# Top Dollar: <br> CEO Compensation in Medicare's <br> Private Insurance Plans 

A REPORT BY
Families USA

# Top Dollar: CEO Compensation in Medicare's Private Insurance Plans <br> Families USA Publication No. 03-105 <br> © 2003 by Families USA Foundation 

Families USA<br>1334 G Street, NW<br>Washington, DC 20005<br>Phone: (202) 628-3030<br>Fax: (202) 347-2417<br>E-mail:info@familiesusa.org

This publication is available online at (www.familiesusa.org).

## INTRODUCTION

Congress is again considering legislation to add a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program. This time, some of the proposalsincluding the approach advocated by the Administration-couple the addition of a drug benefit with provisions to "restructure" Medicare, giving private managed care plans a much greater role. Many of the proposals incorporate incentives designed to steer individuals into private plans. Those who seek to increase the role of private plans in the Medicare program often argue that these private plans are more cost-effective, can save money, and will deliver better quality care.

Given the concerns about the long-term financial outlook for the Medicare program, the public should expect that any proposed changes will make the best possible use of available public funds without compromising health care for the seniors and people with disabilities who depend on Medicare. Evidence so far suggests that increasing the role of private managed care plans in Medicare will not meet these expectations. One red flag is the executive compensation paid by these plans. Executives in private health plans receive lavish compensation packages that, in publicly traded plans, include enormous bonuses and stock incentives. The incentives that these pay packages create may be consistent with the company's financial success, but they are not necessarily consistent with the goal of providing high-quality, reliable care for America's seniors and others receiving Medicare. Furthermore, the handsome executive compensation offered by these private plans is many, many times greater than the compensation of those who run the Medicare program.

This report examines compensation in the year 2002 for the highest-paid executives of the 11 for-profit, publicly traded health insurance companies that currently serve (or are the parent companies of health plans that currently serve) Medicare beneficiaries through Medicare+Choice, a program that allows beneficiaries to enroll in, and receive care through, private plans. ${ }^{1}$ The plans included
in this study are: Aetna Inc.; Anthem, Inc.; CIGNA Corporation; Coventry Health Care, Inc.; Health Net, Inc.; Humana Inc.; Oxford Health Plans, Inc.; PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.; Sierra Health Services, Inc.; UnitedHealth Group Incorporated; and WellPoint Health Networks.

The companies examined all rank among the 25 largest managed care plans in the U.S., and each reported serving over 50,000 Medicare enrollees in 2002. These large insurers would likely be among the plans seeking to serve Medicare beneficiaries in any "restructuring" that would move beneficiaries to private plans. (See the Methodology section of this report for a discussion of plan selection criteria.)

Although many plans that currently participate in Medicare+Choice are not publicly traded-they include not-for-profit plans such as Blue Cross/ Blue Shield affiliates and for-profit companies-this review of executive compensation focuses on publicly traded companies. Those companies must annually file financial data, including information on executive compensation, with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The format for presenting this information, the content, and the methodology for calculating financial information must comply with SEC rules. Companies that are not publicly traded, whether for profit or not-for-profit, may publish annual reports but they do not have to report the same information or meet SEC standards. Relying on SEC filings gives consistency to the financial data that is not present in the financial information for non-publicly traded plans participating in Medicare. (The Methodology section of this report provides additional information on how compensation was calculated.)

With respect to corporate executives' compensation, in 2002, the SEC required companies to report information pertaining to the chief executive officer (CEO), regardless of level of compensation, plus the four most highly compensated executive officers. In some instances, such as where there has been turnover among those executives, the SEC filings include information on more than five executives. The SEC filings include two categories of ex-
ecutive remuneration: (1) total annual compensation exclusive of unexercised stock options and (2) the value of pending, unexercised stock options. Those two types of remuneration include the following:

- Total compensation in 2002 exclusive of unexercised stock options. This includes salaries; bonuses; other compensation (such as retirement plans, automobiles and travel allowances, relocation expenses, value of life insurance); restricted stock awards; long-term-incentive payouts (LTIP); and exercised stock options (options that the executive cashed in during 2002).
- The reported value of unexercised stock options. This includes stock options awarded in 2002 or earlier that have not yet been exercised. The value of these stock options is self-reported by each company based on one of two SEC-approved methodologies, which are described more fully in the Methodology section of this report. The value reported by the companies is designed to indicate the potential value of stock options awarded in 2002 and the current market value of the unexercised options awarded in prior years.

To place the salaries of highly paid executives in leading publicly traded health plans serving Medicare beneficiaries in perspective, their compensation was compared with the compensation of the lead government officials responsible for the operation of the Medicare program, the nation's largest insurance program. ${ }^{2}$ These are the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, who is the individual responsible for oversight of Medicare. The information was obtained through the Office of Personnel Management.

## KEY FINDINGS

## Annual Compensation of Health Plan Executives

- Annual Compensation, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options
- The average compensation of the highest-paid executive in each of the 11 companies was approximately $\$ 15.1$ million in 2002. (See Table 1.)
- The highest-paid of these executives was Norman Payson, former Chairman and CEO of Oxford Health Plans. In 2002, his compensation, exclusive of unexercised stock options, was $\$ 76,010,825$, which included over $\$ 70$ million for the value of shares acquired on exercise.
- The 11 companies paid their most highly compensated executives a total of over $\$ 166$ million in 2002, exclusive of unexercised stock options.

Table 1
Highest Compensation Package in Each Company, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options

| Company | Name | Title | Compensation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aetna | John Rowe, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 8,927,005 |
| Anthem | Larry C. Glasscock | President \& CEO | \$ | 6,857,839 |
| CIGNA | H. Edward Hanway | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 5,976,890 |
| Coventry | Allen F. Wise | President \& CEO | \$ | 21,664,330 |
| Health Net | B. Curtis Westen | Senior VP, General Counsel \& Secretary | \$ | 6,150,970 |
| Humana | Michael B. McCallister | President \& CEO | \$ | 1,648,972 |
| Oxford Health Plans | Norman C. Payson | Former Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 76,010,825 |
| PacifiCare | Howard G. Phanstiel | President \& CEO | \$ | 3,005,781 |
| Sierra Health | Anthony M. Marlon, M. D. | Chairman, CEO \& President | \$ | 4,745,988 |
| UnitedHealth | R. Channing Wheeler | CEO, Uniprise | \$ | 9,588,699 |
| WellPoint | Leonard D. Schaeffer | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 21,765,532 |
| Total compensation for these 11 executives: |  |  | \$ | 166,342,831 |
| Average compensation for these executives: |  |  | \$ | 15,122,076 |

- Value of Unexercised Stock Options for the Executive with the Largest Value of Unexercised Stock Options in Each of the 11 Companies
- The executive with the largest value of unexercised stock options in each of the 11 companies had stock options worth, on average, $\$ 67.7$ million in 2002, with a median value of over $\$ 14$ million. (See Table 2.)
- For the executive with the largest unexercised stock options, the Chairman and CEO of UnitedHealth Group, the total reported value of those options was nearly $\$ 530$ million.

Table 2
Largest Value of Unexercised Stock Options, by Company

| Company | Name | Title |  | ompensation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aetna | John Rowe, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 24,078,480 |
| Anthem | Larry C. Glasscock | President \& CEO | \$ | 9,038,474 |
| CIGNA | H. Edward Hanway | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 6,399,907 |
| Coventry | Allen F. Wise | President \& CEO | \$ | 10,099,038 |
| Health Net | Jay M. Gellert | President \& CEO | \$ | 23,477,657 |
| Humana | Michael B. McCallister | President \& CEO | \$ | 2,707,157 |
| Oxford Health Plans | Norman C. Payson | Former Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 25,589,375 |
| PacifiCare | Howard G. Phanstiel | President \& CEO | \$ | 14,031,740 |
| Sierra Health | Anthony M. Marlon, M.D. | Chairman, CEO \& President | \$ | 6,280,785 |
| UnitedHealth | William W. McGuire, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 529,986,971 |
| WellPoint | Leonard D. Schaeffer | Chairman \& CEO | \$ | 93,087,561 |
| Total compensation for these 11 executives: |  |  | \$ | 744,777,145 |
| Average compensation for these executives: |  |  | \$ | 67,707,013 |

- 20 Highest-Paid Executives in 2002, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options - 2002 compensation, exclusive of unexercised stock options, for the 20 highest-paid executives in the 11 companies ranged from a low of over $\$ 4$ million to a high of over $\$ 76$ million. (See Table 3.)
- The 20 highest-paid executives in the 11 companies received an average compensation package, exclusive of unexercised stock options, of over $\$ 11.8$ million. The median value was over $\$ 6.6$ million in 2002.
- For the 20 most highly compensated executives in the 11 companies, 2002 compensation, exclusive of unexercised stock options, totaled over $\$ 237$ million.

Table 3
The 20 Highest-Paid Executives' 2002 Annual Compensation, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options

| Name | Title | Company | Compensation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Norman C. Payson, M.D. | Former Chairman and CEO | Oxford Health Plans | \$ | 76,010,825 |
| Leonard D. Schaeffer | Chairman \& CEO | WellPoint | \$ | 21,765,532 |
| Allen F. Wise | President \& CEO | Coventry | \$ | 21,664,330 |
| D. Mark Weinberg | Executive VP \& Chief Development Officer | WellPoint | \$ | 14,046,201 |
| R. Channing Wheeler | CEO, Uniprise | UnitedHealth | \$ | 9,588,699 |
| William W. McGuire, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | UnitedHealth | \$ | 9,457,403 |
| John W. Rowe, M. D. | Chairman \& CEO | Aetna | \$ | 8,927,005 |
| Thomas P. McDonough | Executive VP \& COO | Coventry | \$ | 7,505,810 |
| Dale B. Wolf | Executive VP, CFO \& Treasurer | Coventry | \$ | 7,451,391 |
| Larry C. Glasscock | President \& CEO | Anthem | \$ | 6,857,839 |
| Joan E. Herman | Executive VP, Senior Specialty \& Sate-Sponsored Program | WellPoint | \$ | 6,460,301 |
| B. Curtis Westen | Senior VP, General Counsel \& Secretary | Health Net | \$ | 6,150,970 |
| Ronald A. Williams | President | Aetna | \$ | 6,113,491 |
| H. Edward Hanway | Chairman \& CEO | CIGNA | \$ | 5,976,890 |
| David J. Lubben | General Counsel | UnitedHealth | \$ | 5,698,793 |
| James G. Stewart | Former Executive VP \& CFO | CIGNA | \$ | 5,191,809 |
| Robert J. Sheehy | CEO, UnitedHealth Care | UnitedHealth | \$ | 5,064,152 |
| Anthony M. Marlon, M.D. | Chairman, CEO \& President | Sierra Health | \$ | 4,745,988 |
| Charles G. Berg | President and CEO | Oxford Health Plans | \$ | 4,739,173 |
| Donald M. Levinson | Executive VP, Human Resources \& Services | CIGNA | \$ | 4,491,315 |
| Total Compensation for $\mathbf{2 0}$ top executives: |  |  | \$ | 237,907,917 |
| Average Compensation for these executives: |  |  | \$ | 11,895,396 |

- The 20 Highest-Paid Executives with the Largest Value of Unexercised Stock Options
- Among the most highly compensated executives in the 11 companies, the 20 executives with the largest unexercised stock option packages held stock options valued at over $\$ 1.1$ billion in 2002. (See Table 4.)
- The average value of unexercised stock options held by these executives was more than $\$ 57.6$ million, with a median value of over $\$ 20$ million.

Table 4
The 20 Executives with the Largest Value of Unexercised Stock Options in 2002

| Name | Title | Company |  | mensation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| William W. McGuire, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | UnitedHealth | \$ | 529,986,971 |
| Stephen J. Helmsley | President \& COO | UnitedHealth | \$ | 221,458,436 |
| Leonard D. Schaeffer | Chairman \& CEO | WellPoint | \$ | 93,087,561 |
| Robert J. Sheehy | CEO, UnitedHealth Care | UnitedHealth | \$ | 39,152,576 |
| R. Channing Wheeler | CEO, Uniprise | UnitedHealth | \$ | 34,012,480 |
| David J. Lubben | General Counsel | UnitedHealth | \$ | 29,131,986 |
| David C. Colby | Executive VP \& CFO | WellPoint | \$ | 26,369,941 |
| Norman C. Payson, M.D. | Former Chairman and CEO | Oxford Health Plans | \$ | 25,589,375 |
| John W. Rowe, M.D. | Chairman \& CEO | Aetna | \$ | 24,078,480 |
| Jay M. Gellert | President \& CEO | Health Net | \$ | 23,477,657 |
| Thomas C. Geiser | Executive VP, General Counsel and Secretary | WellPoint | \$ | 17,074,545 |
| Marvin P. Rich | Executive VP, Finance \& Health Plan Operations | Health Net | \$ | 14,585,577 |
| Howard G. Phanstiel | President \& CEO | PacifiCare | \$ | 14,031,740 |
| D. Mark Weinberg |  <br> Chief Development Officer | WellPoint | \$ | 10,689,518 |
| Allen F. Wise | President \& CEO | Coventry | \$ | 10,099,038 |
| Joan E. Herman | Executive VP, Senior Specialty \& Sate-Sponsored Program | WellPoint | \$ | 9,292,358 |
| Larry C. Glasscock | President \& CEO | Anthem | \$ | 9,038,474 |
| Ronald A. Williams | President | Aetna | \$ | 7,845,000 |
| Charles G. Berg | President and CEO | Oxford Health Plans | \$ | 7,758,078 |
| Joseph S. Konowiecki | Executive VP, General Counsel \& Secretary | PacifiCare | \$ | 7,104,900 |
| Total value of stock options for $\mathbf{2 0}$ top executives: |  |  | \$ 1,153,864,691 |  |
| Average value of stock options for these executives: |  |  | \$ | 57,639,235 |

- Company-by-Company Comparison of Annual Remuneration for Top Executives
- In 2002, the average compensation, exclusive of unexercised stock options, paid by each company to its CEO and most highly compensated executives ranged from a high of $\$ 17.5$ million for executives at Oxford Health Plans to a low of slightly over $\$ 1$ million for executives at Humana. (See Table 5.)
- In total, the compensation that these 11 health insurance companies gave to their most highly paid executives in 2002 exceeded $\$ 311$ million, not including the value of unexercised stock options.
- The average value of unexercised stock options held by the most highly compensated executives in each company ranged from a high of nearly $\$ 171$ million for executives at UnitedHealth Group to a low of just under $\$ 1$ million for executives at Humana. (See Table 6.)

Table 5
Average Compensation, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options, for Highest-Paid Executives

| Company | Compensation |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| Oxford Health Plans | $\$$ | $17,530,678$ |
| WellPoint | $\$$ | $9,182,700$ |
| Coventry | $\$$ | $8,633,991$ |
| UnitedHealth | $\$$ | $6,821,806$ |
| Aetna | $\$$ | $4,874,363$ |
| Anthem | $\$$ | $3,129,777$ |
| CIGNA | $\$$ | $3,124,435$ |
| Sierra Health | $\$$ | $2,587,101$ |
| Health Net | $\$$ | $2,326,623$ |
| PacifiCare | $\$$ | $1,718,450$ |
| Humana | $\$$ | $1,031,717$ |

Table 6
Average Value of Unexercised
Stock Options for Highest-Paid
Executives

| Company | Compensation |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| UnitedHealth | $\$$ | $170,748,490$ |
| WellPoint | $\$$ | $31,302,785$ |
| Health Net | $\$$ | $9,730,067$ |
| Aetna | $\$$ | $9,428,549$ |
| Oxford Health Plans | $\$$ | $7,728,685$ |
| PacifiCare | $\$$ | $6,554,865$ |
| Coventry | $\$$ | $5,849,849$ |
| Anthem | $\$$ | $3,434,620$ |
| Sierra Health | $\$$ | $2,713,851$ |
| CIGNA | $\$$ | $2,400,922$ |
| Humana | $\$$ | 990,108 |

## - Compensation for Leading Executives, the Medicare Program

- The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the agency that oversees the Medicare program, had 2002 annual salaries of $\$ 166,700$ and $\$ 130,000$, respectively.
- The leading individuals responsible for Medicare did not receive any stock options or long-term-incentive payouts. The average salary for these two positions was $\$ 148,350$ in 2002.


## DISCUSSION

The companies profiled in this report are among the leading companies providing health insurance and managed care services in the U.S. ${ }^{3}$ Each also serves a large number of Medicare beneficiaries. ${ }^{4}$ They would likely be among the companies competing to provide services through Medicare in any "restructuring" that increases private health plans' role in the program.

The huge compensation packages and large stock options awarded to the leading executives in these companies ensure that those running the day-to-day operations focus on profitability and stock price. ${ }^{5}$ This may bode well for company performance, but the emphasis on profitability may not always be consistent with providing savings for the Medicare program or the highest-quality care or most dependable service to those who rely on Medicare. The incentives driving the operation of private plans are one of many factors undercutting the argument that an increased role for private plans in Medicare would improve care and reduce program costs. In fact, there is much evidence that private health plans may do the opposite.

## Spending and Spending Increases

Many of those who champion moving Medicare toward private health plans claim that those plans will increase program efficiency and lower costs. Experience refutes these claims.

The percent of spending that an organization allocates to administration is often used as an indicator of the organization's efficiency. On that measure, tra-
ditional Medicare has done a much better job than private health care plans. Medicare's administrative expenditures as a percent of benefit payments are extremely low: From 1979 through 2000, administrative spending in Medicare ranged from a high of 3 percent to a low of 1.1 percent. Administrative spending was only 1.4 percent in $2000 .{ }^{6}$ In contrast, administrative spending in all private health plans averages 9.5 percent. ${ }^{7}$ Executive compensationpackages that are 37 times the pay of those who manage the Medicare program—are part of the high administrative spending in private plans. ${ }^{8}$

In addition to lower administrative costs, Medicare has also consistently done as well as, or better than, private insurers in holding down spending per enrollee. Over a 30-year period, from 1970 to 2000, Medicare's per-enrollee spending grew at an average of 9.6 percent, whereas private insurers' spending for comparable health care services rose at an average annual rate of 11.1 percent. ${ }^{9}$

That spending has grown faster in private plans is, in part, a reflection of the fact that these plans typically pay physicians and other health care providers more than Medicare pays for comparable services. A recent study showed that private insurers paid 14 percent higher rates than Medicare for hospital care and 25 percent higher rates for physicians. ${ }^{10}$ Although one study found a few areas in the country where private plans were able to negotiate lower rates than Medicare, the author concluded that there was no indication that private plans have the potential for lower costs than Medicare in most areas. ${ }^{11}$

Not only has Medicare done better than private plans in holding down spending and negotiating provider payment rates, traditional Medicare has proven to be more cost-effective than the private plans in Medicare + Choice. A General Accounting Office study found that, in 1998, Medicare paid private plans $\$ 5.2$ billion more than it would have cost to provide care to those same enrollees in traditional Medicare. ${ }^{12}$ Medicare + Choice plans continue to account for a greater percentage of Medicare spending than would be expected, given the number of people these plans cover. In 2002, only 11 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare+Choice, yet the program accounted for 15 percent of Medicare spending. ${ }^{13}$

## Quality of Care

Confronted with evidence that private plans will not generate savings for Medicare, proponents of "restructuring" have turned to claims that private plans will increase the quality of health care for those in Medicare. This is questionable.

In theory, managed care plans should have the medical data to coordinate care. Better coordinated care should improve quality. However, a study of Medicare managed care plans found that, in most cases, plans lacked the types of clinical management that could result in better health care. ${ }^{14}$

Comparisons of health outcomes between Medicare beneficiaries in the fee-for-service system and those enrolled in managed care plans underscore the fact that managed care plans are not necessarily managing care. Both low-income and chronically ill people, who could most benefit from true care management, have better health outcomes in traditional Medicare than in managed care plans. ${ }^{15}$

## Availability and Reliability

It is difficult to argue that quality will be high when health care is routinely disrupted or not available. Disruptions in care or lack of options have been exactly what millions of Medicare beneficiaries have experienced with the private managed care plans in Medicare + Choice.

- Private managed care plans are not a real option for the 9.3 million Medicare beneficiaries who live in rural counties. Eighty percent have no choice of a private plan-they live in counties where there is no managed care plan participating in Medicare. For the few with the option of enrolling in a private managed care plan, most have no choice of plans. Only 15 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who live in rural areas have more than one plan available. ${ }^{16}$
- Private plans have pulled out of Medicare in large numbers, disrupting care for millions. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of plans in Medicare + Choice dropped by more than half. ${ }^{17}$ When a health plan leaves the Medicare program, the Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in that plan often have to find new internists, specialists, and other health care practitioners. Over 2 million people formerly enrolled in Medicare+Choice plans have been affected by health plan pull-outs. ${ }^{18}$
- Not only have plans not been consistently available, but the services they offer Medicare beneficiaries have not been reliable either. Private managed care plans have continually increased the amount that patients have to pay for their care and, at the same time, have reduced benefits. ${ }^{19}$ The most dramatic benefit reductions have been in drug coverage. In 1999, most Medicare + Choice plans offered drug coverage to entice individuals to enroll—in fact, 84 percent of Medicare + Choice enrollees were in plans that offered a basic drug benefit. ${ }^{20}$ Since then, many plans have restricted or completely eliminated drug coverage. ${ }^{21}$ Today, 60 percent of Medicare + Choice plans only cover generic drugs. ${ }^{22}$
- Satisfaction with, and access to, care is also an indicator of qualitydifficulty gaining access to health professionals is inconsistent with quality care. Looking at both the ability to obtain care and overall satisfaction, traditional Medicare again scores better than private plans. Those who receive care in traditional Medicare report that they are more satisfied with their care, and report fewer problems obtaining health care, than adults covered by private plans, such as those offered by employers or through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. ${ }^{23}$

Private plans' history of pulling out of Medicare markets, cutting back on benefits, and shifting more costs to patients, along with their low ratings on patient satisfaction and access to care, are not a recipe for higher quality.

## Eye on the Bottom Line

For private plans participating in Medicare + Choice, profitability-the adequacy of the government's payments-is the main factor considered when determining whether to remain in or pull out of the Medicare program. ${ }^{24}$ Nearly all of the 11 plans covered in this report exited one or more Medicare markets in 2002. For example, citing inadequate Medicare payments, Aetna stopped providing managed care services to Medicare beneficiaries in several areas, affecting approximately 95,000 Medicare beneficiaries. ${ }^{25}$

That profitability is a primary concern for private plans is not surprising. These plans are businesses; as demonstrated in this report, executive compensation is structured to ensure that profitability is a primary consideration. In any
"restructuring" that gives private plans a greater role, Medicare will need to pay these plans enough to make them profitable. Unless Medicare payments are high enough to make them profitable, plans will continue to be an unreliable source of care for seniors and people with disabilities.

In contrast, the only goal of traditional Medicare is to provide health care insurance for the nation's seniors and people with disabilities. Although it is the nation's largest insurance program, its executives are paid considerably less than similarly positioned individuals in private plans, yet the program reliably serves all markets.

## CONCLUSION

Soon a debate will begin about "restructuring" Medicare in ways that weaken traditional Medicare and give a greater role to private health planscompanies that pay their executives lavish compensation packages and have profitability as their primary concern.

Private plans have not done as well as Medicare in controlling per enrollee spending. And experience with the Medicare + Choice program shows that, even when payments exceed the cost of serving the same enrollees in traditional Medicare, plans pull out of the program in large numbers. Plans fail to serve areas that are not profitable, such as rural counties. Plans that remain in the program have a pattern of cutting benefits or shifting costs to patients to increase profitability. Systems to truly manage care are not widely evident, and patients in private plans report greater difficulty accessing care than those in traditional Medicare. Lack of care management and access barriers may be key reasons Medicare beneficiaries with low incomes or chronic conditions-a large number of those in Medicare-have poorer health outcomes in private managed care plans.

Serving only selected areas, pulling out of unprofitable markets, shifting costs, reducing benefits, making access to care more difficult-these may all be strategies that improve company profitability. But they do not deliver better care. Turning Medicare over to private plans may mean more business for those companies, higher profits, and more lucrative stock packages for company executives, but it is a step that shortchanges 40 million seniors and people with disabilities who rely on Medicare.

## ENDNOTES


#### Abstract

${ }^{1}$ Medicare+Choice was established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to give those in Medicare the option of enrolling in a variety of private health plans. Private plans contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to participate in the program. The vast majority of plans participating are private managed care plans like health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs), both of which use financial incentives to steer patients to physicians and other health care providers in the plan's network. ${ }^{2}$ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' description of the Medicare program, available online at (http:// www.medicare.gov/Basics/Overview.asp). ${ }^{3}$ Each of the companies included in this report is listed as one of the top 25 national managed care firms, based on enrollment as of July 1, 2001. Jean Appleby, Managed Health Care Executive, November 2002, available online at (http:// www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/mhe/data/articlestandard/mhe/462002/37925/article.pdf). ${ }^{4}$ Each company reported on its Medicare business in its 2002 Annual Report or other SEC filings. In 2002, each covered at least 50,000 Medicare beneficiaries. ${ }^{5}$ In a few of the companies profiled in this report, top executives' unexercised stock options were valued at zero. That does not mean that the executive did not hold substantial options. Rather, it reflects a fall in company stock price; at the time of the SEC filings, stock options were less than the value at the point the options were awarded. If the stock price rises, the options will again have value. Those executives have a particularly keen interest in improving company profitability and stock price.


${ }^{6}$ The Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare Chartbook, Second Edition Fall 2001, available online at (http://www.kff.org/content/2001/1622/Medicare_Chart_Book.pdf).
${ }^{7}$ Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Medicare and Health Care Chartbook, 1997, available online at (http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/ways-and-means/sec3.pdf).
${ }^{8}$ Average 2002 compensation, not including unexercised stock options, of the 57 executives listed in this report was nearly $\$ 5.5$ million, compared to $\$ 148,350$ for the leading executives in the Medicare program, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
${ }^{9}$ Cristina Boccuti, Marilyn Moon, "Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers Growth Rates In Spending Over Three Decades," the Urban Institute, March 31, 2003, available online at (http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000474).
${ }^{10}$ Letter from Paul Ginsburg, Ph.D., President, Center for Studying Health System Change, to Senator Max Baucus, April 10, 2003.
${ }^{11}$ Ibid.
${ }^{12}$ General Accounting Office, Medicare + Choice Payments Exceed Cost of Fee-For-Service Benefits, Adding Billions to Spending, GAO/HEHS-00-161 (Washington: GAO, August 2000).
${ }^{13}$ Scott Harrison, Presentation to the Senate Committee on Finance Staff, The Medicare + Choice Payment System, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, March 7, 2003, available online at (http://www.medpac.gov/publications/ congressional_reports/MplusCpay_sys_SH.pdf).
${ }^{14}$ Marsha Gold, "Can Managed Care and Competition Control Medicare Costs?" Health Affairs Web Exclusive, April 2, 2003.
${ }^{15}$ D. G. Safran, et al., "Health Outcomes in Traditional Medicare and Medicare HMOs: Equal for All?" presented at Academy Health's June 2002 conference; and, J. E. Ware, M. S. Bayliss, W. P. Rogers, "Differences in four-year health outcomes for elderly poor, chronically ill patients treated in HMO and fee-for-service systems," JAMA 276 no. 13 (October 2, 1996): 1039-1047.
${ }^{16}$ McCloskey, Amanda, Managed Care Plans Offer No Real Choice for Rural Medicare Beneficiaries (Washington: Families USA, May 2003).
${ }^{17}$ Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare + Choice Fact Sheet (Washington: Kaiser Family Foundation, April 2003).
${ }^{18}$ Scott Harrison, op. cit.
${ }^{19}$ Lori Achman and Marsha Gold, Medicare + Choice Plans Continue to Shift More Costs to Enrollees (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, April 2003).
${ }^{20}$ Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare + Choice Fact Sheet, op. cit.
${ }^{21}$ Ibid.
${ }^{22}$ Lori Achman and Marsha Gold, op. cit.
${ }^{23}$ Karen Davis, Cathy Schoen, Michelle Doty, and Katie Tenney, "Medicare Versus Private Insurance: Rhetoric and Reality," Health Affairs Web Exclusive, October 9, 2002.
${ }^{24}$ Debra Draper, et al., The Role of National Firms in Medicare + Choice (Washington: Kaiser Family Foundation, June 2002).
${ }^{25}$ Aetna 2002 10-K, Exhibit 13, available online at (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1122304/ 000095012303002268/y83806exv13.htm).

## APPENDIX I:

Methodology

## METHODOLOGY

Families USA analyzed compensation for the most highly paid executives in 11 leading publicly traded managed care plans, or the parent companies of such managed care plans.

## Selection of Health Plans in This Report

Families USA selected health plans for inclusion in this study from the largest publicly traded managed care plans in the U.S. and from the plans with the largest number of Medicare enrollees in 2002.

Plan size was determined using information from Interstudy, a Minneapolis, Minnesota-based think tank that tracks the managed care industry. Interstudy publishes an annual list of the top national managed care plans. The plans included in this report were all among the top 25 managed care plans in 2001, or the parent company of such plans. (Interstudy's 2002 listing had not yet been published at the time this report was written.) The plans in this report include 10 of the 12 largest managed care companies in the U.S. in 2001 (the other two of the top 12, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association Plans and Kaiser Foundation Health Plans, Inc., are both not-for-profit companies and therefore do not report executive compensation to the SEC).

In 2002, each plan reported that it had 50,000 or more Medicare enrollees, making each among the leading providers of managed care services to the Medicare population.

## Calculating Compensation

The data used to calculate executive compensation were taken from the Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) Database. EDGAR is available online at the SEC's Web site and includes all public companies' filings to the SEC. These companies are required to submit both annual reports (form 10-K) and yearly proxy statements (form DEF 14-A). Proxy statements report the executive compensation-including salaries, bonuses, stock options, and other compensation-of the companies' chief executive officers (CEOs) and the four most highly compensated executive officers. Families USA downloaded SEC filings for each of the companies' fiscal year 2002 DEF 14-As.

## How Executive Remuneration Was Computed

Total Annual Compensation, Exclusive of Unexercised Stock Options: This amount was computed for each executive by adding together the following information from the SEC filing:

- Salary: Annual wages paid to the executive for the fiscal year.
- Bonus: Bonuses paid to the executive for the fiscal year.
- Other Annual Compensation and All Other Compensation: Additional compensation given to the executive, which could include the company's contributions to a savings plan, tax reimbursements, transportation, relocation fees, a signing bonus, life insurance plans, and retirement plans.
- Restricted Stock Awards: The value of shares given to the executive by the company during 2002. These shares are usually subject to restric-tions-for example, the executive may not be able to sell them for a specified period of time. The dollar value is as reported in the proxy statements for the fiscal year and is not adjusted to reflect any of the stock restrictions.
- Long-Term Incentive Plan Payouts: Taxable payments in cash or stock to the executive for reaching a specified performance goal over a period longer than a year.
- Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise: The value of stock options the executive exercised during 2002. The company computes this value by multiplying the number of shares acquired by the difference between the market price and the "exercise price."

The Value of Unexercised Stock Options: This amount was computed by adding together figures from the SEC filings regarding stock option grants awarded to each executive. Stock option grants give these executives the right—but not the obligation-to buy or sell a specific amount of the company's stock at a specified price ("exercise price") during some specified time period in the future. The IRS allows companies to deduct the transaction from taxable income.

Stock options are only valuable when the market price of the company's stock exceeds the exercise price of the option. For example, if an executive is awarded 100 stock options at an exercise price of $\$ 10$ a share and the market price is $\$ 30$ a share, then the executive could buy 100 shares at $\$ 10$ a share, reaping the $\$ 20$ difference between the exercise price and the market price for each share-a total of $\$ 2,000$. However, if the market price of the share is less than the exercise price, the stock options have no value. The value of unexercised stock options was computed for each executive by adding together the following:

- Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (Exercisable): Value of the "in-the-money" stock option grants the executive has been awarded in the past that are fully vested and, thus, could be exercised in the year 2002. This value is the difference between the current market price and the exercise price.
- Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (Unexercisable): The value of the "in-the-money" stock option grants that are not yet vested and that the executive can choose to exercise in the future. This value is the difference between the current market price and the exercise price for stock options that have not yet vested. For example, this would include options that an executive has held for two years but whose terms require three years to pass before the options are available.

The SEC permits companies to estimate the potential value of stock options awarded to executives in one of two ways:

- Grant Date Present Value: This value is estimated using the Black-Sholes option pricing model. Used by market professionals to calculate the value of an option, it includes such variables as the stock price, the exercise price, and the expiration date.
- Potential Realizable Value: This value is calculated at hypothetical annual growth rates of 5 percent and 10 percent for the stock price over the term of the option-usually 5 or 10 years. The company reports potential realizable value at both 5 percent and 10 percent in its proxy statements. For the purposes of this study, the more conservative value of 5 percent was reported.


## APPENDIX II:

Compensation Information by Company

## Aetna Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

## Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options

 Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
## \$ 24,371,813 <br> \$ 4,874,363

## \$ 47,142,746

\$ 9,428,549

| Executive Name and Tifle | ```John W. Rowe, M.D. Chairman & CEO``` | Alan M. <br> Bennett <br> Senior VP \& CFO |  | L. Edward Shaw, Jr. Executive VP \& General Counsel | Ronald A. Williams President |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 1,000,000 | 425,000 | 700,000 | 525,000 | 848,077 |
| Bonus | 2,500,000 | 450,000 | 925,000 | 700,000 | 1,500,000 |
| Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 89,490 | 0 | 76,648 | 0 | 372 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts ${ }^{2}$ | 5,198,400 | 996,360 | 2,599,200 | 797,088 | 3,465,600 |
| All Other Compensation ${ }^{3}$ | 139,115 | 121,262 | 61,562 | 34,350 | 299,442 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 0 | 919,847 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Compensation | 8,927,005 | 2,912,469 | 4,362,410 | 2,056,438 | 6,113,491 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) | 10,556,570 | 517,148 | 1,298,000 | 4,318,446 | 1,180,002 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 8,082,910 | 891,800 | 2,748,000 | 1,251,272 | 3,556,998 |
| Grant Date Present Value ${ }^{4}$ | 5,439,000 | 932,400 | 2,331,000 | 931,200 | 3,108,000 |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 24,078,480 | 2,341,348 | 6,377,000 | 6,500,918 | 7,845,000 |

${ }^{1}$ Includes $\$ 80,360$ and $\$ 66,204$ for personal use of corporate aircraft for Dr. Rowe and Mr. Kelso, respectively. Mr. Williams was reimbursed $\$ 372$ for income taxes.
${ }^{2}$ Represents the value of previously awarded performance units that vested upon attainment of specified performance criteria.
${ }^{3}$ Includes life insurance premiums, matching contributions made under the ISP or the Supplemental ISP, and performance-based company contributions under the ISP.
${ }^{4}$ Based on stock options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Aetna Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 17 , 2003.

## Anthem, Inc

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

## Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options

$\begin{array}{rr}\$ & 15,648,885 \\ \$ & 3,129,777\end{array}$
\$ 3,129,777
\$ 17,173,100
\$ 3,434,620

| Executive Name and Title | Larry C. <br> Glasscock <br> President \& CEO | David R. Frick Executive VP \& Chief Legal and Admin Officer | Michael L. Smith Executive VP \& Chief Financial and Accounting Officer | Keith R. Faller President, Anthem Midwest | Mariorie W. <br> Dorr President, Anthem East |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 980,000 | 475,000 | 475,000 | 465,000 | 465,000 |
| Bonus | 2,352,000 | 760,000 | 760,000 | 744,000 | 744,000 |
| Other Annual Compensation | 197,877 | 56,425 | 101,953 | 114,957 | 3,351 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 3,233,700 | 883,878 | 883,878 | 862,320 | 862,320 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All Other Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 94,262 | 33,932 | 33,905 | 33,071 | 33,056 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise ${ }^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Compensation | 6,857,839 | 2,209,235 | 2,254,736 | 2,219,348 | 2,107,727 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) ${ }^{3}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) ${ }^{3}$ | 0 | 0 | $0$ | 0 | 0 |
| Grant Date Present Value | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth ${ }^{4}$ | 9,038,474 | 2,259,618 | 2,259,618 | 1,807,695 | 1,807,695 |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 9,038,474 | 2,259,618 | 2,259,618 | 1,807,695 | 1,807,695 |

${ }^{1}$ Other compensation represents matching contributions made under the company's $401(\mathrm{k})$ and deferred compensation plans.
${ }^{2}$ There were no stock option exercises by named executive officers during fiscal year 2002.
${ }^{3}$ Market value of securities underlying all of the options held by named executive officers at the end of fiscal year 2002 did not exceed the exercise price of such options, so none of the options were "in the money."
${ }^{4}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Anthem, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 2, 2003.

## CIGNA Corporation

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives <br> Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 21,871,042
\$ 3,124,435
\$ 16,806,454
\$ 2,400,922

| Executive Name and Title | H. Edward Hanway Chairman \& CEO | John Y. Kim President, Retirement \& Investment Services | Patrick E. Welch President, CIGNA Healthcare | Terry L. <br> Kendall <br> President, <br> CIGNA <br> International | Donald $M$. Levinson Executive VP, Human Resources \& Services | James G. <br> Stewart <br> Former <br>  <br> CFO | William M. <br> Pastore <br> Former <br> President, <br> CIGNA <br> Healfhcare |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary <br> Bonus <br> Other Annual Compensation <br> Restricted Stock Awards <br> Long-Term Incentive Payouts ${ }^{1}$ <br> All Other Compensation <br> Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | $\begin{array}{r} 1,021,900 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1,050,000 \\ 0 \\ 119,100 \\ 3,785,890 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 530,800 \\ 1,370,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 8,800 \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 426,900 \\ 800,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 700 \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 484,100 \\ 440,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 32,400 \\ 319,446 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 571,000 \\ 350,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 44,800 \\ 3,525,515 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 724,600 \\ 400,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 48,300 \\ 4,018,909 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 686,000 \\ 400,000 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 51,000 \\ 660,882 \end{array}$ |
| Total Compensation | 5,976,890 | 1,909,600 | 1,227,600 | 1,275,946 | 4,491,315 | 5,191,809 | 1,797,882 |
| Value of Unexercised In-TheMoney Options/SARS (E) ${ }^{2}$ Value of Unexercised In-TheMoney Options/SARS (U) ${ }^{2}$ Grant Date Present Value ${ }^{3}$ Potential Realizable Value at $5 \%$ Growth | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 0 \\ 6,399,907 \\ \mathrm{nr} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1,249,412 \\ \mathrm{nr} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 0 \\ 386,573 \\ \mathrm{nr} \end{array}$ | $679,994$ nr | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 0 \\ 2,280,693 \\ \mathrm{nr} \end{array}$ | $3,495,417$ $\mathrm{nr}$ | $2,314,458$ nr |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 6,399,907 | 1,249,412 | 386,573 | 679,994 | 2,280,693 | 3,495,417 | 2,314,458 |

${ }^{1}$ Long-term compensation for the incentive plan for the period ending December 31, 2002 will be paid in April 2003.
${ }^{2}$ The market value of securities underlying all of the options held by named executive officers at the end of fiscal year 2002 did not exceed the exercise price of such options, so none of the options were "in the money."
${ }^{3}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in SEC filing
Source: CIGNA Corporation, Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 21 , 2003.

## Coventry Health Care, Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 43,169,953
\$ 8,633,991
\$ 29,249,247
\$ 5,849,849

| Executive Name and Title | Allen F. Wise President \& CEO | Thomas P. McDonough Executive VP, \& COO | Dale B. Wolf Executive VP, CFO \& Treasurer | Harvey C. <br> DeMovick, Jr. Senior VP, Customer Service Ops \& CIO | Bernard J. <br> Mansheim, M.D. Senior VP \& Chief Medical Officer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary <br> Bonus ${ }^{1}$ <br> Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{2}$ <br> Restricted Stock Awards <br> Long-Term Incentive Payouts <br> All Other Compensation ${ }^{3}$ <br> Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | $\begin{array}{r} 892,308 \\ 2,100,000 \\ 164,230 \\ 5,710,000 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 1,455,826 \\ 11,341,966 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 594,230 \\ 1,000,000 \\ 74,450 \\ 2,141,250 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 613,096 \\ 3,082,784 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 544,230 \\ 1,000,000 \\ 102,809 \\ 2,141,250 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 585,924 \\ 3,077,178 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 359,231 \\ 400,000 \\ 0 \\ 285,500 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 221,261 \\ 2,406,869 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 349,231 \\ 375,000 \\ 0 \\ 428,250 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 215,546 \\ 1,507,534 \end{array}$ |
| Total Compensation | 21,664,330 | 7,505,810 | 7,451,391 | 3,672,861 | 2,875,561 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) <br> Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) <br> Grant Date Present Value Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth | $\begin{array}{r} 6,412,050 \\ 96,000 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 3,590,988 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,564,664 \\ 882,163 \end{array}$ <br> nr | $\begin{array}{r} 5,674,784 \\ 965,945 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,813,277 \\ 742,525 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1,880,138 \\ 626,713 \end{array}$ <br> nr <br> 0 |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 10,099,038 | 6,446,827 | 6,640,729 | 3,555,802 | 2,506,851 |

${ }^{1}$ Represents Management Incentive Plan awards in 2002; they will be paid in 2003 but appear in the 2002 SEC Compensation report and are therefore noted here.
${ }^{2}$ Other annual compensation includes use of company transportation.
${ }^{3}$ Consists of life insurance premiums, matching contributions to retirement savings plans and supplemental executive retirement plan and the value of credits to phantom cash and stock equivalent accounts made under company's 2000 deferred compensation plan. Actual payouts will occur at the end of the deferral period elected by the participant.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Coventry Health Care, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 29, 2003.

## Health Net, Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 11,633,113
\$ 2,326,623
\$ 48,650,336
\$ 9,730,067

| Executive Name and Tifle | Jay M. <br> Gellert <br> President \& CEO | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Marvin P. } \\ \text { Rich } \\ \text { Executive VP, } \\ \text { Finance \& Health } \\ \text { Plan Operations } \end{array}$ | Christopher Wing Executive VP, Regional Health Plans \& Specialty Companies | B. Curtis Westen Senior VP, General Counsel \& Secrefary |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary ${ }^{1}$ | 754,808 | 451,923 | 337,500 | 448,038 | 308,569 |
| Bonus | 700,000 | 800,000 | 561,450 | 308,000 | 240,100 |
| Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{2}$ | 65,755 | 11,133 | 8,767 | 12,000 | 12,000 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 0 | 0 | 1,056,000 | 132,000 | 0 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All Other Compensation | 6,256 | 5,905 | 162 | 8,432 | 5,803 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5,242,500 | 156,012 |
| Total Compensation | 1,526,819 | 1,268,961 | 1,963,879 | 6,150,970 | 722,484 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) | 16,163,584 | 0 | 0 | 180,269 | 1,169,771 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 2,686,666 | 3,512,000 | 189,000 | 736,531 | 483,680 |
| Grant Date Present Value | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth ${ }^{3}$ | 4,627,407 | 11,073,577 | 5,692,125 | 1,423,817 | 711,909 |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 23,477,657 | 14,585,577 | 5,881,125 | 2,340,617 | 2,365,360 |

${ }^{1}$ Salary includes amounts deferred pursuant to Health Net, Inc.'s deferred compensation plan and profit sharing and $401(\mathrm{k})$ plans.
${ }^{2}$ Other annual compensation includes a housing benefit for Mr. Gellert and car allowance for Messrs. Gellert, Rich, Wing, Westen, and Woys.
${ }^{3}$ Option grants in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Health Net, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 24, 2003.

## Humana Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 5,158,587
\$ 1,031,717
\$ 4,950,538
\$ 990,108

| Executive Name and Title | Michael B. McCallister President \& CEO | James E. <br> Murray <br> COO, Markeł <br> \& Business <br> Segment <br> Operations | Jonathan T. Lord, M.D. Senior VP \& Chief Innovation Officer | Bruce J. <br>  <br> Chief Services \& Information Officer | James H. <br> Bloem Senior VP \& Chief Financial Officer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 700,000 | 470,000 | 425,000 | 378,301 | 385,000 |
| Bonus | 612,500 | 359,023 | 279,951 | 216,732 | 220,570 |
| Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 59,852 | 32,248 | 35,839 | 12,853 | 13,619 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| All Other Compensation ${ }^{2}$ | 276,620 | 312,480 | 42,376 | 132,866 | 19,307 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 0 | 0 | 173,450 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Compensation | 1,648,972 | 1,173,751 | 956,616 | 740,752 | 638,496 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money, Options/SARS (E) | 1,767,085 | 704,183 | 208,200 | 12,530 | 3,292 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 531,448 | 0 | 173,500 | $0$ | 6,583 |
| Grant Date Present Value | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth ${ }^{3}$ | 408,624 | 163,450 | 245,175 | 481,293 | 245,175 |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 2,707,157 | 867,633 | 626,875 | 493,823 | 255,050 |

${ }^{1}$ Includes transportation, executive insurance, relocation expenses and miscellaneous items.
${ }^{2}$ Represents amounts contributed or accrued to the HRSP and contributions and earnings related to the long term benefit plan and the value of the 1998 Restricted Stock Awards that vested in February 2002 based on the company achieving its 2001 management goals.
${ }^{3}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Humana Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 29 , 2003.

## Oxford Health Plans, Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives <br> Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options
Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 87,653,390
\$ 17,530,678
\$ 38,643,423
\$ 7,728,685

| Executive Name and Tifle | Norman C. Payson, M.D. Former Chairman \& CEO | Charles G. <br> Berg President \& CEO | Kurt B. <br> Thompson Executive VP \& CPO | Alan M. Muney Executive VP \& Chief Medical Officer | Daniel N. <br> Gregoire Executive VP \& General Counsel |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 1,000,000 | 609,616 | 500,000 | 400,000 | 400,000 |
| Bonus | 2,000,000 | 700,000 | 350,000 | 300,000 | 300,000 |
| Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 2,242 | 52,477 | 144,815 | 0 | 69,675 |
| Restricted Stock Awards ${ }^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All Other Compensation | 1,858 | 16,699 | 8,540 | 8,629 | 8,629 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 73,006,725 | 3,360,381 | 3,239,031 | 1,174,073 | 0 |
| Total Compensation | 76,010,825 | 4,739,173 | 4,242,386 | 1,882,702 | 778,304 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) | 25,589,375 | 2,925,594 | 1,179,009 | 502,908 | 271,500 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 0 | 4,832,484 | 1,536,408 | 991,645 | 814,500 |
| Grant Date Present Value ${ }^{3}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 25,589,375 | 7,758,078 | 2,715,417 | 1,494,553 | 1,086,000 |

${ }^{1}$ The amounts paid include costs incurred by Dr. Payson and Messrs. Berg and Thompson for use of a company sponsored airplane. The amounts paid to Mr. Gregoire include relocation costs.
${ }^{2}$ No stock options were awarded in 2002.
${ }^{3}$ There were no stock options granted to these executives in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 2, 2003.

## PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options
Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 8,592,250
\$ 1,718,450
\$ 32,774,326
\$ 6,554,865

| Executive Name and Title | Howard G. Phanstiel President \& CEO | Bradford A. Bowlus Executive VP \& CEO Pacificare Health Plans | Joseph S. Konowiecki Executive VP, General Counsel \& Secretary | Gregory W. Scott Executive VP \& CFO | Katherine F. <br> Feeny Executive VP, Senior Solutions |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 917,309 | 600,001 | 547,887 | 501,696 | 374,910 |
| Bonus | 1,690,000 | 780,000 | 800,000 | 650,000 | 206,250 |
| Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 330,160 | 196,348 | 136,511 | 195,788 | 62,139 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 0 | 0 | 0 | 275,700 | 0 |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| All Other Compensation | 68,312 | 42,228 | 24,362 | 38,292 | 25,382 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 0 | 128,975 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Compensation | 3,005,781 | 1,747,552 | 1,508,760 | 1,661,476 | 668,681 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) | 2,405,625 | 310,713 | 0 | 404,531 | 103,300 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 6,293,625 | 3,020,063 | 3,606,000 | 2,671,594 | 394,900 |
| Grant Date Present Value ${ }^{2}$ | 5,332,490 | 2,332,964 | 3,498,900 | 1,999,684 | 399,937 |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 14,031,740 | 5,663,740 | 7,104,900 | 5,075,809 | 898,137 |

${ }^{1}$ Includes forgiveness of loans, risk premium applied to amounts deferred under company's stock unit deferral compensation plan.
${ }^{2}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
Source: PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 30, 2003.

## Sierra Health Services, Inc.

## Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives <br> Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options <br> Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options

\$ 12,935,505
\$ 2,587,101
\$ 13,569,257
\$ 2,713,851

| Executive Name and Title | Anthony M. Marlon, M.D. Chairman, CEO \& President | Frank E. Collins Senior VP, Legal \& Admin \& Secretary | Jonathon W. Bunker Senior VP, Managed Healthcare | Paul H. <br> Palmer <br> Senior VP, <br> Finance, CFO <br> \& Treasurer | Laurence S. Howard Senior VP, Program Office |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary <br> Bonus <br> Other Annual Compensation <br> Restricted Stock Awards <br> Long-Term Incentive Payouts <br> All Other Compensation ${ }^{1}$ <br> Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | $\begin{array}{r} 876,364 \\ 1,663,650 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 92,883 \\ 2,113,091 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 290,922 \\ 275,250 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 31,087 \\ 1,461,825 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 309,002 \\ 338,700 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 25,675 \\ 1,492,407 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 251,693 \\ 254,200 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 36,178 \\ 1,566,361 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 270,104 \\ 183,500 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 32,128 \\ 1,370,485 \end{array}$ |
| Total Compensation | 4,745,988 | 2,059,084 | 2,165,784 | 2,108,432 | 1,856,217 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) <br> Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) <br> Grant Date Present Value <br> Potential Realizable Value at $5 \%$ Growth $^{2}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,750,223 \\ 2,981,065 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 549,497 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 511,850 \\ 1,268,394 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 293,065 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 390,319 \\ 1,195,731 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 293,065 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 305,150 \\ 1,237,400 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 293,065 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 352,850 \\ 1,056,000 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 91,583 \end{array}$ |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 6,280,785 | 2,073,309 | 1,879,115 | 1,835,615 | 1,500,433 |

${ }^{1}$ Includes contributions to the company's $401(\mathrm{k})$ plan and life insurance policies.
${ }^{2}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ not reported in the SEC filing
Source: Sierra Health Services, Inc., Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 18, 2003.

## UnitedHealth Group Incorporated

Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 34,109,028
\$ 6,821,806
\$ 853,742,449
\$ 170,748,490

| Executive Name and Title | William W. <br> McGuire, M.D. <br>  <br> CEO | Stephen J. Hemsley President \& COO | R. Channing Wheeler CEO, <br> Uniprise | Robert J. Sheehy CEO, <br> UnitedHealth Care | David J. Lubben General Counsel |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary <br> Bonus <br> Other Annual Compensation ${ }^{1}$ <br> Restricted Stock Awards <br> Long-Term Incentive Payouts <br> All Other Compensation <br> Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | $\begin{array}{r} 1,896,154 \\ 5,275,000 \\ 203,211 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 1,798,000 \\ 285,038 \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 980,769 \\ 2,300,000 \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 924,000 \\ 95,212 \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 474,231 \\ 540,000 \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 470,000 \\ 21,614 \\ 8,082,854 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 474,231 \\ 650,000 \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 400,000 \\ 34,926 \\ 3,504,995 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 450,000 \\ 550,000 \\ 0 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 425,000 \\ 33,199 \\ 4,240,594 \end{array}$ |
| Total Compensation | 9,457,403 | 4,299,981 | 9,588,699 | 5,064,152 | 5,698,793 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) <br> Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) <br> Grant Date Present Value Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth ${ }^{2}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 448,178,567 \\ 53,377,650 \\ 28,430,754 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 175,927,180 \\ 32,409,370 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 13,121,886 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 18,757,720 \\ 9,391,418 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 5,863,342 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 22,813,677 \\ 10,475,557 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 5,863,342 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 16,876,411 \\ 6,392,233 \\ \mathrm{nr} \\ 5,863,342 \end{array}$ |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 529,986,971 | 221,458,436 | 34,012,480 | 39,152,576 | 29,131,986 |

[^0]
## WellPoint Health Networks

Annual Compensation for Top Executives Average Compensation for Top Executives

Total Value of Unexercised Stock Options Average Value of Unexercised Stock Options
\$ 45,913,499
\$ 9,182,700
\$ 156,513,923
\$ 31,302,785

| Executive Name and Tifle | Leonard D. Schaeffer Chairman \& CEO | David C. Colby Executive VP \& CFO | Thomas C. Geiser <br> Executive VP, <br> General Counsel \& Secretary | D. Mark <br> Weinberg Executive VP \& Chief Development Officer | Joan E. <br> Herman <br>  <br> State-Sponsored Program |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary | 1,246,155 | 541,231 | 501,577 | 614,231 | 472,385 |
| Bonus | 5,690,916 | 1,335,000 | 1,138,613 | 1,025,706 | 1,146,250 |
| Other Annual Compensation | 140,342 | 5,377 | 5,377 | 0 | 5,377 |
| Restricted Stock Awards | 0 | 0 | $n \mathrm{r}$ | 0 | nr |
| Long-Term Incentive Payouts | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| All Other Compensation ${ }^{1}$ | 207,382 | 58,675 | 55,615 | 70,007 | 51,160 |
| Value of Shares Acquired on Exercise | 14,480,737 | 0 | 0 | 12,336,257 | 4,785,129 |
| Total Compensation | 21,765,532 | 1,940,283 | 1,701,182 | 14,046,201 | 6,460,301 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (E) | 65,999,271 | 20,135,650 | 10,840,254 | 530,307 | 2,462,405 |
| Value of Unexercised In-The-Money Options/SARS (U) | 15,106,708 | 3,920,715 | 3,920,715 | 4,972,300 | 3,920,715 |
| Grant Date Present Value ${ }^{2}$ | 11,981,582 | 2,313,576 | 2,313,576 | 5,186,911 | 2,909,238 |
| Potential Realizable Value at 5\% Growth | nr | nr | nr | nr | nr |
| Total Value of Stock Options | 93,087,561 | 26,369,941 | 17,074,545 | 10,689,518 | 9,292,358 |

${ }^{1}$ Other compensation includes matching contributions made under the company's $401(\mathrm{k})$, elective deferral contributions to the company's deferred compensation plan and life insurance premiums.
${ }^{2}$ Options granted in 2002.
$\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in SEC filing
Source: WellPoint Health Networks, Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 31, 2003.

## CREDITS

This report was written by:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Dee Mahan, Senior Health Policy Analyst, } \\
\text { Families USA }
\end{gathered}
$$

The following Families USA staff contributed to the preparation of this report:<br>Ron Pollack, Executive Director<br>Peggy Denker, Director of Publications<br>Ingrid VanTuinen, Writer/Editor<br>Nancy Magill, Design/Production Coordinator<br>Christopher Fellabaum, Research Assistant<br>Anna Resnick, Intern

## Families USA

Families USA is a national, nonprofit organization dedicated to the achievement of high-quality, affordable health and long-term care for all Americans. You can help promote Families USA's goals by becoming a member of Families USA today.
$\square$ Yes, I want to add my voice in support of affordable, high-quality health care for all.
$\qquad$ \$25 $\qquad$ $\$ 50$ $\qquad$ \$100 $\qquad$ \$250 $\qquad$ Other
$\square$ Please send me information about Families USA's grassroots advocacy network.
$\square$ Enclosed is $\$ 70$ for a one-year subscription to Families USA Publication Service (includes a 20\% discount on all previously published materials).*
$\square$ Please send me the publications listed below ( $20 \%$ discount for subscribers to Publication Service).*

| Pub Code | Title | Quantity |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

Name: $\qquad$
Organization: $\qquad$
Street Address: $\qquad$
City, State, Zip Code: $\qquad$
Telephone (Day): $\qquad$ (Evening) $\qquad$ (Fax) $\qquad$

* DC residents/organizations, add $5.75 \%$ sales tax or provide tax-exempt certificate.

Total Amount Enclosed : $\qquad$
Contributions to Families USA are tax-deductible. Please make your check payable to Families USA.

## PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FROM FAMILIES USA*

| Publication Code | Title | Price |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PS-000 | Families USA Publications Service. Annual subscription to reports, issue briefs, and fact sheets published by Families USA. | \$70.00 |
| 03-104 | Slashing Medicaid: The Hidden Effects of the President's Block-Grant Proposal. A Special Report (5/03) | \$5.00 |
| 03-103 | Going Without Health Insurance: Nearly One in Three Non-Elderly Americans (3/03) | \$15.00 |
| 03-102 | Medicaid: Good Medicine for California's Economy (1/03) | \$15.00 |
| 03-101 | Medicaid: Good Medicine for State Economies (1/03) | \$15.00 |
| 03-000 | Health Action 2003 Tool Kit (1/03) | \$50.00 |
| 02-106 | Children Losing Health Coverage. A Special Report (9/02) | \$2.00 |
| 02-105 | Profiting from Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go (7/02) | \$15.00 |
| 02-104 | Bitter Pill: The Rising Prices of Prescription Drugs for Older Americans (6/02) | \$15.00 |
| 02-103 | A 10-Foot Rope for a 40-Foot Hole: Tax Credits for the Uninsured - 2002 Update (5/02) | \$15.00 |
| 02-102 | Failing America's Seniors: Private Health Plans Provide Inadequate Drug Coverage. A Special Report (5/02) | \$2.00 |
| 02-101 | Collusion and Other Anticompetitive Practices: A Survey of Class Action Law Suits Against Drug Manufacturers (4/02) | \$5.00 |
| 02-100 | Assessing the Bush Administration's Proposed Medicare Drug Discount Card Program. A Special Report (3/02) | \$2.00 |
| 02-000 | Health Action 2002 Tool Kit (1/02) | \$35.00 |
| 01-109 | Prescription Drug Costs and Coverage: An Action Kit for State Advocates (12/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-108 | A 10-Foot Rope for a 40-Foot Hole: Tax Credits for the Uninsured (9/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-107 | Consumer Health Assistance Programs: Report on a National Survey (6/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-106 | Designing a Consumer Health Assistance Program (6/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-105 | Healthy Pay for Health Plan Executives. A Special Report (6/01) | \$8.00 |
| 01-104 | Off the Charts: Pay, Profits and Spending in Drug Companies (7/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-103 | Enough To Make You Sick: Prescription Drug Prices for the Elderly (6/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-102 | Getting Less Care: The Uninsured with Chronic Health Conditions (2/01) | \$15.00 |
| 01-101 | Expanding Coverage for Low-Income Parents: An Action Kit for State Advocates (1/01) | \$15.00 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Other annual compensation includes company-provided transportation, expense allowances, and financial planning fees paid by the company.
    ${ }^{2}$ Options granted in 2002.
    $\mathrm{nr}=$ Not reported in the SEC filing
    Source: UnitedHealth Group Incorporated, Notice and Proxy Statement Schedule 14(A) Information, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 9, 2003.

