of the community organization criteria and the grand strategy.

Whether by the use of criteria or by natural intuitive reaction alone, Federation could not be expected to develop a perfectly symmetrical structure and program. On the other hand, it needs to be protected from becoming a Rube Goldberg organizational contraption.

In carrying out its own priority program and that of its agencies, Federation can constructively develop relationships with other community institutions—synagogues, schools, student groups, etc. Where the emphasis on these relationships becomes primary and the program advanced is remote from Federations' priority objectives, the issues are sharpened. Here the criteria for affiliation (the community organization process) and the Federation grand design should be useful in making a central decision. In this connection, Federation cannot justifiably be criticized if it seeks to protect the existing array of services, especially if these, as a group, are balanced, effective and amenable to improvement. Adding to them in number does not necessarily make a better communal body. Some Federations may already include more affiliates, beneficiaries or associations than can be manageable through an effective community organization process as we know it. The addition of new affiliates, especially those which require unorthodox forms of association, may present an opportunity for testing and proving the validity of the Federation idea—if we can be sure they will not stretch it out of shape nor do violence to its basic objectives. The availability of endowment funds makes experimentation possible along these lines. It also offers a temptation for a form of financing outside the Federation process.

To be "communal" a Federation does not necessarily have to be all-inclusive geographically, functionally or fiscally. It need not feel the pressure to include all the services in the area, nor all varieties of programs for large and small groups. It need not feel the obligation to finance "everything Jewish". But the services it does include and support should meet other criteria, communal in character. They must meet the test of common consent or consensual planning and fiscal responsibility to a central body, readiness to yield to changing priorities cooperatively determined, leadership whose loyalties reach beyond the parochial, acceptance of standards centrally established, etc. These characteristics, associated with the Federation idea, can help shape the growth of the Federation movement.

Clearly, the Federation is an imperfect mechanism reflecting many of the imperfections of the people who participate and the society in which they live. Its strength often comes in deliberate restraint essential to voluntary consensus. Sometimes the challenge of new programs and new directions and new affiliations seem to threaten Federation's institutional survival and development. Consciousness of the Federation method of operation and long-range objectives can serve to measure the reality of these dangers. Such consciousness requires awareness of the foundation stones of the community organization process and of our grand dream which we aspire to realize. We can serve it better when they are defined and deliberate—even if subject to change.

Occupational Values and Ethics in Jewish Law and Lore: Premises for Jewish Communal Service*

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...(in this article) I am not discussing the spiritual implications or purposes (of holy writings). I am discussing only the substantive import they seem to carry for occupational values and ethics. If the only effect is to illuminate what impress me as profound and heuristic premises of occupational values and ethics, I shall have in large measure succeeded in my modest attempt.

Boundaries of Presentation

I approach the subject matter of this paper with great humility and perhaps even greater uncertainty. I say this not because my purpose is not clear, but because my purpose is limited. And therein lies the rub, since it increases the probability that I will be misunderstood.

What I mean to do is to draw on a few—a very few— selected Jewish sources to illuminate the contextual framework of occupational values and ethics, particularly that of the human service occupations which operate in Jewish communal services. But I do not mean to do this from a religious or theological point of view, even if they may be regarded as relevant to my limited purpose. This requires a rather literal reading of the sources I will tap, with no presumption of either consistency or inconsistency with a religious or theological interpretation. Whether the purpose I have chosen is an acceptable one I leave to others to judge. That it can be a useful one I have no doubt.

The spirit with which I venture this discussion is similar to that which has guided Freud and other scholars, and to that which has influenced Stoppard and other authors. When they have mined the Shakespearian and other literary fields, they have not done so in the illusion that they have seen in plots, characters, and developments of writers of the past what those writers saw, but only that which is visible, perceptible, and understandable in what they wrote. The literary products of Freud, Stoppard, and others, when they derive insight from writers of the past, are not presumed to argue a theory, or document a hypothesis, but rather to reflect those insights and afford understanding of human character, behavior, experience, and development.

This is what I propose to do with a few illustrations from the holy writings of the Jewish people. But I am not discussing their spiritual implications or purposes. I am discussing only the substantive import they seem to carry for occupational values and ethics. If the only effect is to illuminate what impress me as profound and heuristic premises of occupational values and ethics, I shall have in large measure succeeded in my modest attempt.

Another word of caution before I proceed, however: my selection of illustrations may not prove to be the most apt ones available or even the most indicative. These are not necessarily the "leading cases" in the sense that is employed in the judiciary which accords them the character of ultimate authority. My illustrations may not claim such a character, but they should serve to clarify the points I am trying to make.

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** I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Mark B. Greenspan, rabbinical student at the Jewish Theological Seminary and, through him, the library of the Seminary. I would also like to thank my colleague, Dr. Irving Levitz, who is a rabbi as well as a psychologist, for his wise and understanding counsel. Neither, of course, should be held to account for flaws and errors in this article for which I must retain sole responsibility.

The Distinctive Character of Occupational Values and Ethics

The *Torah*, or the Jewish Law, as a religious-spiritual historical record, contains the corpus of Jewish ethics. It includes ceremonial, ritual, and devotional prescriptions, but it also emphasizes behavioral expectations, ostensibly as much an expression of religious devotion as all of the other provisions.

> Maimonides' concept of the divine attributes of action has great significance. Through faith we know that God exists, but we do not know what He is, for we cannot comprehend His true essence. Through the revealed word of the *Torah*, however, we can know His divine attributes of action, activities so to speak, which attach a definite ethical and spiritual purpose to creation in general and man in particular. Thus God the Creator and Ruler of the universe governs the world through justice and mercy and is concerned with human behavior. The essence of God may be incomprehensible to man, even to a Moses, but man has been vouchsafed a means of bringing him closer to the Divine, and that is by imitating God's divine attributes of action. This is the Jewish concept of *imitatio Dei*.[1]

Though there need not be any incongruence between values and behavioral expectations in general, and the values and behavioral expectations of occupations in particular, some differentiation between the two is necessary if the latter are to be clearly and differentially associated with the functions and identification of practitioners. Occupational values represent, therefore, a standardized reflection of the collective preferences of the members of the occupation in question,[2] and occupational ethics, "behavioral expectations reasonably associated with ... [occupational] responsibility."[3]

The *Torah* emphasizes man's relationship to man, and Jewish values and ethics—when they do not represent more abstract preferences affecting one's practical and spiritual way of life and conduct—derive especially (not exclusively) from the specific nature of the relationship among persons in general. (Values and behavioral expectations that do not so derive are more likely to be described as morals or virtues.)[4] Occupational values and ethics derive specifically (not exclusively) from the relationship between the practitioner and others, among them:

1. Clients of one kind or another, with whom the practitioner has a particular occupational relationship.
2. Third parties who affect or are affected by such clients.
3. Employers or employing institutions.
4. Colleagues, including superiors, peers, and subordinates, and including job associates and other members of the same occupation.
5. The practitioner's occupational group as a whole, to the extent that it is organized.
6. The community or society of which the practitioner, *as a practitioner*, is a part.

Our present aim, therefore, is to seek out from some Jewish sources, and especially the Bible, behavioral expectations in the form of prescriptions or rules that appear to be applicable to one's occupational status, responsibility, and relationship to others. These, it would seem, would represent analogues for the illumination and explication of values and ethics as they apply to practitioners in Jewish communal service, with the added connotation that, cast within the spiritual and theological framework of Jewish tradition, they might lead to formulations of values and ethical responsibility especially appropriate for Jewish communal service.

[1] Samuel Belkin, *The Philosophy of Purpose* (New York: Yeshiva University, 1958), p. 12.

[2] *Cf.* Charles S. Levy, "The Value Base of Social Work," *Journal of Education for Social Work*, 9:1 (Winter, 1973), p. 36.

[3] Charles S. Levy, "The Context of Social Work Ethics," *Social Work*, 17:2 (March, 1972), p. 96.

[4] Ethics arises out of particular interpersonal relationships, relationships between individuals and other persons, groups, and institutions, or relationships among persons, groups and institutions. Morals, on the other hand, describe acts valued in themselves or judged on their own merits, without regard to obligations to others. Occupational ethics represents a special case of ethics in that relationships are defined or structured on the basis of the function of the given occupation. See Charles S. Levy, *Social Work Ethics* (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1976), Chapter 2.

What the Practitioner Values [or Should]

Although what is valued in recorded Jewish tradition, as it affects relationships among persons, has generic as well as spiritual and theological import, it does not take excessive extrapolation to find in it relevance to the value orientation of practitioners in Jewish communal service. One example is found in *Leviticus* if one is prepared to stretch a point, but only slightly. The text admonishes, "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind (xix:14)," with the added force of the immediately associated assertion, "but thou shalt fear thy God: I am the Lord." Whatever the meaning of this passage for human relations in general, it is reminiscent of the compelling value of a non-judgmental attitude toward the clienteles, for example, of social workers in Jewish communal service. It suggests to me, at the very least, the acceptance of difference to which social workers, among others, are ideologically committed, although this value might also be regarded as a desideratum for persons in general. For social workers and other human service practitioners, however, this value is no mere desideratum; for them it implies an expectation for which sanction might be required.

Similarly valued in recorded Jewish tradition is a non-discriminating attitude towards others which, translated into the specifics of occupational expectations, would signify a degree of objectivity in relation to clients, for example—or to any client system for that matter—which discourages bias in the selection of, or responses to, them. "The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the homeborn among you (*Leviticus*, xix:34)." In Jewish communal service this would seem to apply to Jew and non-Jew alike, and whatever their views. The individual would not be adversely judged even for destructive inclinations, although his behavior might be. It is this that becomes the basis for the practitioner's service. As far as social workers in Jewish communal service are concerned, The Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers translates such considerations as these as, "I will not discriminate because of race, color, religion, age, sex, or national ancestry;" "I respect the privacy of the people I serve;" and "I use in a responsible manner information gained in a professional relationship."[5]

Another value enunciated in Jewish texts, which expresses what is valued in the ideology of social work and other human service occupations practiced in Jewish communal service, may be roughly characterized as the avowed concern about the means for the attainment of outcomes as well as the outcomes which may be valued—both being accredited components of a professional ideology. This value is sometimes expressed, in the Bible and the Talmud among other places, through an assertion of the priority accorded life—or perhaps survival, in the terms of a current preoccupation in Jewish organizations—paired with a concern about the nature of the life which is to be preserved. Some kinds of life are not justified—i.e., even such a compelling end does not inevitably validate any and all available means. Limits are often indicated. Thus, the saving of one's own life is not valid if it is done at the expense of the life of another. And life is not acceptable if incest or consanguinity is the price to be paid; or if it is preserved by using one's status to induce the violation of important rituals by others. (Compare the story of the Maccabees.) And, I suppose, one may also add, "Remember Masada."[6]

Much of the book of *Exodus* is premised on this concern about the nature of the means which are employed to attain particular ends. The children of Israel are constantly importuning Moses to let them go back to the

[5] *Encyclopedia of Social Work* (New York: NASW, 1971), pp.958-9.

[6] See Tractate *Sanhedrin*.

security of their enslaved state in Israel, but a life in bondage, the message is, is life not worth living. Freedom is that vital. Elsewhere, justice is given precedence even over life. And Reb. Simcha Bunam of Psishka observed regarding the Biblical admonition, "Justice, justice (or Righteousness, righteousness) shalt thou pursue—(*Deuteronomy*, xvi:20)," that it reflects the valuation of means as well as ends. Parsimony being a guiding motif in the construction of the *Torah*, he reasoned, repetition of the key word signified that kind of differentiation in its meaning, alluding, therefore, once to the end of justice and once to the means for attaining it.[7]

Lazarus reinforces these connections between means and ends by referring to Kant's comment that "If justice is subverted, man's existence on earth is of no value,"[8] suggesting, therefore, that not only is life without justice meaningless; justice without just means is unjust.

The prerequisite nature of justice, as both means and ends, and in relation to life itself, is further attested to in the juxtaposition with it of the clause, "that thou mayest live...," especially when one considers the translation of the word, *l'ma'an*, in the introduction of this clause, which in Ben Yehudah's dictionary is rendered, "so that," and in the Shiloh dictionary is rendered, "in order that."

In *Genesis* (xii:13), Abram is said to counsel Sarai, his wife, to tell the Egyptians that she is Abram's sister rather than his wife (she was evidently quite a looker) because he fears that otherwise they may kill him. This prompts Hertz to comment:

> Once or twice Abram falls a prey to fear and plays with the truth in order to preserve his life. Though merely an episode with him, natural enough in an ordinary man, it is quite unworthy of his majestic soul. It is the glory of the Bible that it shows no partiality towards its heroes; they are not superhuman, sinless beings. And when they err—for "there is no man on earth who doeth good always and sinneth never"—Scripture does not gloss over their faults. Nachmanides refers to Abram's action as "a great sin."[9]

More is expected of Abram as a "majestic soul" than of ordinary mortals: hence the critical judgment of his act. More is also expected of Jewish communal workers, which makes them also accountable not only for attention to desired outcomes—particularly as they represent reasonable job expectations—but also for the means they select to achieve them. This applies even to so determinate and all-embracing an outcome as survival. As this is expressed in a rather unlikely source, "Survival for the sake of surviving makes life pointless."[10]

Practitioners in Jewish communal service owe attention to outcomes preferred by the agencies and communities within which, and for which, they work, and to outcomes preferred by their clienteles, to the extent that these are legitimated by the service functions undertaken by these agencies. But they also owe attention to the means selected for the attainment of these outcomes. There are other outcomes at stake for Jewish communal workers besides survival, and with respect to each the choice of means becomes a critical consideration. The Bible and other Jewish sources make such considerations quite evident. What they make especially clear is that for persons who have a particular station and function in Jewish life, such considerations are imperative. Jewish communal workers are such persons and, as such, the occupational values and ethics stressed in Jewish sources have particular pertinence for them.

A particularly interesting example of the implications of this discussion is the astute view, reflected in Jewish sources, of the nature of learning and teaching, and the responsibilities implicit in both. The illustration is

7 *M'enah Shel Torah.*

8 M. Lazarus. *The Ethics of Judaism*, Trans. Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1900) Part , p. 15.

9 J.H. Hertz, ed. *The Pentateuch and Haftorahs* (London: Soncino Press, 1956), p. 47, fn. 13.

10 Russell Baker. "Winner Take Nothing," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1976.

especially apt in view of the inevitable educational or re-educational import of human service activities in Jewish communal service.

Despite the intrinsic valuation of study or learning for its own sake—specifically as applicable to the *Torah*—the concern is repeatedly expressed about the way in which the study or learning is done, to the very enunciation of principles of analysis and inquiry (for example, *Sifra*: Chapter I). If the vested sectarian interest were in indoctrination alone—the Catholic catechism seems to be so designed—then why would the following be so eloquently articulated in the *Ethics of the Fathers*, with a hardly obscured intent?

> There are four qualities among those that sit before the wise; they are like a sponge, a funnel, a strainer, or a sieve; a sponge, which sucks up everything; a funnel, which lets in at one end and out at the other; a strainer, which lets the wine pass out and retains the lees; a sieve which lets out the bran and retains the fine flour (V:18)

Additional opportunities arise in the course of practice in Jewish communal service, which join the issue of outcomes versus process, of ends versus means; and references in the holy writings of the Jews do much to illuminate them. They also provide bases for action choices. They affect not only what would be preferred in practice and how to achieve it, but also, for example, whether a client's opportunity to make his own choice would transcend the practitioner's known solution, even at the risk of outcome failure. If in every case the outcome, preferred or addressed, were invariably the all-important consideration, less attention would be paid in the holy writings to attendant considerations, some of which may conduce less to outcome success but more to the preservation of values affecting the rights and prerogatives of human beings. This is true as it affects that which is relevant to clients in Jewish communal service; it is especially true as it affects the setting of priorities as between the interests of clients and those of agency or community. Jewish sources offer a sobering perspective on this score.

In this connection I should like to borrow Bleich's judgment regarding the requirement of intellectual honesty which he attributes to Jewish teaching, a requirement which aptly expresses an occupational imperative with profound ethical implications affecting the Jewish communal worker's work with clients and agencies. Bleich cautions against

> the impression that subjective considerations or volitional inclinations may ever be allowed consciously to influence scholarly opinion. *Torah* study requires first and foremost intellectual honesty.... It is a travesty of the *Halachic* process to begin with a preconceived conclusion and then attempt to justify it by means of *Halachic* dialectic.[11]

Well, it is also a travesty of the process of human service. Practitioners do not do what they choose simply because they choose it. Their action choices require validation on the grounds of occupational responsibility and ethical responsibility, both within a framework of an available and accredited value system, and against a backdrop of defined job expectations. And practitioners must feel accountable and be held accountable, to somebody other than themselves, for the choices they finally make.

The Responsibility of "Office"

In his play, *The Balcony*, Genet paints a rather bizarre but telling picture of the effect of one's office, along with its appurtenances, like one's uniform, for example, on his behavior and the behavior of others. And Montaigne keenly and devastatingly observed that "the gravity, the gown, and the fortune of the speaker [in a discussion] often give authority to vain and inept remarks, (since) no one would presume that a personage so redoubtable and with such a following does not have within him some more than vulgar capacity, and that a man to whom so many commissions and offices are given...is not abler than others not so distinctively situated." "Not only the words," he goes on,

11 J. David Bleich. "Halacha—Torah Law: Divine Wisdom Through Human Intellect," *The Jewish Observer*, 11:4 (December, 1975), p. 11.

"but also the grimaces are considered and taken into account."[12]

The practitioner in Jewish communal service, perhaps as he sees himself and certainly as others see him, carries in, on, and about himself the signs and symbols of "office," that cloak him with both responsibility and opportunity. In his occupational "garments," he behaves—or should—like a different person than he normally is; he is certainly expected to by his clients and his peers. In the socialization process which practitioners undergo, this is sometimes characterized, particularly in social work, as the development of the professional self, and the disciplined use of oneself in the service of others.

The investiture of the priests so specifically and so eloquently described in *Exodus* (XXIX:5-9) is a dramatic reflection of a similar intent. Prosaic as it may seem, I find it helpful once again to resort to Hertz, for he offers a specific allusion to the significance which I find in the relevant passage, although his grounds are obviously different from mine:

> The clothing of Aaron, and his sons, invested them with the visible emblems of their holiness and their *functions*, and marked them as distinct from the rest of the nation. "When the priests are clothed in their garments," says the Talmud, "their priesthood is upon them; when they are not clothed in their garments, their priesthood is not upon them."[13]

In Louis Ginzberg's *Legends of the Jews*, one of the reasons suggested for the fate of Nadab and Abihu (*Leviticus*, X:1-2) is that they did not wear the prescribed garments.[14]

[12] "On the Art of Discussion," *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 710.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 345, fn. 5. Emphasis added. See also Maimonides, *The Commandments*, Trans. Charles B. Chavel (London: The Soncino Press, 1967), Vol. i: "The Positive Commandments," pp. 42-43, and Seder Nezikin, Sanhendrin II, *The Babylonian Talmud*, trans. I. Epstein (London: The Soncino Press, 1935), p. 554.

[14] Trans. Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1964), Vol. III, p. 189.

For the purpose of this discussion it may be expressed as, "by the symbols of my office—by my occupational function—will I know myself and be known to others; and by them will my behavior be guided and expectations of me be determined." There are practical connotations as well, some of which are considered below.

Occupational Ethics

Aside from general behavioral expectations, and aside from inherent religious and theological import, Jewish sources are replete with ethical principles rather specifically related to occupational opportunity and responsibility. A rather basic manifestation of this intent is contained in the reference in the *Ethics of the Fathers* to: "he who learns in order to practice," to him "the means will be vouchsafed to learn and to teach, to observe and to practice (IV:6)." Again, the context and purpose of this passage are not identical to the context and purpose of this discussion. And yet, how exquisitely does this express the major principle that competence for occupational practice must be studiously, deliberately, systematically, and purposefully acquired. In fact, this may be regarded as a fundamental and prior ethical principle. To practice in a human service occupation, to practice in Jewish communal service, one must feel the pressing obligation to become equipped to do so.[15] Education, learning, observation, experience, and every other available means must be employed to fulfill this ethical responsibility.

Other sources specify other ethical responsibilities which are applicable to occupational relationships. Much of Chapter XIX in *Leviticus* contains occupationally-related ethical prescriptions which are all the more evident if one conceives of a practitioner's ethical responsibility as related to his obligations to clients, employers, supervisors, subordinates, third parties, and the community at large. For example:

[15] *Cf.* Charles S. Levy, "On the Development of a Code of Ethics," *Social Work*, 19:2 (March, 1974), p. 208.

> 13...The wages of a hired servant shall not abide with thee all night until the morning ....35. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, or in measure. 36. Just balances, weight, a just ephah, and a just hin shall ye have ....[etc.].

The Jew is further enjoined against doing "wrong" to a stranger who sojourns in his land. In each of these instances it seems clear that the "practitioner", that is, the member of an occupation to whose advantage or power another is subject, is importuned not to abuse his advantage or power.

The Rabbinic legend about Dama, a non-Jewish jeweler in Ascalon, is no doubt primarily designed to demonstrate the imperative of filial piety so dramatically enunciated in the fifth of the Ten Commandments, and made all the more forceful by its focusing on a "heathen." However, it also serves as a demonstration of occupational ethics, for the story is primarily concerned with Dama's capacity as jeweler rather than as a non-Jew.

It is a familiar story but one worth retelling here. Dama has a precious stone which is required for the High Priest's breastplate. A deputation comes to his place to buy the stone which he agrees to sell for one hundred *dinars*. When Dama goes to get the stone, however, he finds his father asleep. Rather than disturb his father, he tells the deputation that he cannot sell the stone. Desperate to get the stone and thus to complete their assigned mission, they raise the ante up to one thousand *dinars*. Dama still refuses. When Dama's father finally awakens, Dama races to the temple with the stone, but refuses to take more than the originally agreed upon price of one hundred *dinars*. "I will not make any profit," he says, "from the honour which I paid to my father."[16] From an occupational point of view, Dama's act also represents his reluctance to take advantage of his client simply because he has him over a barrel, which fairly accurately describes the position in which clients of Jewish communal workers often find themselves.

[16] *Kiddushin*, 31a.

Issue might perhaps be taken with the admonition that he who is in a position to render judgments in others, shall "not respect the person of the poor, nor favour the person of the mighty (*Leviticus*, XIX:15)," but that is a matter of debating preferences rather than characterizing them. Equal treatment may not prove to be so equal when individuals are deprived of equal access to generally available opportunities,[17] and hence the validation of preferential treatment for some persons or groups. On the other hand, equal treatment would be one respectable and creditable ethical position, and as such is suggested by this inclusion in *Leviticus*. Another view of this may be that this principle is not invalidated in either case. Rather, what the alternative proposition may represent is a modification of the principle in the interest of equity or some other equally valued end.

An especially compelling illustration, although perhaps a less obvious one, is contained in the story of Joseph in *Genesis*. Joseph resists the attempts of Potiphar's wife to seduce him, saying

> Behold, my master, having me, knoweth not what is in the house, and he hath put all that he hath into my hand; he is not greater in this house than I; neither has he kept back anything from me, but thee, because thou art his wife. How then can I do this great wickedness and sin against God (XXXIX:8-9)?

True, the propinquity of the reference to God would tend to confirm Nachmanides' commentary that as much as Joseph may have feared his master's wife, if not his master, he feared God more! And, true, "In the conflict between human duty and conscience," it may very well be that Joseph "chose the latter."[18] But Joseph's response seems so inescapably suffused with the implications of his position, and the trust and confidence of his employer which are related to his position, that it carries clearly implications of occupational ethics.

[17] *Cf.* Charles S. Levy, "Advocacy and the Injustice of Justice," *The Social Service Review*, 48:1 (March, 1974), pp. 39-50.

[18] Gunther W. Plaut. *The Torah: A Modern Commentary* (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1974), Vol. 1, p. 389.

No argument has been made here for the assumption of any intent, in the Jewish sources cited, to communicate values and ethics specifically and deliberately associated with occupational responsibility, particularly as it applies to practice in Jewish communal service. No "proofs" have been adduced. Nevertheless, occupational values and ethics are illuminated by the substance of the Jewish sources referred to, and would no doubt be further illuminated by additional sources.

My aim here has been to make a beginning attempt in the hope that additional inquiry in similar terms may be further inspired. I hope that this is one of its consequences, in the anticipation that this mode of inquiry would be an additional step toward the harmonization and mutual reinforcement between occupational values and ethics, on one hand, and Jewish values and ethics, on the other. For Jewish communal service this is a consummation devoutly to be wished and fruitfully to be employed.

The Jewish Professional and Jewish Identity*

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Erik Erikson has summed it (identity) up as follows: "...a complementarity of past and future both in the individual and in society: it links the actuality of a living past with that of a promising future". So, we're really in this identity problem together, and separately! — the clients, the patients, the professionals, the agencies.

There are some components of Jewish identity—Jewish religion, the Holocaust, the State of Israel—that are so huge and overwhelming that I must leave them for more sophisticated and talented people to tackle. Nevertheless, we are all aware that there *is* something called Jewish identity. I cannot define it adequately, but I can enumerate some characteristics of identity, Jewish or otherwise.

First, there must be awareness—of self, of family, of community, of history.

Second, there is a choice—by individuals, groups, nations. Here, minority group members' experiences are special and often different.

Third, there are positive and negative components: value judgments, feelings of safety, fear, despair, security, warmth, depression, isolation.

Fourth, there are components of education and indoctrination.

Fifth, there are feelings of confusion, conflict and pain surrounding identity.

Sixth, a sense of identity occurs on many levels—individual, family, community, religious, ethnic and so on.

Erik Erikson has summed it up as follows: "...a complementarity of past and future both in the individual and in society: it links the actuality of a living past with that of a promising future"[1]. So, we're really in this identity problem together, and separately!—the clients, the patients, the professionals, the agencies.

As a preface, let me review some aspects of personal identity development. The infant very early in life forms bonds with the important people in his/her world, and takes into and onto himself/herself many of their characteristics and attitudes—both good and bad. He/She forms relationships with family members and then branches out into the larger world. As he/she does so, the child becomes aware of how his/her family and group are regarded by members of the larger community. At this stage, youngsters have many childhood identifications, but these are more donned and shed like garments according to their changing fancies: the football hero of the today, the rock star tomorrow. The time comes, however, when these identifications are no longer useful. Then the real emotional work of identity formation must occur as the individual tries to determine who and what he/she is and where he/she came from. What normally forms identity? Heinz Hartmann has a good summary: "...a man lives, so to speak, in past generations as well as his own. Thus arises a network of identifications and ideal-formations which is of great significance for the forms and ways of adaptation"[2]. This fits with Hartmann's concepts of man as an independent organism who can adapt to changing conditions.

But suppose our youngster is a member of a minority group. Other factors supervene.

* Presented to a Seminar on Jewish Identity at a Meeting of the Association of Jewish Agency Executives, Philadelphia, March 30, 1976.

[1] E. Erikson, *Identity Youth and Crisis*, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. New York, c1968, p.310.

[2] H. Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, International Universities Press, New York, 1958, p. 30.