CFTC Reauthorization in 2005

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Summary

Authorization for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a “sunset” agency established in 1974, expires on September 30, 2005. In the past, Congress has used the reauthorization process to consider amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides the basis for federal regulation of commodity futures trading. The last reauthorization resulted in the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), the most significant amendments to the CEA since the CFTC was created. This report provides brief summaries of issues that may emerge during the 2005 reauthorization, including (1) the globalization of futures trading and international regulatory harmonization, (2) regulation of energy derivatives markets, where some see a lack of effective regulation, and (3) the market in security futures, or futures contracts based on single stocks, which were authorized by the CFMA, but trade in much lower volumes than their proponents had hoped.

This report will be updated as developments warrant.

Futures contracts — like other financial derivatives such as options or swaps — gain or lose value as the price of some underlying commodity rises or falls. They can be used to avoid, or “hedge,” price risk. That is, farmers, utilities, airlines, banks, and many other businesses can use derivatives to protect themselves against unfavorable changes in commodity prices, interest rates, or other variables. Most futures trading, however, is done by speculators who profit if their forecasts of price trends are correct. (The futures exchanges are associations of professional speculators.) There are two public benefits to speculation: speculators provide liquidity that enables hedgers to take positions quickly and at low cost and to unwind those positions at any time. Speculative trading also provides a very effective price discovery mechanism: futures prices adjust immediately to new information, and serve as the basis for many physical (or spot market) transactions in oil, agricultural, and other markets.

The public interest in regulating futures markets flows from these two functions. Since futures prices are used as reference points for many physical transactions, manipulation in the futures markets can affect the prices actually paid by consumers or received by farmers and other producers. Similarly, the ability to hedge risks allows the
economy to function more efficiently. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan frequently describes the general benefits of derivatives markets. For example:

> Derivatives have permitted financial risks to be unbundled in ways that have facilitated both their measurement and their management. Concentrations of risk are more readily identified, and when such concentrations exceed the risk appetites of intermediaries, derivatives can be employed to transfer the underlying risks to other entities. As a result, not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.¹

How much government regulation is needed to see that the derivatives markets remain sound, to keep markets free from fraud and manipulation, and to insulate the financial system from shocks arising from sudden large speculative losses? These are the basic questions for congressional oversight of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

**The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)**

In several respects, the CFMA was a fundamental rethinking of the government’s role in derivatives markets. Before 2000, the CEA was intended to regulate all forms of derivative trading; any contract “in the character of” a futures contract was to be traded only under CFTC regulation. However, this “one-size-fits-all” regulatory scheme did not correspond to the reality of the marketplace, where a very large over-the-counter (OTC, that is, off-exchange) derivatives market was flourishing without CFTC oversight. Under the CFMA, most trading in OTC derivatives was placed beyond the reach of the CEA (and thus the CFTC). Where markets were off-limits to small investors, market discipline was deemed to be a sufficient regulatory force.

The exception was for contracts based on agricultural commodities, which were thought to be susceptible to price manipulation. Agricultural derivatives, as a result, can be traded only on CFTC-regulated futures exchanges.

The CFMA provided for the creation of unregulated futures exchanges, where all trading involved sophisticated or professional investors. (Again, there is an exception for farm derivatives.) Potentially, therefore, the futures exchanges can reconfigure themselves into largely unregulated entities, but since the enactment of the CFMA, the major exchanges have not done so, and continue to operate in (more or less) the same regulatory environment as before. Both the exchanges and the OTC markets have experienced strong growth in trading volumes since 2000.

In the 108th Congress, both the House and Senate Agriculture Committees held oversight hearings on the CFMA.² At both hearings, CFTC Chairman James Newsome

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stated his view that the CFMA had worked well and that the CFTC was able to use more flexibility in matters such as approving new contracts for trading and accepting the registration of new exchanges and clearing houses. The new entrants generally sought to introduce or facilitate innovative electronic forms of trading. His view was that legislative amendments to the CEA were not needed.

**Issues for the 109th Congress**

Given the CFTC’s satisfaction with its role under the CFMA, and the growth of trading volumes and continued innovation in the markets, it does not appear likely that another thorough overhaul of the CEA is in prospect for 2005. There are several issues, however, that observers of the market expect to be subject to oversight scrutiny. These are summarized briefly below.

**International Regulatory Issues**

To a derivatives trader seated at a computer terminal, it is unimportant whether price quotes on, say, the dollar/yen exchange rate originate in Chicago, London, or Shanghai. Telecommunications access is instantaneous, and most exchanges are electronic, making physical presence on a trading floor not just unnecessary, but impossible. The only barriers to truly global trading are legal and regulatory.

To regulators, however, national borders still matter. The core mission of the CFTC is to ensure that traders are fully advised of the risks of futures contracts, that an audit trail is maintained for all transactions, and that markets are not manipulated. Because of concerns that U.S. traders will not have these same protections in foreign futures markets, the CFTC has resisted allowing direct electronic access to foreign markets from terminals in the United States.

The laudable aim of protecting U.S. customers, however, imposes costs on traders who do not feel the need for government protection. They must approach foreign markets through an extra layer of intermediaries and maintain margin accounts in each financial center where they trade, even though their international transactions are part of a single risk management strategy.

A common criticism of regulation is that if it is excessive it will hamper financial innovation and cause business to move to another financial center where regulators are more laissez-faire. On the other hand, strong regulation can be a selling point in international competition. It can be difficult to strike a balance.

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2 (...)continued


3 Among major markets, the only holdouts where traders still meet face to face are the Chicago futures exchanges.
The CFTC has taken several actions to facilitate international trading. In February 2004, it approved the application for exchange registration of Eurex US, a subsidiary of Eurex, the largest European futures market. Eurex US has struggled to attract business, but this is partly because of competitive fee reductions by the major Chicago exchanges, which have benefitted all traders.

Another industry initiative is global clearing. Clearing houses hold customer margin payments and guarantee all contracts against default. Traders who hold related positions in different national markets must deal with multiple clearing houses; their costs would be reduced if a single clearing house could handle all their trades. The CFTC has approved half of a transatlantic clearing initiative: since November 2004, the Clearing Corporation (Eurex US’s clearing house) has been authorized to clear U.S. traders’ transactions in 16 European futures contracts, based on European government bonds, interest rates, and stock indexes. This means that U.S. traders can clear both U.S. and European trades through the same clearing house. However, the CFTC has not acted on phase two of the transatlantic project: trades executed on U.S. exchanges may not yet be cleared through a European clearinghouse.

**Energy Derivatives**

Energy markets have seen turmoil in recent years: prices have been unusually volatile, and there have been several episodes of fraud or scandal. During the California electricity crisis of 2000, severe shortages were combined with soaring prices, and several energy trading firms (including Enron) were found to have manipulated the partially deregulated electricity marketing system that California had established. After the collapse of Enron, numerous energy firms admitted to making fictitious “wash” trades, for purposes of falsifying their accounting statements. Natural gas markets have experienced several price spikes attributed to market manipulation achieved by reporting false information about market prices and supplies. Finally, many commercial users of energy commodities suspect that hedge funds and other financial speculators have driven prices higher than fundamental economic factors of supply and demand would warrant, and have called for a limit on the size of speculative futures positions.4

Some observers attribute these problems in the markets to a regulatory gap, arguing that neither the CFTC nor the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has sufficient authority or resources to enforce anti-fraud and -manipulation rules. A particular focus of these arguments is the over-the-counter (OTC) market for energy derivatives, which under the CFMA is subject to very limited oversight. During the 108th Congress, the Senate twice voted down measures to give the CFTC more authority to collect market data from traders in OTC energy contracts.5

Others, including the CFTC, maintain that regulators already have sufficient authority to investigate and punish fraud, and that price volatility itself is not evidence of manipulation. CFTC chairmen have repeatedly rejected the view that new legislation is

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needed. In a 2004 speech, acting chairman Sharon Brown-Hruska defended the CFTC’s enforcement record, pointing to actions taken against false reporting of natural gas prices and market manipulation by Enron and others: “In my mind, this era in which many acted with a lack of integrity and violated the law will soon be a part of history — one that will not be repeated as a result of our enforcement actions.”

**Security Futures**

Security futures are futures contracts based on single stocks or narrow-based stock indexes. Until the CFMA, these contracts were not permitted, largely because of concerns that they could be used to manipulate stock prices. The CFMA provided for joint regulation of the new market by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the CFTC. Perhaps as a result, the process of writing trading rules was slow: the first contracts were not traded until 2003.

Volumes in security futures trading remain very low. The leading market is OneChicago, a joint venture between the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). During the first 11 months of 2004, 1.8 million security futures contracts were traded on OneChicago. This was only slightly higher than the daily volume over the same period on the CBOE, where options on individual stocks are traded.

Some observers suggest that the dual regulatory regime may be cumbersome and hampers trading. However, it may take time for single-stock future volume to grow, given the presence of a highly liquid and well-developed stock options market, which offers contracts that permit most — if not all — the investment strategies that security futures do. It is not uncommon for new futures contracts to fail to excite enough trading interest to sustain themselves; this is a possible fate for security futures.

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