The Primary Residence Exception: Legislative Proposals in the 111th Congress to Amend the Bankruptcy Code to Allow the Strip Down of Certain Home Mortgages

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Summary

The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a result, there has been a significant rise in late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies nationwide. Many believe the market will get worse in the absence of changes in laws and/or regulations. Additionally, there are a number of obstacles that may discourage mortgage servicers and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of a petition for bankruptcy, even in situations in which a modification would be the most economically beneficial outcome for the majority of interested parties. These obstacles include potential contract liability, tax regulations, accounting standards, and payment schemes. Allowing bankruptcy courts to modify debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence is seen by proponents as encouraging the modification of mortgages before default or delinquency.

Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs reorganizations for most individuals. The Code provides courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured debts, the court has “strip down” – also, commonly referred to as “cram down” – authority. Strip down is the power to lower, over the creditor’s objections, the secured claim to as low as the collateral’s fair market value and treat the balance of the debt as an unsecured claim. However, Section 1322(b)(2) of the Code prohibits the strip down of debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence.

At least three bills that would amend Section 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code have been introduced in the 111th Congress. These bills are S. 61 and H.R. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009), and H.R. 225 (the Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act).

This report provides an overview of the general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how these bills would amend certain sections of Chapter 13.
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Mortgage Market Backdrop

The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a result, there has been a significant rise of late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies nationwide. Many believe the market will get worse in the absence of changes in laws and/or regulations. For instance, Sheila Bair, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, testified before the House Committee on Financial Services on November 18, 2008, that “over the next two years, an estimated 4 to 5 million mortgage loans will enter foreclosure if nothing is done.”

In an attempt to stem the tide of foreclosures and bankruptcies, a number of voluntary loan modification programs have been initiated. These programs seek to make mortgage payments more affordable to homeowners who are having, or likely will have difficulty meeting their mortgage obligations, while also avoiding the costs for both debtors and creditors associated with a foreclosure or bankruptcy. However, there are a number of obstacles that have operated to discourage mortgage servicers and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of foreclosure or a petition for bankruptcy, even in situations in which a modification would be the most economically beneficial outcome for most interested parties. These obstacles include potential contract liability, tax regulations, accounting standards, and payment schemes.

Some argue that these voluntary modification programs have not been effective enough. In a letter sent to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and House Minority Leader John Boehner, the Attorneys General of 22 states and the District of Columbia stated:

In recent months, State Attorneys General have especially focused on urging mortgage servicers to avoid unnecessary foreclosures by modifying unaffordable loans in a manner that serves holders, servicers, homeowners, and the public. Through the multi-state Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, we collected data which demonstrates that

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1 See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrather, Serena Ng, and Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since the ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html (“‘This has been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. There is no question about it.’ said Mark Gertler, a New York University economist who worked with fellow academic Ben Bernanke, now the Federal Reserve chairman, to explain how financial turmoil can infect the overall economy.”).

2 See CRS Report RL33930, Subprime Mortgages: Primer on Current Lending and Foreclosure Issues, by Edward V. Murphy. Chapter 13 filings in FY2008 were up 14% from the same period a year before, according to a Dec. 15, 2008 press release by the U.S. Courts [available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilingsDec2008.cfm]. It is unclear how much of this increase was directly related to mortgage debt.


voluntary loan modification measures have failed.... Because most troubled mortgages are securitized, multiple stakeholders may be involved in the decision to modify mortgage loans, causing a continued paralysis. Although some major lenders have recently embarked on loan modifications on a wide scale, many servicers and secondary market investors remain unwilling or unable to act, even when their own economic interests dictate otherwise.\(^6\)

Proponents of amending the Bankruptcy Code believe allowing strip down of primary residences would have two important results. First, it would encourage the voluntary modification of mortgages before default or delinquency that may drive borrowers into bankruptcy. Second, they believe that where voluntary workouts prior to bankruptcy could not be achieved, strip down would adjust the mortgage terms such that the costs and benefits are efficiently spread among debtors and creditors, while allowing debtors to remain in the home after bankruptcy. Senator Durbin, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated:

As we heard at last year’s hearing, the benefits of this proposal [to allow the modification of certain mortgage debts in bankruptcy] are clear. We heard testimony that:

- My legislation would significantly reduce the number of foreclosures and help hundreds of thousands of families stay in their homes.
- Mortgage modification in bankruptcy benefits everyone - the homeowner, the lender, the neighboring homeowners and the economy - far more than foreclosure.
- My proposal would give lenders, servicers and investors a real incentive to voluntarily rework mortgages....\(^7\)

Professor Adam Levitin, at the same Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, explained:

In a perfectly functioning market without agency and transaction costs, lenders would be engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or distressed mortgage loans, as the lenders would prefer a smaller loss from modification than a larger loss from foreclosure. Voluntary modification, however, has not been happening on a large-scale, for a variety of reasons, most notably contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, and other transaction costs.

If all distressed mortgages could be modified in bankruptcy, it would provide a method for bypassing the various contractual, agency, and other transactional inefficiencies. Permitting bankruptcy modification would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the mortgage, subject to the limitations provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the possibility of a bankruptcy modification would encourage voluntary modifications, as mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over the shape of the modification.

An involuntary public system of mortgage modification would actually help foster voluntary, private solutions to the mortgage crisis....

Allowing bankruptcy to serve as a forum for distressed homeowners to restructure their mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method for resolving the foreclosure crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets. Unlike any other proposed response, bankruptcy


modification offers immediate relief, solves the market problems created by securitization, addresses both problems of payment reset shock and negative equity, screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers and lenders, and avoids both the costs and moral hazard of a government bailout.8

Others argue that amending the Bankruptcy Code alone would not promote voluntary modifications outside of bankruptcy because such legislation would not directly address the litigation, tax, accounting, and payment concerns that are the main deterrent to voluntary modifications.9 For instance, a group of Columbia University professors argue that

"Proposals to change the [Bankruptcy] Code could dramatically increase bankruptcy-filing rates. Servicers will prefer mortgage modification in bankruptcy because their expenses are reimbursed in bankruptcy, not outside it. Thus, proposed reforms could push millions of borrowers into bankruptcy, delaying the resolution of the current crisis for years."

Still others believe allowing modifications of these mortgages in bankruptcy will reduce market stability. For instance, Professor Mark S. Scarberry, a Resident Scholar at the American Bankruptcy Institute, believes allowing strip down of primary residence mortgages would “cause problems in the secondary mortgage market” and would “substantially change the risk characteristics of home mortgages.…”10 Additionally, David G. Kittle, Chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, has testified:

"One of the greatest potential destabilizing initiatives is the topic of discussion today - allowing bankruptcy “cramdown” for home mortgages.... We understand the well intentioned goal of such legislation is to provide a back stop against the large numbers of foreclosures. However, the unintended result would be large numbers of bankruptcies, higher losses to servicers, lenders and investors, and reduced ability by the financial industry to extend affordable credit. Such bankruptcy reform will have a negative impact on individual borrowers, a housing recovery and the economy as a whole."

At least three bills that would amend Section 1322 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code12 have been introduced in the 111th Congress. These bills are S. 61 and its House companion, H.R. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009); and H.R. 225 (the Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act). This report provides an overview of the general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how the three bills seek to amend Chapter 13. As these bills, in some cases, deal with matters beyond the scope of this report, the analysis of them is limited to proposed effects on when the modification of mortgages secured by the debtor’s primary residence would be allowed; when prepayment penalties on these loans could be waived; whether and to what extent repayment of these loans would be allowed; whether and to what extent

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8 Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center, Helping Families Save their Homes: the Role of Bankruptcy Law, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 19, 2008, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3598&wit_id=7542 (internal citations omitted).


10 Statement of Mark S. Scarberry, Professor of Law and Robert M. Zinman Resident Scholar at the American Bankruptcy Institute, The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How To Help Families Save Their Homes, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 5, 2007.


degree interest rates and annual percentage rates (APRs) on these loans could be modified; and whether and in what circumstances the credit counseling requirement could be waived or otherwise adjusted.

Overview of Chapter 13

Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. Chapter 13 governs reorganizations for most individuals. A reorganization generally means that debts are paid from the debtors’ future income. Outside of bankruptcy, debtors and creditors may attempt to consensually modify the terms of their contractual obligations. If the parties attempt to reach a voluntary workout outside of bankruptcy, the Chapter 13 framework may serve as a baseline for negotiations with the parties understanding that if they cannot agree, the terms may be modified in accordance with the parameters of the Code if the debtor files and qualifies for bankruptcy.

When a qualified debtor cannot meet outstanding obligations or negotiate revised payments with his or her creditors, the debtor may file a petition for an individual reorganization. In most cases, debtors must receive credit counseling before filing a Chapter 13 petition. Under Chapter 13, the debtor is required to file a proposed reorganization plan with the court. The proposed Chapter 13 plan generally is submitted at the same time as the petition for bankruptcy. Section 1322(a) states the requirements for all plans. Section 1322(b) states additional parameters that a plan may meet, if applicable. If the plan meets the Code’s requirements, including the guidelines

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13 For instance, 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) requires a Chapter 13 petitioner to have a regular income and limited amount of secured and unsecured debt.

14 Voluntary mortgage modifications were relatively rare prior to 2008. See Statement of Henry J. Sommer, President of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How To Help Families Save Their Homes, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 5, 2007. (“If cramdown is not permitted for debtors who cannot pay their mortgages, debtors and creditors have several other alternatives, none of which is more favorable to the mortgage creditor: ... (4) Voluntary modification, which lenders rarely agree to, in which an arrangement similar to cramdown results.”) (emphasis added) (“But the truth is that voluntary modifications are not being made in any significant numbers ... In a dramatic example, it was recently reported that when state housing finance agencies sought to help borrowers by asking lenders to modify loans so the agencies could then refinance them, they had no success because lenders would not make the modifications. If mortgage companies will not modify loans even when they will receive an immediate payoff through refinancing, they certainly will not modify them in cases where they will be paid over a long period of time.”).


15 This requirement can delay bankruptcy filings. Such a delay may be detrimental to debtors seeking to save their homes from foreclosure through a Chapter 13 reorganization.


17 Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) allows the debtor to file a reorganization plan within 15 days of petition.
of Section 1322, the court may confirm the plan in accordance with Section 1325.18 Chapter 13 plan disputes among debtors and creditors are settled by the bankruptcy judge.19

The Code provides courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured debts, the court has “strip down” – also, commonly referred to as “cram down” – authority. Strip down is the power to lower, over the creditor’s objections, the amount the debtor must pay the creditor for the secured claim to as low as the collateral’s fair market value. Amounts in excess of fair market value are treated as unsecured debt and may be discharged.20

Among the secured debts that the court may not strip down under the current Chapter 13 are those that are secured by the debtor’s principal residence.21 Section 1322(b)(2) states in relevant part, “the plan may ... modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s primary residence.”

Other real property liens, however, are commonly modified in bankruptcy reorganizations. As a general rule, a real property lien is only protected as a nondischargeable secured debt up to the market value of the collateral. Indebtedness under a mortgage or security interest is treated as unsecured – and therefore modifiable or potentially dischargeable to the extent that the amount of indebtedness exceeds the value of the collateral.22 The Code allows a court to modify a mortgage secured by the debtor’s vacation home, investment home, and family farm,23 for instance, but by virtue of § 1322(b)(2) – and a parallel provision in Chapter 1124 – a court may not strip down the claim on a mortgage secured by the same individual’s primary residence. Even after this provision was enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, some courts interpreted the Code as allowing strip down of primary residences until they were overruled by a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision.25 Hence, the Code’s prohibition on the modification of liens that secure a primary residence is arguably the exception, not the rule.

The purpose of the exception, at least based on analysis of its legislative history as expressed in a concurring Supreme Court opinion by Justice Stevens, was to “encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market.”26

18 11 U.S.C. § 1325 provides the standards by which a bankruptcy court may confirm a reorganization plan.
20 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2). To determine the fair market value of a collateral for the purpose of exercising its strip down authority, the court generally holds a hearing during which the parties submit evidence to support a value. After this hearing, the court determines the appropriate fair market value, and that amount is used to set the reduced debt value, which is plugged into the debtor’s reorganization plan.
21 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). An exception to this rule is provided for primary residence mortgages in which the final payment under the original terms would be due during the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2); see In re Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2002). While modification generally is not allowed, a debtor may be able to cure defaults and otherwise reinstate the terms of a debt secured by the debtor’s primary residence pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). See 8 Collier on Bankr., (15th Ed. 2008), p. 1322.09.
26 Id. at 332 (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass’n., 730 F. 2d 236, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1984). Despite Justice (continued...)
Bill Comparisons

S. 61

S. 61 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009), as introduced, would allow for certain modifications of debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence “that is the subject of a notice that a foreclosure may be commenced.” The foreclosure process varies by state. In some states, the process can start and finish in a matter of days. Requiring a foreclosure notice before a debtor may take advantage of the strip down in bankruptcy may limit the law’s effectiveness because it could force a debtor to file a bankruptcy petition within a short period of time. Making the decision to file for bankruptcy may be difficult to do quickly because potential debtors may desire to compare bankruptcy to other options based on the effect a reorganization is likely to have on their ability to retain certain property, their credit worthiness, their future income, etc. Potential debtors may need to discuss their situation with a bankruptcy attorney in order to make a knowledgeable decision.

If a qualified debtor’s mortgage meets the above requirements, then the debtor’s Chapter 13 reorganization plan may modify the terms of the mortgage debt in several different ways. First, the secured claim may be stripped down to the fair market value of the property, and the remaining balance would be treated as an unsecured claim.

Second, the plan may prohibit, reduce, or delay changes in variable interest rates. This provision would address, in part, mortgages that started with relatively low fixed rates, but subsequently adjusted to a significantly higher variable rate. These low, initial rates are often referred to as teaser rates. Borrowers who could meet the payments at the introductory rate may not be able to afford the higher, adjusted rate.

(...continued)

Stevens’s statement, it is unclear whether encouraging capital into the mortgage lending market was the only, or even primary, legislative purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The language of § 1322(b)(2) was the result of a compromise between the House and Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-598). However, there was no conference report for this bill, and CRS research of the recorded legislative history of § 1322(b)(2) yielded little to explain the purpose behind the exception for debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence. Grubbs’s conclusion, which was relied upon by Justice Stevens, appeared to be based on witness testimony during hearings on the act, which were conducted in the 94th and 95th Congresses. Some of the more relevant testimony cited was given by Edward J. Kulik during the hearings from the 95th Congress. Mr. Kulik, representing the Real Estate Division of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, expressed concern about provisions of the bills that would allow modification of secured debts. He stated “[the] these provisions may cause residential mortgage lenders to be extraordinarily cautious in making loans in cases where the general financial resources of the individual borrower are not particularly strong.” Mr. Kulik continued: “[s]erious consideration should be given to modifying both bills so that, at the least ... a mortgage on real property other than investment property may not be modified....” See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 707, 714-15 (1977).

27 Unlike H.R. 200, as ordered to be reported by the Judiciary Committee, S. 61 does not expressly state that these modifications may be made to subordinate debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence.

28 S. 61 § 4. The holder of the claim that is modified pursuant to § 4 of this bill would continue to have a lien on the property until the secured claim is fully paid under the plan or until the claim is discharged in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1328, whichever comes later. S. 61 § 6.

29 S. 61 § 4.
Third, the plan may allow for payment of the qualifying mortgage debt for 40 years less the number of years the loan has been outstanding or for the remaining payment term, whichever is longer. This provision would not adjust the payment of other debts beyond the normal three- to five-year term of repayment plans. In other words, the bill would allow for repayment of modified primary residence debts over 40 or more years, but the repayment period of all other debts would not be changed by the bill. Requiring debtors to pay off a potentially large debt, like a primary residence mortgage, in five years or less could be prohibitively difficult and could undermine the effectiveness of the law. This provision of S. 61 is important because most courts interpret the current Code as requiring debtors to pay off the entire secured claim of non-primary residence mortgages that are modified in accordance with § 1322(b)(2) during the three- to five-year plan.

Fourth, plans may provide a fixed interest rate based on the prevailing rate as published by the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, plus a reasonable yield for risk. This provision would allow the reduction of fixed interest rates to levels consistent with current market conditions for comparable mortgages.

Fifth, plans may waive prepayment penalties that are provided for in the loan document. Prepayment penalties are intended to cover the mortgage holder for lost interest payments incurred due to early payment. These fees were especially common in subprime mortgages.

Finally, the bill would allow for the elimination of the Code’s credit counseling requirement if the debtor certifies to a court that a foreclosure sale has been scheduled on the debtor’s principal residence. This waiver would remove a procedural hurdle that could slow the debtor’s ability to file a bankruptcy petition, which may be important in light of the streamlined foreclosure process, as discussed above.

H.R. 200

H.R. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009) was ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee on January 27, 2009. This bill was a mirror image of S. 61 when it was introduced, but markup of the bill by the House Judiciary Committee resulted in several substantive changes relevant to this report. First, modifications could only be made to qualifying debts that were entered into prior to the bill’s enactment date. Proponents argue that

30 S. 61 § 4.
31 See, e.g., In re Enewally, 368 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, a debtor may not use § 506(a) in combination with § 1322(b)(5) to reduce the secured claim and repay it over a period longer than the plan term.”); In re Kinney, LEXIS 22313, 18 (Conn. 2000) (“If the [mortgage] payments are changed, sections 1322(c) and 1325(a)(5) both require that they be completed over the life of the plan, which cannot exceed five years.... ” (quoting In re MacGregor, 172 B.R. 718, 721 (Mass. 1994) (internal citations omitted)); In re Pruett, 178 B.R. 7 (N.D.Ala. 1995); In re Brown, 175 B.R. 129 (Mass. 1994); In re Murphy, 175 B.R. 134 (Mass. 1994). There is some disagreement among the courts as to what adjustments to mortgage terms constitute a “modification” pursuant to § 1322(b)(2). Compare In re Koper, 284 B.R. 747, 752 (Conn. 2002) with In re Pruett, 178 B.R. at 9.
32 S. 61 § 4.
33 S. 61 § 5.
34 S. 61 § 2.
limiting strip down to existing debts would reduce the likelihood that the bankruptcy changes would increase overall mortgage rates.

Second, the bill makes clear that the ability to modify debts secured by a debtor’s primary residence applies to subordinate debts in addition to primary debts. Many homeowners have more than one mortgage on their home, for instance from financing a “piggy-back” loan to cover some or all of the 20% of the sales price traditionally required as a downpayment to purchase a home.

Third, the bill would change the way in which fixed rates would be calculated for modified mortgages. Rather than relying on an index based on Treasury securities, H.R. 200 would be based upon an index of average prime rates that is published by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). A premium for risk would still be added to the FFIEIC average rate. The Federal Reserve Board and many mortgage industry groups believe an index based on average prime offer rates is a more accurate and consistent way to establish mortgage rates than reliance on Treasury securities.

Fourth, H.R. 200 includes a profit sharing provision that would require debtors who have their mortgages modified in bankruptcy and sell the home within four years of the modification to share the net proceeds of the sale with their creditors. The amount that would have to be shared would decrease each year after the modification. The debtor would have to pay the creditor 80% of the net proceeds of a sale within the first year of modification; 60% for a sale in the second year; 40% for a sale in the third year; and 20% for a sale in the fourth year. The net proceeds would be calculated by subtracting the amount of the modified secured claim, the sales costs, and the value of home improvements made from the sales price. The bill also appears to place a ceiling on the amount creditors may recoup through the profit sharing provision to the difference between the secured claim before the bankruptcy and the amount of the modified claim; however, the language of this portion of the provision is less than clear. This profit sharing provision would limit the ability of debtors to quickly profit off of a stripped down mortgage and would allow both creditors and debtors to reap the benefits of a stabilized housing market. It is unclear if or to what extent holders of secondary mortgages would be able to share in the net proceeds based on this provision.

Fifth, debtors would not be able to modify debts secured by their primary residence without certifying that they attempted to discuss a loan modification with creditors before filing for bankruptcy or that a foreclosure sale is scheduled to take place within 30 days of the bankruptcy filing. This provision would force most debtors to seek a voluntary loss mitigation effort before being able to take advantage of the change in the Bankruptcy Code. However, because no action

36 H.R. 200 § 4.
37 H.R. 200 § 4
39 H.R. 200 § 4. A representative portion of the bill’s profit sharing provision is: “A claim may be reduced under subsection (b)(11)(A) only on the condition that if the debtor sells the principal residence securing such claim ... then the debtor agrees to pay to such holder, if such residence is sold in the 1st year occurring after the effective date of the plan, 8- percent of the amount of the different between the sales price and the amount of such claim (plus costs of sale and improvements), but not to exceed the amount of the allowed secured claim determined as if such claim had not been reduced under such subsection.... ”
40 H.R. 200 § 4.
is required by creditors, debtors would not be prevented from reaping the bill’s benefits simply because creditors failed to respond to debtors’ requests for voluntary relief or were unable or unwilling to grant such relief.

Sixth, modifications would not be available to debtors that received a refinance, an extension, or a renewal of mortgage credit based on “the debtor’s material misrepresentation, false pretenses, or actual fraud.”41 This provision would bar debtors who arguably are less deserving of help from taking advantage of the bill.

Finally, H.R. 200 expressly states that the changes made by the bill would not in anyway change the mortgage insurance obligations of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Agriculture, or the Veterans Administration (VA).42 Some have questioned how these federal mortgage insurance programs would be affected by changes to the Bankruptcy Code in absence of an explicit legislative statement on the issue.

**H.R. 225**

H.R. 225 (the Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act), as introduced, is identical to S. 61 with regards to the terms discussed in this report, except that modifications could only be made to qualifying debts that were entered into prior to the bill’s enactment date.43

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41 H.R. 200 § 6.  
42 H.R. 200 § 8.  
43 H.R. 225 § 3.