

The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family

Herbert C. Kelman
(HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

This article presents a general approach to the development of personal identity, exploring the ways in which various group identities may be incorporated into the emerging personal identity of an individual. It is hoped that this general scheme will have some implications for the question of how Jewish identity can be built into the personal identity of Jewish children, and what role Jewish education might play in this process.

The approach is based on a conceptual model developed for the analysis of social influence and extended to the analysis of personal involvement in social systems.¹ This model is not specifically addressed to identity formation, but it has some relevance to the development of identity both at the level of the individual and at that of the group—that is, both to personal and to national or ethnic identity. The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of this model for identity formation at these two levels, with special reference to Jewish identity.²

What is Personal Identity?

Personal identity refers to the enduring aspects of a person's definition of her- or himself, the conception of who one is and what one is over time and across situations. It is what individuals bring to the many situations and social interactions in which they become involved as they go through the life cycle and, at any given period of time, as they enact their various social roles. This is not to say that personal identity—even once a person has reached adulthood—is an entirely stable, consistent, and unchanging property. Though the degree of stability and consistency of one's identity varies widely among individuals, it is never a fixed entity, but rather a constantly evolving self-definition. As people's life situation changes and as they accumulate new experiences, their identity becomes modified in various ways. Certain aspects may be strengthened, filled out, revised or abandoned. In some instances there may be radical alterations in personal identity. More typically, however, personal identity is a cumulative product built up over a person's lifetime experiences.

The conception of identity as a product of experiences underlines one of the central assumptions of the present model: personal identity is, to a large extent, a resultant of the various social influences to which individuals are exposed as they grow up and as they continue to function in society. This view, however, does not imply that personal identity is merely the reflection of social influences and thus epiphenomenal. Rather, it assumes that elements of identity derived through social influence are clustered around a personal core. The combination and integration of diverse elements around this core are unique for each individual and thus assure an individualized product, even though many of its components are socially shared. Accordingly, any approach that pits the self against society (whether by viewing personal identity as a reflection of the “true self” apart from social roles or as “nothing but” a reflection of social roles) is based on a false dichotomy. Personal identity represents, by its very nature, an interaction of personal and social forces.

The personal core around which identity takes shape starts with the individual’s innate characteristics. Research based on observations of infants from the day of birth suggests that there are apparently innate individual differences in temperamental orientation. Infants differ, for example, in their degree of activity or passivity and in the extent to which they seek or avoid stimulation. There also seem to be innate differences in a variety of capacities, such as those involved in intellectual and physical functioning, in the processing of information, and in the acquisition of various skills. These innate characteristics can be seen as the beginnings of what the individual *is*. They have an important effect on individuals’ orientation to the environment—on what they need and expect from it—as well as on their ways of coping with the environment—on their ability to meet its demands and exploit the opportunities it offers. Children’s subsequent experiences, as they cope with the environment, relate to their families, and interact with others, help to determine what they *become*, given their innate orientations and capacities.

Children’s cultural and ethnic heritage—the groups into which they are born and in which they are raised—are part of the personal core of their identity, insofar as these group memberships enter into their lives. The ethnic group may be a more or less central part of children’s experience, providing the context of their daily lives. For example, children may grow up in a Jewish neighborhood, live in a home in which Jewish religious rituals are regularly or occasionally observed, go to synagogue frequently or for special holidays, be taught Hebrew or at least the prayers, hear discussions about Israel and Jewish affairs in various parts of the world around the dinner table, know that their parents belong to Jewish organizations or at least contribute to Jewish causes, and so on. Alternatively, ethnicity may be quite peripheral, serving primarily as a basis for children’s self-identification and for symbolic and intermittent association. Mary Waters has written about the prevalence of such a relationship to their ethnic ancestry among white Americans in the United States, particularly individuals growing up in families with mixed ethnic heritage that have lived in the country for more than three generations and have moved away from ethnic neighborhoods.³ Waters argues persuasively that ethnic whites—in contrast to African Americans and members of other racially defined ethnic groups—exercise many options as to which, if any, ethnic group to identify with and how to relate themselves to that group. Waters’ data are based primarily on ethnic white Catholics; the likeli-

hood is that American Jews exercise fewer options in how they define themselves, because of the convergence of ethnicity and religion in the Jewish case. However, those American and other diaspora Jews who grow up in homes in which association with the Jewish heritage is largely symbolic and intermittent will generally experience few structural constraints in opting out of their Jewish identification entirely.

When, and to the extent that, children's cultural and ethnic heritage plays an integral role in their life experiences, their ethnic group membership becomes an inherent part of the personal core of their identity. At the very least, the fact of their affiliation with a particular group is communicated to children in the course of their socialization, and also has a bearing on the way in which they are perceived and treated by others. Usually, membership in ethnic groups is reflected in the values, traditions, assumptions, and expectations that are conveyed to children by their families and others in their environment. Although ethnicity is ultimately a social construction, it is formed by each individual out of real-life experiences. There are wide differences, as noted, in the centrality of a particular group membership in children's early experiences. But in some sense, at least, people's ethnic and cultural heritage enters into who and what they are, just as their biological heritage does. This is not to say that individuals must accept their group memberships passively and unalterably, any more than they must accept their biological constraints in a fatalistic way. What is assumed, however, is that the individuals must somehow take their cultural as well as their biological heritage into account if they are to develop a firm personal identity.

The personal core, as indicated, is the starting point around which an individual's identity develops. As people participate in a variety of social interactions—first within the family and increasingly within other contexts, including those formed by their important membership groups—they are exposed to different influences. Out of these influences they draw beliefs, attitudes, values, and expectations that, when added to their personal core, make up their emerging identity. These socially derived elements of identity are modified to varying degrees as they are related to the person's core identity and to each other.⁴

It should also be noted, in keeping with the assumption that identity represents an interaction of personal and social forces, that identity includes not only people's conceptions of who and what they are in their *own* eyes, but also who and what they are in the eyes of others. Thus, important components of their identity refer to the way others see them and to what others expect of them (which, of course, do not necessarily correspond to the others' actual perceptions and expectations). In other words, identity includes definitions of the self not only as a personal agent, but also as a social stimulus and as a congeries of social roles.

Dimensions of Personal Identity

Three interrelated dimensions of personal identity can be distinguished: stability, integration, and authenticity.

Stability refers to the degree to which the person's identity maintains itself over time and across situations. To some extent, stability is built into the very definition of

the concept of identity: If there is no stability—if a person's view of her- or himself changes from day to day and from situation to situation—one cannot properly speak of identity at all. The degree of stability of identity, however, can vary considerably from individual to individual. It may also vary from time to time within the same individual, since even a relatively stable identity may be undermined by traumatic or disconfirming experiences. The less stable their personal identity—either in general or as a result of destabilizing experiences—the less capable individuals are of managing the various situations in which they find themselves by bringing an enduring self-definition to them. Instead, their definition of themselves fluctuates as a function of the temporary and situational forces to which they are exposed. Stability does not mean that the person's identity is rigidly fixed and uninfluenced by new experiences. A stable identity does not preclude an openness to change; indeed, stability is conducive to a process of constant development of personal identity as the individual goes through life and responds to new experiences. But stability does imply a high degree of continuity even while change takes place. When there is change, it is not in the form of abandoning one identity and replacing it by another, but in the form of building on the existing identity, relating new elements to old ones, and readjusting different elements in the light of new inputs.

Integration refers to the extent to which the different elements of a person's identity are in communication with each other. A person's identity—particularly in complex and pluralistic modern societies—is the resultant of numerous and often contradictory inputs. People differ in the degree to which these various inputs are related to one another and form a coherent, integrated whole. An integrated identity is not necessarily one that is fully consistent. It is often impossible to harmonize some of the contradictory elements of one's identity without depriving them of their richness and vitality. Integration does not preclude the existence and recognition of a degree of creative tension between different elements of identity. But integration does imply that these contradictory elements are not compartmentalized, but remain in communication with each other. Thus, the awareness and acceptance of certain inconsistencies become part of personal identity. Moreover, insofar as there is communication between the different elements, they retain their ability to influence each other so that actions flowing from one part of a person's identity will not take place in total disregard of the demands of another part.

Authenticity refers to the extent to which a person's identity takes into account what he or she "really" is and has become. An identity is authentic to the extent to which its different elements draw on and flow from the person's temperamental orientations, capacities, ethnic and cultural background—in short, the person's biological and cultural heritage, which form the personal core of identity; and to the extent to which they reflect the person's life experiences and the various roles and activities in which he or she has been involved. As already indicated, the biological and cultural givens need not be passively accepted. Authenticity does not imply a fatalistic view that you are what you are and can do nothing about it. There is nothing inauthentic about an active effort to overcome certain biological or social limitations, or even to reject parts of one's experience as incongruent with one's evolving identity. What would make an identity inauthentic would be a denial or repression of these unwanted elements—a failure to take them into account (even though they may have been rejected) and to

recognize the part that they have played in shaping the personal identity. Furthermore, an identity is inauthentic to the extent to which its different elements are “borrowed”—that is, represent a wholesale adoption of the roles and expectations of others—and to the extent to which they are selected to accommodate others and gain their approval. An authentic identity does not preclude attention to the expectations and approval of others, but it implies an active effort to relate socially derived elements of identity to one’s personal orientations and experiences, to adapt them accordingly, and to integrate them with one’s emerging personal identity.

The concepts of stability, integrity, and authenticity are descriptive, in the sense that they are dimensions on which an identity can be located and assessed. Although it may not be easy to do so, it is certainly possible to develop empirical measures of these identity dimensions. At the same time, however, these concepts are normative, in the sense that they represent what I regard as desirable qualities of personal identity. That is, my view of a mature and effective person is one whose identity is stable without being rigidly unchanging, integrated without being simplistically consistent, and authentic without being oblivious to social demands and expectations.

A Model of Social Influence

We can now turn to a description of the model of social influence, which will then be applied to an analysis of identity formation. Specifically, we will want to look at what this model suggests about the ways in which socially derived elements of identity may be acquired.

Social influence is defined as change in a person’s behavior as a result of induction by others, whether another person or a group. Induction refers to an action by the other (the “influencing agent”) that—through any one of a variety of means, such as suggestion, persuasion, modeling, coercion, or providing information—points a new direction for the person and makes a new behavioral possibility available to her or him. The term behavior is used very broadly to include attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and action preferences. The model is not concerned with the motor aspects of behavior, but with its evaluative components.

The starting point of this model is a distinction between three processes of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. The basic assumption of the model is that each of these three processes is determined by a qualitatively distinct set of antecedent conditions and that each, in turn, yields a qualitatively different type of change.

Compliance can be said to occur when people accept influence from a person or from a group because they hope to achieve a favorable reaction from the other. They may be interested in attaining certain specific rewards or in avoiding certain specific punishments that the influencing agent controls. For example, an individual may make a special effort to express only “correct” opinions in order to gain admission to a particular group, or in order to avoid being dismissed from a job. Or people may be concerned with gaining approval or avoiding disapproval from the influencing agent in a more general way. For example, some individuals may try to say what is expected and what will please others in all (or in certain types of) situations, out of

a disproportionate need for favorable reactions of a direct and immediate kind. In any event, when people comply, they do what the agent wants them to do—or what they think the agent wants them to do—because they see this as a way of achieving a desired response from that agent. They do not adopt the induced behavior—for example, a particular opinion response—because they believe in its content, but because it is instrumental in the production of a satisfying social effect. What individuals learn, essentially, is to say or do the expected thing in special situations, regardless of what their private beliefs may be. Opinions adopted through compliance tend to be expressed only when the person's behavior is observable by the influencing agent.

Identification can be said to occur when an individual adopts behavior derived from another person or a group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to this person or group. A self-defining relationship is a role relationship that forms a part of the person's self-image. Accepting influence through identification, then, is a way of establishing or maintaining the desired relationship to the other, and the self-definition that is anchored in this relationship.

The relationship that an individual tries to establish or maintain through identification may take different forms. It may take the form of classical identification, that is, of a relationship in which individuals take over all or part of the role of the influencing agent, and in effect define their own roles in terms of the role of the other. They attempt to be like or actually *be* the other person. By saying what the other says, doing what the other does, believing what the other believes, they maintain this relationship and the satisfying self-definition that it provides them. An influencing agent who is likely to be an attractive object for such a relationship is one who occupies a role desired by these individuals—who possesses those characteristics that they themselves lack, such as control in a situation in which they are helpless, direction in a situation in which they are disoriented, or “group belongingness”⁵ in a situation in which they are isolated.

The behavior of prisoners undergoing brainwashing or severe interrogation provides an extreme example of this type of identification. By adopting the attitudes and beliefs of the interrogator—including his evaluation of them—they attempt to regain their identity, which has been subjected to massive threats. But this kind of identification does not occur only in such severe crisis situations. It can also be observed, for example, in the context of socialization of children, where the taking over of parental attitudes and actions is a normal (and probably essential) part of personality development. The more or less conscious efforts involved when individuals learn to play a desired occupational role and imitate an appropriate role model would also exemplify this process. Here, of course, the individuals are much more selective in the attitudes and actions they take over from the other person. What is at stake is not their basic sense of identity or the stability of their self-concept, but rather their more limited “professional identity.”

The self-defining relationship that an individual tries to establish or maintain through identification may also take the form of a reciprocal-role relationship—that is, of a relationship in which the roles of the two parties are defined with reference to one another. An individual may be involved in a reciprocal relationship with another specific individual, as in a friendship relationship between two people. Or a person may enact a social role that is defined with reference to another (reciprocal) role, as

in the relationship between patient and doctor. A reciprocal-role relationship can be maintained only if the participants have mutually shared expectations of one another's behavior. Thus, if people find a particular relationship satisfying, they will tend to behave in such a way as to meet the expectations of the other. In other words, they will tend to behave in line with the requirements of this particular relationship. This should be true regardless of whether the other is watching or not: quite apart from the reactions of the other, it is important to people's own self-concept to meet the expectations of their friendship roles, for example, or those of their occupational roles.

Thus, the acceptance of influence through identification should take place when people see the induced behavior as relevant to and required by a reciprocal-role relationship in which they are participants. Acceptance of influence based on a reciprocal-role relationship is similar to that involved in classical identification in that it is a way of establishing or maintaining a satisfying self-defining relationship to another. The nature of the relationship differs, of course. In one case it is a relationship of identity; in the other, one of reciprocity. In the case of reciprocal-role relationships, the individual is not identifying with the other in the sense of taking over the other's identity, but in the sense of empathically reacting in terms of the other's expectations, feelings, or needs.

Identification may also serve to maintain people's relationship to a group in which their self-definition is anchored. Such a relationship may have elements of classical identification as well as of reciprocal roles: to maintain their self-definition as group members, people have to model their behavior along particular lines and have to meet the expectations of their fellow members. An example of identification with a group is provided by the member of a revolutionary movement who derives strength and a sense of identity from his or her self-definition as part of the vanguard of the revolution and as an agent of historical destiny. A similar process, but at a low degree of intensity, is probably involved in many of the conventions that people acquire as part of their socialization into a particular group.

Identification is similar to compliance in that the individual does not adopt the induced behavior because its content per se is intrinsically satisfying. Identification differs from compliance, however, in that the individual actually believes in the opinions and actions adopted. The behavior is accepted both publicly and privately, and its manifestation does not depend on observability by the influencing agent. It does depend, however, on the role that the individual takes at any given moment in time. Only when the appropriate role is activated—only when the individual is acting within the relationship upon which the identification is based—will the induced opinions be expressed or actions performed. In the case of identification, people are not primarily concerned with pleasing or accommodating the other (as in compliance), but they are concerned with meeting the other's expectations for their own role performance. Thus, opinions adopted through identification do remain tied to the external source and dependent on social support. They are not integrated with the individual's value system, but rather tend to be isolated from the rest of one's values—to remain encapsulated.

Finally, *internalization* can be said to occur when people accept influence because the induced behavior is congruent with their value system. The content of the induced behavior is intrinsically rewarding here. It is adopted because people find it useful for

the solution of a problem, or because it is congenial to their own orientation, or because it is demanded by their own beliefs—in short, because they perceive it as inherently conducive to the maximization of their values. The characteristics of the influencing agent do play an important role in internalization, but the crucial dimension here is credibility, that is, the agent's relation to the content.

The most obvious examples of internalization are those that involve the evaluation and acceptance of induced behavior on rational grounds. People may adopt the recommendations of an expert, for example, because they find them relevant to their own problems and congruent with their own values. Typically, when internalization is involved, they will not accept these recommendations in toto, but modify them to some degree so that they will fit their own unique situation. In a somewhat different scenario, visitors to a foreign country may be challenged by the different patterns of behavior to which they are exposed, and they may decide to adopt them (again, selectively and in modified form) because they find them more in keeping with their own values than the patterns in their home country. There is no implication, of course, that adopting the recommendations of an expert or the customs of a foreign country always involves internalization. One would speak of internalization only if acceptance of influence was based on an assessment of the induced behavior against the person's own values.

Internalization, however, does not necessarily involve the adoption of induced behavior on rational grounds, even though the description of the process has decidedly rationalist overtones. Thus, one might characterize as internalization the adoption of beliefs because of their congruence with a value system that is based on *irrational* premises. For example, authoritarian individuals who adopt certain racist attitudes that fit into their paranoid, irrational view of the world may be engaging in internalization, as long as it is the content of these attitudes and their congruence with the individual's value system that motivates their adoption. Furthermore, congruence with a person's value system does not necessarily imply logical consistency. Behavior would be congruent if, in one or another way, it fit into the person's value system, if it seemed to belong there and be demanded by it.

It follows from this conception that behavior adopted through internalization is in some way—rational or otherwise—integrated with the individual's existing values. It becomes part of a personal system, as distinguished from a system of social-role expectations. Such behavior gradually becomes independent of the external source. Its manifestation depends neither on observability by the influencing agent nor on the activation of the relevant role, but on the extent to which the underlying values have been made relevant by the issues under consideration. This does not mean that people will invariably express internalized opinions, regardless of the social situation. In any specific situation, one has to choose among competing values in the face of a variety of situational requirements. It does mean, however, that these opinions will at least enter into competition with other alternatives whenever their content is deemed relevant to the situation at hand.

It should be stressed that the three processes are not mutually exclusive. While they have been defined as ideal types, they do not generally occur in pure form in real-life situations. The examples that have been given represent, at best, situations in which a particular process predominates and determines the central features of the interaction.

Each of these three processes is characterized by a distinct set of antecedent conditions and a distinct set of consequents. These are summarized in Table 1. Briefly, on the antecedent side, it is proposed that three qualitative aspects of the influence situation determine which process is likely to result: (1) the basis for the importance of the induction—that is, the nature of the predominant motivational orientation that is activated in the influence situation; (2) the source of power of the influencing agent—that is, the particular characteristics that enable the influencing agent to affect the person's goal achievement; and (3) the manner of achieving prepotency of the induced response—that is, the particular induction techniques that are used (deliberately or otherwise) to make the desired behavior stand out in preference to other alternatives. Thus, compliance is likely to result if the individual's primary concern in the influence situation is with the social effect of her or his behavior; if the influencing agent's power is based largely on the agent's "means control" (the ability to supply or withhold material or psychological resources on which the person's goal achievement depends); and if the induction techniques are designed to limit the individual's choice behavior. Identification is likely to result if the individual is primarily concerned, in this situation, with the social anchorage of her or his behavior; if the influencing agent's power is based largely on attractiveness (that is, the possession of qualities that make a continued relationship to the agent particularly desirable); and if the induction techniques serve to delineate the requirements of a role relationship in which the person's self-definition is anchored (for example, if they spell out the expectations of a relevant reference group). Internalization is likely to result if the in-

Table 1. Summary of the Distinctions Between the Three Processes of Social Influence

	Compliance	Identification	Internalization
Antecedents			
1. Basis for the importance of the induction	Concern with social effect of behavior	Concern with social anchorage of behavior	Concern with value congruence of behavior
2. Source of power of the influencing agent	Means control	Attractiveness	Credibility
3. Manner of achieving prepotency of the induced response	Limitation of choice behavior	Delineation of role requirements	Reorganization of means-ends framework
Consequents			
1. Conditions of performance of induced response	Surveillance by influencing agent	Salience of relationship to agent	Relevance of values to issue
2. Conditions of change and extinction of induced response	Changed perception of conditions for social rewards	Changed perception of conditions for satisfying self-defining relationships	Changed perception of conditions for value maximization
3. Type of behavior system in which induced response is embedded	External demands of a specific setting	Expectations defining a specific role	Person's value system

Source: Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change" (see n. 1), 67. Reprinted by permission of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, published by the University of Chicago Press.

dividual's primary concern in the influence situation is with the value congruence of her or his behavior; if the influencing agent's power is based largely on the agent's credibility (that is, expertness and trustworthiness); and if the induction techniques are designed to reorganize the person's "means-ends framework"—the person's conception of the paths toward maximizing her or his values.

On the consequent side, the framework proposes that the changes produced by each of the three processes tend to be of a different nature. The crucial difference in nature of change between the three processes is in the conditions under which the newly acquired behavior is likely to manifest itself. Behavior accepted through compliance will tend to manifest itself only under conditions of surveillance by the influencing agent, that is, only when the person's behavior is observable (directly and indirectly) by the agent. The manifestation of identification-based behavior does not depend on observability by the influencing agent, but it does depend on the salience of the person's relationship to the agent. That is, the behavior is likely to manifest itself only in situations that are in some way associated with the individual or group from whom the behavior was originally adopted. Thus, whether or not the behavior is manifested will depend on the role that the individual takes at any given moment in time. While surveillance is irrelevant, identification-based behavior is designed to meet the other's expectations for the person's own role performance. The behavior, therefore, remains tied to the external source and dependent upon social support. It is not integrated with the individual's value system, but rather tends to remain encapsulated. In contrast, behavior accepted through internalization depends neither on surveillance nor on salience of the influencing agent, but tends to manifest itself whenever the values on which it is based are relevant to the issue at hand. Behavior adopted through internalization is in some way, rational or otherwise, integrated with the individual's existing values. It becomes part of a personal system, as distinguished from a system of social-role expectations. It becomes independent of the original source and, because of the resulting interplay with other parts of the person's value system, it tends to be more idiosyncratic, more flexible, and more complex. This does not imply complete consistency, nor does it mean that the behavior will occur every time it is relevant to the situation. Internalized beliefs will, however, at least come into play whenever their content is relevant and will contribute to the final behavioral outcome, along with competing value considerations and situational demands.

Social Influences on Identity Formation

Each of the three processes of social influence may contribute to the acquisition of elements of personal identity. Internalization can be said to yield authentic elements of identity, identification to yield vicarious elements, and compliance to yield conferred elements. Thus, at the risk of some oversimplification, we can distinguish between *authentic identity*, which is largely based on internalization, *vicarious identity*, which is largely based on identification, and *conferred identity*, which is largely based on compliance.

In terms of the dimensions of identity described earlier, it is proposed that a stable, integrated, and authentic identity is likely to emerge to the extent to which people in-

ternalize the socially derived elements of their self-definition. Internalization, by definition, involves the acceptance of social influence because the induced behavior is congruent with the person's own value system. In adopting the new behavior, people make it their own: They go through a more or less active process of relating it to their values and orientations. This often means some modification in the induced behavior to fit into the preexisting structure, as well as some modification in that structure to accommodate the new element. The product of this process is relatively stable, in that it is less vulnerable to variations in social context; it is integrated in the individual's value system; and it bears the individual's personal stamp. Thus, the conditions favorable to the internalization of socially derived elements of self-definition are, in effect, the conditions conducive to a stable, integrated, and authentic identity. Indeed, one can define an authentic identity as one composed in large part of internalized elements.

The process of identification also contributes to identity formation, but in a way that is not as conducive—at least in and of itself—to the emergence of a stable, integrated, and authentic identity. In identification, people take over, in more or less full-blown form, aspects of another's identity—for example, the identity of the parent or of the generalized group member—as a way of establishing, filling out, or shoring up their own identity. One can speak here of vicarious elements of identity because, in taking over the other's role, the individual may try to become the other and thus to acquire vicariously the desired characteristics of the other. Vicarious identity—particularly when based on identification with a group—often has a *compensatory* character: through identification with the group, individuals can gain a sense of power and status that, as individuals, they lack. Vicarious elements of identity are not adapted to people's own capacities and orientations, nor are they integrated into their personal value systems. They are thus lower in authenticity than internalized elements, even though they may represent a high level of personal commitment and emotional involvement. Though they may be highly durable (as long as the relationship from which they derive persists), they are relatively low in stability, since their manifestation depends on the extent to which the situational context brings the relevant role into salience. In sum, insofar as influence conditions favor the adoption of socially derived aspects of self-definition through identification—and therefore the development of an identity dominated by vicarious elements—the resultant identity is likely to be relatively low in stability, integration, and authenticity.⁶

The relationship of the process of compliance to identity formation is less obvious. Compliance refers to the acceptance of induced behavior as a way of producing a desired social effect. Compliance-based behavior is situation-bound and depends on observability by the influencing agent or by those the agent represents. This does not mean, however, that it lacks transsituational implications. People acquire, through compliance, certain patterns of self-presentation (applicable to a particular set of situations) that will gain the approval of those with whom they interact, or at least conform to the others' expectations sufficiently to permit the interaction to proceed smoothly. Insofar as these self-presentations become part of people's self-definition—that is, insofar as they define themselves in terms of the characteristics favored by others and the categories imposed by others—one can speak of elements of identity based on compliance. For example, a person may define her- or himself as

someone whom others see as generous or as hard-nosed or as a loyal Jew, and may bring to various interaction situations a concern with maintaining this public image.⁷ One can speak here of conferred elements of identity because they are aspects of self-definition that depend entirely on the reactions of others—on how others regard and treat the individual.

A special case of conferred identity, relating to self-definition in terms of a particular group membership, may be called *nominal* identity: people may define themselves as members of a group to which they belong (by birth or by virtue of subsequent experiences), but have only a minimal degree of identification with their membership role or internalization of group norms and values. Nominal identity, then, provides elements of self-definition based almost entirely on the way others categorize the person. Nominal and other conferred elements of identity are situation-bound in that their manifestation depends very heavily on the particular others with whom the person interacts. They are thus relatively low in stability, as well as in integration and authenticity. Compared to vicarious elements, they are less authentic in that their acceptance is at a more superficial, less emotionally involving level; by the same token, however, their inauthenticity may be less pervasive in that it is usually tied to a specific set of situations. Insofar as a person's identity is dominated by conferred elements, it can perhaps be seen as the ultimate in inauthenticity, since self-definition in this case is almost entirely subject to the demands of the situation and the vicissitudes of the moment.

The discussion of different types of identity and identity elements in relation to the three processes of influence has been marked by a normative flavor. The very choice of terms to describe the three types of identity reflects the normative orientation: calling internalization-based elements of identity "authentic," while referring to the others as "vicarious" and "conferred"—which smack of inauthenticity—clearly suggests what is deemed desirable and what undesirable. This does indeed reflect my normative orientation toward authentic identity, but it probably conveys a more negative view of compliance and identification than I actually hold. To restore the balance, it must be pointed out that the contributions of the three processes of influence to identity formation are not as sharply separate and divergent as the discussion so far may have implied. Identity formation is never simply a matter of either internalization or identification or compliance. Instead, there are several important ways in which the three processes may be related to one another and interact with each other in the development of personal identity:

1. No identity—regardless of its degree of authenticity—is composed entirely of internalized elements. Identity is always a mixture of elements derived from each of the three processes. As already indicated, identity includes definitions of the self not only as a personal agent, but also as a social stimulus and as a congeries of social roles—that is, conceptions of how others see us and what they expect of us. Almost invariably, some of these will have been adopted—and will remain—at the level of compliance and identification, respectively. In other words, even individuals with an authentic, well-integrated identity will partly define themselves in terms of aspects of self-presentation that have habitually brought them the approval of others, as well as in terms of aspects of role performance that conform to the expectations of others. The real issue is how dominant and pervasive these elements are in a person's iden-

tity. An identity that is predominantly made up of elements that are “marketable” or “borrowed,” without a coherent, autonomous self-definition built up around a personal core, can be viewed as a flawed identity. But the presence of some conferred and vicarious elements, alongside an authentic sense of self—particularly if these elements are not sharply at variance with that sense of self—can be seen as a perfectly “healthy” and probably inevitable feature of identity formation.

2. In a child’s acquisition of certain elements of identity, the three processes may represent successive stages of development. Children may first adopt an aspect of self-definition through compliance, having found that a particular mode of self-presentation brings forth parental approval. They may then move to identification, initially for instrumental reasons: By taking the parents’ roles in their absence, they can predict more accurately what behavior is likely to meet with parental approval or disapproval. Taking the parental role may turn out to be satisfying in its own right, by giving children a vicarious sense of power and efficacy, and they may thus—as part of the process of identification with the parental role—adopt the parents’ definition of them as their own. Having done so, they may find that this aspect of self-definition is intrinsically desirable and congruent with their evolving personal identity, and they may then internalize it. In such cases, then, compliance and identification may provide the conditions for internalization and thus facilitate that process.

There is no assumption, however, that the succession of the three processes is in any sense automatic. Aspects of self-definition acquired through compliance or identification often remain fixated at that level. Whether or not compliance leads to identification (or internalization) depends on the extent to which the conditions for identification (or internalization) are present subsequent to compliance. Similarly, whether identification leads to internalization depends on the extent to which the conditions for internalization are present subsequent to identification. The presence of these subsequent conditions, in turn, depends on the conditions under which compliance or identification was initially induced—that is, on the particular character of the initial compliance or identification. Some illustrations may help to clarify this point.

Compliance may contribute to the development of authentic identity by bringing potentially authentic elements of the child’s self into salience and enabling them to become part of her or his behavioral repertoire. For example, the approval of others may help to bring out behaviors that express the child’s talents, interpersonal skills, or basic orientations. Though these behaviors may originally enter the child’s repertoire by way of compliance, they may provide the occasion for discovering and building authentic elements of the self. Clearly, whether or not compliance is likely to have such consequences depends on the precise conditions under which it takes place—on the extent to which it actually serves to encourage the child in expressing her or his talents and inclinations. Thus, compliance is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if it is based on reward and approval than if it is based on punishment and disapproval. Similarly, compliance is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if reward and approval focus on self-expressive and exploratory behavior rather than conforming and obedient behavior. In short, compliance may well facilitate the development of authentic identity, provided the conditions under which compliance occurs are favorable to subsequent internalization.

Identification may contribute to the development of authentic identity by helping

children to acquire the tools and develop the commitment for performing social roles that may become integrated into their emerging identity. Though they may originally take over the role through identification and perform it according to the assumptions and expectations of others, they may in the process gain mastery over the role and bring it into increasing communication with other aspects of the self. Thus, identification may provide the occasion for exploring and developing an arena for authentic self-expression. Whether or not identification is likely to have such consequences depends, again, on the precise conditions under which it takes place—on the extent to which it actually serves to encourage children in gaining mastery over the roles they have taken over and adapting them to their own ends. Accordingly, the likelihood that identification will lead to subsequent internalization depends on the aspect of the parental role that the child takes over: Internalization is more probable if children identify with the parent as an efficacious agent, capable of controlling the environment, than if they identify with the parent as an aggressor capable of exerting punitive power. Similarly, identification is more likely to lead to subsequent internalization if role expectations focus on active, individualized performance of the role rather than on stereotyped repetition of prescribed behavior. In short, identification, like compliance, can facilitate the development of authentic identity, given the proper conditions.

3. Even in adulthood, compliance and identification may contribute to an authentic self-definition. Though performance in a role—expressing, for example, one's professional or ethnic identity—may be well integrated with the person's value system, it may still require periodic reinforcement in the form of social approval (for having demonstrated to others that one is, for example, a good scholar or a good Jew), as well as self-approval (for having demonstrated to oneself that one has adequately met the expectations of the role and that one can continue to see oneself as a good scholar or as a good Jew). It is not unusual for an important aspect of personal identity to include conferred and vicarious elements along with authentic ones. Such co-existence of different elements does not undermine the authenticity of the identity, as long as the authentic elements clearly predominate and the conferred and vicarious elements are closely linked to them and point in the same direction. The activation of such conferred and vicarious elements may help to strengthen the authentic elements and to facilitate their expression.

The Acquisition of Group Identity

One can speak of a group identity (focusing here primarily on an ethnic or national identity) as the group's definition of itself—its conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes, and future prospects.⁸ Underlying all of these components of the group identity is the extent to which the group has an identity at all: the extent to which its members see themselves as constituting a unique, identifiable entity, with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across geographical distance, and to the recognized right to various forms of collective self-expression. Group identity is carried by the

individual members of the group, but it is not coterminous with the sum of the conceptions of individual group members. For one thing, it has an independent existence in the form of accumulated historical products, including written documents, oral traditions, institutional arrangements, and symbolic artifacts. For another, different segments of the group differ widely in their degree of active involvement and emotional commitment to the group; various leadership elements and particularly active and committed subgroups are far more instrumental in defining the group identity than the rank-and-file members.

Clearly, group identity—as a collective phenomenon—is complex and differentiated. It varies over time and circumstances. Its strength and nature depend on the kind of mobilization processes that occur within the group and on the particular leadership elements most responsible for that mobilization. Group identity typically represents a combination of historical realities and deliberate mobilization. To a certain degree, the fostering of group identity is an arbitrary matter, determined by the interests and opportunities of those leaders who are mobilizing support for political action within the group. It cannot be entirely arbitrary, however, in that there must be some elements of common culture and historical experience around which this mobilization can take place. What aspects of identity will become central depends on the particular leadership that is responsible for mobilization and the historical context within which it operates.

Recognizing its complexity and fluidity, one can think of group identity as a collective product—in the form of a system of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations—that is transmitted to group members in the course of their socialization and mobilized through a variety of communications over the course of their lives. It is reflected in the consciousness of individual group members to different degrees and in different ways, depending on the nature of the socialization and mobilization experiences to which they have been exposed and the way in which they have handled these. In terms of the conceptual model used in the present article, group identity and its various components represent external inputs that become incorporated in an individual's personal identity through various processes of social influence.

In the context of identity formation in the child, one can think of group identity and its components as behavioral possibilities induced by important socializing agents, including parents, teachers, and peers. The question is: To what extent and in what way does the child adopt these induced behaviors as elements of personal identity? More specifically, from the normative perspective taken here, the important question would be: What are the conditions most conducive to the internalization of these elements—that is, to their inclusion as authentic parts of a stable and integrated personal identity?

A social-influence analysis of the acquisition of group identity as a component of personal identity can address itself to two issues: (1) the adoption of the specific elements of the group identity, that is, the beliefs, values, assumptions and expectations that make up the group identity as a collective product; and (2) the development of an orientation to the group itself. These two issues correspond closely (in reverse order) to the criteria of Jewish identity distinguished by Simon Herman: the relationship to the Jewish group and the adoption of the norms of the group and other contents of the group identity.⁹

Adoption of the Elements of Group Identity

In asking how a group identity is incorporated into the personal identity of an individual, we are, in large part, asking how the individual accepts the specific elements that make up the group identity. To what extent does she or he adopt the normatively prescribed beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations of the group? Adoption of these elements may enter into personal identity in two ways.

First, the ethnic or national group to which individuals belong is inevitably part of their definition of who and what they personally are. The particular elements of the group identity that they adopt determine and provide the contents of their self-definition as members of that group. They may come to share, to varying degrees, such collective aspects of the group identity as images of the group itself and of other groups in its environment, conceptions of the group's history and goals, attitudes toward group traditions and symbols, and memories of group experiences and achievements. Insofar as a person adopts these collective identity elements as her or his own, they become important parts of that person's self-identity.

Second, the elements of group identity that individuals adopt may determine their personal self-definition more generally by contributing to their worldview. A group identity, such as Jewish identity, contains within it beliefs and values pertaining to the meaning of human existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, the definition of the ideal personality. These are rooted in the group's historical experiences, and reflected and elaborated in its documents, traditions, and institutional forms. Insofar as group members adopt the group's beliefs and values as their own, they influence the way in which these individuals view the world and their own place in it and the way in which they conceive their relationship to their environment.

The adoption of elements of group identity involves a combination of knowledge, affect, and action. If group identity is to become an integral part of an authentic personal identity, individuals must acquire some substantive knowledge of the historical and cultural context of the group's beliefs and values; they must see these beliefs and values as personally meaningful to them; and they must somehow translate them into concrete practices in their daily lives. Take, for example, the Holocaust, which is so central an element of contemporary Jewish experience that any authentic Jewish identity must somehow come to grips with it. In developing a consciousness of the Holocaust among Jewish children, one would want to foster knowledge of the historical events and reflection upon them; an emotional grasp of the meaning of their own membership in a community of Holocaust survivors; and an exploration of the kinds of individual and collective actions that the Holocaust suggests to them as Jews and as members of other groups.

In keeping with the conceptual and normative approach of this article, it is proposed that the optimal integration of knowledge, affect, and action is most likely to result if elements of group identity are accepted at the level of internalization. Compliance may lead to ritualistic practice, lacking in personal involvement and conviction; or to a nominal acceptance of group identity, devoid of substantive content and subject to mobilization only in response to threats to group survival. Identification may lead to a high affective involvement in group identity as a source of self-en-

hancement, but one in which the elements of group identity are compartmentalized and held inflexibly and unreflectively, and in which action is mobilized primarily by pride or guilt. Internalization, by contrast, should lead to an acceptance of group-identity elements based on evaluation of them in terms of the individual's general values and orientations; group-identity elements would then be reflected in her or his judgments, feelings, and actions insofar as they have become integral parts of personal identity. The conditions conducive to adoption of group-identity elements at the level of internalization can be stated in general terms by reference to the earlier discussion of the antecedents of internalization (as summarized in Table 1), as well as the discussion of the conditions under which compliance and identification are likely to lead to subsequent internalization. The challenge, of course, is to translate these general propositions into concrete approaches to Jewish education that would create the conditions for internalization of Jewish beliefs and values and avoid the conditions under which learnings are likely to become fixated at the level of compliance or identification.

In exploring the possibilities of an educational model conducive to internalization, it would be well to keep in mind a perhaps controversial implication of the present analysis. Emphasis has been placed on the incorporation of elements of group identity into a stable, integrated, and authentic personal identity. It is quite conceivable that the requirements for promoting the integration and authenticity of *personal* identity may come into conflict with the requirements for maintaining the unity and stability of Jewish *group* identity, at least in its traditional, historical sense. Internalization implies an active process of shaping socially derived elements into a product suited to the person's own value system. The person evaluates induced behaviors in terms of a preexisting and evolving structure, adopts them selectively, and modifies them as she or he integrates them with the rest of her or his values and orientations. Thus, internalization of Jewish-identity elements implies that the person approaches Jewish identity in a flexible, selective way; that Jewish-identity elements enter into communication and competition with other identity elements, including those derived from the various other roles the person enacts and the various other groups to which the person belongs; and that the resultant product may represent a personal transformation of the group identity, giving varied and new meanings to old beliefs and values, in keeping with the unique personal identity in which the Jewish elements are embedded.

This view has definite implications for the conception of Jewish identity that is offered to children in the course of Jewish education. It suggests a view of Jewish identity that is differentiated rather than monolithic, making it possible for the individual to "disaggregate" its various elements and evaluate them separately (though recognizing their historical unity). Further, it suggests a view of Jewish identity that is variable rather than fixed in meaning, making it possible for the individual to redefine some of its elements in keeping with the realities of her or his own existence (though recognizing their historical roots).

Take, for example, the relationship between religious and national elements, which are clearly intertwined in Jewish identity as it has historically developed. In a stable, traditional Jewish community, the unity of these two elements tended to present relatively few problems. "Judaism as a religion and the Jewish group were

coterminous," in Peter Medding's words. In communities operating under halakhic rules,

the ethnic components of Judaism were subsumed within, and subservient to the religious components. Jewish identity was enveloped in a community of belief based upon a system of shared prescriptive values. This constituted a total system which controlled the individual's whole environment in a detailed pattern of prescribed actions and fixed roles. Group membership, consequently, was clearly defined.¹⁰

In the less stable, more pluralistic environment in which most Jewish children now grow up, these two elements have become relatively independent of each other, and "group values, beliefs, rituals and roles have all become matters of individual choice and personal definition."¹¹ Under these circumstances, the relative weights of the two components and the nature of the relationship between them may have to differ for different individuals if Jewish identity is to be successfully integrated into their emerging personal identities. To insist on an unchanging relationship between the two elements may confront individuals with an either-or choice, which may lead some to reject their Jewish identity entirely and others to adopt elements of Jewish identity at a compliance or identification level.

An educational model aiming toward internalization would explore the historical relationship between the religious and national elements, but encourage each individual to evaluate them independently. Moreover, it would define the religious elements more broadly so that they would not be inextricably tied to a particular set of practices and beliefs. Such a broader definition would enable some individuals to extract from the Jewish religious worldview certain ethical values, assumptions about the nature of humankind, or teachings about human relations and social justice, which they could integrate with values derived from other sources, even if they chose to reject the specific religious idiom in which these have been traditionally expressed.

In short, the educational model proposed here would aim to individualize Jewish identity rather than to maximize it. Such a model may not be acceptable to those who are committed to the unity and integrity of Jewish identity in its traditional form. There is good reason to argue, however, that in the complex, pluralistic, rapidly changing world in which we now live, the model presented here is more conducive to the incorporation of Jewish identity into an authentic, integrated personal identity. By opening up the communication between Jewish values and other values, it may transform some of the Jewish values, but in so doing retain their vitality. The alternative may be a Jewish identity that is offered in maximal form but accepted in minimal form—stripped of content, playing an insignificant role in the person's daily life or existential choices, and activated only when there is an opportunity for status enhancement or a threat to group survival. These are very old issues, but perhaps the framework presented here may provide some new handles for dealing with them.

Development of Orientation to the Group

The second issue in the incorporation of group identity into the personal identity of individuals concerns the development of their orientation to the group itself. How central and significant a part does their membership in this particular group play in

their personal identity? To what extent is their definition of who and what they are linked to that group? How salient is this group membership in their daily lives, how intense is their involvement with it, how strong their commitment and loyalty to it, how solid their sense of belongingness in it?

The person's orientation to the group can be explored not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. That is, one can ask not only about the strength of the person's involvement in the group, but also about the nature of that involvement. Here the model of social influence presented above may again be of some relevance. The model has been extended to an analysis of patterns of personal involvement in the political system,¹² which can also be applied to the analysis of involvement in a national or ethnic group.

Table 2 summarizes six different patterns of personal involvement in a group, corresponding to the six patterns distinguished in the earlier work on political ideology. The rows of the table identify two sources of attachment to the group—two motivational bases for extending loyalty to the group: sentimental attachment and instrumental attachment. These two sources of attachment correspond to Simon Herman's distinction between alignment with a group on the basis of a feeling of *similarity* or a feeling of *interdependence*, though his focus is on intermember perceptions rather than on perception of the group.¹³

Sentimental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on a perception of that group as representative of their personal identity—as somehow reflecting, extending, or confirming their identity. Insofar as it represents them, as individuals and as parts of a collectivity, they extend loyalty to it. Instrumental attachment refers to people's attachment to a group based on a perception of that group as meeting their personal needs and interests and those of the other members of the social category encompassed by the group. Insofar as the group is seen as instrumental to the achievement of their goals, they extend loyalty to it. For present purposes, the first row of the table—which refers to the relationship of the group to personal identity—is most germane. The two sources of attachment, however, are clearly related to one

Table 2. Patterns of Personal Involvement in a National or Ethnic Group

	Types of orientation to the group		
	Rule orientation (compliance with group rules)	Role orientation (identification with group roles)	Value orientation (internalization of group values)
Sources of attachment to the group			
Sentimental (perception of the group as representative of personal identity)	Acceptance of the group's authority to define membership	Emotional involvement in role of group member	Commitment to the group's traditions and defining values
Instrumental (perception of the group as meeting personal needs and interests)	Acceptance of rules and regulations governing member interaction	Entanglement in social roles mediated by the group	Commitment to the group's institutional arrangements and operating values

Source: Herbert C. Kelman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity," in *Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub (Chicago: 1997), 174. Reprinted by permission of Nelson Hall.

another. Though they are analytically distinct and need not go together empirically, they do tend to generate and reinforce one another. That is, instrumental attachment to a group also tends to strengthen the perception of that group as representative of one's identity, and sentimental attachment also encourages members to look to that group for the fulfillment of their needs and interests.

The two sources of attachment jointly determine the strength of the person's loyalty and commitment to the group. This commitment may express itself in different ways, however, depending on the basis of people's integration in the group and the nature of their orientation to it. The columns of Table 2 distinguish three types of orientation (or bases of integration): rule orientation, role orientation, and value orientation—which correspond to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization, respectively.

One can speak of rule orientation when people's relationship to the group is based primarily on their acceptance of the group rules. They recognize the group's authority to set rules and their obligation to adhere to them. In return, they expect to be included within the definition of group membership and to have access to their fair share of the resources that are at the disposal of the group. This type of orientation can be visualized quite readily in the context of a stable, traditional Jewish community as represented, for example, by the East European shtetl. In this setting, daily behavior was governed by a widely accepted set of rules and regulations, and adherence to these rules often had direct bearing on people's acceptance by the group and access to resources on which they depended. In the context of the present-day American Jewish community, rule orientation in daily life is probably relevant only to relatively small segments of the population. This orientation, however, does have wider implications when it refers to the basic rules by which continued membership in the group is defined. One can speak of rule orientation in this context when an individual's relationship to the group is based on adherence to those minimal rules that would assure their continuing acceptance within the definition of members of the Jewish community. Typically, this involves assertion of their Jewish identity on those occasions when group survival becomes an issue—through such means as financial and moral support for Israel, particularly at times of crisis, or through opposition to intermarriage. In terms of the earlier discussion of types of identity, for individuals who are primarily rule-oriented, relationship to the group represents a conferred or nominal identity element in their personal identities.

One can speak of role orientation when the person's relationship to the group is based on identification with and active involvement in group roles. In particular, at the sentimental level, role-oriented individuals are identified with the role of group member: they are emotionally involved in the group, regard it as a central part of their self-definition, and derive a sense of status enhancement and self-transcendence from it. What is significant for them, however, is possession of the role itself rather than the specific content of that role and its relationship to their broader value system. They tend to accept the role as prescribed—more or less totally and uncritically—without integrating it with their other values and beliefs. In short, their commitment to the group can be described as a vicarious element of their personal identity. This pattern might be exemplified by many Jews who are closely identified with Israel or actively involved in Jewish community affairs, but who express these commitments in a rel-

actively conventional and unreflective fashion. It should be noted that in these examples of role orientation, sentimental and instrumental features typically coincide: Involvement in Zionist or Jewish community affairs provides an opportunity not only to derive vicarious satisfaction from enacting the group member role, but also to participate in other satisfying role relationships.

Value orientation, charted in the third column of Table 2, represents a relationship to the group based on a sharing of the group's values. Here members have internalized the group's values because they find them congruent with their own value system. Their commitment to the group thus represents an authentic element of their personal identity. It should be stressed that value orientation does not preclude responsiveness to issues of group survival (mentioned above as a feature of rule orientation), or active involvement in the role of group member (mentioned above as a feature of role orientation). If anything, value-oriented members should be more responsive to issues of group survival, because they are concerned not merely with the physical survival of the group, but with the values for which it stands. Similarly, they may be more actively involved in the role of group member insofar as they see this role as a way of expressing their personal identity and promoting their personal values. What characterizes their relationship to the group, however, is that it goes beyond adherence to group rules and involvement in group roles and becomes an integral part of an authentic personal identity.

Within the present framework, the question for Jewish education is: How can one create the conditions conducive to the development of a value-oriented commitment to Jewish identity, and avoid the conditions conducive to the development of commitments that remain fixated at the level of rule orientation or role orientation? Clearly, responsiveness to threats against Jewish survival and emotional involvement in one's Jewish role are essential ingredients of a Jewish education, but there is a need to go beyond these if commitment to the group is to become part of an authentic personal identity in which Jewish values are integrated in a multiply determined and personally coherent value system.

Again, a potentially controversial implication of this view should be noted. A commitment based on internalization and value orientation is likely to be more stable and more profound, but it is also more differentiated and more questioning. A rule-oriented loyalty has little depth and continuity, but is likely to be elicited automatically if the proper symbols are brought into play. A role-oriented loyalty is particularly powerful in that it may represent a total and enthusiastic commitment to the group's cause. A value-oriented loyalty, in contrast, is conditional; it does not promise support for the group, right or wrong. Value-oriented members evaluate the actions they are asked to support on the basis of their own values and of the fundamental group values that they share, and are prepared to criticize and dissent.

The implications of these distinctions are readily apparent if we think of commitment to the state of Israel. An authentic Jewish identity in our time typically includes, for diaspora Jews no less than for Israelis, a commitment to the vision and the enterprise represented by Israel. But my model of Jewish education would encourage a commitment characterized by reflective, rather than reflexive support for government policies and practices. To be sure, such a commitment is less easily activated because it does not respond automatically to fear, guilt, and group pressures. But in the long

run, it is most conducive to a creative interaction between Israel and the diaspora in evolving a new Jewish identity that is rooted in both the experiences of Jewish history and the realities of Jewish existence.

Conclusion

The analysis in this article reflects a pluralistic view of Jewish identity for both Israeli and diaspora Jews. Pluralism, within both the state of Israel and the Jewish people, is seen as a necessary condition for the maintenance of democratic institutions, for the vitality of Jewish culture and religion, and for Jewish survival in our contemporary and ever-changing world. An authentic Jewish identity for the coming century must take account of the close link between religion and ethnicity in the development of Jewish peoplehood; of the historical experiences of the Jewish people, including the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel—the two momentous events of the twentieth century for the Jewish people; and the central role of Israel in contemporary Jewish life. Within these limits, however, an authentic Jewish identity can take many different forms.

If we want to encourage internalization of Jewish identity in the coming generations of Jewish children, we must allow them to choose and adapt the different elements of that identity in ways that are congruent and integrated with their evolving personal values and with their other identities—in other words, in ways that are personally authentic for them. In this spirit, the definition of an authentic Jewish group identity must allow for different ways of expressing and combining the religious and ethnic components of Jewish identity. It must accommodate different degrees and forms of Jewish religious belief and practice, including thoroughgoing secularism. Similarly, it must leave room—among both Israeli and diaspora Jews—for different views of Jewish nationalism, Zionism, and the state of Israel. Ideological positions that relegate diaspora Jews, non-Zionist Jews or non-Orthodox Jews to a status of lesser or incomplete Jews, or that seek to limit the pluralism of Israel or of the Jewish people, are detrimental to the creative integration of Jewish identity into an authentic personal identity.

A pluralistic view of Jewish identity takes cognizance of the ambiguities inherent in this group identity as it has evolved over the centuries. Jewish identity is similar in this respect to other group identities, each of which is marked by its own particular set of ambiguities. In the Jewish case, a major source of ambiguity is the confrontation of the historical link between religion and peoplehood with the current diversity of religious commitments among self-identified Jews. Another source of ambiguity is the success of the Zionist enterprise in establishing a state for the Jewish people in its ancestral homeland, which must of necessity face two realities: that there is also another people living in that state and that land, which must be afforded the legal, material, and psychological conditions for full citizenship; and that there is a majority of Jews living outside of Israel, which must be afforded the conditions for developing a vital and creative Jewish life in the diaspora communities. To incorporate Jewish identity in an authentic personal identity, Jews in Israel and the diaspora, at all stages of personal development, must be aware of these ambiguities, accept their reality, and

struggle with their implications. To this end, we need to focus thinking and debate on how to build a conception of Jewish peoplehood, of Jewish identity, that is alive to these ambiguities. Jewish education, in turn, needs to sensitize children to these ambiguities, encourage and equip them to question ideological assumptions anchored in religious and political doctrines, and enable them to choose a definition of Jewish identity that is both Jewishly and personally authentic.

Notes

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1. See Herbert C. Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1961), 57–78; *idem*, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: 1969), 276–288; *idem*, "Social Influence and Linkages Between the Individual and the Social System," in *Perspectives on Social Power*, ed. James T. Tedeschi (Chicago: 1974), 125–171; and Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (New Haven and London: 1989).

2. The article does not attempt to link this model systematically to the various approaches to identity that have been developed by psychologists and sociologists since the early writings of Erik Erikson. For notable examples, see Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: 1950); Daniel R. Miller, "The Study of Social Relationships: Situation, Identity, and Social Interaction," in *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, vol. 5, *The Process Areas, the Person and Some Applied Fields: Their Place in Psychology and in Science*, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: 1963), 639–737; Sheldon Stryker, "Identity Theory: Developments and Extensions," in *Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives*, ed. Krysia Yardley and Terry Honess (Chichester: 1987), 89–103; and Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: 1986), 7–24.

3. See Mary C. Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: 1990); *idem*, "Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?" in *Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America*, ed. Silvia Pedraza and Rubén G. Rumbaut (Belmont: 1996), 444–454.

4. Note that the term "personal identity" is used differently here than it is in social-identity theory, which has been a focus of social-psychological research in recent years. (See Tajfel and Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior"; for recent extensions, see John C. Turner, Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, and Craig McGarty, "Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 20, no. 5 [1994], 454–463; Robin M. Kowalski and Randall Wolfe, "Collective Identity Orientation, Patriotism, and Reactions to National Outcomes," *ibid.* [1994], 533–540; Marilynn B. Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," *ibid.*, 17, no. 5 [1991], 475–482; and Marilynn B. Brewer and Wendi Gardner, "Who Is This 'We'? Levels of Collective Identity and Self Representations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 1 [1996], 83–93.) In social-identity theory, personal identity refers to an individual's self-definition as a unique person differentiated from others, in contrast to social or collective

identity, which refers to shared similarities with members of certain social categories. In the present usage, personal identity includes elements derived from and shared with various groups, which—to varying degrees and in varying ways, to be explicated below—are integrated with the personal core of the identity.

5. Group belongingness is a term used extensively by Kurt Lewin. See his *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: 1948) and *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York: 1951).

6. It is intriguing that Turner et al.'s description of the variability and context dependence of social identity (see their "Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context") is very reminiscent of the process of identification and the functioning of what is here called a vicarious identity. The authors argue (quite persuasively) that the variability in self-categorization across situations is not a sign of superficial, inauthentic change. This may be correct relative to compliance-based conferred identity (see below), but—according to the present argument—it should not be true relative to internalization-based authentic identity.

7. This differs from the case of identification where people may be concerned with actually being generous or hard-nosed or a good Jew—that is, with meeting the expectations of the role and seeing themselves as solidly anchored in it—not just with the way others see them. The one may, of course, shade into the other.

8. Note that the use of the term "group identity" here differs from its use in the social-psychological literature based on social-identity theory (see n. 4 for relevant references). In that literature, group (or collective) identity refers to a property of individuals: an aspect of the self-concept that reflects the person's relationship to a group or social category. Here, group identity refers to a collective phenomenon—to a property of the group.

9. See Simon N. Herman, *Jewish Identity*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ, and Oxford: 1989), esp. ch. 3.

10. Peter Y. Medding, "Political Zionism, the State of Israel and Jewish Identity." Paper presented at the Conference on the Centenary of Political Zionism, Harvard University, Oct. 1996, 6–7.

11. *Ibid.*, 8.

12. See Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System," and Kelman and Hamilton, *Crimes of Obedience*.

13. Herman, *Jewish Identity*, 42 ff.