The Changing American Jewish Family Faces the 1990s[1]

Traditionally, the Jewish emphasis on marriage begins at birth. The male child, as he is ritually circumcised, and the female child, as she is named in the synagogue, each receives a blessing that they mature into marriage and good deeds and (for boys) the study of Torah. That blessing is repeated at each official milestone in the child's life, for Judaism views marriage not as a necessary compromise to human frailities but as the most productive state for adult human beings.

Informally as well, Jewish culture has reflected an emphasis on marriage which suffuses language, attitudes and behavior. Common Yiddish phrases expressed that preoccupation: If a five-year-old boy's ears protruded, his mother shrugged and remarked that "his bride will find him beautiful." If a twelve-year-old girl wore a mismatched skirt and blouse, a grandmother advised her to wear more appropriate clothing, for she was "almost a bridal girl." If a fifteen-year-old found unsavory friends, parents warned that she would "ruin her own marriage match."

Partially as a result of this overwhelming cultural bias, Jewish populations in the United States have, until very recently, achieved almost universal marriage—over 95 percent—by the time they were well into their reproductive years. Analyses based on the 1970 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS),[2] for example, show that, in 1970, 95 percent of American Jewish females were married by age 34, and 96 percent of American Jewish males achieved the same status by age 39. Although Jews married one to three years later, on average, than other whites in the United States, more of them ended up married.[3] Similarly, while American Jews have long had smaller families than other ethnic groups, until very recently children were cherished and deliberate childlessness was almost unheard of.

During the past two and one-half decades, however, the social climates of the United States has undergone dramatic changes, including a lively and much publicized "singles culture," later marriages, smaller families, increasing divorce

rates, high geographical mobility, and chronological segmentation of populations. The behavior of the Jewish population has epitomized many of these changes.

For example, while four-fifths of Jewish households in 1970 consisted of married couples, most of whom had or intended to have at least two children, in 1990 fewer than two-thirds of Jewish households consisted of married couples, and very small families (one or no children) have become more commonplace, especially among those with high educational and professional status. The "singles" state, rather than being regarded as a mere prelude to marriage, has been adopted by some as an alternative lifestyle. Increases in divorce are seen, to lesser and greater extents, throughout Jewish-American society. In addition to later marriage, later family formation, and increased divorce, longer life spans among the elderly have meant that increasing numbers of Jewish "families" are composed of childless couples and unmarried individuals. For Jews, as for all Americans, the family has become increasingly unconventional.

Data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Study provide today's social scientists with information about Jews in the United States from coast to coast. These national data enable us, for the first time in twenty years, to engage in a systematic analysis of the status of contemporary Jewish households. When these national data are used in combination with studies conducted by almost two dozen individual Jewish communities, they reveal a picture both of sweeping national change and individual geographic variations (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1 shows the marital status of the Jewish population in the United States in 1990 and compares it with marital status of Jews in 21 cities in the 1980s, with marital status of Jews nationwide in 1970, and with U.S. census data on all Americans in 1970 and 1989. As table 4.1 illustrates, in terms of marital status the contemporary American Jewish community resembles the non-Jewish community far more than it resembles the American Jewish community of 1970. About two-thirds of today's Jews, like two-thirds of today's non-Jews, are married, compared to nearly four-fifths of Jews in 1970. As the 1990s began, fewer than two-thirds of Americans, both Jews and non-Jews, were married. More than one-fifth of Jews and non-Jews alike had never been married. Seven percent of Jews and 8 percent of all Americans were widowed, and 8 percent of both groups were currently divorced. When the national data are compared with the city studies, the populations of Jewish singles in six cities exceed the national average; the singles populations of another four cities equal or are within four percentage points of the national average. Only in cities which have large numbers of elderly Jews do the percentage of singles begin to approach the low of 6 percent singles found in the 1970 NJPS. In addition, the percentages of divorced or separated Jews are higher in a dozen cities than the 5 percent divorced Jews found in the 1970 study. Among all Americans in 1989 those who were divorced were 8 percent; Jewish divorced individuals exceeded that figure in five communities.

For American Jews, as for other Americans today, there is no one model of "the family." Jewish families reflect, in somewhat less extreme profile, an America in

TABLE 4.1
Marital Status of American Jewish Men and Women (Jewish Community Studies, 1970 and 1990 National Jewish Population Surveys, and White Americans, 1970 and 1989 Census Studies)

Location	*Year Study Completed*	*Married*	*Single*	*Widowed*	*Divorced*
Atlantic City	1985	67	13	13	6
Boston	1985	61	29	4	5
Baltimore	1985	68	19	9	5
Chicago	1982	65	23	6	6
Cleveland	1981	69	11	13	8
Denver	1981	64	23	4	9
Kansas City	1985	70	17	7	5
Los Angeles	1979	57	17	12	14
Miami	1982	61	7	23	8
Milwaukee	1983	67	14	9	10
Minneapolis	1981	66	22	7	5
Nashville	1982	70	17	8	5
New York	1981	65	15	11	9
Phoenix	1983	63	18	9	10
Richmond	1983	67	14	12	7
Rochester	1987	68	23	6	3
St. Louis	1982	68	9	17	6
St. Paul	1981	66	20	11	3
San Francisco	1988	69	19	4	7
Washington, D.C.	1983	61	27	4	7
Worcester	1987	69	14	—18—	
NPS	1990	64	21	7	8
US Census	1989	64	21	8	8
NJPS	1970	78	6	10	5
US Census	1970	73	16	9	3

which less than 15 percent of households conform to the model of father, mother-at-home, and children living together.[4] Jewish households in the United States include persons who have never married; the traditional, two-parent family with clearly differentiated masculine and feminine roles; the ultra-Orthodox two-parent family with many children; the dual-career two-parent family; divorced households without children; divorced and "blended" families; single-parent families; and elderly couples of widowed elder "singles."

The Singles in Contemporary Jewish Communities

During the 1970s the singles state, for the first time in Jewish history, became an extended period in the adult life cycle rather than a short way station between childhood and adulthood. In every community a growing number of Jewish households could be designated as "single," a statistical category including several groups: young, middle-aged, and older people who have never married; young, middle-aged, and older divorcees; widows and widowers.

Never Married

The recent trend toward postponement of marriage is nowhere more striking than in the advancing ages at which "universal marriage"[5] has occurred among Jews during the past fifteen years. In 1970 more than 95 percent of American Jewish women were married before age 34 and over 96 percent of American Jewish men before age 39. In the 1980s, however, universal marriage was achieved ten to fifteen years later, depending on location (see table 4.2).

Table 4.2 illustrates postponed marriage among Jews and non-Jews at the beginning of the 1990s. In the 1950s, three-quarters of American Jewish women were married by the time they reached age 25. Today, only 12 percent of Jewish women marry before age 25. In 1990, among American Jewish women ages 25 to 34, 30 percent had never been married, 62 percent were married, and 7 percent were divorced. Among those ages 35 to 44—once the most married of Jewish populations!—11 percent had never married, 74 percent were married, and 14 percent were divorced. For Jewish men, ages for first marriage are even later than they are for Jewish women, with 17 percent never married in the age 35 to 44 group.

Many unmarried Jews have gravitated toward cities reputed to offer a sophisticated and vibrant singles culture, such as Los Angeles, Denver, New York, and Washington, D.C. They appear to be primarily attracted by educational or job opportunities and by the presence of large numbers of singles, for few have families in the area. Friends often fill many family-like functions for singles, but the absence of actual family may be a factor in the length of time that passes before they marry.

TABLE 4.2
Marital Status of 1990 National Jewish Population Survey Respondents (Percentages Born or Raised Jewish by Age and Gender)[a]

	18–24		25–34		35–44		45–54		55–64		65+	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
Married	12	2	62	46	74	73	75	77	77	87	57	82
Never married	88	96	30	50	11	17	7	9	2	6	2	3
Divorced/separated	1	1	7	3	14	10	14	11	14	6	4	3
Widowed	—	—	1	—	1	1	4	3	8	1	38	12

1989 U.S. Census All Americans[b]

	20–24		25–29		30–34		35–39		40–44		45–54		55–64	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
Married	35	21	29	49	72	66	76	74	75	80	75	81	68	83
Never married	63	77	62	46	17	26	10	15	6	8	5	7	4	6
Divorced	3	1	8	5	11	8	13	11	16	12	14	11	18	8
Widowed	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	3	1	6	1	9	3

Sources:

a. Sylvia Barack Fishman, *A Breath of Life: Feminism in the American Jewish Community* (New York: Free Press, 1993); 1990 NJPS data.

b. 1989 U.S. Census, U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, series P-20, No. 445.

Los Angeles had the smallest percentage of ever-married Jews in the 18–39 age category of any American city; more than one-third of Los Angeles Jewish respondents under 39 years old had never married, according to a 1980 study of households or "family types."[6] Similarly, Denver had a large number of young people: 43 percent of Denver's Jews are between the ages of 18 and 34, compared to 29 percent in this age group in Los Angeles. Just over half of Denver's Jews are married by age 29, and just under three-quarters of them by age 34. Universal marriage is not achieved until age 44.[7] The geographical mobility of the Jewish population, many of whom have moved to Denver recently, may delay readiness for commitment and the establishment of homes.

Washington, D.C., which has attracted numerous young professionals since the days of the New Deal, continues to host a large percentage (27 percent of the entire community) of Jewish singles, many of whom are attracted by and work in government-related positions. As Elazar notes, "given the revolving-door nature of federal employment, Washington is not a city that encourages people to sink roots. The effects are felt in the Jewish community, which is perhaps the most socially fragmented community in the United States, surpassing even Los Angeles

and Miami, other contenders for the title."[8] The effects of this rootlessness and fragmentation are clearly seen in the city's ever-married figures. Less than 60 percent of Washington's Jews have ever been married by age 34; 92 percent have been married by age 44; and universal marriage is achieved by age 55, with 98 percent of Washington's Jews married.[9]

Manhattan, "the home of the never-marrieds," has the second-largest number of Jewish households in the New York area, following Brooklyn. In Manhattan in 1981, one-third of the population had never been married, 15 percent were divorced or separated, and 11 percent were widowed.[10]

While the figures are more dramatic in such cities, the Jewish singles phenomenon is also clearly visible in more family-oriented, "middle American" communities. A study of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, showed that less than a third of all Jewish respondents were married by age 29 (30); 87 percent were ever-married by age 39; and not until the 40–49 age group did universal marriage occur, with 95 percent ever-married.[11]

For more than a decade, the singles culture was celebrated by the media as an exhilarating, vital way of life. Like others in their socioeconomic class, Jewish men born in the late 1940s and 1950s seemed uninterested in early commitments; when they did marry, they usually chose younger women, rather than choosing from the large number of unmarried women in their own age cohort. In addition, many more Jewish men than women intermarried, leaving a sizable proportion of Jewish women unmarried.[12]

A growing emphasis on feminist aspiration and achievement also contributed to later marriage and childbearing. The names of Jewish women were prominent among the roster of militant feminists, who exhorted women not to be lured into the twin slaveries of marriage and motherhood. Rather than viewing job skills as useful for earning money in cases of necessity, women began to see themselves acquiring professional education and careers in much the same way as men. Jewish women, who had always comparatively high educational levels and had married later than the general population, excelled in this new atmosphere of opening opportunities and often postponed marriage and family.[13]

By the 1980s, however, large numbers of unmarried Jews were openly searching for ways to combine the pleasures of achievement with the more traditional and companionable joys of family life and community participation. Singles and community leaders alike said that new methods had to be devised so that single Jews could meet each other and become involved in the Jewish community. Jewish dating services, both commercial and not-for-profit, have proliferated in major metropolitan areas. Some modern versions of the traditional *shadchan* utilize "computer matching" of eligible men and women. Some rely exclusively on the skills of human interviewers to combine like prospects for introductions, and some combine both methods.[14]

Homosexual households are newly visible in the Jewish community. Gay and lesbian congregations exist in Baltimore, Cambridge, Cleveland, Dallas, Miami,

Minneapolis, Montreal, Philadelphia, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere in North America.[15] In addition, most major college campuses have Jewish gay and lesbian societies.

Precise figures on the proportion of homosexuals in the Jewish community—as in the general American community—are difficult to obtain. Estimates as to the percentages of homosexuals in given communities have varied widely and are the subject of considerable disagreement. Recent estimates on the percentage of homosexuals are substantially lower than earlier estimates. No one knows exactly how many Jews now live as homosexual singles or in homosexual households, but there is no reason to assume that the percentage of homosexual Jews differs significantly from that in the general population. A proliferating number of books and articles on the subject of Jewish homosexuality indicates that the Jewish homosexual community includes many Jews who are extensively involved in Jewish life. Jewish homosexuals, whose group includes men and women, youths and senior citizens, whatever their other Jewish communal involvements, often establish alternative Jewish households, some of which include children.[16]

Divorced Jews

Jews, like other Americans, experienced an increased divorce rate in the 1970s and 1980s. One may speculate that marriages broke up for traditional and not so traditional reasons. Men who were attracted to women outside the home may have been more willing to leave their families because of the putative attractiveness of freedom. Women who felt put upon by traditional roles may have been emboldened to leave them, both because they now had viable job skills and because the ideology of women's liberation encouraged independence rather than compromise.

Much in contemporary American culture contributes to the prevalence of divorce, not least the persistence of the youth culture and the pervasive pleasure principle in American society. One woman's husband left her "the year he turned 45 and the year his mother died." She says, "I guess his behavior is classic male mid-life crisis. But it's all so sordid!" A Jewish historian suggests that in "many instances, the divorce is a reassertion in middle age of youthful goals and dreams which have not been fulfilled in real life." Breaking the bonds of marriage is a last-ditch effort to "begin again," with presumably a more congenial and exciting partner, one more likely to gratify the fantasies still persisting from the past. In other cases, couples who married when they were young find that they have grown away from one another. One partner may have matured more than the other, developed new interests, or achieved a higher level of success. It cannot be denied that biological urges and socieconomic promptings such as these play a decisive role in the upsurge of middle-aged divorced in our times.[17]

Legal innovations such as no-fault divorce laws had the unpredictable consequence of making it easier for men to initiate divorce—often leaving the very

women it aimed to defend in extremely difficult circumstances.[18] However, no-fault divorce laws have also often eased the way for women out of unhappy marriages. The net result of all this is increased rates of divorce.

Some contemporary divorces may be linked to the greater ambition of women today. Career goals may lead to stress with marriage and thus to divorce. About one-third of divorced Jewish women have master's degrees, compared to half as many married women with children at home. A surprisingly high proportion of divorced women in the general population have master's degrees. Women who obtained their master's degrees before marriage are not more likely than average to be divorced, whereas women who obtained their master's degrees after marriage are more likely to be divorced. Marriages which from their inception included a professional woman may be psychologically adjusted to weather the pressures of careers far better than those which began with more conventionally divided gender roles and later switched course.[19]

Both men and women today are often less committed to marriage as a permanent state and more interested in beginning a new life rather than making do with an imperfect situation. American societal norms, rather than supporting the couple who struggles to work out their differences and to grow together through episodes of conflict, often seem to support the individual in making a break with the past. Compromise is often presented by the media as antithetical to personal integrity and self-esteem. The idea that parents should make sacrifices in order to maintain the family unit is often seen as completely outmoded. Judith Wallerstein recalls Margaret Mead's troubled reflections on the rising rate of divorce: "There is no society in the world where people have stayed married without enormous community pressure to do so."[20]

And yet current studies demonstrate that the children of divorce often suffer more greatly from the breakup of the family than they did from the conflicts between their married parents. As Ari Goldman strongly asserts about his parents' divorce: "If they had tried, they could have learned to stop shouting and slamming doors. It might not have been easy for them—but it would have been easier than it was for me to learn how to live with divorce."[21]

Among other social movements, feminism has played its part in increased divorce. Given the economic skills to be self-supporting, women are far less likely to remain in an unhappy marriage simply to have a roof over their heads. In addition, some men, who expected a submissive wife, are outraged when their spouses grow into different roles. Moreover, feminist impatience with the compromises which most marriages require is also a factor in some breakups. Self-described Jewish Orthodox feminist and mother of five Blu Greenberg insists that "it goes without saying that feminism has had a powerful impact on the rising divorce rate in the Jewish community. As a young, divorced rabbi recently put it when asked why he divorced: 'My ex-wife got into this women's liberation thing, and I was too immature to know how to cope with it.' (He was being kind in not saying that his wife also did not know how to cope with it.) I am convinced that

three-fourths of the marriages that succeed could have come apart at ten different points along the way," Greenberg adds, "and some three-fourths of the marriages that fail could have been put back together again at twenty points along the way. A great deal has to do with how one negotiates the inevitable impasses in an intimate relationship."[22]

The extent of Jewish divorce varies widely from community to community. In Los Angeles, for example, 9 percent of the Jewish population was currently divorced or separated in 1980, as opposed to 4 percent in 1968 and 2 percent in 1959. Thus, while substantially lower than the population as a whole, Jewish divorce rates in Los Angeles quadrupled in 21 years.[23]

Denver had a particularly high divorce rate: 68 percent of all Denver Jewish marriages in 1981 involved a second marriage for one partner; 14 percent were a second or third marriage for both partners; only 18 percent were a first marriage for both partners. One-fifth of Denver Jews between the ages of 40 and 49 were divorced.[24] This may be related to Denver's high rate of in-migration, for communities which attract large groups of immigrants also tend to have large percentages of divorced Jewish households: Los Angeles had 17 percent divorced/separated households in the 40–59 cohort;[25] Washington, D.C. had 12 percent in the 45–54 cohort;[26] Phoenix had 11 percent in the 40–49 cohort.[27]

Apparently, the newly divorced often find their singles state lonely rather than glamorous, for such high proportions of divorced Jewish men and women remarry that the true rate of divorce is effectively disguised in those studies which do not inquire about previous marriages. Several studies, however, have explored the relationship between divorce and remarriage. A 1982 St. Louis study, for example, reports that although less than 6 percent of the Jewish population is currently divorced or separated, an additional 12.5 percent of respondents and spouses were divorced and had remarried. The ever-divorced population of St. Louis would thus be 18.5 percent, a proportion far higher than it first appears.[28]

Table 4.3 presents the currently divorced, currently remarried, and ever-divorced rates in Denver, Miami, and Milwaukee by age cohorts. It illustrates the large number of divorces that are not apparent because of remarriage, especially among respondents in their 30s and 40s.

Those who emerge from marriage often join a singles culture very different from the one they had experienced before marriage. Lang describes women caught in a "cruel squeeze play": "Women's liberation offers vistas of growth, 'creative divorce,' and personal happiness, when the reality is often a long period of loss and mourning, and societal rejection of the middle-aged woman in favor of youth and good looks."[29] For men, too, the reality of divorce is often quite different from the fantasy of carefree bachelorhood. Men who joined a support group For Men Only at the Mid-Westchester Y.M.H.A. complained of loneliness, bitterness, and feeling of failure. They experienced difficulty in establishing new social networks.[30]

All denominations of Jewry have been influenced by the American propensity to divorce, but religious observance still has an inverse relationship to the number

TABLE 4.3
Currently Divorced/Remarried by Age Cohorts, Percent of Jewish Population in Denver, Miami, Milawaukee

	Up to 29	*Up to 35*	*Up to 39*	*Up to 49*
Denver				
Divorced[a]	6		13	21
Remarried			13	7
Ever divorced	9		26	28
Milwaukee				
Divorced[a]	4		8	6
Remarried	3		6	16
Ever divorced	7		14	22
Miami				
Divorced[a]		11		16
Remarried		6		9
Ever divorced		17		26

a. Indicates divorced and separated

of divorces, with unaffiliated Jews experiencing the greatest number of divorces. Brodbar-Nemzer found that Jews with a low rate of ritual observance are eight times as likely to be divorced at some time in their lives than Jews who have a greater commitment to traditional Jewish observance.[31] Nevertheless, the Orthodox Rabbinical Court *(Bet Din)* of New York reports that divorce rates are rising among Orthodox Jews and even among members of Hasidic sects.[32] It is not uncommon now for marriages even among the ultra-Orthodox to be "in trouble," partially because of the gap in the socialization of men and women. Young women have some acquaintance with secular culture and are encouraged to be perfectly groomed, while young men are expected to focus exclusively on the study of sacred literature, often leaving social graces to chance. Marital strain and divorce sometimes follow, although still far below the rates encountered in other Jewish denominations.

One study of divorced individuals shows that most of the women who initiated divorce did so prior to forming a romantic liaison, while all of the men who asked for a divorce were already involved with another woman before they initiated proceedings.[33] Perhaps most disturbing, Reform Rabbi Sheila Pelz Weinberg says that the traditional Jewish emphasis on the family stands in the way of communal response to the needs of women who do not fit the mold, because some fear that by supporting those who live in alternative households, "we are validating them."[34]

In most American cities, Jewish divorce primarily occurs among couples in their 30s and 40s. Young and middle-aged couples are not the only divorces, however; between 5 and 10 percent of Jewish respondents in their fifties and sixties were divorced in Denver, Miami, and Milwaukee.[35] Newspapers report that "an increasing number of couples who have been married for 20 or more years" are splitting up after their major responsibilities to their children have ended. Late-life divorces are most often initiated by men, often facing retirement or other intimations of mortality. They are probably also spurred on by the expectation of longer lives, by no-fault divorce laws, by isolation from extended family, and by unrealistic expectations from the marital relationship.[36]

Wives usually find such divorces a profound shock. For both younger and middle-aged female divorcees, a large part of that shock can be financial. In addition to the fact that women have traditionally gravitated toward lower-paying fields, the early years of marriage are often focused on the establishment of the husband's career while the wife's career is slowed by maternity, and husbands can emerge from a divorce with considerably more earning power than their wives have.

Table 4.4 compares the financial status of Jewish men and women in Rochester in the middle 1980s by their marital status. Total yearly household incomes of married men and women respondents are roughly equal. However, the financial status of divorced men and women is radically different: nearly two-thirds of Rochester divorced Jewish women make under $30,000 per year, while no divorced Jewish men make under $30,000 per year. More than half of Rochester divorced Jewish women have an annual family income of less than $20,000, and another 8 percent make between $20,000 and $30,000; 11 percent make $20,000 to $39,000; 24 percent make $40,000 to $49,000; and the highest income for

TABLE 4.4
The Effect of Termination of a Marriage on Financial Status of Males and Females, Rochester Jewish Population, 1987 (Percentages by Sex, Marital Status, and Yearly Income)

Income	*Divorced (separated)*		*Widowed*		*Married*	
by thousands	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Up to $20	54%	0	67%	60%	6	5%
$20–$30	8%	0	7%	16%	19%	18%
$30–$39	11%	47%	7%	0	19%	16%
$40–$49	24%	6%	18%	12%	17%	20%
$50–74	3%	38%	0	0	21%	22%
$75–$100	0	0	0	0	10%	11%
Over $100	0	9%	0	12%	8%	7%

divorced Jewish women, $50,000 to $74,000, is earned by only 3 percent. Nearly half the divorced Jewish men, on the other hand, make between $30,000 and $39,000 per year; another 44 percent of divorced Jewish men make between $40,000 and $74,000 per year; 9 percent make more than $100,000 per year.

Women in older age groups often have no professional life to turn to, and their social circles are being narrowed by illness and death. Most of them have shaped their entire lives and self-image around their husbands and view divorce, unlike widowhood, as a devastating shame. "Whatever he wanted I did it," said one sixty-four-year-old woman. "He wanted blintzes, I made blintzes. He wanted help in the store, I helped in the store. You name it, I did it. How does he say 'Thank you'? He lies; he cheats; and for an encore he defects."[37]

Widows and Widowers

A third group of unmarried Jewish adults is composed of widows and widowers. They are, as a group, older than the never-marrieds and the divorced, and thus both their options and their problems are significantly different from the younger group of "singles."

The elderly tend to be more polarized financially and geographically than any other age group. Older singles, for example, comprise approximately one-fifth of the Jewish populations of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan but one-tenth or less of the Jewish populations of Staten Island, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester in New York.[38] Milwaukee provides a typical profile: elderly Jews in the inner city are older (many over age 75), less affluent, and the most likely to live with someone else. Jews in the most affluent North Shore include a number of very elderly, but the majority can afford to get help. Half of the elderly households in the North Shore, for example, have incomes of $30,000 or over.[39]

Despite the high rate of Jewish mobility, a significant proportion of elderly Jews live in the same geographical area as at least some of their children. Only one-quarter of the households over sixty in St. Louis, for example, report no children living in the St. Louis area. Only 11 percent have no other family living in the area. In addition, more than half of St. Louis elderly Jews surveyed said that they saw family members at least five times a month. Eighty-seven percent saw family members at least once a month, which roughly corresponds to the 89 percent who have children or other family members in the area.[40]

But large numbers of older singles live far from family. When they are lucky, they live close enough to persons similar to themselves to form family-like support networks. They may live in nearby apartment buildings or may find a congenial spot in a local library or Jewish community center to socialize. Barbara Myerhoff described such a family-like society of elderly Jews in Venice, California. For the elderly poor, a Jewish community center can become a kind of tribal meeting place, a locale in which lonely people can eat, talk, play cards, sing, get angry and argue, maintain deeply felt friendships and feuds, and care about each other.[41]

Affluent older persons have more flexibility; they are able to relocate to the more desirable sections of the urban areas they have always lived in or to spend part or all of the year in luxurious communities in the sunbelt. When they remain in their own communities, wealthy older Jews frequently make increased community work an effective substitute for waning family involvements. When they move to the sunbelt, however, they often choose to live in restricted communities with others of the same chronological and socioeconomic status. Like the poor inner city elderly Jews, the wealthy older Jews of the sunbelt thus socialize in homogeneous colonies. When given the choice, a number of elderly Jews evidently prefer to live in the tranquility of a child-free environment.

Some elderly Jews are not fortunate enough to find a community life of any kind. Left behind in decaying urban areas, they may be childless, or their children may have moved far away. Isolated from daily human contact, their physical and emotional health can deteriorate rapidly. Jewish community organizations in some cities actively search for such isolated persons and try to provide them with "friendly volunteers," who can bring quasi-family interactions back into their lies.

Jewish Families with Children in America Today

Dual Career Jewish Families

More than 20 years ago, David Reisman described "a few exceptionally energetic women, fortunate in their spouses and family situations, who appear to be omnicompetent and who as often arouse envy and admiration among other women."[42] Today, however, working Jewish wives and mothers are no longer an oddity and are less often considered as "omnicompetent" superwomen. Instead dual career families are a normative variety of contemporary nuclear family in the Jewish community.

Today's striking levels of higher education for Jewish women translate into shifting occupational profiles. The vast majority of Jewish college women today assume they will be labor force participants for most of their lives. They plan for that labor force participation and educate themselves for it; the days when college functioned as a kind of intellectual finishing school or exclusively as a preparation for intelligent motherhood seem to be past. Moreover, Jewish college women not only take for granted that they will work, they often assume that they have the right to choose and prepare themselves for work which will bring them maximal emotional and financial compensation. Thus, it is not at all unusual for middle-class Jewish college women to be directly ambitious for themselves, where they once would have been ambitious for their husbands, and only vicariously for themselves ("behind every great man . . .").

This ambition is reflected in the large numbers of Jewish women currently enrolled in professional programs. Silberman, for example, reports that "a 1980

national survey of first-year college students taken by the American Council on Education found that 9 percent of Jewish women were planning to be lawyers—up from 2 percent in 1969. The proportion planning a career in business management increased by the same amount, and the number planning to be doctors tripled, from 2 percent to 6 percent. In this same period the number of Jewish women planning to be elementary school teachers dropped . . . from 18 percent in 1969 to 6 percent in 1980; those choosing secondary school teaching plummeted from 12 percent to only 1 percent."[43]

Nearly 40 percent of contemporary wage-earning American Jewish women who fall into the following categories—childless women, mothers with children age 18 or under, and women age 44 and under—are employed in professional capacities. Indeed, viewing Jewish women by family formation and moving from the more mature family groupings to the youngest family groupings, the data indicate a dramatic decline in employment in clerical and technical capacities and a corresponding increase in those employed in professional capacities.

Employment in the generally more lucrative high-status professions, which have been accessible to women for the shortest period of time (physicians and dentists, lawyers and judges, professors, senior systems analysts, executive positions, etc.) increases from only 7 percent of Jewish women with children 19 and over to 11 percent of women with children 18 and under, and 15 percent of women who have not yet had children. Employment in the helping professions (teachers below the college level, social workers, librarians, middle-level engineers and programmers, nurses, etc.), many of which require master's degrees but are not usually as lucrative as the high-status professions, increases from 16 percent of women with children ages 19 and over to 28 percent of women with children ages 18 and under, and declines slightly among women with no children (24 percent); this decline may be significant, because teaching, social work, librarianship and nursing have traditionally been considered "women's professions," and the first two especially have historically been favored by American Jewish women. While percentages of women employed in managerial or service positions remain stable from one family grouping to another, women with children ages 19 or over are far more likely to be employed in clerical or technical positions—56 percent—than women with children ages 18 or under—37 percent.

Indeed, in many communities women with children under 18 are more likely to work than women with no children in the household. In Worcester, for example, nearly three-quarters of married women with children work full-time, part-time, or are students, and only one-quarter are full-time homemakers, compared to more than 40 percent of women without children at home who describe themselves as full-time homemakers.[44]

Until very recently, Jewish women were distinguished by the impact of family on their work lives—a pronounced plummeting pattern of their participation in the labor force. In 1957, only 12 percent of Jewish women with children under six worked outside the home, compared to 18 percent of White Protestants. As

recently as 15 years ago, it was still true that Jewish women were likely to work until they became pregnant with their first child, and then to drop out of the labor force until their youngest child was about junior high school age.

Feminism and other social and economic factors have ensured that American Jewish women today are much more likely to be paid employees than American Jewish women at midcentury, and the majority of them continue to work for pay outside the home throughout their childbearing and child-rearing years. Among contemporary married Jewish women, 56 percent work for pay (44 percent work part-time and another 12 percent work full-time), one-quarter call themselves full-time homemakers, and 18 percent are unemployed or retired from labor force participation. Among American Jewish women ages 44 and under, 70 percent work for pay (59 percent work full-time and another 11 percent work part-time), only 17 percent are homemakers, 11 percent are students, and 4 percent are not employed (1990 NJPS Jewish female respondents). Today the labor force participation of Jewish women departs radically from patterns of the recent past. In most cities the majority of Jewish mothers continue to work even when their children are quite young. In Boston, Baltimore, San Francisco, and Washington, three out of every five Jewish mothers of preschool children are working (see table 4.5.)

Feminism is strongly bolstered by perceived economic need as factors encouraging a large proportion of Jewish women to work outside the home. As has been widely demonstrated in the general American population, for middle-class families today, two incomes are often needed in order to attain and maintain a middle-class standard of living; that is, purchase of a single family home in a desirable location; relatively new automobiles and major appliances; attractive educational options for one's children, including college and possibly private school and/or graduate school; and summer camp and vacation options. It is also true that perceptions of what comprises a middle-class lifestyle have been significantly revised upward, so that more income is needed by "middle class" families. These factors are especially significant for American Jewish families, who have traditionally had a strong ethic of providing their children with "everything."[45]

As the authors of the Cleveland study noted, "we are seeing a new generation of women who do not interrupt work or career even during child-bearing years. Their participation in the work force conforms to an entirely new pattern in society in general."[46]

Like other middle- and upper-middle-class American women, Jewish mothers face a series of decisions about how to balance the demands of careers and motherhood. They use a variety of strategies. Some sequence motherhood and career, by completing a portion of their schooling and/or career agenda, then dropping out of the labor force for a time to bear and raise their young children, and then returning to work when their children are school age. Others juggle the demands of work and home throughout the early childhood of their families. Part-time work is often an important strategy for both jugglers and sequencers. Jugglers often turn to part-time employment temporarily when their children are very

TABLE 4.5
Labor Force Participation by Location: Jewish Mothers of Children Under Six Years Old, Percentage Full-time and Part-time Employment

	Full-time	*Part-time*	*Homemake*	*Other*
Boston	29%	36%	33%	2%
Baltimore	27%	38%	35%	1%
Kansas City	28%	21%	44%	7%
MetroWest	22%	26%	49%	4%
Milwaukee	18%	32%	36%	14%
Philadelphia	23%	14%	59%	3%
Pittsburgh	29%	25%	42%	4%
Phoenix	26%	21%	50%	3%
Rochester	22%	32%	42%	4%
San Francisco	36%	25%	31%	8%
Washington	34%	30%	30%	6%
Worcester	15%	34%	51%	1%

Source: Adapted from Gabriel Berger and Lawrence Sternberg, *Jewish Child-Care: A Challenge and an Opportunity* (Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, Research Report No. 3, November 1988).

young, and sequencers may use part-time hours as a way of easing back into the job market. Part-time employment has the great advantage that it allows women to maintain their working skills and their visibility in the labor market while still enabling them to spend considerable amounts of time with their families. Disadvantages to the arrangement often include disproportionately lower salaries, job benefits, and prestige. Moreover, in certain fields part-time work is almost impossible to arrange.

Mothers who work part-time may need Jewish communal help in finding child care arrangements at least as much as mothers who work full-time because of the peculiarities of child care availability. Full-time workers often have more lucrative positions than part-time workers and thus are more easily able to find and afford good full-time, home-based child care, of either the live-in or live-out variety. When full-time workers have more than one child, they may opt to send the older child to an excellent preschool program even if it only operates for part of a day, because the full-time, home-based child care provider who watches their younger child(ren) can cover the rest of the needed hours. Part-time workers, on the other hand, are likely to use child care provisions outside of their homes.

It is important to note that the vast majority of all parents of children under six years old, whether they work full-time or part-time or define themselves as homemakers, state that they prefer Jewish-sponsored child care.[47] Moreover, studies indicate that families which enroll their children in Jewish-sponsored child care draw closer to Jewish practices as a family unit.[48]

In contrast to the conditions Reisman described, Jewish community disapproval no longer seems to be a salient factor in a woman's decision on whether or not to work. A recent survey found that only a third of Jewish women currently believe that nonworking women make better mothers than women who work, while close to half of non-Jewish women think that working women are less effective mothers and that children are more likely to get into trouble when both parents work.[49]

A Minneapolis survey of working Jewish mothers provided an interesting portrait of the group: on the whole, they tended to be young, highly educated, and professionally skilled. Thirty-nine percent were in the age 30–39 cohort. Almost 60 percent of the working Jewish mothers had B.A.s, master's degrees, or Ph.D.s, and almost 60 percent of them were employed in professional, technical, or administrative occupations. Only 12 percent of the at-home mothers in Minneapolis, on the other hand, had finished college or gone beyond.[50]

Studies have shown that women who are firmly grounded in Jewish life can enjoy great success both in wife-mother roles and in career roles.[51] Compromising and mutual supportiveness is typical of working families that work it all out: things are often less than perfect, but both spouses are firmly committed to their relationship and to their children, so they compromise, roll with the punches, and usually emerge with arrangements which are satisfactory for them both. In a study of nearly 500 married dual-career couples, researchers discovered that the character of the husband is the key to a successful dual-career marriage:

> The more supportive a husband is and the more supportive his wife perceives him to be, the higher the marital quality experienced by his wife. Examining the impact of "competitiveness, balance, gender-role identity, and support," these researchers found that "by far the most important factor affecting husbands' perceived marital quality is sensitivity. The stronger his sensitivity the more positive his perceived marital quality. The wife's perceived marital quality also rises with the increase in the husband's sensitivity. . . . The contemporary marriage is based on the emotional attachment of two persons, and that attachment is expressed by giving and receiving emotional support. People who lack the ability to form emotional attachments by expressing love and support obviously will experience a lower-quality marital relationship than people who have that ability.[52]

A study of ninety-seven Jewish career women with three or more children in the Washington, D.C. area,[53] for example, found that eighty-six women were members of Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox synagogues; three belonged to *havurot*; two were Reconstructionists; and only six had no religious affiliation. Over half the

women invited to participate in the survey "said that Jewish beliefs and attitudes helped them to juggle their multiple obligations. . . . Several stated that religion and tradition 'held them together'" as the family worked through crisis situations. One-third of the respondents kept kosher homes, more than half had some form of Sabbath observance, and three-quarters sent their children to religious school—with one-fifth in day schools. Significantly, among these working women strong religious identification was not a factor of being closer to the immigrant generation: religious observance was more pronounced among younger than older respondents.[54]

Dual-career families do face significant practical problems in juggling their responsibilities to work and to each other, however, and these problems are often complicated by the decline in extended family units. Dual-career couples today are the predominant group among young and middle-aged families in every wing of American Judaism. Many are deeply committed to Jewish life. Such women say that their Jewish values and lifestyles have enhanced familial devotion, stability, and structure and increased the family's ability to weather dual-career stresses and strains. However, some say that the Jewish community, which supposedly wants to strengthen families and encourage larger families, is not doing its part. They feel that the local Jewish community is sadly failing Jewish dual-career families. They voice the complaint that "the Jewish community is urging us to have more children, but it isn't willing to help us meet the cost." The area of largest dissatisfaction is that of day care and Jewish education. Mothers of young children complain bitterly about the lack of Jewish day care centers. "Children should be raised in a Jewish environment, and day-care is part of that," said one. Others complain that Hebrew schools, day schools, and Jewish camps are unwilling to lower tuition fees for large Jewish families unless their income is very low. They assert that Jewish organizations retain the attitude that Jewish women should have more children *and* that Jewish women should bear the financial and psychological burden of raising those children.[55]

Traditional Jewish Families

Traditional Jewish families—that is, children living with their own father and mother, with father as main breadwinner for the family, are a substantially represented family type in some middle-sized Jewish communities and in many suburban areas. While only 17 percent of American Jewish women under age 45 define themselves as full-time homemakers, the proportion focusing on homemaking and children is much higher in some particular communities. In Pittsburgh, one of the most demographically traditional communities, for example, more than half the Jewish mothers with children under 6 stayed at home full-time, and 42 percent of women with children under 18 were full-time homemakers.[56] The behavior of these families retains similarities to earlier American Jewish families.

A 1973 study by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) compared cross-generated data among 12 ethnic groups in Michigan and found that Jewish

families ranked unusually high "on scales measuring social support and warmth in the family environment," "parental compatibility," and "family intimacy," as well as on "scales measuring democracy and equality of decision making" compared to non-Jewish ethnic groups. Teenage children felt close to their parents and very much a part of the family decision-making process; they voiced their opinions easily and felt they were taken seriously. On the other hand, Jewish parents did not feel they were taken all that seriously by their teenage children; both parents and children assessed parental control of the family situation on a very low level. Additionally, Jewish fathers ranked far below the national average in "decision making power." The strong parent or disciplinarian is often the Jewish mother.[57]

Parents in traditional Jewish families still tend to treat children as extensions of themselves, as Marshall Sklare describes in *America's Jews*,[58] with the major change that they now place great stress on "independence training." Partially for this reason, the majority of Jewish children now participate in playgrounds, nursery school, or day-care programs. A 1984 study of the Pittsburgh Jewish community, for example, reported that even in this relatively traditional community, "child care usage for preschoolers is high. Eighty-three percent of all pre-school children are or will be in child care facilities, including both pre-school and day care programs. Two-thirds of them are using Jewish-sponsored facilities."[59]

A small but noteworthy and much-publicized trend is now emerging in which career women decide to leave or modify their careers in order to bear and raise children. Rejecting the pressures to be "superwomen," they opt, at least temporarily, for a more traditional nurturing role. Some leave work altogether when their children are small; others work part-time or at home, at times changing fields so they may have more flexible hours and access to their children. Many of these women become passionate advocates for the art of mothering and for the advantages of the traditional family.[60]

Mainstays of the traditional Jewish family are found among the Hasidim or ultra-Orthodox communities, largely located in self-defined enclaves in and around major American cities. Although life there proceeds in certain ways as it did in similar European communities, American mores and patterns have made significant inroads. In contemporary America, for example, it is extremely rare for even *shadchan*-matched Hasidic young men and women to come to the *chuppah* without having spent many hours with each other, although Hasidic "dates" are always in public places such as hotel lobbies or chaperoned situations.[61] Even more than other traditional families, ultra-Orthodox couples tend to be very close to their parents. Unlike other American Jews, Hasidic newlyweds are likely to choose residences in their parents' neighborhoods. Herz and Rosen describe the emotional hierarchy in which young Jewish couples persist in their parents' eyes as children:

> Some couples seen by the authors have reflected the intensity of their family orientation in their conviction that they would always be children who, in their parents' view, would

forever need to be cared for financially and otherwise. As might be expected, along with the very high value placed on the family is the emphasis upon geographical as well as emotional closeness between generations.[62]

This dependence may be fostered by the custom of young husbands studying for several years in a *kolel*, an institution for intensive Talmudic study, while the couple is supported by one or both sets of parents.

While highly traditional, many in the ultra-Orthodox community are two-paycheck families. Even in very Orthodox households, the working mother has often become a communal norm. In more modern Orthodox households, where levels of secular education among women are virtually indistinguishable from women who identify with other wings of Judaism, younger Orthodox women are almost as likely as their Conservative, Reform, and Just Jewish sisters to hold professional or managerial positions. The employment pattern differs somewhat among Orthodox women with lower levels of secular education, but Rubin cites figures showing that over half the Hasidic Satmar wives with children over six work outside the home. Rubin notes that the early assumption of responsibilities trains ultratraditional Satmar Hasidic girls for a life in which extensive child-rearing and work outside the home is the norm for women.[63]

Where strictly Orthodox facilities are available, such as in certain neighborhoods of New York which have city or federation-sponsored, religiously run day care, many Hasidic children are placed in day care facilities.

Single-Parent Jewish Families

The number of Jewish single-parent families, like the number of divorces, seems deceptively small at first glance. Single-parent families occupy relatively small percentages in the number of Jewish *households* in each city, but, because of the generally low Jewish birthrate, they are a significant factor in the number of *households with children*. Nationwide, an estimated third of Jewish children live in homes which have been touched by divorce, with approximately 10 percent living in single-parent homes and approximately 20 percent living in homes in which at least one parent has been divorced. Although only 5 percent of Miami[64] Jewish households were headed by a single parent, for example, 18 percent of the households with children were single-parent families. In Pittsburgh,[65] 5 percent of all households were single-parent families, but 12 percent of households with children fell into that category. While Denver[66] Jewish households included only 4 percent single-parent families, one out of every seven Jewish families with children under 18 in Denver was a single-parent household. Thirty percent of New York's Jewish households fell into the traditional two parents with children configuration; only 4 percent were single-parent families—but that 4 percent translated into 27,300 single-parent households, hardly an insignificant number.[67]

These families have some unique problems, for Jewish life cycle celebrations

can pull children of some single-parent or blended families in two directions. Children of single-parent families sometimes have difficulty dealing with the Jewish emphasis on family, particularly around holiday time.[68] In response, some Jewish institutions have begun to support programs to help broken families arrange life cycle celebrations with a minimum of trauma.

In the majority of cases, for Jews as well as non-Jews, the single-parent household is headed by a woman. Often this means that the financial base of the parent/child unit is severely diminished. As illustrated earlier, in table 5.4, divorced women usually have a much smaller annual income from earnings than divorced men do. While paternal child-care payments, when they are assigned and complied with, can help to alleviate low maternal earnings, national studies show that child-care payments usually are a small fraction of paternal earnings.[69] Single-parent mothers remain as a group among the least affluent members of the Jewish community, often even when they are working full-time.

Social and emotional factors as well as financial factors complicate life for the Jewish single-parent mother. In a sense, the Jewish emphasis on family works against those whose families are no longer intact by making it difficult for them to find a niche in the community and making them feel even more isolated. When the Jewish single parent reaches out to the Jewish community, she may have difficulty finding a supportive peer group. The call for responsiveness from the Jewish community is legion among single parents. Women in Oakland, California, complained that mothers emerging from divorce "should get help in finding affordable housing and day care—the same help immigrant families get. Single mothers are the new poor in the society."[70]

Single parenthood complicates not only the functioning of the fragmented nuclear family, but also the relationship between parents and grandparents. Divorced children may be less responsive to their aging parents, both emotionally and financially. In addition, as Hofstein points out, "The single parent is often thrown back into a dependency relationship with her own parents." He quotes Nehauer's observations that a divorced woman's "parents may add to her emotional burden by feeling sorry for her and worrying about her future. It is not uncommon for a parent to say to a daughter, 'Before I die, I would like to see you happily married again.'"[71]

Intermarriage

For American Jews, who now face a shrinking Jewish population due to the twin forces of intermarriage and assimilation, concerns about the religious identity of children raised in Jewish homes is particularly pronounced today. Intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews in the United States is now commonplace. The propensity of Jews to marry non-Jews was extremely low until the mid-1960s, but rose sharply thereafter and continued to climb in the 1980s. As a result, in many Jewish communities, among those marrying in recent years, there are more outmarriages than inmarriages.

This change in the underlying social and religious structure of the American Jewish community has important implications. Marriage to non-Jews has increased partially because of the successful integration of Jews into American society and their achievement of a high level of social acceptance. However, intermarriage may reflect and contribute to the decline of Judaism in America.

The subject of intermarriage evokes considerable passion among Jews because it arouses fears about elemental issues of group survival. One aspect of the matter is quantitative: the offspring of intermarriage may not remain Jewish; within one or two generations there may be fewer Jews and a greatly weakened Jewish community. Another aspect is qualitative: even if intemarriage does not lead to a decrease in the physical number of persons living in households with a Jewish parent, questions remain as to their Jewishness, i.e., the intensity of their communal affiliation, ethnic identification, and religious practice.[72]

Observers differ widely in their perceptions of the consequences of the intermarriage phenomenon.[73] At one end of the spectrum are scholars who are comparatively pessimistic, some of whom predict the eventual disappearance of a distinctive Jewish community, seeing only the survival of the Orthodox. At the end of the spectrum are scholars who are relatively optimistic, who discern the transformation and even revitalization of the American Jewish community. Rising rates of intermarriage, the latter argue, provide an opportunity to strengthen the ranks of American Jewry through an infusion of new blood or "imports"— the born non-Jewish spouses and their children.

We do have certain numerical facts about the rates of intermarriage.

Although intermarriage increases dramatically among younger American Jews, rates of conversion fall. Mixed marriage is five times higher among Jews 18 to 34 than it is among those over 55. Almost one-third of Jews who married out in the 1970s have spouses who converted into Judaism, but only 13 percent of those who married out in the 1980s have spouses who are now Jews by choice.

The occurrence of intermarriage is not random. The likelihood that persons will marry out and will not be married to a Jew by choice follows certain patterns. Non-Jewish women are still far more likely than non-Jewish men to become Jews by choice. More than matrilineal descent is at work here. Jews who marry out—especially women who marry out, marry substantially later than Jews who marry in. Jewish women who marry Jewish men have a mean marriage age of 23.2 years; those who marry non-Jewish men have a mean age of 26 years. It seems very likely that conflicting feelings about marital choices may often enter into these later marriages.

A factor which is no longer salient to mixed marriage—or, to be more precise, is salient in the opposite ways than it used to be—is educational, occupational and income grouping. When men—and it was then mostly men—married out in the 1950s and 1960s, they were most likely to be the most highly educated, highly placed professionally, and affluent men. Marrying out was a way up the ladder of social mobility. Today, just the opposite is true. Now that Jews are largely highly

educated, professional, and affluent, Jews who marry out are far more likely to be less educated, less professional, and less affluent. It is possible that they feel more accepted in non-Jewish than in Jewish social circles.

Intensive Jewish education is clearly associated with a reduced likelihood of marrying out. Persons receiving more than six years of either supplementary school education or day school education are dramatically less likely than persons receiving more minimal forms of Jewish education to marry a non-Jew. Day school education is associated with reduced likelihood of mixed marriage no matter in which branch of Judaism the person had been raised. The clear association between Jewish education and inmarried is strongest among younger American Jews. Overall, about one-fifth of Jews ages 25 to 44 who had received six or more years of day school education married non-Jews, compared to half of those who had received six or more years of supplementary school, and three-fifths of Jews who had received supplementary school or Sunday school. Two-thirds of those who received no Jewish education married non-Jews.[74] In addition, those who received extensive Jewish education were much more likely than those who had not to have spouses who converted to Judaism, rather than remaining non-Jews.

Moreover, the impact of Jewish education carries over to the next generation. Ninety-five percent of inmarried Jews provide their children with some Jewish education, as do 86 percent of conversionary families, while only 41 percent of married couples did so. Many Jews feel ambivalent about Judaism, but ambivalent is not the same as ambiguous. Whatever conflicts and/or hostilities a Jew carries vis-à-vis Judaism and/or the Jewish people, he or she feels at the core of being Jewish—not part Jewish and part Christian.

Today, group membership has become voluntary. Americans, living in an open society, are not compelled to remain tied either physically or emotionally to the ethnic and religious groups from which they derived. They may—and do—choose to move away from their group of origin by obtaining their schooling and their employment in a mixed environment, by living in a mixed neighborhood, by abandoning practices which distinguish and separate their ethnic or religious group, and by marrying persons who derive from a different heritage. Boundaries which in many societies seemed fixed are quite permeable in America today. While it is fashionable to celebrate "roots" and the maintaining of ethnic ties, powerful social forces act to diminish and even obliterate those very ties.

Nevertheless, many Jews do struggle to maintain ties with Judaism and the Jewish people. Being Jewish is very important to many individuals: they express considerable Jewish pride, are comfortable with their Jewishness, are happy that they were born Jewish, relate to other Jews as family, and want their children to remain Jewish. Popular religious observances—i.e., those relating to *rites de passage* and the holidays—continue to provide personal identity with its group aspects, a vehicle for expressing shared feelings in familial and communal contexts, which reinforce and heighten the positive emotional affect of group belonging at the core of personal identity. In the United States, being Jewish rather

than Christian separates Jews. In Robert Bellah's words, "It is part of Jewish identity and the maintenance of the boundaries of the Jewish community to deny that Jesus is the Christ, the Messiah."[75] Paradoxically, as the religious aspects of Judaism have become relatively less central to the core of Jewish identity, and shared feelings have become more important, being *not* Christian has taken on greater salience as a defining element of Jewishness.[76]

Mixed marriage involves a very different situation. A mixed family creates an environment for identity formation that is founded on the competing heritages of the Jewish and the non-Jewish spouses, both of which enter into the child's core identity. Mixed marriage thus not only decreases the likelihood that an unambiguous Jewish identity will be formed, but also raises the possibility that no Jewish identity at all will emerge. As Nathan Glazer has explained, "Their children have alternatives before them that the children of families in which both parents were born Jewish do not—they have legitimate alternative identities."[77] They can incorporate the identity of the Jewish parent, that of the non-Jewish parent, that of both, or that of neither. Identifying wholly with one parent may prove traumatic to the extent that it involves the rejection of the other parent, as well as part of the self. Maintaining both identities simultaneously may create tensions and conflicts. The most commonly chosen solution is to identify with neither parent religiously and focus instead on shared general, secular values.

Since *not* being Christian is a major defining element of Jewish identity, the creation of an unambiguous Jewish identity entails the absence from the home of Christian symbols and practices, even if the level of Jewish identification is low. Inmarrieds shun Christian symbols: 98 percent do not have a Christmas tree. Among conversionary marrieds, 78 percent do not have a Christmas tree while 22 percent do. In contrast, among mixed-marrieds, 62 percent have a Christmas tree while 38 percent do not. Quite strikingly, more mixed-marrieds have Christmas trees than perform any single Jewish ritual.

Geographical Concentration of Jewish Families

Today's American Jewish families are frequently physically divided along chronological and marital status lines into homogeneous colonies. This movement of specific Jewish populations into particular metropolitan areas represents a departure from earlier Jewish mobility. Jews have long been upwardly mobile, moving, often unidirectionally, from depresssed urban areas to more pleasant urban or suburban areas. The "Jewish" neighborhood typically traveled, with as many of its denizens as could afford the move, into outlying districts. The young, the middle-aged, and the elderly lived side by side, although the style and quality of their housing might vary considerably.

Contemporary Jewish communities, however, exhibit patterns of "specialization": single persons and childless dual-career couples occupy revitalized urban

areas, families seek out suburban or exurban areas, and the elderly either move to communities specifically designed for their needs or are left behind in less desirable urban areas in neighborhoods largely devoid of Jewish youth.

As table 4.6 illustrates, for example, the 1981 New York Jewish population study, found dramatic divisions between population types in the eight counties. In the Bronx, which once had a vibrant Jewish population but which is now an economically depressed area, senior citizens comprised almost a third of the Jewish population, while less than one-fifth were two-parent families, and one-tenth were singles. In Brooklyn and Queens, long-standing residential communities with both apartment dwellings and private homes, nearly a third of the Jewish households were families, while approximately one-fifth were singles or young couples. Suffolk and Staten Island, the newest areas of settlement, had the highest proportion of dependent children, with approximately two-fifths of the Jewish population under the age of twenty. Only 3 percent of Staten Island's Jewish households were single, but 59 percent in Staten Island and 63 percent in Suffolk were two-parent families. In Nassau and Westchester, affluent residential communities, the under-20 population comprised 29 percent of the total Jewish community. Manhattan had a disproportionate number of singles and childless couples, with those two groups comprising almost half of the Jewish households. Forty percent of Manhattan's population were married, but only 16 percent had children under eighteen. Of those who have children, over half had one child and over one-third had two children, with less than 10 percent having three or more children.[78]

Cities that attract singles also tend to attract couples who have no children or very small families. While the number of Los Angeles Jewish never-marrieds fell to just under 4 percent in the 40–59 age category, for example, over 40 percent of Jewish households in the 40–59 cohort were married with no children under 18, and more than 15 percent were separated or divorced with no children. One can speculate that the atmosphere in many such communities stress both professional

TABLE 4.6
Geographical Concentration of Family Types in Greater New York

Household	*Bronx*	*Brooklyn*	*Manhattan*	*Queens*	*Staten Island*	*Nassau*	*Suffolk*	*Westchester*
Young singles	10	12	35	13	3	8	7	7
Young couples	8	9	12	9	13	6	10	9
Conventional families	18	28	13	25	59	50	63	42
Singe parents	3	5	3	4	4	4	5	4
Mature couples	34	28	16	35	13	28	12	28
Mature singles	21	18	21	14	8	4	3	10

achievement and enjoyment of the "good life" and offers little impetus for the sacrifice of either in order to maintain a marriage or raise a family. As the authors of the Los Angeles study comment:

> In general, one is struck by the overall absence of households with children. When all family types with children are combined overall, only 28.3 percent of all Los Angeles Jewish households have children under 18 in the household. Even in San Valley, which has the highest proportion of children, less than half (41.6 percent) of all the households include a child under 18. This is caused in part by delaying marriage, in part by delayed child bearing, and in part by some couples who have decided not to have children at all.[79]

A similar point might be made about Denver, a locale with many younger adults. When taken as a whole, nearly 60 percent of Denver Jewish households are married couples—but only one-quarter of these married couples have children under 18. Even in the 30–39 and 40–49 ages cohorts, less than half of Denver's married Jewish couples have children under 18.[80]

Childbearing: The Contemporary Jewish Family and Fertility

Jewish communities across the country, concerned with the prognosis for Jewish family life in their area, have compiled figures on the number of children under 20 and on the sizes and configurations of Jewish households. Those community studies which ask respondents about the number of children in the household have generally asked how many children the couple *expects to have* and combined these figures with existing children for inclusion in the study (see table 4.7.)

Choosing parenthood is often correlated with the strength of a woman's Jewish connections and behaviors. Data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Study show that women who identify themselves as "Jewish by religion" are much more likely to have children than women who consider themselves to be secular Jews. Being a Jewish mother is also strongly associated with belonging to a synagogue, belonging to and working for Jewish organizations, making donations to Jewish charitable causes, having mostly Jewish friends, observing Jewish holidays, and seeing Judaism as a "very important" aspect of one's life. Women who call themselves Orthodox are more likely than others in the same age group to be married and have children; as a group, Orthodox women alone are currently having children above replacement (2.1 children per family) levels. Conservative women expect to have more children than Reform women, but among 35- to 44-year-old Conservative and Reform women few differences in actual family size exist.[81]

Despite differences between particular groups of women, there are sweeping changes in patterns of childbearing among large segments of the American Jewish population. With the exception that larger proportions of non-Jewish white women have children in their early twenties than do Jewish women, patterns of

TABLE 4.7
Family Formation Status of American Jewish Women, Percentages by Professional Status (Data Drawn from 1990 NJP Respondents Born or Raised Jewish)

Occupational Status Level	*No Children*	*Children 18 or under*	*Children 19 or over*
High-status professionals	15%	11%	7%
Helping professions	24%	28%	16%
Managerial position	13%	13%	14%
Clerical/technical	35%	37%	56%
Service positions	9%	9%	7%
Totals[a]	96%	8%	100%

a. Totals shown may be greater than or less than 100% because they are rounded.

Source: Sylvia Barack Fishman, *A Breath of Life: Feminism in the American Jewish Community* (New York: Free Press 1993).

childbearing among Jewish and non-Jewish women are similar.[82] Changes in marriage patterns have affected both the timing and the size of today's families. In 1990, 93 percent of Jewish women ages 18 to 24 had not yet had children. More than half of those ages 25 to 34 (55 percent) had no children. Among Jewish women ages 35 to 44, one out of four had no children. While almost all American Jewish women ages 45 or over reported having children, either biological or adopted, it is not clear that all or even most of the 24 percent of childless women in the 35 to 44 age group will in fact achieve the status of motherhood. As a result of delayed marriage and childbirth, the societal preference for smaller families, and unwanted infertility, most demographers now estimate the completed size of the contemporary Jewish family to average fewer than two children per married household.[83]

The vast majority of Jewish women still place an enormous value on having children. Jewish women are less likely than any other religious or ethnic group to state that they wish to remain childless.[84] Most American Jewish couples hope to have children "someday." Unlike women of other ethnic groups, where higher education is associated with lower expectations of childbearing, the more highly educated a Jewish woman, the more children she expects to have. Calvin Goldschieder and Francis Kobrin Goldscheider, relying on data which deal with expected family size, point out that among Jewish populations—unlike among Protestants and Catholics—"educational attainment is directly rather than inversely related to the fertility expectations." Thus, "Jews with doctorates expect 2.2 children and only 11 percent expect to be childless; Jews with 'only' college degrees expect only 1.8 children and 21 percent expect to be childless." In contrast, the reverse pattern is true of highly educated Protestants and Catholic women.[85]

However, highly educated Jewish women do not actually have as many children as they once expected to. Although Jewish career women are more committed to having families than any other group of career women, they are at least as likely as other white middle-class women to delay the onset of childbearing until they have reached what they consider to be an appropriate level of financial or occupational achievement. Expectations do not always give way to reality. Jewish women ages 16 to 26 years old who were interviewed in a national study in 1969–70 expected to have an average of 2.5 children; that cohort, today ages 35 to 44, have in fact borne an average of 1.5 children and expect an average of 1.7 children completed family size.[86] Contrary to the expectations of both women and demographers, "as education increases among both Jewish men and women, the proportion with no children increases." Indeed, "among those with a master's degree . . . Jews have significantly higher levels of childlessness than non-Jews."[87]

Recent data demonstrate that in many types of communities younger Jewish women are in fact beginning their families at measurably later ages than middle-aged women did. The ages at which today's mothers begin their families are similar to those of women ages 65 to 75, who married during the Depression.

Often, such childlessness is unintentional. When a couple conscientiously uses birth control as part of "family planning," they do not imagine that one day promoting conception rather than preventing it will be problematic. Despite insistence by some feminists that the specter of infertility has been exaggerated as part of an anti-woman "backlash,"[88] fertility is not an even playing field bounded on one side by menarche and on the other by menopause. For reasons still not clearly understood by the medical community, some women who easily conceive and carry pregnancies to term in their twenties have problems with conception and gestation in their later years. Moreover, even among those couples who would suffer from infertility at any age, beginning the process of trying to conceive earlier gives them and infertility specialists more time to work with and more chance of a successful outcome.

Additionally, the change in lifestyles inflicted by an infant upon older parents may be experienced as more disruptive than upon a more flexible younger couple. The classic comment of younger parents was that they "grew up" with their children. In contrast, an older mother of one interviewed in *The New York Times* cogently summarized the problem:

> There are all the problems of getting older. Running after a toddler in the street when I was in my late 30s didn't fit my image of myself at that age. And I used to force naps to compensate for my own loss of physical energy. . . . If I had it to do over again, I would probably have had one earlier in my 30s and at least one more right away.[89]

Under such circumstances, couples who had indicated that they wanted two children may decide they are better off with one.

Conclusion

The "typical" American Jewish household today is more likely than not to be atypical in some way. Proportions of older, single, divorced, remarried, or dual-career households make up more of the Jewish population than intact young families with children. First, the elderly are the fastest growing cohort among the American Jewish population. Within this cohort, the young-old, aged 60–75, and the old-old, aged 75 and over, often comprise different kinds of "families" and have different effects on household structure. The great majority of older Jews, both couples and singles, live in their own households rather than with relatives: in Milwaukee, for example, less than 2 percent of Jewish households were composed of an elderly person living with children or other younger relatives.[90] In Los Angeles, 6 percent of persons over age 65 lived with others;[91] and in Phoenix, 5 percent of older Jews live with adult children.[92] As the frailer old-old population increases, however, this situation may change. Regardless of where they live, older couples and older singles will be increasingly prominent among American Jewish families.

The impact of changes in educational and occupational patterns on the American Jewish family appears to be continuing. Singles will probably maintain an important presence among Jewish families as young adults use their 20s and 30s to pursue career goals and self-development. In addition, it seems unlikely that American Jewish women will abandon educational and career opportunities; they will probably continue to marry later and bear their children later than earlier generations. As Jewish women retain career commitments even during their childbearing years, the dual-career family may become even more normative.

No aspect of contemporary American life has aroused as much anxiety and debate in the Jewish community as changes in family formation. Many American Jews feel caught between two value systems, between an individualistic American ethos which gives priority to an individual's talents, strengths, and opportunities, and Jewish tradition, which gives priority to the needs of the family unit and the community first. The transformed Jewish family—like the transformed American family—has been influenced not only by feminism but by widespread cultural attitudes which stress individual achievement and pleasure; by materialistic expectations that elevate the perceived standard of what a "middle-class" lifestyle comprises; by a tightening economic market requiring dual incomes to maintain middle-class lifestyles; by the easy availability of contraceptive techniques and by the accompanying sexual revolution; and by patterns of chronological separation that split families by sending adolescents to far-off university campuses and grandparents to the sunbelt.

Individualism, with all the increased opportunities it has opened up, has not lessened the desire of American Jews to form families. Indeed, most American

Jews either have children or report that they hope to have children. Individualism has, however, changed the timing of childbearing, and has had a negative impact on the actual size of Jewish families. Rising rates of divorce, also part of our individualistic society, have created a situation in which one-third of Jewish children live in homes which have been touched by divorce: about 10 percent of Jewish children live in single-parent homes and 20 percent live in households in which at least one spouse has been divorced. Increasingly, moreover, the families which Jews form are not exclusively Jewish families. About one-third of children born to Jews today live in households in which one spouse does not consider him/herself to be a Jew.

The changed lifestyles of American Jewish men and women today have had a powerful, and probably permanent, impact on the character of the American Jewish family. And yet, despite the individualism which permeates American life, recent research indicates that Jews continue to value the creation of a happy home. Brodbar-Nemzer has shown that Jews are more likely than other ethnic groups to consider themselves successful human beings when they enjoy marital satisfaction and more likely to suffer a loss of self-esteem when they experience marital instability or divorce.[93] Jewish families have faced many challenges in the past—challenges which were usually evoked by adversity rather than prosperity. Today, however, Jewish families face the challenge of retaining their vitality and cohesion while responding to the opportunities of an individualistic and open society.

Notes

1. This article, which is based on data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey and recent studies of Jewish populations in individual communities, also includes substantial information from my earlier essay on the subject, "The Changing American Jewish Family in the 80s," *Contemporary Jewry* 9, no. 2 (1988), pp. 1–33. Special thanks are due to my colleagues at the Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University, especially to the following: Marshall Sklare, of blessed memory, who introduced me to the sociological study of the Jews; Gary Tobin and Lawrence Sternberg, for their ongoing support for and interest in my work on the Jewish family; research assistants Gabrielle Garschina and Miriam Hertz for their competent performance of a variety of tasks; and Sylvia Riese, executive secretary, who was of invaluable assistance in expediting the revisions of this essay.

   A portion of an earlier version of this essay, "The Changing Jewish Family of the 1980's," appeared in *Contemporary Jewry* 9, no. 2 (fall 1988): 1–33. The author is grateful for permission to reprint.
2. National statistics on the Jewish community in the United States are drawn from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, conducted under the auspices of the council of Jewish Federations. The first national study of American Jews undertaken since 1970, the 1990 NJPS studied some 6500 individuals in 2440 households, which were found after extensive screening through random digit dialing techniques. These households represent Jews across the country living in communities of diverse sizes

and composition. A summary of the findings is provided by Barry Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York: Council of Jewish Federations, 1991). All nationwide figures for the American Jewish population in 1970 in this essay are derived from the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS). Unless otherwise noted, data from individual city studies are drawn from the following sources: Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, *The 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1981); Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey Overview for Regional Planning* (Los Angeles, 1980); Allied Jewish Federation of Denver, *The Denver Jewish Population Study* (Denver, 1981); Lois Geer, *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community* (St. Paul, 1981); Lois Geer, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study* (Minneapolis, 1981); Population Research Committee, *Survey of Cleveland's Jewish Population*, 1981 (Cleveland, 1981); Ira M. Sheskin, *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community* (Miami, 1982); Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1982); Bruce A. Phillips and William S. Aron, *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study* (Phoenix, 1984–85); Bruce A. Phillips, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population Study* (Milwaukee, 1984); Nancy Hendrix, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Nashville and Middle Tennessee* (Nashville, 1982); Ann Shorr, Jewish Community Federation of Cleveland, and Jane Berkey and Saul Weisberg, United Federation of Greater Pittsburgh, *Survey of Greater Pittsburgh's Jewish Population*, 1984; Gary A. Tobin, Joseph Waksberg, and Janet Greenblatt, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington* (Washington, D.C., 1984); Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore*, 1986; Gary A. Tobin and Sylvia Barack Fishman, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Worcester*, 1987; Gary A. Tobin and Sylvia Barack Fishman, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Rochester*, 1988. Percentages in this paper have been rounded from .5 to the next highest number.

3. U. O. Schmeltz and S. DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book* (1983), pp. 148–49.
4. Peggy Wireman, *Urban Neighborhoods, Networks, and Families: New Forms for Old Values* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Health and Company, (1984), p. 6.
5. We define "universal marriage" to be 95 percent or over ever-married, regardless of the ultimate disposition of that marriage.
6. Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey Overview for Regional Planning* (Los Angeles, 1980), p. 11.
7. Allied Jewish Federation of Denver, *The Denver Jewish Population Study* (Denver, 1981), pp. 14, 40.
8. Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of American, 1976), p. 236.
9. Gary A. Tobin, Joseph Waksberg, and Janet Greenblatt, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington* (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 45.
10. Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, *The 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Study* (New York, 1981), p. II–11.
11. Bruce A. Phillips, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population Study* (Milwaukee, 1984), p. II–12.
12. William Novak, "Are Good Jewish Men a Vanishing Breed?" *Moment* 5, no. 2 (Jan./Feb., 1980), pp. 14–20.

13. See Sylvia Barack Fishman, *A Breath of Life: Feminism in the American Jewish Community* (New York: Free Press, 1993).
14. Among numerous newspaper articles and advertisements for Jewish dating services, see B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "For Jewish Only: A Computer Dating Service," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1974; Judith L. Kuper, "2000 Singles Enrolled in Dating Service," *The Jewish Post and Opinion*, July 16, 1976; Yitta Halberstam, "Today's Shadchan: Popular and Expensive," *Jewish Week*, July 31, 1977.
15. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *Community News Reporter*, April 11, 1986.
16. Christie Balka and Andy Rose, *Twice Blessed: On Being Lesbian and Gay and Jewish* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
17. Robert Gordis, *Love and Sex: A Modern Jewish Perspective* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), p. 23.
18. Debra Renee Kaufman, *Rachel's Daughter: Newly Orthodox Jewish Women* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991), p. 125.
19. Sharon K. Houseknecht, Suzanne Vaughan, and Anne S. Macke, "Marital Disruption among Professional Women: The Timing of Career and Family Events," *Social Problems*, February 1984, pp. 273–83.
20. Judith S. Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, *Second Chances: Men, Women and Children a Decade after Divorce—Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989).
21. Ari L. Goldman, *The Search for God at Harvard* (New York: Times Books and Random House, 1991).
22. Blu Greenberg, "Zero Population Growth: Feminism and Jewish Survival," *Hadassah Magazine*, October, 1978, pp. 12–33, p. 29. Excerpted from *On Women and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1979).
23. Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles*, 1980, p. 9.
24. *Denver*, 1981, p. 44.
25. Phillips, *Los Angeles*, 1980, p. 44.
26. Gary A. Tobin et al., *Greater Washington*, 1984, p. 45.
27. Bruce A. Phillips and William S. Aron, *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study* (Phoenix, 1983–1984), p. IV–7.
28. Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1982), p. 26.
29. Judith Lang, "Divorce and the Jewish Woman: A Family Agency Approach," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 54, no. 3 (1978), p. 12.
30. Thomas P. Ronan, "A Program for Men Facing the Traumas of Marriage's End," *The New York Times*, December 30, 1976; Andree Brooks, "When Older Men Divorce," *The New York Times*, October 12, 1984; Herme Shore, "Only for Men! Who've Been Hurt," *The Jewish Week–American Examiner*, June 17, 1979.
31. Jay Brodbar-Nemzer, "Divorce in the Jewish Community: The Impact of Jewish Commitment," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, 61 (winter 1984), pp. 150–59.
32. Rabbi Nahum Josephy, executive vice-president of the Rabbinical Alliance of America and secretary of its rabbinical court, quoted in Ben Gallob, "Divorce among Orthodox on Rise," *The Jewish Advocate*, July 17, 1975.
33. Wallerstein and Blakeslee, *Second Chances*.
34. Sheila Pelz Weinberg, "The Jewish Single-Parent Family," *Response* 14, no. 4 (spring 1985), pp. 77–84.

35. *Denver*, 1981, p. 31; Ira M. Sheskin, *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community* (Miami, 1981), p. 84; Bruce A. Phillips, *Milwaukee*, 1984, p. II–1.
36. Barbara S. Cain, "Plight of the Gray Divorcee," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 19, 1982; Sharon Johnson, "Expectations Higher; Many Long-Married Couples Are Divorcing," *The New York Times*.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Ritterband and Cohen, *New York*, 1981, p. II–9.
39. Phillips, *Milwaukee*, p. III–5.
40. Tobin, *St. Louis*, p. 44.
41. Barbara Meyerhoff, *Number Our Days* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).
42. David Reisman, "Two Generations," *Daedalus* 92, no. 2 (spring 1964), pp. 711–35.
43. Charles Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: Summit Books, 1985), p. 123. See also Abraham D. Lavender, "Jewish College Women: Future Leaders of the Jewish Community," *The Journal of Ethnic Studies*, 52 (summer 1976).
44. Gary A. Tobin and Sylvia Barack Fishman, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Worcester*, 1987, pp. 70–71.
45. Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 88.
46. Population Research Committee, *Survey of Cleveland's Jewish Population*, 1981, p. 38.
47. Gabriel Berger and Lawrence Sternberg, *Jewish Child Care: A Challenge and an Opportunity*, Research Report No. 3 (Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 1988), p. 21.
48. Ruth Pinkenson Feldman, *Child Care in Jewish Family Policy* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1980).
49. Survey conducted by the Public Affairs Division of Market Facts, Inc., for B'nai B'rith Women, Inc., polled almost 1000 Jewish and non-Jewish women from across the U.S. Cited in "Jewish Women See Role Differently," *The Jewish Advocate*, Boston, June 20, 1985.
50. Lois Geer, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study*, Minneapolis, 1981.
51. See, for example, Aileen Cohen Nusbacher, "The Orthodox Jewish Professional Woman," M.A. thesis in the Department of Sociology, Brooklyn College, January 1977.
52. Dana Vannoy-Hiller and William W. Philliber, *Equal Partners: Successful Women in Marriage* (Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications/Sage Library of Social Research 174, 1989), pp. 120–22.
53. Linda Gordon Kuzmack and George Salomon, *Working and Mothering: A Study of 97 Jewish Career Women with Three or More Children* (The National Jewish Family Center, The American Jewish Family Center, The American Jewish Committee, 1982). The research began with a questionnaire sent to 383 women selected from membership rosters of synagogues and Jewish community centers, lists of contributors to United Jewish Appeal and Federation, participants in Jewish education courses, and names suggested by early respondents to the questionnaire. Ninety-seven women completed the questionnaire, of whom thirty were later interviewed in depth.
54. Kuzmack and Salomon, *Working and Mothering*, p. 23.
55. See Rhea Karlin, "Challenges to the Jewish Family: A Jewish Single-Parent Family," American Jewish Committee Annual Meeting, November 1978; Weinberg, "The

Jewish Single Parent Family"; and Shirley Frank, "The Population Panic: Why Jewish Leaders Want Women to Be Fruitful and Multiply," *Lilith* 14 (winter/fall 1978), pp. 12–17.

56. Jane Berkey and Saul Weisberg, United Federation of Greater Pittsburgh, *Survey of Greater Pittsburgh's Jewish Population*, 1984, p. 27.
57. Andrew M. Greeley, "Further Commentary on the Michigan Cross-Generational Data," National Opinion Research Center for the Study of American Pluralism, October 31, 1973.
58. Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 87–89.
59. United Federation of Greater Pittsburgh, p. 9.
60. See Anita Shreve, "Careers and the Lure of Motherhood," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1982; Arlene Rossen Cardozo, *Women at Home* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), and *Sequencing* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1986); and Deborah Fallows, *A Mother's Work* (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 1985).
61. Michael Graubart Levin, *Journey to Tradition: The Odyssey of a Born-Again Jew* (Hoboken, N.J., 1986).
62. Fredda M. Herz and Elliot J. Rosen, "Jewish Families," in McGoldrick, Pearce, and Giordano, eds., *Ethnicity and Family Therapy* (New York, 1982), p. 366.
63. Israel Rubin, *Satmar: An Island in the City* (Chicago, 1972).
64. Sheskin, *Greater Miami*, 1981, p. 91.
65. Berkey and Weisberg, *Pittsburgh*, 1984, p. 28.
66. *Denver*, 1981, p. 21.
67. Ritterband and Cohen, *New York*, 1981, p. II–9.
68. Sylvia Barack Fishman, "Challenge for Jewish Educators: Children of the Fragmented Family," *Ideas on Jewish Education* (June 1983), pp. 1–8.
69. See Gary A. Tobin and Ingrid Lomfors, "The Feminization of Poverty among Jews," unpublished manuscript, Center for Modern Jewish Studies; Lenore J. Weitzman, "The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards," *UCLA Law Review*, no. 28 (November 1981); Ellen Max, "Divorce Is a Financial Disaster for Women and Children," *The Women's Advocate* (September 1982). Tobin and Lomfors write:

    > . . . the standard of living for women decreased by 73% during the first year after a divorce. At the same time, that standard of living for men increased by 42%. After divorce, the child support payments from the father are inadequate. Forty percent pay nothing and those who do pay average less than $2100 per year. Furthermore, in 1975 half the fathers who did pay support were contributing less than 10% of their income. In the cases where the child support payments were made, they decreased sharply after the first three years. (pp. 15–16)

70. "Single Parents Demand Services," *The Jewish Advocate*, May 3, 1984.
71. Saul Hofstein, "Perspectives on the Single Family," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, Spring 1978, p. 236.
72. Peter Y. Medding, Gary A. Tobin, Sylvia Barack Fishman, and Mordechai Rimor, "Jewish Identity in Conversionary and Mixed Marriages," *American Jewish Year Book 1992* (New York: American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication Society, 1992) [chapter 12 in this volume].
73. Interpersonal relationships in intermarried households are explored in Paul and

Rachel Cowan, *Mixed Blessings: Marriage Between Jews and Christians* (New York, 1987) and in Susan Weidman Schneider, *Intermarriage: The Challenge of Living with Differences between Christians and Jews* (New York, 1989).

74. Sylvia Barack Fishman and Alice Goldstein, *When They Are Grown They Will Not Depart: Jewish Education and the Jewish Behavior of American Adults*, a joint publication of the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies and the Jewish Educational Service of North America (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University CMJS Research Report, 1993).
75. Robert N. Bellah, "Competing Visions of the Role of Religion in American Society," in *Uncivil Religion: Interreligious Hostility in America*, eds. Robert N. Bellah and Frederick E. Greenspahn (New York, 1987), p. 228.
76. Medding et al., "Jewish Identity," p. 17.
77. Nathan Glazer, *New Perspectives in American Jewish Sociology* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1987), p. 13.
78. Ritterband and Cohen, *New York*, 1981, p. II–2.
79. Phillips, *Los Angeles*, 1980, pp. 8–11.
80. *Denver*, 1981, pp. 16, 20, 43.
81. Frank Mott and Joyce Abma, "Contemporary Jewish Fertility: Does Religion Make a Difference?" *Contemporary Jewry*, Spring 1993.
82. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990. Current Population Reports, Series P-20 No. 436, *Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office); and 1989, Current Population Reports, Series P-20 No. 436, *Fertility of Americans: June 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office); and 1988, Current Population Reports, Series P-20 No. 428, *Educational Attainment in the United States: March 1987 and 1986* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
83. Uziel Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, Israeli demographers who study trends in the international Jewish population, estimate that married American Jewish women are having about 1.5 children; if unmarried Jewish women are included, they estimate 1.3 total fertility for American Jewish women over age 20 (U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book, 1983* [New York and Philadelphia: American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983], p. 154). They find marital fertility for the years 1970–76 to be 1.5 children per Jewish woman, with only a 1.3 total fertility rate for all Jewish women, regardless of marital status. However, it is very likely that Schmelz and DellaPergola's figures underestimate the completed fertility levels of American Jewish women, because they include women ages 20 and over. In contemporary American Jewish society, only tiny numbers of Jewish women marry before their mid-20s, except in right-of-center Orthodox circles. Thus, it may be valid to begin fertility estimates at age 20 among Jewish women in Israel or other more traditional societies, but among American Jewish women fertility statistics should probably begin with women not younger than age 24.
84. Calvin Goldscheider and Frances K. Goldscheider, "The Transition to Jewish Adulthood: Education, Marriage, and Fertility," paper for the 10th World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1989, pp. 17–20.
85. Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 92–98.

86. Mott and Abma, "Contemporary Jewish Fertility."
87. Goldscheider and Goldscheider, "The Transition to Jewish Adulthood," pp. 17–20.
88. Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War against American Women* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1991), pp. 27–29.
89. Nadine Brozan, "Women Who Waited: Starting a Family after the Age of 30," *The New York Times*, September 23, 1977.
90. Phillips, *Milwaukee*, 1984, p. III–3.
91. Phillips, *Los Angeles*, 1980, p. 24.
92. Phillips and Aron, *Phoenix*, 1983–84, p. III–3.
93. Jay Brodbar-Nemzer, "Divorce in the Jewish Community: The Impact of Jewish Commitment," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 61 (winter 1984), pp. 89–98.

References

I. Jewish Population Studies

Geer, Lois. *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study*. Minneapolis, 1981.

———. *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community*. St. Paul, 1981.

Hedrix, Nancy. *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Nashville and Middle Tennessee*. Nashville, 1982.

Phillips, Bruce A. *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey Overview for Regional Planning*. Los Angeles, 1980.

———. *The Milwaukee Jewish Population Study*. Milwaukee, 1984.

Phillips, Bruce A., and William S. Aron. *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study*. Phoenix, 1983–84.

Population Research Committee. *Survey of Cleveland's Jewish Population, 1981*. Cleveland, 1981.

Ritterband, Paul, and Steven M. Cohen. *The 191 Greater New York Jewish Population Survey*. New York, 1981.

Sheskin, Ira M. *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community*. Miami, 1981.

Shorr, Ann, Jewish Community Federation of Cleveland, and Anne Berkey and Saul Weisberg, United Federation of Greater Pittsburgh. *Survey of Greater Pittsburgh's Jewish Population*, 1984.

Tobin, Gary A. *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis*. St. Louis, 1982.

———. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore*. Baltimore, 1986.

Tobin, Gary A., Joseph Waksberg, and Janet Greenblatt. *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington*. Washington, D.C., 1984.

Tobin, Gary A., and Sylvia Barack Fishman. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Rochester*, 1987.

———. *Jewish Population Study of Greater Worcester*, 1987.

II. Books and Articles Cited

Ayres, B. Drummond, Jr. "For Jews Only: A Computer Dating Service. *The New York Times*, June 27, 1974.

Brodar-Nemzer, Jay. "Divorce in the Jewish Community: The Impact of Jewish Commitment." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 61 (winter 1984):150–59.

———. "Marital Relationships and Self-Esteem: How Jewish Families Are Different." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48 (February 1986): 89–98.

Brooks, Andree. When Older Men Divorce." *The New York Times*, October 12, 1984.

Brozan, Nadine. "Women Who Waited: Starting a Family after the Age of 30." *The New York Times*, September 23, 1977.

Cain, Barbara S. "Plight of the Gray Divorcee." *The New York Times Magazine,* December 19, 1982.

Cardozo, Arlene Rossen. *Women at Home*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976.

Elazar, Daniel J. *Community and Policy: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1976.

Fallows, Deborah. *A Mother's Work*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.

Fishman, Sylvia Barack. "Challenge for Jewish Educators: Children of the Fragmented Family." *Ideas on Jewish Education*, June 1983, 1–8.

———. "The Changing American Jewish Family in the 80s." *Contemporary American Jewry*, fall 1988.

———. "Marginal No More: Jewish and Single in the 1980s." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, summer 1989.

———. "The Altered American Jewish Family." *USA Today*, Winter 1990.

———. *Jewish Households, Jewish Homes: Servicing Contemporary American Jewish Households*. Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Policy and Planning Paper 4 (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University, 1990).

———. "Into the Mouths of Babes: A Jewish Nursery School Education." *Trends in Jewish Education*, spring 1984.

Gallob, Ben. "Divorce among Orthodox on Rise." *The Jewish Advocate*, July 17, 1975.

Glazer, Nathan. *New Perspectives in American Jewish Sociology.* New York: American Jewish Committee, 1987.

Goldscheider, Calvin. *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Goldstein, Sidney. "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America." In *Modern Jewish Fertility*, Paul Ritterband, ed., pp. 160–208. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981.

Greeley, Andrew M. "Further Commentary on the Michigan Cross-Generational Data." Chicago: National Opinion Research Center for the Study of American Pluralism, 1973.

Halberstam, Yitta. "Today's Shadchan: Popular and Expensive." *Jewish Week*, July 31, 1977.

Herz, Fredda M., and Elliott J. Rosen. "Jewish Families." In McGoldrick, Peace, and Giordano, eds. *Ethnicity and Family Therapy*, p. 366. New York: Guilford Press, 1982.

Holfstein, Saul. "Perspectives On the Jewish Single-Parent Family." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, spring 1978.

"Jewish Population Growth." *The William Petschek National Jewish Family Center Newsletter 4*, no. 1 winter 1984.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency. *Community News Reporter*, April 11, 1986. "Jewish Women See Role Differently." *The Jewish Advocate* (Boston), June 10, 1985.

Johnson, Sharon. "Expectations Higher: Many Long-Married Couples Are Divorcing." *The New York Times*, August 26, 1977.

Kosmin, Barry A., et al. *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey.* New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991.

Kuper, Judith L. "2000 Singles enrolled in Dating Service." *The Jewish Post and Opinion*, July 17, 1976.

Kuzmack, Linda Gordon, and George Salomon. *Working and Mothering: A Study of 97 Jewish Career Women with Three or More Children.* New York: The National Jewish Family Center of the American Jewish Committee, 1980.

Lang, Judith. "Divorce and the Jewish Woman: a Family Agency Approach." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 54, no. 3 (1978).

Levin, Michael Graubart. *Journal to Tradition: The Odyssey of a Born-Again Jew.* Hoboken, N.J.: KTAV Publishing House, 1986.

Max, Ellen. "Divorce Is a Financial Disaster for Women and Children." *The Women's Advocate*, September 1982.

Mayer, Egon. *From Suburb to Shtetl: The Jews of Boro Park.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979.

Myerhoff, Barbara. *Number Our Days.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.

Novak, William. "Are Good Jewish Men a Vanishing Breed?" *Moment* 5, no. 2 (Jan./Feb., 1980):1–20.

Nusbacher, Aileen Cohen. "The Orthodox Jewish Professional Woman." M.A. thesis, Brooklyn College, Department of Sociology January 197.

Reisman, David. "Two Generations." *Daedalus* 92, no. 2 (spring 1964): 711–35.

Ronan, Thomas P. A Program for Men Facing the Traumas of Marriage's End." *The New York Times*, December 30, 1976.

Rubin, Israel. *Satmar: An Island in the City.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Schmelz, U. O., and S. DellaPergola. "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Population Trends." *American Jewish Year Book* (1983):148–49.

Shore, Herme. "Only for Men! Who've Been Hurt." *The Jewish Week–American Examiner*, June 17, 1979.

Shreve, Anita. "Careers and the Lure of Motherhood." *The New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1982.

"Single Parents Demand Services." *The Jewish Advocate*, May 3, 1984.

Sklare, Marshall. *America's Jews.* New York: Random House, 1971.

Tobin, Gary A., and Alvin Chenkin. "A Profile of the American Jewish Community: A Comparison of Selected Cities." *American Jewish Year Book* (1985): 154–78.

Tobin, Gary A., and Ingrid Lomfors. "the Feminization of Poverty among Jews." Unpublished manuscript, Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University.

Weitzman, Lenore J. "The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards." *UCLA Law Review* 28 (November 1981).

Wireman, Peggy. *Urban Neighborhoods, Networks, and Families: New Forms for Old Values.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1984.