about 70 percent of the American white rate. Also, in Canada where we do have statistics on Jews, the fertility rate is clearly below replacement.

Certainly, the popularity of child bearing in one's thirties will help some. But there is simply *no* evidence that this will bring us to or over replacement. For planning purposes, one has to assume that beginning in the 1990's, as the bulge in the cohort of World War II babyboomers passes beyond their childbearing years, we will be faced with a gradual decline in the North American Jewish population.

The ideology here is a little more subtle. It is easy to understand why some Zionists and Orthodox Jews have a need to predict doom among those who do not share their ideology. "There is no salvation outside the church."

But there is also an ideological basis to

the optimistic projections. They tend to come from those who are very reluctant to exhort people in matters of personal lifestyle and choice. If we can prove that there is nothing we can do about fertility, or if better yet, there is no problem to begin with, then it will be unnecessary or unfruitful to bother people about their family life and styles of living.

Well, we're afraid there is a problem, and there may be things we can do about it—but that's the subject of another discussion. The important point here is that the optimistic scenario on Jewish fertility must be viewed as a myth, and that we are at a fertility rate below replacement levels.

7. *Intermarriage Will Increase the Jewish Population*

The current controversy over the impact of intermarriage on the future of the American Jewish community may also relate to a reluctance to confront matters of personal lifestyle and choice. Charles Silberman's excellent and moving book, *A Certain People*, is at the center of this debate. Silberman's main thesis on this subject are:

A. The intermarriage rate among Jews under age 35 was probably about 24 percent in 1981—lower than many other estimates.

B. About 20 percent of the non-Jewish spouses ultimately convert to Judaism.

C. In those marriages remaining mixed, the largest group is made up of families in which the Jewish partner (in most instances the wife) retains a strong Jewish identification. Silberman speculates that "if these couples raise their children as they say they will" there will be a significant increase in the number of American Jews. He further asserts that even if only half follow through there will still be only a 13 percent reduction in the number of actively committed Jews.

D. The fact that so many Jewish spouses seem to retain a strong Jewish

identity is due in large part to a new acceptance and openness to intermarriage among American Jews.

E. Therefore, between conversion and children being raised as Jews, the Jewish community can remain stable and may even grow in number with intermarriage.

It's true that the worst case scenarios on intermarriage tend to overlook the fact that not all intermarried Jews are lost to Judaism. But, questions of their quality of Jewishness or Halachic issues aside, there are reasons why the Silberman thesis may prove overly optimistic.

A. *Current Intermarriage Rates May Be Significantly Higher Than 24 Percent.*

The demographic department of the Jewish Community Federation of Cleveland has pioneered in the use of a question on intermarriage patterns among *children of respondents* in surveys conducted in Pittsburgh, Richmond and Cleveland with some surprising results. In each case, questions on children of respondents provided data on a broader sample of young marrieds than traditional studies and showed significantly more intermarriage, particularly among Jewish women, than data on respondents of the same age cohort.

These studies suggest that many Jewish communal surveys may miss a significant number of intermarried Jews—especially women. The number of children of respondents, under 40, living in Cleveland and married to an unconverted non-Jew for example, was fifty percent higher than among respondents of about the same age. Similar results were found comparing "children of respondent" and "respondent" patterns in Pittsburgh and Richmond.

These results cast at least some doubt on current intermarriage data, which suggests a need to test the "children of respondents" technique in other cities, and then to reevaluate national estimates based on the new findings. The limited

findings to date support the estimates of those who feel that the intermarriage rate is well above 24 percent.

B. The Jewishness of Children of Non-conversionary Intermarriage May Be Very Low.

Almost the only data available (data that, to his credit, Silberman himself cites), suggests a gloomy picture. Egon Mayer's longitudinal study of the children of intermarriage showed that "84 percent of the children of conversionary marriages considered themselves Jews, compared to only 24 percent of the offspring of mixed marriages.

Moreover, 70 percent of the former group, compared to 18 percent of the latter, reported that "being Jewish is very important to me." Fully 85 percent of the children of conversionary marriages, but only 20 percent of those born to mixed-married couples, had received a Jewish education.

Of the 37 respondents who were married, 92 percent of the children of the mixed-married couples, compared to 36 percent of the offspring of conversionary marriages, had married non-Jews.

Based on Mayer's data, the children of conversionary intermarriage are as Jewish as, or more Jewish than the children of born Jews. There is, however, little support for the idea that the children of non-conversionary intermarriages have much chance of growing up as Jews.

Mayer's data is somewhat dated and his sample may even be flawed but there is little hard evidence to support any alternative thesis. Nor do we know much about children of mixed marriages now being raised as Jews in terms of the quality of their Jewish experience. Will Jewishness have any real content or meaning in most of their lives? What kind of Jewish identity will they be able to transmit to *their* children?

C. Openness to Non-conversionary Intermarriage May Actually Promote Intermarriage More Than It Encourages Identity with the Jewish Community.

The recent study of Cleveland's Jewish population over age 50 and their married children generated some very interesting (though hardly conclusive) data suggesting a possible connection between liberal parental attitudes toward intermarriage and increased intermarriage rates. Only 22.6 percent of families surveyed who had a married child and who believed that "having children and grandchildren marry Jews" is "very important" had a child intermarry (without conversion) while twice that percentage (close to 46 percent) of families who have a married child and who believe that "having children and grandchildren marry Jews" is "moderately important" had experienced a non-conversionary intermarriage among their children.

Cause and effect are difficult to separate. It's possible that families' attitudes become more liberal as a result of their children's intermarriage. This interpretation seems unlikely however in light of the fact that the proportion of families who believe that "children and grandchildren marrying Jews" is "very important," "moderately important," "moderately unimportant," and "totally unimportant" is virtually identical among those who have married children and those who don't have married children. If attitudes became more liberal as a result of intermarriage, one would expect that families with married children would have far more liberal attitudes than those without married children since at least a third of them have already experienced an intermarriage. In fact, this was not the case.

Of course this data is merely suggestive—parental attitudes toward intermarriage may mask a range of other parental attitudes and behaviors that may be even

more predictive of intermarriage among children. It's also important to stress that there's obviously no one-to-one relationship between parental behavior and intermarriage since even the most committed families experience intermarriage in this very open society. And it's very difficult to separate cause and effect. But it's also incorrect to suggest that parental attitudes and behavior don't influence intermarriage rates at all since every study shows that Orthodox Jews have fewer intermarriages among their children than Conservative Jews, and Conservative Jews fewer than Reform, while unaffiliated Jews have far more than any of the above.

In summary, the intermarriage rate may be higher than some have suggested; the children of mixed marriages may be significantly less Jewish than some have asserted; and greater acceptance of intermarriage may well lead to even greater increases in the level of intermarriage in the future. The added danger is that the myth that intermarriage actually increases the Jewish population could add fuel to the fire by, in effect, saying to parents and their grown children alike: "You *can* marry a non-Jew who doesn't convert and still have a good chance of raising a Jewish child and even having Jewish grandchildren."

While a complete discussion of policy implications is impossible here, a possible strategy would include a continuing communal stance in opposition to mixed marriage (based on a full understanding of the dangers that mixed marriage continues to pose for the American Jewish community) combined with a systematic and targeted approach for outreach to "marginally affiliated" couples who are already intermarried, and full acceptance of and encouragement for the conversion of the Gentile spouse. A careful study of trends and an in-depth consideration of policy alternatives may well be essential to the creative survival of the American Jewish community. An easy acceptance of the

comforting myth that intermarriage "may provide a much needed spiritual boost to Judaism" will not help to promote such study.

IN SUMMARY

We've discussed seven myths which we have adopted because of the scientism prevalent in our society. If something shows up on graphs and tables, it almost has the ring of religious truth. Our job is to resist this idolatry and to maintain a healthy Jewish skepticism—to examine and analyze data, to accept valuable input, but to understand that input is not revealed truth.

Finally, there are three general points about research data:

1. Often a community seeks information which doesn't lend itself to a survey. It might be more valuable to get a dozen people in a room and interview them. Somehow this strikes people as being less "scientific" or "researchy" than a survey. We need to understand that research is simply an organized effort to study and gain knowledge. At this moment, when the Council of Jewish Federations is starting a North American Jewish Data Bank largely devoted to quantitative research, we would urge all planners and campaigners not to forget that *qualitative* research can also be valuable.

2. We do ourselves and our lay leadership a disservice if we allow a general split into "optimistic" and "pessimistic" camps. The truth is much more complex. Charles Silberman's fine book and the reactions to it have tended to divide us much too broadly. It is possible, taking his themes for instance, to be optimistic about anti-Semitism, to believe that a Jewish cultural and religious revival is taking place, and at the same time to believe that revival is shallow and tenuous, and that we do face numerical shrinkage. Let us look at the facts, not sign on to slogans.

3. No amount of data and research can lift the burden from us and from our lay leadership to make decisions based on value judgments. Research can tell us if there are more elderly or more teens in our community, but *cannot* tell us to which groups we should devote more resources. Research can only help us, as the late Arnie Pins used to say, "to be con-

fused on a much higher level."

We hope that planners and campaigners will meet the challenges posed by a scientific world—will continue to seek data, but will evaluate and analyze data as well, so that we can continue to serve our Jewish community responsibly and well.



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A fundamental contradiction, however, in much of community planning has been the fact that the community services themselves frequently do not meet any clear, direct instrumental purposes of the decision-makers. There is thus considerable lack of congruence between the rational-instrumental purposes that the process is designed to serve and the orientations of the groups on whom it depends for support.

From a rational-instrumental point of view, the people most affected by community planning decisions are the clients who use the services of the respective agencies. These people are not usually represented in the decision-making process, at least not in their capacity as clients. This means that the very structure of the decision-making process as set up in the planning organization (as well as in the individual agencies) is based not on direct representation of the interests involved, but rather on representation of those claiming to serve certain groups of clientele. This very structure opens the way for introducing into the criteria for decisions, not only the demonstrable needs, as rationally determined, but the extrinsic interests of the spokesmen—interests that are bound to be based not only on the actual needs they attempt to represent but on the demands of other relationships and social structures in which they are involved.

Arnold Gurin
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