

Tradition and Autonomy: The Paradox of Contemporary Jewish Education

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The catalogue of the problems of contemporary Jewish education is well-known and depressing: lack of time; poorly motivated students; inadequately trained teachers; outdated materials; irrelevant curricula; uninterested parents. Together, they create serious stumbling blocks for the success of the enterprise.

At the same time, I would like to suggest that there is a larger, philosophic issue which underlies and weaves its way through the many practical problems just cited; *viz.*, the conflict between Tradition and Autonomy in contemporary Jewish education.

The opposing forces of Tradition and Autonomy are factors which have defined contemporary Jewish education structurally, programmatically, and ideologically. Modern Jewish education is the heir of a system of Jewish schooling in which Tradition was the central defining force. At the same time, modern Jewish education, like modern Jewish life, constitutes a questioning, an ambivalence, and, in some cases, a break from Tradition as the definitive force, with new prominence and centrality ascribed to the role of the autonomous choice of the individual (or of individual communities).

These two forces apparently pull the school and the Jewish educator in different directions. Tradition urges the school to see its goal as the effective transmission of Tradition to the young. Autonomy, bolstered by the environment of modern life and education, urges the school to put the child's considerations and choices at the center of its concerns. Thus, the Jewish educator is faced with the following sorts of questions: is his role to transmit the Jewish heritage or to "liberate" the Jewish child? Is he responsible to Tradition or children? Are the teachings of Tradition or membership in the contemporary Jewish fellowship more important? How much can Tradition be a viable educational concept in the post-Emancipation and Enlightenment, anti-Tradition milieu in which the modern school functions? Many of the most practical questions about contemporary Jewish education which

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surface today ("Why should we bother to teach Hebrew?" "What type of teachers should we hire?" "Why not devote all our energies to experiential educational activities rather than text study or formal classes?") can ultimately be traced back to these more basic issues. The question is whether the two forces of Jewish education and Autonomy are doomed to be at war, or is there some form of accommodation and synthesis between them which would provide both a very Jewish and a very modern Jewish educational system? That is the subject of this paper.

The Case for Tradition in Jewish education

The argument that Jewish education should be concerned with the transmission of Tradition is presented in two different sorts of sources: (1) literature on the nature of Judaism and Jewish education throughout Jewish history; (2) certain prominent general theories of education.

The notion of Tradition obviously occupies a central role in the classical Jewish experience and in the classical Jewish school.¹ It is both one of the major constituent concepts and problematic issues in the delineation of the nature of the Jewish experience. In a detailed analysis of some of the senses of Tradition, and of the fundamental shifts that have taken place in modern Jewish consciousness vis-à-vis Tradition, Natan Rotenstreich analyzes several meanings and peculiarities of the term in the Jewish context.² Rotenstreich describes the following three classical meanings of the term:

The first meaning of tradition (*Massoret*) refers to the faithful, word-for-word carrying out of the text of the Bible. . . . Tradition in this sense is a documentary and textual discipline. . . . The second meaning of tradition refers to the whole domain of religious writing in its theoretical and legal aspects. This body of work is essentially Biblical interpretation, comprising a running commentary on the Scriptures. . . . In [the] third meaning, tradition comprises the totality of life as shaped and handed down from generation to generation (pp. 7-8).

Rotenstreich emphasizes the unique inter-relation of Revelation and Tradition, of the metaphysical transcendent and the historical-eminent which emerges in Judaism. Tradition encompasses both the recorded message and the ongoing flow of the life of the Jewish people throughout time.

What is very clear is that because of its centrality to Jewish life, Tradition has to be a key component of any Jewish educational format. As such, it cannot appear as a separate or isolated subject area in the school as is currently attempted through such courses variously entitled: "Customs and Ceremonies", "Judaism", *masoret*, *toda'ah yehudit*. But Tradition (in one or more of the senses delineated by Rotenstreich) permeates the entire curriculum, social life, and supportive environment of the school, and indeed constitutes one of the central cornerstones of the Jewish educational enterprise. Moreover, because of the link between Tradition, Revelation, and texts,³ the confrontation with Tradition was directly related to the study of texts; hence, Jewish education would have to, in some way, encompass the analysis of the holy texts.⁴

The transmission of Tradition in the Jewish school should not be confused with the (simple) transfer of facts or with behavioral conditioning; i.e., it was probably categorically neither 'skills training' nor 'cognitive education' *per se*. Rather, the classical Jewish model is probably best seen categorically as a form of 'character education' in which Tradition is a primary resource and context for influencing and forming a certain type Jewish personality. Different epistemological and pedagogic conceptions as to how Tradition is best taught emerged, and we therefore find different types of schools and teaching styles (indeed, it is in the sense that the monolithic phrase "classical Jewish education" is probably misleading). However, differences that do emerge would seem to be about issues of pedagogy and style, and not about the legitimacy or primacy of Tradition as an educational force.

The issue, therefore, was never whether Tradition as an educational concept is irrelevant for the Jewish school, but rather *which* Tradition would become binding. Thus, the "new" Jewish education systems (*Haskalah* Jewish education, state general education in Israel, kibbutz education) did not come to deny Tradition as an educational force; rather, they came to replace or re-adjust certain classical notions of Tradition.⁵ Thus, contemporary Israel state general education which might seem to be among the most radical of the new educational movements may actually be regarded as the most conservative of educational systems, calling not for a denial of Tradition, but rather for a return to the "true" pastoral, national, Biblical Tradition of our people.⁶

Thus, the notion of a Tradition-less Jewish education would seem to be a logical contradiction (and probably, as early reform Jewish education discovered, a pedagogic near-impossibility), for the introduction of the word 'Jewish' in the phrase 'Jewish education' immediately implies some Tradition-laden content.

The second defense of the legitimacy of Tradition in Jewish education is provided by a certain category of general educational writings which argues that education is the transmission of the heritage of the adults to the young.⁷ There are several alternative sorts of philosophic underpinnings to this approach, essentialist, realist, idealist. However, in all cases there is agreement that education is about the transmission of some body of worthwhile contents and activities, which constitute a Tradition, to the young.

There are several important examples of this approach, perhaps the most prominent being that of Emile Durkheim.⁸ However, I should like to look briefly at a vivid "Hebrew" version of this argument, presented by the renowned Bible scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann in a speech to a Teachers Convention in Palestine in the late 1930's.⁹ Kaufmann's contention is that individual human experience becomes elevated into a collective body of spiritual-cultural truths (from *nefesh* to *ruah*) which constitute the subjects and contents of education. These truths are expressed in terms of the components of a culture (language, religion, customs) which are transmitted from generation to generation. The role of education, he argues, is to convey, transmit, implant, inculcate these forms and truths to subsequent gen-

erations. The child is to be regarded as a *tabula rasa* on which these truths are to be inscribed. The "autonomy" of the child is non-existent, and is an excuse for a mischievous abdication of educational responsibility. Admittedly, the process of transmission and inculcation is often difficult, as the child will most likely resist, because of the natural tension between the educator who comes to impose and the child who is imposed upon (much as, according to some versions, the stone wrestles with and resists the sculptor's attempt to re-form it into a statue). But the chiseling and forming of the child according to the legacies of the cultural tradition is the true role and responsibility of the school. In this particular article, Kaufmann does not argue for a specific substantive content of Tradition; however, he does contend that education without a Tradition encompassing specific contents is not, in fact, education. (In the article he goes on to decry the deficiencies of Palestinian Jewish education for its abdication of commitment to any cultural Tradition.)

A similar conclusion is, ironically, to be found in the argument of R.S. Peters, a contemporary British analytic philosopher of education, who claims that there are three major criteria of education:

- 1) . . . 'education' implies the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it.
- 2) . . . 'education' must involve knowledge and understanding, and some kind of cognitive perspective which are not inert.
- 3) . . . 'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission on the grounds that they lack willingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner.¹⁰

Peters argues that "education should involve the initiation of others into worthwhile activities" (p. 71). At the same time, a school should encourage the child to consider and examine, for himself or herself, the value of that which is presented. Peters is less "Tradition" than Durkheim or Kaufmann in that he speaks of "worthwhile activities" in broad, non-particular terms; e.g., liberty, equality, respect for persons and fraternity. However, these worthwhile activities are reflected in and conveyed through a tradition, in this case, the "Liberal Tradition". A Peters school would be concerned with transmitting these "traditional" values, quite probably through the use of certain classical sources and texts, while at the same time being very concerned that the child be able to reflect on and ultimately choose what he regards as worthwhile.

Thus, supporters of the Tradition school of Jewish education can bring substantial support for their position, both from within the Jewish experience as well as from the world of general educational theory and practice. According to their contention, all education is about confronting young people with contents and values regarded as good or worthwhile. These contents and values are contained in and constitute a Tradition which is the defining factor of a school. Thus, 'Jewish education' should be rooted in and defined by 'Jewish Tradition' (however that may be defined), and should be concerned with presenting, transmitting, and inculcating that Tradition to the young.

The case for Autonomy in Jewish education

The proponents of a Jewish education geared to and defined by the individual, rather than by an imposed Tradition, bring equally impressive evidence for their case. We shall examine three sorts of arguments they bring.

First, they argue that Judaism itself places a premium on the dignity of the individual and the importance of his "free" acceptance of his heritage. Thus, such an argument is likely to cite specific statements of Haninah ben Pappa or of Maimonides or analyses by contemporary expositors of Judaism¹¹ to verify Judaism's concern with purposeful and intentional acceptance by the individual. In short, Tradition itself is sometimes used to verify the claim as to the importance of Autonomy in the Jewish ethic.

A second affirmation of the "Autonomy in Jewish education" school draws upon the contemporary historian and sociologist of Judaism. They remind us of the major metamorphoses in the contemporary Jewish world, from a Torah-Tradition-determined society to the modern, voluntary, associational, autonomous Jewish community. 'Tradition' and 'sanction' give way to 'Jewishness' and 'Jewish identity'; i.e., to individual states of mind and feeling. Thus, it might be argued, it is today impossible to begin from the given of a Tradition. Rather, we have entered a new era whose master is man and his Autonomy. This does not necessarily mean that Tradition must be abrogated, but it does mean that Tradition can only be a force if arrived at and accepted by a freely choosing person. Thus, an Autonomy-less Jewish education is simply inconsistent with the realities of the contemporary Jewish situation.

A third source of support for the Autonomy school comes from certain other writings of contemporary educational theory. We shall briefly look at two sub-groups of this literature, the analytic educational philosophers, and the radical reform literature.

The analytic educational philosophers have devoted much time to the concept of 'teaching', and a surprising agreement surfaces in their analyses. Scheffler defines 'teaching' as:

an activity aimed at learning; and practiced in such a way as to respect the student's intellectual integrity and ability for independent reason.¹²

Gilbert Ryle says that 'teaching' is ultimately 'teaching yourself', which really means "thinking for yourself":

I have given you some equipment against failing, if you try. But that you try is not something I can coerce. Teaching is not gate-shutting, but gate-opening.¹³

Hare says that education is bringing the student to the point where he ultimately thinks and decides for himself:

Indoctrination begins when we are trying to stop the growth in children of their capacity to think for themselves.¹⁴

And, as we saw, one of the criteria of education presented by Peters was that:

Education at least rules out some procedures of transmission on the grounds that they lack willingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner.¹⁵

These analytic philosophers have generally linked choice with thinking or reason; thus, Ryle talks about "decisions of principle" and Scheffler talks about intellectual integrity and independent reason. They clearly believe that choice should not be thoughtless, and they come to refine overly open or anarchistic notions of Autonomy. At the same time, the legitimacy of individual choice is paramount to their position.

The radical educational literature of the 1960's and 1970's has writ large the message of Autonomy. Kohl, Kozol, Illich, Reimer, Leonard, Postman, Weingartner, Bereiter, have vividly argued that schools which are defined and dominated by Tradition destroy individuality and self-expression in teacher and pupil. They are morally deficient because they "impose" or "inculcate". They are aesthetically deficient in that they subjugate human creativity to conformity. They are psychologically deficient in that they operate on a faulty notion of how children learn. They are philosophically deficient in that they have denied the key values of human life — freedom, growth, ecstasy — and have replaced them with loyalty to the group, to the past, to the system. The new education calls for schools that free, and education that liberates. It is time, they argue, to liberate the oppressed child through education, rather than to further suppress him.

Thus, the Autonomy school presents strong arguments for its case: the place of the notion of human dignity and choice in Jewish Tradition; the essentially voluntaristic, individualistic nature of post-Emancipation Jewish life; the desirability of contemporary educational theory which is rooted in thinking and autonomy.

The dilemma re-examined

While my sometimes metaphorical delineation of the dilemma seems somewhat sharply drawn and even exaggerated, do not think that it misrepresents the basic tension; moreover, the resolution of this dilemma is not an irrelevant academic exercise, but is, as I have suggested, at the heart of many of the current problems of Jewish education.

Part of the problem derives from the sometimes confused and careless use of the terms 'Tradition' and 'Autonomy'. The term 'Tradition' (or in our case 'Jewish Tradition') implies a body of values, laws, norms, behaviors, and practices which are regarded as rooted in Jewish history and which are considered to be relevant and good for the lives of Jews today. However, one of the major problems vis-à-vis Tradition which has basic educational implications, has to do with the question of the origins of Tradition and the nature of its control over the contemporary Jew. Thus, one view sees Tradition as transcendent-metaphysical in origin, thus, true and binding, and hence a central dimension of the Jewish school. Another view sees Tradition in historical terms, as a body of values and behaviors of a specific people

which are good and meaningful and hence a central dimension of the Jewish school.¹⁶ What has happened, in Rotenstreich's terms, is a disintegration of the classical trilogy of meanings of 'Tradition'. Thus, these two approaches have serious disagreements over the origins of Tradition, the nature of its legitimacy (in one case, it is true, hence legitimate; in other other, it is good or meaningful, hence legitimate), and perhaps over its contents. At the same time, both of these approaches would agree that 'Tradition' (in one of its two senses) would have to constitute — if for different reasons — an indispensable component of the Jewish educational enterprise.

The linguistic confusion vis-à-vis the term 'Autonomy' is rooted in the popular equation of it with the notion of license, or lack of restraint or limitation on one's actions. In fact, however, much of the analytic and psychological literature on the subject emphasizes the fact that 'Autonomy' is not simply the absence of outside restraints or a state of *laissez-faire* but, rather:

Autonomy implies the ability and determination to regulate one's life by rules which one has accepted for oneself presumably because the reasons for them are both apparent and convincing. [Children] have to learn what it is to act on rules generally before the notion of determining their own code of rules can have any significance for them.¹⁷

The analytic educational philosophers have emphasized the crucial link between autonomy and reason. Thus, they depict autonomy as the ability to make choices on the basis of careful consideration of alternatives. The psychological literature on the subject has emphasized the link between autonomy and responsibility; i.e., the fact that autonomy implies deliberation and decision, followed by the acceptance of the results and subsequent tasks that will emerge. In addition, both the philosophical and the psychological literature indicates that the development of 'Autonomy' is a slow and laborious process; it is not a skill or state of mind that is quickly or lightly arrived at, but it must grow and develop. Finally, several analyses suggest that the development of 'Autonomy' is informed and expedited by the exposure to and confrontation with Tradition; that is, Autonomy is best able to develop when the individual is confronted with a body of experience, values, and behavior which can be referred to and drawn upon in the process of considering alternatives and making decisions.¹⁸ The argument in this case is that the development of Autonomy is paradoxically dependent upon some (outside) compendium, content, and body of knowledge and experience.

The interaction of Tradition and Autonomy

The (albeit brief) clarifications which we have just made vis-à-vis the terms Tradition and Autonomy help us, I believe, to begin to deal with the "war" on our hands. When we juxtapose the two notions of Jewish Tradition which emerged with the more complicated notion of Autonomy briefly delineated, two educational models emerge which I would suggest constitute the two viable systems for contemporary Jewish education.

The first model regards Tradition as Divine in origin and hence binding. At the same time, it is cognizant of the classical concern for, and the contemporary prominence, of Autonomy. Hence, its goal is to have the child come to live by and love Tradition in a thoughtful and considered way. This model would want him to "live by" and "love" Tradition because of its belief in the Truth of Tradition; it would want him to do so in a "thoughtful and considered way" because of its sensitivity to the 'Autonomy' factor. It should be clear that this model is not "wishy-washy" vis-à-vis the primacy of Tradition. It regards Tradition as the central educational force and content of the Jewish school, but it does not assume that this must be at the total expense of some commitment to the principle and reality of Autonomy.

The second model regards Jewish Tradition as a powerful and persuasive compendium of beliefs and behaviors about life, and it assumes that such a compendium has much to offer to young Jews. At the same time, it doubts that Tradition can be imposed on young people today, and even if it could be, the model would, in principle, be opposed to types of imposition which come to thwart the child's freedom to choose. Thus, this model wants to present Jewish Tradition in as convincing a way as possible in order to: (1) perpetuate Tradition; (2) help the child arrive at Jewish Tradition through his own considerations and commitments. This model, too, is not "wishy-washy" vis-à-vis Tradition; it regards it as positive because of the value of its contents. It, too, would like to see Tradition emerge as a central force; however, in contradistinction to the first model, it believes that the road to Tradition must pass through the tunnel of Autonomy.

Both of these models take Tradition seriously, and both would see their tasks as confronting the Jewish child with Jewish Tradition in all its richness. Moreover, while they would disagree as to the origins of Tradition, they would probably be able to agree about several of the sources and contents of Tradition. Furthermore, in both systems the child would have to be very central and dear, and would be considered a key actor in the educational drama. His 'Autonomy' would be seen as very much related to intelligence and reason rather than to capricious action; hence, a concern for Autonomy would not only not be a problem for these models, it would be a value.

There are two additional models which are sometimes suggested, both of which would seem to be unsatisfactory on Jewish and educational grounds. One model is that of a school system for which the perpetuation of the notion of Tradition is the only goal, with the child being secondary in the process. Such a system is unsatisfactory because: (1) Jewish Tradition itself would seem to be uncomfortable with such an approach; (2) it has little chance of succeeding in today's Jewish world; (3) it is educationally misinformed and mischievous. Such a model does not take children seriously or treat them fairly, nor is it loyal enough to some of the principles of the very Tradition it is concerned with propagating.

The second unsatisfactory model is that of a school system primarily concerned with the way Jewish children think and feel about their "Jewish

identifications''. Such schools would be concerned with maximizing children's self-expression, feelings, personal thought about and links with "Jewish things'', and they would be quite willing to be selective of Jewish Tradition in terms of those items (e.g., the Holocaust, Israel) which are good catalysts and sparks for feelings and associations. Thus, in such an approach, Tradition becomes a resource bank for contents which might be used, depending upon their pedagogic viability. This model is unsatisfactory because: (1) it does not take Jewish Tradition seriously as a thoughtful compendium of principles and lifestyle but, rather, utilizes it or discards it as a medium and tool for stimulating a sense of Jewish associationalism; (2) it does not ultimately educate for Autonomy for it does not provide the student with a body of resources and principles which he can thoughtfully consider.¹⁹ Indeed, there are those who argue that such a model discourages thinking and consideration and instead encourages quick, affective, behavioral response. Such a model, then, is defective Jewishly because it teaches little about Judaism, and it is, ironically, defective educationally because it does not help to develop Autonomy.

The case for a Traditional Jewish education

I would contend that the two former models which I have described in the previous section are the only appropriate models for contemporary Jewish education. That is, Jewish schools should be defined by the dual parameters of a curriculum whose content is derived from and informed by Jewish Tradition (which minimally would have to imply a text orientation), and aimed at the development of reflection on — and ultimately responsibility towards — this Tradition. As I suggested at the outset of this paper, there are a host of practical educational considerations which flow from this analysis, concerning: curriculum, textbooks, teachers, schools. These practical questions are currently confronted and answered in a haphazard manner in contemporary Jewish education. I believe that they could be responded to more systematically and successfully if they were dealt with in terms of the larger context which I have suggested in this paper.

It should be added that both of the models I have presented are probably alien to the dominant trends in contemporary Jewish education, which I would regard as being characterized by: 1) the primacy of associationalism or group affiliation as the main educational concern; 2) the diminution of Tradition as a significant educational force or its transformation into nostalgia, folklore, and programming resources. That is, contemporary Jewish education seems mainly to be concerned with linking children with the Jewish people (Tradition being important to the extent that it serves that cause), rather than with Tradition as a systematic and organic compendium of lifestyle and value system.

My conclusion is, obviously, that the present course of Jewish education is misguided *educationally* because of its abdication of the role of Tradition. I should like to re-emphasize that this argument is, to a large extent, logical

and educational, rather than theological. My complaint is not that "alas, a people has strayed from its Tradition", but that Jewish education as a form of education has strayed from the educational prototype to which it logically and historically belongs.

The paradox of Tradition and Autonomy in Jewish education is, ultimately, that there is no paradox between them. Instead, these two concepts would seem to be symbiotically related, with each being crucial for the other's existence. Tradition and Autonomy seem to be allies. Truly autonomous thought and choice in contemporary Jewish education can best be reached through the corridor of Jewish Tradition.²⁰ Any other route would seem to lead the child astray; certainly away from the castle of Jewish life. □

NOTES

1. For some discussions on this issue in the educational context, see: H. Dimitrovsky (editor), *Exploring the Talmud, Volume I: Education* (New York: Ktv, 1976); L. Ginzberg, *Students, Scholars and Saints* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1928); Nathan Morris, *The Jewish School* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937); J. Maller, "The Role of Education in Jewish History," in: *The Jews*, Louis Finkelstein, editor (New York: Harper and Row, 1949).

2. N. Rotenstreich, *Tradition and Reality* (New York: Random House, 1972), esp. Chapters 1, 2. See also: Gershom Scholem, "Tradition and Commentary as Religious Categories in Judaism," *Judaism*, XV (Winter, 1966).

3. E. Dorf, "Study Leads to Action," *Religious Education*, LXXV, 2 (March-April, 1980), pp. 171-172.

4. There were variations on the way and extent to which textual analysis was a factor in Jewish schooling. One of the interesting variations was the educational approach of the Mussar Movement. This world is colorfully described in Chaim Grade's *The Yeshivah*.

5. Z. Adar, *Jewish Education in Israel and in the United States* (Jerusalem: Melton Press, 1977), Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

6. For a discussion of these approaches as reflected in the teaching of the Bible in Israel, see: J. Schoneveld, *The Bible in Israeli Education* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976).

7. See the following for a discussion and critique of this educational category: L. Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer, "Development as the Aim of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, XLII, 4 (November, 1972), pp. 449-496.

8. E. Durkheim, *Education and Sociology* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

9. Y. Kaufmann, "Nefesh V' Ruah Bahinukh," (Hebrew) in: *Al HaHinukh Hatikhon B'erez Yisrael* (Jerusalem: R. Mass, 1939) pp. 245-274.

10. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1967), p. 20.

11. Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah*, 5; J. Lookstein, *Faith and Destiny of Man* (New York: Bloch, 1967), p. 15; M. Steinberg, *Basic Judaism*; A.J. Heschel, *God in Search of Man* (New York: Meridian, 1958).

12. I. Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of Teaching," in: I. Scheffler, *Reason and Teaching* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 67.

13. G. Ryle, "Teaching and Training," in: R.S. Peters (ed.), *The Concept of Education* (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 1.

14. R.M. Hare, "Adolescents into Adults," in: T.H.B. Hollins (ed.), *Aims in Education* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p. 52.

15. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, op. cit., p. 20.

16. These two views are analyzed in: Milton Steinberg, *Basic Judaism*, op. cit., pp. 23-30.

17. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, op. cit., p. 120.

18. "Nobody can learn to do this kind of thinking unless he knows what sort of thing a moral principle is. So it is a real advantage to be brought up, even heteronomously, in a system of moral principles which is a working example of the sort of thing that morality is. The child may later reject some of these moral principles and adopt others with a different *content*, but at least he will have learnt the *form* of a moral principle." R.M. Hare, "Language and Moral Education," in: *The Domain of Moral Education*, D.B. Cochrane, C.M. Hames, A.C. Kazepides (editors) (Ramsey, N.J. and Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Paulist Press and The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1979), p. 95.

19. A similar critique is found in recent analyses of the values clarification approach to moral education: see: Alan Lockwood, "A Critical View of Values Clarification," *T.C. Record*, LXXVII, 1 (September, 1975), 35-50.

20. Peters says that children have to enter "The Palace of Reason Through the Courtyard of Habit and Tradition." R.S. Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education," in: W.P. Niblett (editor), *Moral Education in a Changing Society* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1963), p. 47.