


TIES AND TENSIONS

The 1986 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

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INTRODUCTION

American Jews have had a unique relationship with the State of Israel ever since its establishment in 1948. Warm and familial from the outset, pro-Israel feelings rose sharply after the Six Day War in 1967 and have remained strong throughout the American Jewish community. In the late 60s and early 70s, this attachment included an idealized image of Israelis and Israeli society. Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish saw Israelis as young, tough, hardworking, idealistic pioneers, struggling in the midst of a backward and hostile world, balancing a reverence for Jewish tradition with a socially progressive commitment to build a modern, democratic society and make the desert bloom.

Since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, however, and increasingly during the last few years, the heavy news coverage of events in the Middle East has made it difficult for attentive observers to maintain a one-dimensional, idealized stereotype of Israelis. The election of Menachem Begin in 1977, and the prominence of such Likud personalities as Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon, highlighted the sharp political differences separating their Likud bloc from the Labor Party of Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Abba Eban. The rise of Likud also brought into focus the social and economic differences separating Sephardi from Ashkenazi Israelis; and more recently, the interreligious strife, marked by violent incidents, has reminded many American Jews of the sharp distinctions among Israelis along religious lines. The single image of the Ashkenazi pioneer was supplanted by a multiplicity of contrasting images of Israelis -- left and right, Ashkenazi and Sephardi, rich and poor, secular and religious, Arab and Jewish.

Not only has the perception of Israelis become more complicated; a number of developments -- news stories alleging Israel's mistreatment of its Arab minority both in Israel proper and in the territories, the election of American-born Meir Kahane to the Israeli Knesset on a

platform which most Israeli political leaders regard as racist and anti-democratic and, most recently, the Iran-Contra and Pollard affairs -- have raised questions of conscience for many American Jews. At the same time, the terrorist attacks on tourists have dampened the enthusiasm of some American Jews for travel to Israel, if only for limited intervals.

How such changes affect the salience of Israel in the American Jewish consciousness, and the images, beliefs, and sentiments held by American Jews about the Jewish State is one of the major questions probed in our 1986 study of attitudes of American Jews toward Israel.* We sought to examine not only the broad sweep of American Jewish involvement with Israel, but also the attitudes and images that influence that involvement, and how and why they may have changed since our last survey of American Jewish opinion sponsored by the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations in 1983.

Aside from the ambivalence created by recent events, there are other reasons why the attitudes of American Jews toward Israel may have shifted somewhat since 1983. Historically, military attacks on Israel and political assaults on Zionism have provoked heightened support for the Jewish State on the part of American Jews. Since the Lebanon War in 1982 (which many American Jews felt was unfairly reported by the U.S. media), no Israeli-Arab confrontations have captured the sustained attention of Americans, Jewish or non-Jewish. There have been several widely covered terrorist incidents, of course; but many of these took place outside of Israel, and none had the same galvanizing impact on American Jews as the country's major military conflicts from the War of Independence in 1948 to the conflict in Lebanon in 1982. In short, during the last four years there were no pressing reasons for American Jews to focus their attention on Israel and mobilize in its behalf.

It is possible that these years of relative lack of attention have resulted in some cooling of ardor on the part of American Jews toward the Jewish State; and if such a process is indeed under way, younger adults are probably more likely than their elders to reflect such distancing. The research literature on political socialization suggests that many fundamental political attitudes crystallize in one's late teens and early twenties -- a period when the majority of American Jews are relatively uninvolved in Jewish life. For these reasons and more, it is important to examine the orientation toward Israel among American Jews of different generations.

*This study was completed before the Iran-Contra and Pollard affairs were publicized. Reactions to the issues that surfaced earlier may, however, suggest how American Jews are likely to respond to these events.

It has also been suggested that a decline in Israel involvement is likely among all age groups -- and perhaps among the young in particular -- as American Jewry returns to its pre-1967 norm. While there is no substantiating survey evidence, a review of organizational agenda and of the periodic literature indicates that before the Six Day War, American Jews expressed rhetorical interest in Israel's survival, but gave major attention to other Jewish concerns. If the 1986 data indicate some overall erosion in the levels of involvement with Israel, and perhaps a more severe decline among younger adults who have no personal memories of the dramatic events that propelled Israel to the center of American Jewish consciousness, it is possible that American Jews may be reverting to the more remote relationship with Israel that prevailed before 1967.

There are also reasons to expect that Orthodox Jews, consistent with their generally greater involvement in Jewish life, will display more involvement with Israel than their non-Orthodox counterparts. Recent events also argue for other significant interdenominational differences. In the last few years especially, Conservative and Reform rabbis and institutions in Israel have pressed for greater legitimacy, while the Orthodox rabbinate and its supporters have demanded greater Orthodox influence over matters of personal status, particularly conversion. This conflict in Israel has spurred similar interdenominational battles in the United States. Indeed, religious pluralism and Jewish unity are now among the most important issues on the communal agenda.

This report, then, not only describes the general attitudes and behavior of American Jews in relation to Israel, and if and how they have changed, but focuses as well on how these characteristics vary among key American Jewish population groups. Our chief concerns involve young-old and interdenominational differences, but also examine such relevant background factors as sex, education, income, Jewish institutional affiliation and other interrelationships and world-views that help shape orientations to Israel.

DATA AND METHODS: AN OVERVIEW*

In October 1986, the Washington office of Market Facts, Inc., a national survey research company, sent an eight-page mail-back questionnaire to 1700 self-identified Jewish members of the company's "Consumer Mail Panel." In all, 1133 respondents returned usable questionnaires, many after receiving a reminder postcard. This high rate of return is not atypical for the Panel, which consists of over 200,000 individuals nationwide who have agreed to participate in mail-back surveys on a variety of issues. It is constructed to permit the extraction of national samples balanced on five critical demographic characteristics as reported by the U.S. Census: age, household size, income, region, and size of city or town.

Members of the Consumer Mail Panel fill out a screening questionnaire at the time they join and about every two years thereafter, so it was possible to reach those who have identified themselves as Jews, or their husbands (in married couples, the wife is the official Panel member). This advance information also permitted an oversampling of young adults (under 39), which would help examine age-related differences in some detail.

To correct for the oversampling of young adults, weighting procedures in effect reduced their representation in the total's calculations. In addition, as had been anticipated from an earlier study of a Jewish subsample of the Panel (Cohen 1986), the sample of 1133 respondents contained about half as many Orthodox participants as local Jewish population studies have reported. To compensate, the weighting procedures doubled the representation of the Orthodox. Doing so produced a sample whose demographic and Jewish-identity characteristics largely resemble those found in a number of local Jewish community studies that use far more expensive sampling techniques (primarily Random Digit Dialing), as well as the sample from the American Jewish Committee's 1983 study, *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis* (Cohen 1983c).

*Refer to Appendix I, "Methodology," for more details.

While this report focuses primarily on data collected in 1986, for comparison purposes it frequently draws on other studies, most of them sponsored by the AJC in previous years, particularly the 1983 survey mentioned above (also Cohen 1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1985). About 20 questions from that study, aside from those on demography and Jewish identity, were replicated word for word. In addition, the present study also draws upon four other surveys of American Jews conducted annually from 1981 to 1985. In contrast with the method used here, the earlier surveys relied on samples based on "Distinctive Jewish Names" (DJN). Questionnaires were sent to households listed in the telephone directories whose names statistically belong almost exclusively to Jews (or, perhaps, descendants of Jews). In 1981, 1983 and 1984, mail-back questionnaires went to DJN households, and in 1985 to a subsample of the 1984 respondents. The 1982 study relied on brief telephone interviews with 500 DJN households to assess attitudes toward Israel in September 1982, in the wake of the fiercest fighting in Lebanon.

At times, this report also refers to two AJC-sponsored studies of the Israeli public. The first, entitled *Attitudes of Israelis Towards America and American Jews*, was conducted by Hanoach Smith in 1983; the second was done in September 1986 by Mina Zemach of Dahaf, Inc., and will be published in the near future. Both were based on national samples of over 1,000 Jewish households, excluding the kibbutzim.

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL : THREE BROAD LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT

As in 1983, the vast majority of American Jews in 1986 expressed keen interest in and support for Israel (see Table 1). Over five in six said they paid "special attention to articles about Israel." Between 60 and 64 percent responded positively to a series of what may be termed the "I care for Israel" questions, saying that they "often talk about Israel with friends and relatives," that "if Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life," that "caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew," that they intended "to visit Israel ever," and that they felt either "very close" or "fairly close" to Israel.

From these responses, it seems fair to conclude that a solid majority of American Jews claim a psychic attachment to Israel. To put this figure in perspective, it may be compared with the distributions of other acts of Jewish affirmation. For example, the proportion of Jews who are sentimentally attached to Israel is about equal to the three-fifths who fast on Yom Kippur, but somewhat greater than the one-half who belong to synagogues and lower than the four-fifths who light Hanukkah candles (cf. Tables 4 and 7). Of course, these almost fanciful comparisons would change if the definition of attachment were broadened to include the almost seven-eighths who merely read about Israel, or narrowed to include only those who answered in the affirmative at least many, if not most, of the "I care for Israel" questions.

Among the five-eighths who may be regarded as attached to Israel are a quarter to a third of the total sample who expressed a truly significant or deep attachment. About a quarter of the sample considered themselves Zionists, and about the same proportion intended to visit Israel within three years. Moreover, one-fourth to one-third affirmed each of several measures of Israel involvement -- that is, they had visited Israel, had personal friends or family there, had personal contact in the past year with someone in Israel,

Table 1

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL MEASURES

		Percent		
		Yes/ Agree	No/ Disagree	Not Sure
Do you pay special attention to articles about Israel when you read newspapers or magazines?	1986	85	13	3
	1983	92	8	—
Do you often talk about Israel with friends and relatives?	1986	64	32	4
	1983	73	27	—
	1981	68	30	2
Do you intend to visit Israel within three years?	1986	24	42	34
Do you intend to visit Israel ever?	1986	64	10	26
Do you consider yourself a Zionist?	1986	27	57	16
	1983	36	64	—
Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew:	1986	63	24	14
	1983	78	9	13
If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life	1986	61	21	18
	1983	78	9	13
	1981	83	13	5
I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel	1986	8	84	9
	1983	9	85	6
How close do you feel to Israel?	Very close	20	Fairly close	42
	Not very close	33	Not sure	5

would want their children to spend a year there, and could answer correctly one or another question testing their knowledge of Israeli society (cf. Tables 12, 16 and 20).

While it may be a somewhat arbitrary exercise, there is some value in dividing American Jewry into three levels of attachment to Israel (Table 2). The one-fourth to one-third of the sample who seemed rather intensely involved or attached were generally Jews who had been to Israel, who had close contacts there, who had some knowledge of its society, and who were most concerned about its future. The middle third or so cared deeply about Israel, but had much weaker, if any, personal ties with the people and country. The remaining third (or even slightly more) expressed little deep concern for Israel. Nevertheless most -- but certainly not all -- of these are probably "pro-Israel"; they have a special interest in the state, undoubtedly greater than that of other Americans, but feel little of the special closeness expressed in so many ways by the other two-thirds. They also include a minority who may be regarded as indifferent, if not downright antipathetic, to Israel. Thus, while 85 percent of the entire sample said they pay special attention to articles about Israel, the remaining 15 percent made no such claim. And while 84 percent rejected the proposition, "I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel," 8 percent agreed and 9 percent were unsure.

From these answers it seems that a small number, perhaps fewer than one in 12, may be regarded as potentially and basically (though probably not passionately) antipathetic to Israel, and that about one in ten are indifferent and probably feel hardly any of the emotion impelling the vast majority of American Jews to express more than a passing interest.

Younger Adults Are Less Attached to Israel

For a better grasp of how these groups vary across major divisions in the Jewish population, an index of seven items was constructed (see Table 1 for full text): the "personal tragedy" question; "Israel is an important part of my being a Jew"; talking about Israel; reading about Israel; regarding oneself as a Zionist; and intending to visit Israel ever, and within three years.*

Attachment to Israel generally increases with age; older respondents expressed greater commitment, younger ones generally less (Table 2). For example, the proportions scoring

*For the technically oriented: "not sure" answers were given an intermediate value between the "agree"/"yes" and the "disagree"/"no" responses. After all the scores were added up, the distribution on the index was divided into three almost equally large strata, indicating those with "high," "moderate," and "low" levels of attachment to Israel.

Table 2

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY AGE
(Percent)

Attachment	21-30	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	31	25	34	38	42	34
Moderate	35	36	40	38	40	38
Low	34	39	27	24	19	28
	100	100	100	100	100	100

PREVIOUS VISITS TO ISRAEL BY AGE
(Percent)

Visits	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
Twice or more	14	8	13	13	19	13
Once	18	15	21	22	25	20
Never	68	77	67	65	56	67
	100	100	100	100	100	100

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY NUMBER OF PREVIOUS VISITS TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Attachment	Twice or more	Once	Never	All
High	74	59	19	34
Moderate	20	32	43	38
Low	5	9	38	28
	100	100	100	100

high on the attachment index dropped from 31 percent of those under 30, to 25 percent of the 30-39 group, then up to 34 percent of the 40-49-year-olds and 38 percent of those 50 to 64, and peaked at 42 percent of those over 65. At the low end of this index, fully 34 percent of the youngest adults and almost 39 percent of those in their 30s scored low, as opposed to only a fourth of respondents between 40 and 64 and less than a fifth of the elderly. In short, those under 40 were appreciably less likely to express close attachment to Israel than those over 40; but, for some inexplicable reason, those 21-29 scored somewhat higher than those 30 to 39.

One reason for these differences lies in the proportions who traveled to Israel. Almost half of the elderly had visited there, as had a third of those from 40 to 64. The proportion dropped to less than a fourth for only the 30-39-year-olds but rose to fully a third of the 21-29-year-olds. Interestingly, except for the elderly, the youngest group reported the highest proportions who had been to Israel at least twice, no doubt reflecting the proliferation of teenage travel programs in the 1970s. The loose correspondence of age-specific travel rates with age-specific attachment suggests an association between visiting and caring about Israel.

Having visited Israel, especially more than once, is closely associated with commitment (Table 3). Clearly, more pro-Israel Jews visit Israel more often and acquire a deeper commitment, although there is no way to disentangle the direction of causality. All the same, of those who had never been to Israel, less than a fifth scored high on the attachment index, as compared with almost three-fifths who had been there once, and three-fourths of those who had been there at least twice. In other words, the first trip to Israel is associated with a far larger jump in attachment than the second.

To some extent, caring about Israel impels one to travel there and, conversely, a single visit may significantly increase the chances of caring deeply for all one's life. Insofar as this process pertains, one reason fewer younger adults feel attached to Israel is that they have not yet had an opportunity to see it. However, less frequent travel only partially explains their weaker attachment; when the sample is stratified by number of visits, they still score lower. Among all respondents who had never been to Israel, almost half of those under 40 scored low on attachment, compared with less than a third of those 40 and over; among respondents who had visited Israel once, less than half of the under-40-year-olds scored high compared with more than three-fifths of those 40 or over.

One explanation for this finding is that Jewish involvement -- including, perhaps, sentimental attachment to Israel -- generally reflects a life curve. Affiliation with Jewish

Table 3

**ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY AGE, CONTROLLING FOR
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS VISITS TO ISRAEL**

**VISITED ISRAEL TWICE OR MORE
(Percent)**

Attachment	21-39	40-64	65+	All
High	76	72	77	74
Moderate	22	21	19	21
Low	2	7	5	5
	100	100	100	100

**VISITED ISRAEL ONCE
(Percent)**

Attachment	21-39	40-64	65+	All
High	46	63	64	59
Moderate	39	28	33	32
Low	15	9	4	9
	100	100	100	100

**NEVER VISITED ISRAEL
(Percent)**

Attachment	21-39	40-64	65+	All
High	16	21	20	19
Moderate	37	45	49	43
Low	47	34	31	38
	100	100	100	100

Table 4

JEWISH AFFILIATION ITEMS

Do/did you...	Percent	
	Yes	No
belong to a Jewish organization or group aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group now?	46	54
contribute \$100 or more to the UJA/Federation in the past year?	23	77
pay annual dues to a synagogue in the past 12 months?	48	52

AFFILIATION WITH JEWISH INSTITUTIONS BY AGE
(Percent)

Affiliation	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High (3)*	5	6	15	16	20	13
Moderate (2)	17	20	28	31	25	26
Low (1)	25	30	27	21	31	27
None (0)	53	44	29	32	24	35
	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Numbers refer to the total of types of affiliation cited above.

institutions is lowest among younger adults (Table 4). More than half of the respondents under 30 and over two-fifths of those in their 30s were not affiliated with a synagogue, Jewish organization or Federation campaign (contributing \$100 or more). By contrast, 29 percent of the 40-49-year-olds, 32 percent of those 50-64, and a mere 24 percent of the elderly were unaffiliated. Similarly, affiliation with at least two Jewish institutions rose sharply with age: from 22 percent of respondents under 30, to 26 percent of those in their 30s, to 44-46 percent of those in their 40s or older. Research has shown that young adults with families belong to Jewish institutions about as frequently as their elders, demonstrating that attachment in Jewish life is often a function of marriage and parenthood (Cohen 1983a, 1988). Insofar as attachment to Israel can be compared with, or even grows out of, other forms of Jewish involvement, it may be predicted that as young people age, marry, and have children, the attachment will increase.

However, there is evidence in this survey that casts doubt on such a rosy inference. Two other important attitude clusters were, in fact, stable or nearly stable over the age spectrum. The index measuring faith in God was a composite of respondents' answers to three questions -- did they "definitely" believe in God, that He "gave the Torah to Moses at Mount Sinai," and that "God wants me to be Jewish"? (Table 5). In contrast with their Israel attachment, the young respondents nearly matched their elders in religious faith.

The second index, which may be seen as a measure of "Jewish familism" (Table 6), also combined several items: Jews "have special moral and ethical obligations," "have a special responsibility to help other Jews," "see the Jewish people as an extension of my family"; and "how close do you feel to other Jews?" Again, the younger respondents generally matched the elderly on this index.

Ritual observance, too, was fairly stable across the age spectrum (Table 7). Asked about five practices ranging in popularity from the Passover seder (observed by 84 percent) to using separate dishes for meat and dairy products (20 percent), the proportions performing them were virtually identical for all respondents, young to old.

These findings point up a telling inconsistency between relatively low levels of Israel involvement among the young and their relatively higher levels of belief in God, Jewish familism and ritual practice. Why? Single status and childlessness readily explain their low levels of communal affiliation, but not their feelings about Israel. In the face of the evidence concerning their religious beliefs and practices, it is hard to maintain that as they grow older, their attachment to Israel will rise along with their communal affiliation.

In the final analysis, one can only speculate about how their feelings toward the State

Table 5
FAITH IN GOD

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
I definitely believe in God	77	8	15
I believe that God gave the Torah to Moses at Mount Sinai	62	12	26
To the extent that being Jewish is important to you, is it important because "God wants me to be Jewish"?	39	39	22

BY AGE
(Percent)

Faith	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	31	36	38	32	32	34
Moderate	37	35	35	35	37	36
Low	32	29	27	33	31	31
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6
JEWISH FAMILISM

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
I see the Jewish people as an extension of my family	60	23	17
As Jews, we have special moral and ethical obligations	71	17	12
As a Jew I have a special responsibility to help other Jews	74	14	12
How close do you feel to other Jews?			
Very close	31		
Fairly close	54		
Not very close	9		
Not sure	6		

BY AGE
(Percent)

Familism	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	29	22	27	23	25	24
Moderate	39	45	49	50	57	49
Low	32	33	24	27	18	27
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 7

RITUAL PRACTICES

Do/did you...	Percent	
	Yes	No
attend a Passover seder at home or elsewhere in 1986?	84	16
fast on Yom Kippur this past year?	61	39
attend Sabbath services once a month or more during 1986?	25	75
use separate dishes at home for meat and dairy products?	20	81
light Hanukkah candles in 1985?	82	18

RITUAL OBSERVANCE BY AGE
(Percent)

Observance	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
Very high (5) *	17	8	17	5	17	11
High (4)	6	15	17	18	12	15
Moderate (3)	40	31	32	33	24	32
Low (2)	24	24	22	24	24	24
Very low (0-1)	13	21	11	20	24	19
	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Numbers refer to the total of ritual practices cited above.

will be affected by their forming families and becoming more involved in organized Jewish life. However, it is clear that attachment to Israel is relatively less frequent among Jews under 40, than in the older groups. And notwithstanding evidence of an upward turn among those in their 20s from those in their 30s, the broad trend still suggests that the middle-aged, and above all the elderly, care more deeply about Israel than those born after World War II.

Orthodoxy's Strong Attachment to Israel

Because denominational cleavages among both American and Israeli Jews have deepened, variations among Orthodox, Conservative, Reform and nondenominational groups in Israel-related attitudes and behaviors are especially interesting today, perhaps even more than in 1983. In 1986, the extent of Orthodox Jews' attachment to Israel, however measured, significantly exceeded that of the other denominations, and Conservative Jews consistently scored higher than Reform or nondenominational Jews. Moreover, differences between Orthodox and non-Orthodox were sharpest on the most demanding measures of involvement -- receptivity to aliyah (settling in Israel), familiarity with several Israelis, and fluency in Hebrew.

Over three-fifths of Orthodox Jews in the sample scored at the highest level of attachment to Israel, and less than 4 percent at the lowest; among the Conservatives, almost half scored highest and less than a sixth lowest; and a fifth of the Reform and a fourth of the nondenominational scored highest, and about two-fifths of each group lowest (Table 8).

Consistent with these patterns, the Orthodox had traveled to Israel far more often than the others, and more Conservative than Reform or nondenominational "just Jewish" Jews had been there (Table 9). Most Orthodox Jews, just over a third of the Conservative, and about a fourth of the rest had been to Israel at least once. The proportions who had been there at least twice were in an even sharper contrast: over a third of the Orthodox fell into this group (as great as the proportion of non-Orthodox who had ever gone at all). No other denomination came even close; only one Conservative Jew in eight and less than one in ten Reform and nondenominational Jews had been to Israel twice. Clearly, whether measured in terms of sentiment or previous trips to the Land of Israel, the more traditional the denomination, the greater the attachment to Israel. Moreover, the gap between the Orthodox and the non-Orthodox was larger than that between the Conservative and less traditional groups.

The Shrinking Middle and Expanding Indifferent

Five questions on attachment to Israel appeared in both the 1983 and 1986 studies,

Table 8
ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Attachment	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	62	43	20	26	34
Moderate	35	41	40	33	38
Low	4	16	40	41	28
	100	100	100	100	100

Table 9
NUMBER OF VISITS TO ISRAEL BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Visits	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
Twice or more	34	13	7	10	13
Once	24	25	17	16	20
Never	42	63	76	74	68
	100	100	100	100	100

permitting a cautious comparison between them. In every instance, the 1986 respondents showed less attachment, with differences ranging from an almost insignificant 7 percent for those who pay special attention to articles about Israel to at least 15 percent for those who agreed that "caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew," or that its destruction would make one "feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life" (cf. Table 1).

To examine these trends more closely, an index of the replicated questions in the two surveys was constructed, and revealed that the proportion of respondents who scored high on the indices in both studies held nearly steady over the three years. The principal change from 1983 to 1986 was that the number scoring low grew from 31 to 43 percent, at the expense of those who scored in the middle range, which declined from almost 40 percent to less than 30 percent (Table 10). In other words, attachment to Israel diminished somewhat, chiefly among the moderately involved. At the same time, the number of most deeply attached across the age groups -- young, middle-aged, and elderly -- remained fairly constant.

These results certainly support the hypothesis advanced earlier that when Israel is engaged in intense military or diplomatic conflict, American Jewish passions run high; as the conflicts recede, ardor for Israel tends to wane, especially among those more peripheral to Jewish life and partisanship for Israelis.

Orthodox Intensification Versus Reform Alienation

The denominational groups apparently moved in different directions between 1983 and 1986. The Orthodox proportion of the highly attached rose from almost half to about three-fifths (Table 11).^{*} The number of highly attached Conservative Jews held steady, with the least involved increasing slightly at the expense of the middle group. In sharp contrast, the proportion of Reform Jews with high scores fell from 25 to 17 percent, and rose from 39

^{*}Denominational comparisons over time rest on somewhat shaky methodological grounds, owing in part to the small number of cases for the Orthodox. In addition, the residual (nondenominational) category was called "other" in 1983, and was checked by only 12 percent of the sample, whereas in 1986, when it was called "just Jewish," fully 30 percent checked it. The 1986 results were more consistent with several local Jewish population studies, while the earlier wording apparently led many otherwise nondenominational Jews to circle Conservative or Reform rather than "other." Consequently, Conservative and Reform Jews in 1983 consisted of more marginally affiliated respondents than in 1986. However, the impact of this discrepancy is only to understate the principal findings, namely, the erosion in the intervening years of Israel involvement among Conservative and especially Reform Jews.

Table 10

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL (5-ITEM INDEX) BY AGE, IN 1986 AND 1983
(Percent)

Attachment	<u>1986</u>			
	21-39	40-64	65+	All
High	24	30	37	29
Moderate	21	30	37	28
Low	55	40	27	43
	100	100	100	100
	<u>1983</u>			
High	29	28	37	31
Moderate	25	43	42	38
Low	47	29	22	31
	100	100	100	100

Table 11

ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL (5-ITEM INDEX) BY DENOMINATION, IN 1986 AND 1983
(Percent)

Attachment	<u>1986</u>			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish
High	58	35	17	20
Moderate	24	36	27	23
Low	18	30	56	57
	100	100	100	100
	<u>1983</u>			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Other
High	48	35	25	19
Moderate	34	42	35	31
Low	18	23	40	50
	100	100	100	100

to 56 percent in the low category. In sum, the Orthodox intensified their already ardent attachment to Israel, the Conservatives' attachment eroded slightly at the lower end of the scale, and the Reform Jews grew even more alienated.

Possible reasons for these shifts are explored in a later section of this report, but certainly one of them should be mentioned here. The news of religious conflict in Israel highlights an aspect of its society not generally or heretofore apparent to most American Jews. It probably strengthens their perception that the Orthodox rabbinate, political parties, and the public significantly influence life in the Jewish State. In fact, it could be argued that even when non-Orthodox forces prevail in legislative or judicial clashes, the very news of the conflicts serves to underscore the influence of Israeli Orthodoxy. Such perceptions may partially explain the contradictory responses of American Orthodox and Reform respondents, simultaneously inspiring even greater enthusiasm among the former and further disturbing the latter. Both see a more Orthodox Israel, but the American Orthodox like what they see, and the Reform are repelled by their perceptions. Reform Jews, whose leadership is more exercised than the Conservative leadership over the struggle with the Orthodox rabbinate in Israel (and the United States), may have been especially alienated by this situation.

TIES WITH ISRAELIS: FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNICATION

Personal Contacts with Israelis for Most American Jews

Knowing Israelis personally and maintaining contacts with them creates opportunities for many American Jews to learn of their concerns, moods and reactions to major current developments. American Jews who have friends or family there presumably add a deep personal concern with the State's fortunes to the more abstract -- although still genuine -- feeling for Israel that grows out of Jewish involvement.

When respondents were asked about their contacts with Israelis, just over half said they knew someone "in Israel who would invite you to their home for a meal" if they knew you were visiting and about two-fifths that they had "friends or family members who had moved there" (Table 12). Consistent with these figures, about a third in each instance said they had "any family" and "any personal friends in Israel." Crosstabulation of the last two responses, revealed that about half had either family, or personal friends, or both in Israel. Respondents had many personal ties with Israelis, mostly friends and/or family, and felt they had a home to go to when they came. Indeed, the proportion with such ties substantially exceeded the approximately one-third who had visited Israel.

Considering these relationships and Israel's important role in the psyche of American Jews, their attachment is understandable. If 60 percent of them had some sort of personal ties with Israelis, one could expect that at minimum, the same proportion would feel that loss of the State would be a personal tragedy, or that it is crucial to their Jewishness.

A little less than half of those who knew Israelis kept in touch with them during the 12 months prior to the survey. Nearly a quarter had "corresponded" with someone, as many as 10 percent had spoken by telephone, and a notable 7 percent had some sort of "business or professional dealings" with someone. This last figure is especially significant because fewer

Table 12

TIES WITH ISRAELIS

		Percent		
		Yes	No	Not Sure
Do you have any friends or family members who have moved from the U.S. to Israel?	1986	40	59	2
Do you know anybody in Israel who would invite you to their home for a meal if they knew you were in the country?	1986	51	43	6
Do you have any family in Israel?	1986	34	62	4
	1983	32	68	—
Do you have any personal friends in Israel?	1986	30	67	3
	1983	33	67	—
Within the last 12 months, have you...				
had any professional or business dealings with anyone in Israel?	1986	7	93	1
corresponded with anyone you know in Israel?	1986	23	77	0
spoken by telephone with someone living in Israel?	1986	10	90	0

Table 13

PERSONAL TIES* WITH ISRAELIS BY AGE

Ties	(Percent)					All
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	
High (4)	24	12	13	16	14	15
Moderate (2-3)	32	36	45	29	35	35
Low (0-1)	44	53	42	55	51	51
	100	100	100	100	100	100

CONTACT** WITH ISRAELIS IN LAST 12 MONTHS BY AGE

Contact	(Percent)					All
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	
High (2-3)	13	7	16	8	14	11
Moderate (1)	21	14	12	15	19	15
Low (0)	66	79	72	77	67	74
	100	100	100	100	100	100

PERSONAL TIES* WITH ISRAELIS BY DENOMINATION

Ties	(Percent)					All
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish		
High (4)	41	7	10	8	15	
Moderate (2-3)	29	41	31	33	35	
Low (0-1)	31	42	60	59	51	
	100	100	100	100	100	

CONTACT** WITH ISRAELIS IN LAST 12 MONTHS BY DENOMINATION

Contact	(Percent)					All
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish		
High (2-3)	31	9	6	9	10	
Moderate (1)	20	20	13	11	16	
Low (0)	49	71	81	80	74	
	100	100	100	100	100	

* Personal Ties Index consists of knowing (1) friends or family who have moved from the U.S. to Israel; (2) an Israeli who would invite you or a meal; (3) family; (4) friends.

** Contact Index consists of (1) business dealings; (2) corresponded; (3) telephoned.

than half the respondents were between the ages of 30 and 64, when business activity peaks, not all of these worked full time (fewer women do), and not all had careers that offered possibilities for connection with Israelis.

All told, in the year preceding this survey, slightly over a fourth of adult American Jews had some sort of direct communication with someone living in Israel.

Younger Adults Have as Many Personal Ties and as Much Contact with Israelis

Even though fewer young adults express a significant psychic attachment to Israel, they were just as likely as their elders, if not more so, to know Israelis and keep in touch with them (Table 13). Not only did more than half of those under 30 have an Israeli personal friend or relative, compared with slightly less than half of those 30 and over; but almost twice as many young adults as other respondents said they had all four types of relations with Israelis -- family, friends, migrants, and potential dinner hosts. Maintaining some kind of written correspondence or other communication was most frequent among the youngest and oldest respondents, one-third of whom reported such a contact as opposed to one-fourth of the 30-to-64 group.

Orthodox Jews' Exceptional Ties with Israelis

The proportion who have any kind of personal ties with Israelis advances considerably with denominational traditionalism. Half of the Reform and nondenominational Jews, over two-thirds of the Conservative and over three-fourths of the Orthodox checked at least one type of contact.

The distinction between the denominations was even sharper for respondents who claimed many ties with Israelis. Less than one in ten Reform and nondenominational Jews, slightly more than one in six (still few) Conservatives, and a full two in five of the Orthodox reported all four types of connection. Crosstabulating the four items by denomination demonstrated that these variations applied to every single one. The widest gap between Orthodox and non-Orthodox was on whether they knew American settlers in Israel (henceforth *olim*, Hebrew for migrants to Israel). Almost three-quarters of the Orthodox, less than half of the Conservative, a third of the Reform, and a quarter of the nondenominational Jews knew *olim*, a finding that reflects a far greater representation of Orthodox in the small stream of American settlers in Israel.

Contact with Israelis increases with denominational traditionalism, and the sharpest distinction between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox is in the proportions reporting more

than one type of contact. Over half of the Orthodox had been in some kind of touch with an Israeli over the past 12 months, as compared with less than a third of Conservative and a fifth of Reform and nondenominational Jews. Overall, only 10 percent of the respondents had had at least two types of contact -- generally letters and telephone calls or business dealings -- but the Orthodox proportion was almost a third against one-eleventh for the other groups.

AMERICAN PRO-ISRAELISM VERSUS ISRAELI ZIONISM

American Jews are ardent supporters of Israel, but they generally fail to embrace what most Israelis or Zionist ideologues would regard as essential Zionist principles. Classical Zionists have argued that Jewish life in the Diaspora is unstable and limited, if not distorted. It is unstable, they say, because of anti-Semitism in some countries, or assimilation in open and tolerant societies, it is limited because only Israeli society can offer the fullest potential for cultural creativity, spiritual enrichment and political decision-making in a completely Jewish context. Hence, the argument goes, believers in "real" Zionism (not the watered-down American version), should make aliyah -- settlement in Israel -- a personal priority for themselves, and if not for themselves, then for their children.

The extent of this feeling can be gleaned from the 1986 AJC survey of Israelis, in which nearly a two-to-one plurality agreed that "American Jews who refuse to seriously consider aliyah are doing something wrong," and an equal number were also "troubled that they do not make aliyah." Better than a two-to-one majority agreed that Israelis should "urge" them to do so and, finally, a majority agreed that they could "lead a fuller Jewish life in Israel than in the United States."

American Jews have a far different understanding of Zionism and how they relate to Israel. When asked to choose among several definitions of "Zionist," only 4 percent of respondents checked "someone who intends to live in Israel." The vast majority of those with a preference and 53 percent of the entire sample said a Zionist was "someone who believes in the centrality of Israel to the Jewish people." Another 17 percent picked the less demanding response, someone who "strongly supports" Israel, and 3 percent said a Zionist was someone who felt "deeply Jewish"; 11 percent said none of the definitions fit their idea of a Zionist, and 13 percent were "not sure." There were few age-related or interdenominational differences in these responses.

Should the Children Go to Israel? The Acid Test of Zionism

Three questions on whether and how much time respondents would want their children to spend in Israel depicted, perhaps even concisely summarized, the distribution of attitudes toward the State, ranging from near indifference to mildly pro-Israel, to very pro-Israel, to intensely Zionist (Table 14). Three-fourths of the sample said they would want their children to "visit Israel," only a third wanted them to "spend a year there," and an even smaller 6 percent would want them to "live there."

The attitudes implicit in these responses parallel, with a slightly different distribution, those seen earlier in this report. Here, one could say that one-fourth of American Jews were too indifferent to Israel to care whether their children even visited there. Almost half, the vast middle, were sufficiently attached to want their children to visit, but not so committed as to want to part with them for a full year. The most involved third, who favored their children's staying in Israel for a year, made up about the same proportion as those who repeatedly expressed attachment in more than one or two previously reported responses. Finally, only 5-6 percent were sufficiently imbued with Zionist principle to want their children to make aliyah. Age made no substantial differences on this issue.

Orthodox and Reform: Contrasting Support for Children's Travel to Israel

A composite index, awarding one point for each way respondents affirmed their interest in their children going to Israel, summarized their attitudes. When crosstabulated by age, the responses showed few consistent and substantively interesting differences. However, denominational differences were dramatic. Only among the Orthodox did a sizable number, as many as one-fourth, want their children to visit, stay a year, and make aliyah; a mere 2 to 3 percent of the other groups were aliyah-oriented. However, the Orthodox population was so small that such figures notwithstanding, they made up no more than half of all the aliyah-oriented American Jews.

Two-thirds of the Orthodox, two-fifths of the Conservatives, and only about one-fifth of Reform or non-denominational Jews wanted their children at least to visit Israel. At the other end of the spectrum, only 5 percent of Orthodox and 14 percent of Conservative Jews expressed no interest in their children even visiting, but about a third of the Reform and nondenominational respondents fell into this least Israel-oriented group.

A similar denominational pattern of involvement with Israel appeared repeatedly. The Orthodox were heavily overrepresented in the upper reaches; the Conservative distributions largely paralleled those of the Jewish population as a whole; and the Reform and nondenomi-

Table 14

INTEREST IN CHILDREN VISITING ISRAEL

	Percent		
	Yes	No	Not Sure
Would you want your children to visit Israel?	77	8	15
Would you want them to spend a year there?	34	35	32
Would you want them to live there?	6	66	28

BY AGE
(Percent)

Interest	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High (aliyah)	7	7	6	2	7	5
Moderate (year)	28	23	37	26	24	27
Low (visit)	43	39	38	53	48	45
None	22	32	19	19	21	23
	100	100	100	100	100	100

BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Interest	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High (aliyah)	25	3	3	2	5
Moderate (year)	41	36	19	19	27
Low (visit)	29	47	48	46	45
None	5	14	30	33	23
	100	100	100	100	100

Table 15

PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN ANTI-SEMITISM

		Percent		
		Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews	1986	67	16	18
	1984	77	10	13
	1983	70	11	19
Anti-semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews	1986	26	54	20
	1984	40	47	13
	1983	35	45	20
Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews	1986	37	50	13
	1984	31	58	11
	1983	26	55	19

BY AGE
(Percent)

Perception	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	24	31	37	41	39	36
Moderate	39	41	33	39	40	38
Low	38	29	30	21	21	26
	100	100	100	100	100	100

BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Perception	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	46	44	31	28	36
Moderate	24	32	41	46	38
Low	31	24	28	26	26
	100	100	100	100	100

national Jews were heavily represented at the lower end, where fewer than average expressed higher levels of involvement, and far more than average fell into the most indifferent group.

Anti-Semitism and Assimilation: Twin Threats to American Jewry

Although American Jews largely reject the settlement imperative in classical or Israeli Zionism, they do share Zionism's concern with the twin threats of anti-Semitism and assimilation (Table 15). An overwhelming majority -- better than four to one -- agreed that "anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem." More than half disagreed that it was "currently not a serious problem," whereas only one-fourth agreed; and half did not believe that "virtually all positions of influence in America" were open to Jews. In sum, most of the sample felt that anti-Semitism and obstacles to advancement because they are Jews were existing problems, a small additional number that they might become problems, and only about a fourth to a third were relatively unconcerned about it.

The same questions were asked in the two earlier AJC studies -- *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis*, in 1983, and *The National Survey of American Jews*, in 1984. The small inconsistent year-to-year fluctuations in distribution suggest that these feelings have been fairly stable over the past few years.

Greater Perceptions of Anti-Semitism Among the Older and the More Traditional

In his book, *A Certain People*, Charles Silberman argues that anti-Semitic attitudes and obstacles have receded over the past few decades. If this is so, one would expect that older Jews who reached adulthood in an earlier, presumably more anti-Semitic era would have more vivid memories and perceptions of it than younger Jews.

Younger adults in this study were indeed less likely to perceive American anti-Semitism than their elders. In one striking contrast, respondents under 30 with a low perception outnumbered those with a high perception by almost two to one. But among those over 50 the ratio was reversed, with about twice as many (some two-fifths), scoring high as scoring low. In other words, perception of anti-Semitism mounted considerably from the young to the middle-aged.

Orthodox, Conservative, Reform and nondenominational Jews perceived significant anti-Semitism, in descending order, from 46 to 44 to 31 to 28 percent. Apparently, concern with or perception of anti-Semitism is somewhat related to the depth of attachment to traditional Judaism.

The 1986 AJC survey of Israelis conducted by Mina Zemach asked the same three

questions on perceptions of anti-Semitism. Interestingly, about a fifth fewer Israelis than Americans thought anti-Semitism might become a serious problem in the United States, that it was currently serious, and that some positions of influence were closed to Jews.

Israelis felt their own security as Jews was more threatened than that of the Americans, and vice versa. Thus, while many American Jews thought the Arabs violent and untrustworthy, they trusted them enough to think Israel might engage in dialogue with them to settle disputes. And despite all their affluence and political influence, American Jews were more anxious about anti-Semitism in this country than Israelis who viewed the same situation from afar. In sum, each community of Jews worried more about its own enemies than about the others.

If most American Jews worried about anti-Semitism, even more were concerned with the assimilationist threat to Jewish continuity (Table 16). By more than two to one, the sample felt that "current rates of assimilation and intermarriage pose serious dangers to American Jewish survival." In responses to an almost identically worded question, the 1986 Israeli sample divided along almost similar lines. The earlier Smith survey of Israelis had found that an overwhelming majority (74 to 14 percent) agreed that "American Jews are assimilating fast into American life and there is a danger to their survival as Jews."

Thus, both Israelis and American Jews are anxious over the possible impact of assimilation on group continuity, but beyond that point, in what may be called the Zionist analysis of American Jewry, the two communities part company. Despite their concerns for the future, American respondents overwhelmingly believed -- by almost eight to one -- that Jewish life in America is "vital and dynamic"; only 10 percent agreed with the Zionist principle that they could "live a fuller Jewish life in Israel," and 14 percent had "ever seriously considered living in Israel" (the figure was 15 percent in 1983). Israelis sharply disagreed with these views.

Anxious About American Non-Jews' Support for Israel, but Less Than in 1983

Of course, concerns for the future of Israel play a central role in shaping American Jews' attitudes toward the Jewish State. They believe U.S. support for Israel is essential to its military and diplomatic struggle with Arab enemies, which is one reason why those who care about Israel's future expressed anxiety over continuation of that support. Another factor is a thread in the Jewish consciousness captured in the phrase, "a people who dwells alone." The Jews' understanding of their history embraces powerful images of centuries of persecution culminating in the destruction of six million European Jews in the Holocaust.

Table 16

ZIONIST IDEOLOGY AND RELATED MATTERS

		Percent		
		Agree/ Yes	Disagree/ No	Not Sure
The current rates of assimilation and intermarriage pose serious dangers to American Jewish survival	1986	62	25	14
	1985	68	19	14
American Jewish life is vital and dynamic	1986	68	9	23
I feel I can live a fuller Jewish life in Israel than in the U.S.	1986	10	73	17
Have you ever seriously considered living in Israel?	1986	14	79	7
	1983	15	85	—

Table 17

ANXIETY ABOUT AMERICANS' SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

		Percent		
		Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive	1986	46	33	21
	1983	54	24	22
I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel	1986	40	43	17
	1983	55	32	14

Anxiety	BY AGE (Percent)					
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	27	34	34	33	31	32
Moderate	44	42	40	42	49	43
Low	30	25	26	25	21	25
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Anxiety	BY DENOMINATION (Percent)				All
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	
High	33	38	29	30	33
Moderate	37	42	44	44	43
Low	28	20	27	27	25
	100	100	100	100	100

Anxiety	BY ISRAEL ATTACHMENT (Percent)			
	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	38	34	25	33
Moderate	45	43	42	43
Low	17	23	33	24
	100	100	100	100

The 1983 survey uncovered the respondents' complex, perhaps even paradoxical, set of attitudes involving Israel, their understanding of America, and images of how non-Jewish Americans view the Jewish State. On the one hand, by and large, they overwhelmingly believed that "U.S. support of Israel is in America's interest"; on the other hand, they feared most Americans were not quite ready to accept that view. More than half of the respondents thought that "when it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side," and an equal majority were worried that the United States might stop being a "firm ally" (Table 17).

In 1986, many American Jews were still worried about non-Jews' support of Israel, but the anxieties had apparently receded somewhat; only 46 percent agreed that few non-Jews would come to Israel's side in a life-and-death struggle, and those who worried about the U.S.-Israel alliance dropped to 40 percent. These proportions were about the same for different age groups and religious denominations. Almost half of the most attached and moderately attached to Israel expressed concern for America's alliance with Israel against just over a fourth of the least attached.

One plausible explanation for the shift toward a more optimistic view of America's support for Israel takes into account historical developments in the interim period. The 1983 survey was taken a few months after the war in Lebanon and the attendant criticism of Israel in the news media. Then, by all accounts, the Reagan administration expanded cooperation with Israel in the military, intelligence-gathering and diplomatic spheres. At the same time, the administration was reluctant to play a significant independent role in promoting renewed Arab-Israeli peace talks, especially if it means (as it has in the past) advancing proposals that might be endorsed by only one part of Israel's political leadership. The last such proposal was the Reagan Peace Plan announced in September 1982, and subsequently dropped partly in response to a forceful rejection by then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

The 1983 respondents were probably, in a diffuse way, reacting to heightened tensions in the U.S.-Israel relationship after the war in Lebanon and the Reagan peace initiative. The 1986 respondents were much farther away from these events, and there have been no intervening developments to disrupt U.S.-Israel ties. (The Iran arms-Contra funds scandal and the Jonathan Pollard spy case broke after this survey was completed.) Also, to a certain extent, an increase in the number of American Jews who were least attached to Israel produced a slight decrease in anxieties about U.S. and non-Jewish support.

IGNORANCE OF ISRAEL AND OF HEBREW

Israelis have often been struck by an apparent paradox, if not contradiction, among American Jews. Many of them, especially those who travel to Israel, express passionate enthusiasm for the nation and its people; but their passion is matched neither by familiarity with Israel society nor by interest in learning more about its language and culture. The Americans' inability to speak Hebrew and their relative ignorance of Israeli life are critical impediments to communication between most Israelis and all but a few unusually involved Jews in this country.

To gauge the extent of their knowledge or ignorance of Israel, four factual questions, allowing for "yes," "no," and "not sure" responses were asked (Table 18). It is true that this is not enough to provide a definitive judgment of the respondents' knowledge of Israel (no schoolteacher would base a final grade on answers to just four yes/no questions), but the answers at least begin to reveal the dimensions of what they know or do not know. Respondents were asked whether Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres belong to the same party, whether non-Orthodox rabbis can perform marriages in Israel, whether Arab and Jewish Israelis go to the same schools, and whether Jewish religious holidays are legal holidays as well. The answers to these basic political, cultural and religious questions would be obvious to any reasonably intelligent Israeli or, for that matter, any reasonably intelligent American who spent a few months living in Israel.

Two-thirds of the respondents knew that "most major Jewish religious holidays [are] also legal national holidays in Israel," but the other third either answered wrong or were not sure enough to hazard a guess. On the other three questions, only a third were right (answering "no"), about half were "not sure," and 10 to 23 percent answered incorrectly. Despite the prominence of Mr. Begin and Mr. Peres in the news media, only a third of the sample knew they were not "from the same political party." Notwithstanding the great interest of the

American rabbinate in the issue, only a third of the respondents knew that Conservative and Reform rabbis could not officially perform Jewish marriages in Israel, and slightly less than a third knew that Arab and Jewish Israeli children go to separate schools.

Almost a fourth of the respondents knew none of the answers, just over a fourth knew one, another fourth two, and a fourth at least three out of four. Only 9 percent answered all four questions correctly, a proportion very similar to the small proportion identified as intensely Zionist or aliyah-oriented.

The Orthodox, Activists, Travelers and the Educated Are Better Informed

The Orthodox knew significantly more about Israel than the other denominations, and the Conservatives outscored the Reform or nondenominational Jews. Nearly half the Orthodox, but only 21 to 27 percent of the three other groups, had at least three out of four correct answers. Affiliation with Jewish institutions was a better predictor of knowledge of Israel than was denomination. Of those involved with a synagogue, Federation campaign and at least one other Jewish institution, almost half knew at least three answers, as opposed to one-third who belonged to two organizations, one-fourth who were affiliated with one, and less than one-fifth of the totally unaffiliated. In sum, intensive involvement with the community, whether as an Orthodox Jew or an active member of a Jewish institution, apparently familiarizes one with Israeli society. So does travel to Israel. Only one-fifth of the respondents who had never been to Israel could answer at least three of the four questions; of those who had been there once, the proportion with at least three right answers nearly doubled to more than a third; among those who had been to Israel twice, more than half knew at least three answers. (To be sure, the causal direction here is not clear; to some extent, knowledge of Israel's society grows out of commitment, which, in turn, fosters travel there.)

Better-educated respondents were also more knowledgeable about Israel. The proportion who gave at least three correct answers rose from 15 percent of those who had finished high school to 22 percent of those with some college, to 31 percent of those with B.A.'s, and to 40 percent of those with graduate degrees. Higher education reflects and promotes interest in world affairs, reading, and foreign travel, which partially explains why the better-educated answered correctly so much more frequently. However, even factoring out travel to Israel, the better-educated are better informed about Israel.

Although there is no fixed standard for evaluating these answers and what they imply, on many counts they demonstrate widespread ignorance of Israel among American Jews. Two

Table 18

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ISRAEL

	Percent		
	Yes	No	Not Sure
Are Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres from the same political party?	10	34*	56
Can Conservative and Reform rabbis officially marry couples in Israel?	23	34*	43
Do Arab Israeli and Jewish Israeli children generally go to the same schools?	19	31*	50
Are most major Jewish religious holidays also legal national holidays in Israel?	68*	5	27

Knowledge	BY AGE (Percent)					
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High (3-4)**	27	26	31	28	22	27
Moderate (2)	23	23	24	22	30	24
Low (1)	30	28	21	23	34	27
Very low (0)	20	23	23	27	14	23
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Knowledge	BY DENOMINATION (Percent)				
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High (3-4)**	50	27	23	21	27
Moderate (2)	29	26	23	20	24
Low (1)	15	27	28	30	27
Very low (0)	7	20	26	29	23
	100	100	100	100	100

*Correct answers.

**Numbers refer to the total of correct answers to the factual questions cited above.

Table 18 (cont'd)

**BY JEWISH COMMUNAL AFFILIATION
(Percent)**

Knowledge	High	Moderate	Low	None	All
High (3-4)	43	36	26	15	27
Moderate (2)	36	23	24	19	24
Low (1)	12	27	29	30	27
Very low (0)	10	15	20	35	23
	100	100	100	100	100

**BY NUMBER OF VISITS TO ISRAEL
(Percent)**

Knowledge	Twice	Once	Never	All
High (3-4)	53	36	19	27
Moderate (2)	25	28	22	24
Low (1)	19	23	29	27
Very low (0)	3	12	29	23
	100	100	100	100

**BY EDUCATION
(Percent)**

Knowledge	High School	Some College	B.A.	Graduate Degree	All
High (3-4)	15	22	31	40	27
Moderate (2)	20	26	24	25	24
Low (1)	31	28	27	22	27
Very low (0)	35	25	18	14	23
	100	100	100	100	100

questions, on Israeli political personalities and non-Orthodox rabbis, pertain to areas in which American Jewish leaders have invested considerable time and energy. For a long time, especially since the 1977 victory of the Likud Party and Begin, they have been concerned with such political developments as religious-secular strife in Israel; indeed, the efforts of non-Orthodox rabbis to secure greater legitimacy in the Jewish State have become a cause célèbre.

Yet, despite the salience of these issues, no more than a third of the respondents could answer correctly (or even guess at) questions demanding what must be the minimal competence required for dialogue with Israelis about political and internal religious matters. Not even travel to Israel or Jewish involvement, which dissipate ignorance, had very pronounced effects. As a pessimist who sees the glass as half empty would say, only half of the Jews who had been to Israel, and only a substantial minority who belonged to three different types of Jewish institutions could answer three out of four simple questions about Israeli life.

The Orthodox and the Young Are More Fluent in Hebrew

The cognitive gap is further illustrated by deficiencies in Hebrew among American Jews, of whom 41 percent understood no spoken Hebrew "at all" and 38 percent "a few words." Only 11 percent could manage "simple sentences," 6 percent "simple conversations with some difficulty," and 3 percent "most conversations with relative ease." A mere 1 percent claimed "total fluency (or almost)."

If, for argument's sake, those who could understand at least "simple conversations with some difficulty" were considered to have minimally adequate Hebrew, only 10 percent of American Jews reached this level (Table 19). It is interesting, however, that knowledge of Hebrew is increasing significantly among young people. Of those 50 and over, only 6-7 percent were minimally competent, but the figure almost doubled to 11 percent in the 30-49 age group, and, almost doubled again, to a high of 21 percent among those under 30. Apparently, the spread of day-school and yeshiva education is playing an important role in these increases. The Orthodox Jews' greater involvement in Israel, more extensive attendance in full-time Jewish schools and more frequent trips to Israel account for their strikingly wider knowledge of Hebrew; more than two-fifths claimed they could understand at least "simple conversations, with some difficulty," if not far greater fluency. Among Reform and nondenominational Jews, only 4-5 percent attained minimal competence, and the Conservative group's 9 percent is only slightly higher.

Table 19
MINIMAL COMPETENCE* IN HEBREW

BY AGE (Percent)					
21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
21	11	11	7	6	10

BY DENOMINATION (Percent)			
Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish
41	9	5	5

BY NUMBER OF VISITS TO ISRAEL (Percent)		
Twice or more	Once	Never
32	15	4

*"Minimal competence" = at least "simple conversations, with some difficulty."

Travel to Israel, too, is a vital determinant (or at least a correlate) of fluency in Hebrew. The proportion who claimed minimal fluency rose from 4 percent among those who had never been there to 15 percent among the one-time visitors, and to 32 percent of those who had been to Israel twice or more. Where the Israel travelers acquired their Hebrew is not known, but for some, spending some time there clearly is one of a few critical factors in bolstering fluency. The reverse causal ordering -- from fluency to travel -- is also plausible, that is, to some extent, many American Jews who learn Hebrew live in an environment that encourages travel to Israel. These data do not reveal the extent to which a stay there improves Hebrew, or the share of Hebrew competency in a larger configuration of forces that encourages visits.

HAWKS AND DOVES, LIKUD AND LABOR: PASSION AND IGNORANCE

Most American Jews generally care passionately for Israel. However, even as the vast majority care about, read about and talk about Israel, few possess the rudimentary information necessary to make reasonably well-thought-out judgments about particular policy or leadership alternatives. The responses to the opinion questions on the Arab-Israeli conflict, then, must be seen as indicators of only general tendencies and broadly defined feelings and images. They do not represent well-informed judgments; instead, it should be acknowledged that many such questions require fairly advanced political thinking -- a level of sophistication that may be beyond the competence of many American Jews. (This problem is not unique to this study. Indeed, most studies of American opinion on foreign affairs issues face the same kind of difficulty.)

Hawkish on "Territorial Compromise," but Dovish on Negotiations

Since 1981, AJC surveys of American Jews have asked whether they agree or disagree that "Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace," or the same proposition in similar wording. To Israelis, "territorial compromise" is a slogan-like characterization of the Labor Party's position that Israel should, for the sake of a real peace, return to Arab control parts of the territories administered since 1967. To Americans, this meaning may be less precise. In this study, the American Jewish sample split almost in thirds, with somewhat fewer agreeing than disagreeing -- 29 percent versus 36 percent -- and 35 percent "not sure" (Table 20).

These distributions, which in 1986 leaned in the hawkish direction, have fluctuated over the past six years. In 1981, the sample split evenly, with 41 percent agreeing, and the same proportion disagreeing. In August 1982, at the height of the war in Lebanon when Israel was

Table 20

"HAWKS" AND "DOVES"

		Percent		
		Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace	<i>1986</i>	29	36	35
	<i>1985</i>	30	44	26
	<i>1984</i>	43	37	20
	<i>1983</i>	40	36	25
	<i>1982*</i>	31	52	17
	<i>1981*</i>	41	41	18
Israel should not talk with the PLO even if the PLO recognizes Israel and announces terrorism	<i>1986</i>	18	57	25
Israel should not talk with the Jordanians about "giving back" parts of the West Bank even if the Jordanians say they would recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty	<i>1986</i>	22	49	30
All things considered, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt was bad for Israel	<i>1986</i>	6	65	29
Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel	<i>1986</i>	48	21	31
	<i>1985</i>	51	24	25
	<i>1983</i>	47	26	28
Jews have rights to the land of Israel that are more just and compelling than those of Arabs	<i>1986</i>	51	23	26
Shimon Peres and his Labor Party have been too ready to compromise in dealing with the Jordanians and Palestinians	<i>1986</i>	12	39	49
Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party have been too unwilling to compromise in dealings with the Jordanians and Palestinians	<i>1986</i>	26	18	56
You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel	<i>1986</i>	44	23	33
I firmly believe that God promised the entire Land of Israel -- including Judea and Samaria -- to the Jewish People	<i>1986</i>	33	33	34

*"If Israel could be assured of peace and secure borders, she should be willing to return to Arab control most of the territories she has occupied since 1967."

being criticized in the news media, the sample rejected territorial compromise by the largest margin ever, less than a third for, more than half against. In 1983, when the fighting had become less ferocious and its costs were better known, supporters of compromise slightly outnumbered opponents by about 4 percent, and in 1984 by about 6 percent. In 1985, however, opponents of compromise decidedly outnumbered supporters, 44 to 30 percent; the most recent results -- at 29 to 36 percent -- continue the "hawkish" two-year minitrend.

But all is not "hawkish" in the thinking of American Jews. In fact, another question reveals that a plurality of Americans do not unalterably oppose return of some territories for real peace. Most even seem receptive to what the Labor Party has called the "Jordanian option." By better than two to one, the sample rejected the view that "Israel should not talk with the Jordanians about 'giving back' parts of the West Bank even if the Jordanians say they would recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty." On the other hand, a plurality of the Israeli sample actually endorsed this view, rejecting negotiations by a slim margin, 45 to 38 percent. In other words, American Jews are decidedly more "dovish" than Israelis with respect to peace talks with the Jordanians; or, alternatively, Israelis are more "hawkish" than the Americans.

Two factors may be at work here. First, observers have long noted that Americans in general, perhaps more than other Westerners, instinctively favor negotiation between conflicting parties. The premium on talking things over derives from what may be termed the Enlightenment view of man, that even bitter enemies can settle their differences if they can meet face to face, appreciate each other's humanity, and reason together. (Political conservatives find such optimism unrealistic and naive.)

However, Israelis who have experienced personal and collective injury inflicted by Jordan feel that this neighboring state is a far more real and dangerous enemy than do American Jews, so the average Israeli is less eager for talks. Nowhere was the contrast between the two attitudes toward negotiation with the Arabs clearer than in the responses on talking with a hypothetically less aggressive version of the PLO. By a clear three-to-one margin, the American sample rejected the view that "Israel should not talk with the PLO even if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism," whereas the Israeli balance on a similarly worded question was in the opposite direction. Only a third of the Israelis thought the State should agree to conduct negotiations with the PLO if this organization recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism, while almost half disagreed. In sum, most American Jews, but only a third of the Israelis, favored Israeli talks with a reconstructed PLO.

Which American Jews are more hawkish or more dovish? To answer this question, an

overall index was used to locate the sources of relative hawkishness and dovishness among the various groups (Table 21). Respondents were deemed more hawkish if they disagreed with (1) offering territorial compromise, (2) talking with a reformed PLO, (3) talking with Jordan, (4) trusting the Arabs to make peace, and (5) granting the Palestinians a homeland (even if it posed no threat to Israel); and if they (6) agreed that Jews have more rights than Arabs to the Land of Israel, (7) supported Likud, and (8) criticized Labor for their respective approaches to dealing with the Arabs (see Questionnaire wording). Indexing created three arbitrarily delineated groups in the sample: slightly over one-third most hawkish, about one-fifth least hawkish, and over two-fifths in between.

Given the lack of familiarity with Israeli politics demonstrated by the fact that only one-third of American Jews knew that Begin and Peres belong to different parties, the question arises whether the foreign policy attitudes of the better-informed differed from those of the less-informed. One might have expected that those who correctly distinguished the party affiliations of two of Israel's recent premiers would be somewhat more hawkish, but although they leaned in that direction, the difference from the entire sample was a mere 2 to 3 percent. In short, the entire sample had roughly the same distribution of attitudes on Israeli foreign policy as the better-informed subgroup.

Differences in hawkish attitudes among the various age cohorts were inconsistent, but the denominational variations were more clear-cut: the Orthodox, with 61 percent, were far more hawkish than non-Orthodox Jews; the Conservatives with 37 percent hawks were more hawkish than the Reform or nondenominational who registered 30 and 29 percent hawks.

Most of the respondents who had been to Israel twice or more, about two-fifths who had been there once, and fewer than a third who had never been there were hawkish, but part of this association with travel derives from the fact that so many Orthodox Jews go there frequently.

Attachment to Israel is also positively related to hawkishness. Among the most involved third of the sample, almost half scored high on hawkishness, as contrasted with just over a third of the intermediate group, and only 18 percent of the least attached.

Arab Threat and Israeli Vulnerability: Key Factors Affecting Readiness to Talk

The 1986 study did not ask whether the American sample favored Israeli talks with the PLO without preconditions, but the 1981 and 1982 surveys showed that the vast majority rejected this proposition. In 1982, by the huge margin of 76 to 15 percent, respondents agreed that "Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the PLO because the PLO is a

Table 21

**HAWKISHNESS ON ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICIES
BY KNOWLEDGE OF ISRAELI POLITICS
(Percent)**

Are Begin and Peres from same party?

Hawkishness	Yes(Wrong)	No(Right)	Not Sure	All
High	27	37	35	35
Moderate	49	40	47	45
Low	24	23	18	21
	100	100	100	100

**BY AGE
(Percent)**

Hawkishness	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	37	31	45	32	37	35
Moderate	44	43	35	48	50	44
Low	18	26	21	20	14	21
	100	100	100	100	100	100

**BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)**

Hawkishness	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	61	37	28	29	35
Moderate	31	46	46	46	45
Low	9	17	6	25	21
	100	100	100	100	100

Table 21 (cont'd)
BY VISITS TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Hawkishness	Twice or More	Once	Never	All
High	53	39	31	35
Moderate	36	44	46	44
Low	11	16	27	21
	100	100	100	100

BY DENOMINATION AND ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL

The Orthodox
(Percent)

Hawkishness	High	Attachment Moderate	Low	All
High	82	32	0	62
Moderate	6	63	100	29
Low	12	5	0	9
	100	100	100	100

The Conservative
(Percent)

Hawkishness	High	Attachment Moderate	Low	All
High	39	40	26	37
Moderate	50	43	45	46
Low	12	17	29	17
	100	100	100	100

Table 21 (cont'd)

	<u>The Reform</u> (Percent)		Attachment		
Hawkishness	High	Moderate	Low		All
High	39	37	13		28
Moderate	43	42	54		47
Low	18	21	34		25
	100	100	100		100

	<u>The Nondenominational</u> (Percent)			
Hawkishness		Attachment		
	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	44	30	19	29
Moderate	46	45	46	46
Low	9	25	35	25
	100	100	100	100

BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Hawkishness	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	48	36	18	35
Moderate	40	45	49	44
Low	12	19	33	21
	100	100	100	100

terrorist organization that wants to destroy Israel," virtually the identical proportion as in the previous year; and there is no reason to suspect that opposition to talks without preconditions has diminished much, if at all, since then. If that is so, the question is why American Jews are so ready today to talk with a potentially (even if wholly hypothetically) "reformed" PLO, one that "recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism." From these and previously collected data, a strong case can be made that the perception of Arab hostility and threat, coupled with the perception of Israeli or Jewish vulnerability, diminishes readiness to compromise. At the same time, Jews welcome a decrease in the Arab threat and in Israeli vulnerability, and react to it with greater readiness to search for a compromise.

Thus, a two-to-one plurality (44 to 23 percent) would "never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel." (The Israeli sample broke almost the same way on the issue: 47 to 30 percent.) Nevertheless, only 6 percent agreed and almost 65 percent disagreed that "All things considered, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt was bad for Israel." In other words, the sample was saying: "When we look ahead, we don't find the Arabs trustworthy. They can't make a real peace. But when we look back, it does seem that despite their violent and dishonest nature, some Arabs did make some kind of peace that was largely good for Israel."

The findings clearly demonstrate a close relationship between believing the Arabs can make peace and a readiness to talk about compromise with them (Table 22). Among those who thought the Arabs could never be trusted to make a "real peace," the opponents of "territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria" outnumbered advocates by more than two to one. Among those who thought the Arabs could make a real peace, the figures were almost identically reversed, with two to one favoring compromise. In other words, the sample felt that some trust in the enemy is a precondition for some readiness to compromise.

The contrasting images of violent, untrustworthy Arabs and peaceful, honest Israelis came across vividly in 1985, when the respondents surveyed in 1984 were questioned again. Three-fourths agreed the Israelis were "peace-loving," but less than one in ten said the same about Arabs. Similarly, only 17 percent said Israelis were "violent," as opposed to 68 percent for Arabs. Trustworthiness and honesty are, of course, very relevant to any search for a peaceful compromise, and here again American Jews gave Israelis much higher marks: 56 percent said the Arabs were "untrustworthy," and only 6 percent said the same about Israelis. The vast majority, 69 percent, said Israelis were "honest," whereas only 13 percent had the same to say about Arabs.

These contrasting images make it clear that American Jews are wary, perhaps increasingly so, of compromise. However, when the fear of Arab threat and Israeli

Table 22

READINESS FOR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE BY TRUST OF ARABS

Compromise: "Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace."

Trust: "You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel."

Compromise	Trust (Percent)			All
	Agree (Don't Trust)	Not Sure	Disagree (Trust)	
Agree (For)	21	27	48	29
Not sure	26	51	31	35
Disagree (Against)	54	22	20	36
	100	100	100	100

vulnerability is diminished, either in the concrete case of Egypt or in the hypothetical case of Jordan and the PLO, American Jews express far more flexible attitudes.

Jews Have More Rights to Israel -- But a Non-Threatening Palestinian Homeland Is OK

The same feeling emerges from answers to two related questions on Jewish and Arab rights to homelands in the land that Jews call Israel, and Arabs call Palestine. A better than two-to-one majority of the 1986 respondents agreed that "Jews have rights to the land of Israel that are more just and compelling than those of Arabs" (see Questionnaire). In fact, a third endorsed the more rigorously worded view that "God promised the entire Land of Israel -- including Judea and Samaria -- to the Jewish people"; the sample split into equal thirds for agreed, disagreed, and not sure. The 1981 sample had overwhelmingly endorsed, by 64 to 11 percent, the view that "an independent Palestinian state would probably be used as a launching pad to endanger Israel," and again, there is no reason to believe this view has changed appreciably. Nevertheless, in 1986 a greater than two-to-one plurality felt that "Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel." The stability of American Jewish support for a non-threatening Palestinian homeland can be seen in the two previous surveys: in 1985 a 51-to-24 percent majority and in 1983 a 47-to-26 percent plurality agreed.

In sum, at the crucial center of the American Jewish public-opinion spectrum is the idea that, on the one hand, Jews have preponderant and perhaps even divinely given rights to the Land of Israel that outweigh whatever rights Arabs may claim. On the other hand, one reason, if not the principal reason, why Israel cannot accommodate Arab claims to part of the Land of Israel is that it would probably constitute a grave danger to the Jewish State, which Jews love dearly. However, the American Jewish center is saying, Israelis ought to be ready to permit the exercise of Palestinian group rights on the West Bank and Gaza provided it poses no threat to the Jewish national enterprise.

Equal Rights for Israeli Arabs

Notwithstanding the majority of American Jews who believe Jewish rights to the land outweigh Arab rights, the vast majority think Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel should be treated equally (Table 23). Overwhelmingly, by 84 to 6 percent, they rejected the proposition that "Since Israel is a Jewish State, Arab citizens of Israel should not enjoy the same rights and opportunities as Jewish Israelis."

A significant minority of American Jews are concerned about the rights of Arab Israelis.

Table 23

ARABS IN ISRAEL

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Since Israel is a Jewish State, Arab citizens of Israel should not enjoy the same rights and opportunities as Jewish Israelis	6	84	10

In your view, how fairly is each of the following groups being treated in Israel?

	Very Fairly	Somewhat Fairly	Somewhat Unfairly	Very Unfairly	Not Sure
	Percent				
Women	36	27	9	2	26
Israeli Arabs	13	29	20	8	30
Sephardim	19	27	11	1	43
Poor people	21	23	11	2	43
Conservative and Reform Jews	14	23	22	9	31

When respondents were asked "how fairly" each of five groups -- women, Sephardim, the poor, Israeli Arabs, Conservative and Reform Jews -- was treated, between 26 and 43 percent professed ignorance. Of those who had an opinion, from small to large majorities responded "very fairly" or "somewhat fairly" in every case, reflecting a general tendency to think well of Israel. For three of the groups -- women, Sephardim, and poor people -- only 11 to 12 percent answered "very unfairly" or "somewhat unfairly"; but over a fourth had reservations about the treatment of Israeli Arabs, and about Conservative and Reform Jews. In fact, of those who expressed an opinion, 42 percent said Israeli Arabs were at least somewhat fairly treated and only 28 percent said at least somewhat unfairly -- a surprisingly small three-to-two margin. (A discussion of the item on Conservative and Reform Jews appears below.)

Israeli treatment of Arab citizens, and probably the other Arabs under its jurisdiction, may well become a point of contention with American Jews. In contrast with their near-universal commitment to equal treatment of Israeli Arabs, 39 percent of the 1986 Israeli sample endorsed the view that "Since Israel is a Jewish state, Arab citizens should not be entitled to the same rights and opportunities as Jewish Israelis."

In all fairness, Israelis who felt this way may have been thinking of rights and opportunities whose deprivation may be defensible even in the eyes of strict civil libertarians. Military service (which entails many veterans' benefits), sensitive positions in government, and employment in the nation's vast armaments industry are three examples that come to mind. However, civil libertarians in Israel have claimed that its restrictions of Arab rights and opportunities extend to areas beyond those affecting security, such as funding of Arab and Jewish municipalities, treatment in the criminal justice system, and limits on economic activity or residential expansion, among others. Finally, the Hebrew wording may appear descriptive rather than normative, that is, the respondents -- even ardent Israeli civil libertarians -- may have been saying that it is a fact that Arabs are not treated equally, even if they ought to be. Hence, a direct comparison between the American and Israeli findings is not so simple.

In light of these considerations, the actual gap between American Jewish and Israeli Jewish attitudes toward Arab rights in Israel is probably somewhat narrower than it may first appear. Nevertheless, even if the two societies read the question differently, when 84 percent of the Americans advocate equal rights versus less than a fourth of the Israelis, it is likely that far more American than Israeli Jews maintain a commitment to minority group -- i.e., Arab -- rights in Israel. After all, Jews are a minority in America, whereas in Israel they are the numerical, economic, political, and cultural majority. As a minority, American Jews

have developed a political philosophy that defends minority rights.

More Comfort with Labor Than Likud

Whatever their views on specific policy questions surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict, this sample of American Jews apparently expressed greater support for the leadership of "Shimon Peres and his Labor Party" than for "Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party" in dealing with the Jordanians and Palestinians.

In response to two questions asking for assessments of the two major leadership choices, the majority of respondents answered "not sure," which indicates vast ignorance of Israeli internal political affairs. Of those who did answer, far more were critical of Shamir and Likud than of Peres and Labor. By more than a three-to-one plurality, the sample rejected the proposition that Peres and the Labor Party were "too ready to compromise in dealings with the Jordanians and Palestinians"; but a slim plurality of 26 to 18 percent also thought Shamir and Likud were "too unwilling" (cf. Table 20). In other words, of those who gave a definite answer, more supported Peres and Labor, and criticized Shamir and Likud.

The apparent hawkishness on territorial compromise contrasts sharply with this clear preference for Labor over Likud, but the two tendencies are not as paradoxical as they seem. In many ways, American Jewish public opinion parallels Israeli public opinion, with the former often shaped directly by the latter and responding to many of the same developments, even if less directly. Hence, observations from Israel take on significance in this country. Observers there report that Israelis also take a dim view of talks with Arabs, especially where the issue is trading territory for peace. However, the image of Labor in general and of Peres in particular has improved dramatically in the recent years when he headed a coalition government credited with extricating Israeli soldiers from Lebanon and providing for economic stability at home. Moreover, the premiership enhanced his visibility and surrounded him with the trappings of high office. He and his party apparently won respect as efficient leaders of government, but failed to convert the Israeli public to their foreign policy priorities. As in America, personal popularity and agreement with policy positions need not go hand in hand.

Another factor in American Jews' relatively better opinion of Labor (again among the minority who had an opinion) must be their greater familiarity with the party's personalities, owing to the many years it was in power. To some extent, Shamir is not only less well-known in this country, but may seem less suited than Peres to the role of prime minister in the eyes of Americans who are more familiar with Labor-style Israeli leaders.

THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE ISRAEL

Openness to Criticism of Israel -- Even More Than in the Past

A widely discussed issue in the organized community has been the appropriateness of public criticism by Jews of Israeli government policies. Once a rarity, it began to mount after the Likud's electoral victory in 1977 and reached a peak during the war in Lebanon in the summer of 1982. Although criticism of Israel has been more noticeable, if not more frequent, among left-leaning Jews, those who leaned more to the right have engaged in some of their own. In the past, the criticism focused largely on such foreign policy issues as settlements, negotiations with the Arabs, and the war in Lebanon. More recently, American Jews of varying denominations have taken Israelis to task on questions concerning the legitimacy of non-Orthodox religious authorities and the proper role of religious law and the Orthodox rabbinate in Israel.

Opponents of open criticism maintain that it serves the cause of those who would delegitimize Israel. In a hostile world, they argue, with military enemies at and within its borders, and with political enemies in the United States and around the world, American Jews should support Israel, not give aid and comfort to its adversaries. Moreover, in the face of huge hardships endured by Israelis in their struggle to survive, the moral legitimacy and suitability of American Jewish criticism is dubious at best. This view was perhaps best articulated by literary critic Ruth Wisse in a *Commentary* magazine article in 1980 denouncing American Friends of Peace Now. She drew a parallel between Nazi and PLO "delegitimation of Israel," and criticism of Israeli government policies by Leonard J. Fein, editor of *Moment* magazine and Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, among others. Criticism, if expressed at all, should be expressed in private, or at least within Jewish channels, *en famille*.

Advocates of the right to criticize maintain that Israel is better served by supporters who are seen as discriminating, who display and act on the shared moral values that form

the basis of American support. If it appears that American Jews support Israel right or wrong, their credibility as honest advocates evaporates; defense of the indefensible invariably weakens defense of the necessary. Furthermore, a vigorous Israel-Diaspora relationship, one that strives for passionate involvement in the problems of Israel and the Jewish people, demands readiness to express and be subject to constructive, if sometimes heated criticism. As for the moral argument, Israelis hold all shades of political opinion and welcome the support of like-minded American Jews, preferring their outspoken help to their silence.

Five times since 1981, AJC surveys of American Jews have asked respondents whether they agree that "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel" (Table 24). In 1986, the sample rejected this view by the largest majority yet, nearly three to one. These results indicate the widest acceptance of criticizing Israeli government policies since the surveys began. In all five studies, the ratios between opposition and tolerance of criticism showed fluctuating readiness to accept it, but always less opposition than tolerance. However, opposition rose from 38 percent in 1981 to a high-water mark of 43 percent in 1982, when Israel was battling PLO and Syrian forces in Lebanon as well as critics in the United States. As the war wound down, American Jewish opposition to criticism declined in 1983, then rose slightly in 1985, and fell to 22 percent in 1986, its lowest point ever.

The 1983 survey demonstrated that American Jews view criticism of Israel as a family matter, that they were most prepared to tolerate it from Israelis, generally ready to accept it from American Jews, and widely opposed to it among non-Jews. In other words, the farther inside the Jewish family, the greater the right to criticize. In 1986, this familial conception of criticizing Israel emerged when respondents agreed by more than five to one that "Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers."

On the two questions concerning the appropriateness of criticizing Israel, the sample was about evenly divided between those who opposed it someplace -- in public or in a Jewish community center or synagogue -- and those who opposed it outright under either circumstances.

More elderly respondents objected to criticizing Israel than did the young or middle-aged: almost two-thirds of those over 65 but less than half of those under 65 were in some ways opposed or hesitant (Table 25). Opposition increased with denominational traditionalism, so that about two-fifths of the Reform and nondenominational, over half of the Conservative, and three-fourths of the Orthodox Jews were opposed. Only a small part of the reason for the Orthodox position is that the Orthodox are more deeply attached to Israel, but the relation-

Table 24

CRITICIZING ISRAEL GOVERNMENT POLICIES

		Percent		
		Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel	<i>1986</i>	22	63	16
	<i>1985</i>	36	55	10
	<i>1983</i>	31	57	12
	<i>1982</i>	43	49	8
	<i>1981</i>	38	57	17
Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers	<i>1986</i>	72	14	15
Most American Jewish organizations have been too willing to automatically support the policies of whatever Israeli party happens to be in power	<i>1986</i>	38	27	35
I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government	<i>1986</i>	40	25	35
	<i>1983</i>	52	37	11

Table 25

OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN JEWS CRITICIZING ISRAEL *

BY AGE (Percent)					
21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
52	44	39	50	65	49
BY DENOMINATION (Percent)					
Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All	
75	54	42	40	49	
BY VISITS TO ISRAEL (Percent)					
Twice or more	Once			Never	
62	48			47	
BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL (Percent)					
High	Moderate			Low	
56	50			39	
BY SUPPORT OF FREE SPEECH FOR EXTREMISTS (Percent)					
Low	Moderate			High	
66	45			21	
BY EDUCATION (Percent)					
High School	Some College	B.A.		Graduate Degree	
74	54	41		30	

* Opposition to criticizing Israel is defined as failing to disagree that "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel," or failing to agree that critics "should be...allowed to speak in synagogues and...community centers."

ship between attachment and reservations about criticism is weak. While more than half of the most attached group in some way opposed criticism, as many as two-fifths of the least involved also objected to public criticism by Jews. Clearly other factors influenced these responses.

Many American Jews feel they may openly criticize Israel because they believe in the importance of free speech to a free society, but this reason, too, fails to explain the phenomenon entirely (Table 26). American Jews, are far from staunchly committed civil libertarians when odious views are involved. When asked whether various sorts of "people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous...ought to be allowed to make a speech in your town or neighborhood," only one-fourth could be classified as hard-core civil libertarians; this was the proportion who endorsed the right even of Nazi sympathizers to speak. In no case did the free speech position garner more than 42 percent support (for "a Communist") and, even here, about half would not allow a Communist to speak in their town or neighborhood. If so many Jews who deny people with "bad or dangerous" ideas the right to speak would nevertheless support this right for critics of Israel, especially within the Jewish community, it follows that many if not most Jews do not think such critics are necessarily people with "bad or dangerous" ideas.

Civil libertarian commitment to free speech does not fully explain tolerance of criticism of Israeli government policies by Jews, but it is clearly an important factor (cf. Table 25). Among the respondents who would under no circumstances permit extremists to speak in public, two-thirds opposed criticism of Israel in some fashion; fewer than half of those who would allow some extremists to speak were opposed; and only one-fifth of those who would permit extremist speech in most instances registered as opposed to critics of Israel. Previous research showed a strong correlation between education and tolerance of deviants, so it is not surprising that in this study, opposition to public criticism of Israel dropped sharply with educational achievement. Three-fourths of the respondents who had only finished high school opposed public criticism; the figure dropped to a bare majority of those with some college, to only two-fifths of those with a college degree, and to less than a third of those with a graduate degree.

American Jews' interest in an independent voice on Israeli matters is seen in reactions to the proposition that American Jewish organizations are "too willing to automatically support the policies of whatever Israeli party happens to be in power." A plurality of respondents, 38 to 27 percent, agreed. And, apparently, a healthy plurality of 40 to 25 percent were "often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government" (Table 27), a lower figure than in

Table 26

FREE SPEECH

There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. Below are a list of several sorts of people. In each case, do you think such a person ought to be allowed to make a speech in your town or neighborhood? And, in each case, do you think such a person ought to be allowed to make a speech in Israel?

	Should Be Allowed to Make a Speech in...					
	Your town/neighborhood			Israel		
	Percent					
	Yes	No	Not Sure	Yes	No	Not Sure
A person who believes Blacks are genetically inferior	30	63	7	27	64	9
A Communist	42	49	8	39	50	11
A Nazi sympathizer	24	73	3	20	74	6
An anti-Semite	29	67	4	24	69	7
A PLO sympathizer	34	58	8	27	62	11
A person who believes Israel should expel all Arabs from the Land of Israel	37	48	15	35	49	15
A person who believes the Arabs should expel all Jews from the Land of Israel	33	61	7	29	61	10

Table 27

TROUBLED BY ISRAELI POLICIES

"I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government."

	BY AGE (Percent)					All
	21-29.	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	
Agree	38	39	41	40	45	40
Not sure	38	36	36	34	37	35
Disagree	25	25	24	27	18	24
	100	100	100	100	100	100

	BY DENOMINATION (Percent)			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish
Agree	56	37	40	39
Not Sure	25	37	33	37
Disagree	19	26	27	23
	100	100	100	100

	BY VISITS TO ISRAEL (Percent)		
	Twice or more	Once	Never
Agree	56	41	37
Not Sure	21	31	39
Disagree	23	28	24
	100	100	100

	BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL (Percent)		
	High	Moderate	Low
Agree	45	39	37
Not Sure	30	36	41
Disagree	25	25	22
	100	100	100

1983 when the split was 48 to 29 percent. Nevertheless, the "troubled" 40 percent represent a large proportion of American Jews.

One ready explanation for this "troubled" feeling might focus on alienated Jews. Perhaps some Jews were upset by the policies on religious pluralism or a too-hawkish or too-dovish foreign policy. Or, as some journalists have suggested, American Jews' "anguish" over the Israeli government at times has fostered some alienation from Israel in general. If that were so, groups more distant from Israel might have been expected to be troubled more often, but in fact, the reverse was the case. The findings revealed no relationship between such feelings and age, and the Orthodox were troubled about 10 percent more often than the non-Orthodox.

More to the point, respondents who were more attached to Israel were more often troubled than the less attached; more than half of those had been to Israel twice or more, and only about a third who had never been there were "often troubled." Clearly, greater intimacy leads to greater caring and more occasion to be upset, but problems with its policies (generally worded) do not seem inevitably to diminish caring for Israel.

Despite tolerance of criticism and the doubts of many Jews about Israeli government policies, none of the findings suggests that American Jews accept pure indifference to the Jewish State. In the 1985 survey, respondents were asked whether they would approve or disapprove of a Jewish friend's engaging in such acts as "abortion in order to limit family size," "extramarital sex" and, of special interest to the concerns of this report, expressing "total apathy about the survival of Israel." Except in the case of apathy, none of the disapproving proportions exceeded 54 percent (for extramarital sex; almost as many, 45 percent, disapproved of homosexual acts). By contrast, an astounding 83 percent disapproved of expressing "total apathy" to Israel's survival. Of these, more than half checked "strongly disapprove," more than twice the proportion who strongly objected to any of the other acts (for homosexuality, the figure reached only 24 percent). To put it another way, more respondents "strongly disapproved" of apathy toward Israel than either "strongly" or merely "disapproved" of adultery.

If the findings of the two surveys are combined, it may be inferred that most American Jews have learned to distinguish between criticism of Israeli government policy, which they largely approve or at least tolerate, from apathy to Israel's survival, which they roundly condemn. In general, the respondents who were most tolerant of Jewish criticism of Israel were the least traditional, the younger and middle-aged, those committed to free speech in general, and -- most crucially and significantly -- the better educated.

PARTISANSHIP VERSUS PRO-ISRAELISM

In U.S. Senate Choices, Most Reject One-Issue Politics

In the past decade or so, Jews have become more adept at translating their concern for Israel into effective political action. Their lobbying, spearheaded by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has been widely admired by both critics and supporters as a model of organization, combining professional expertise in Washington with an ability to mobilize key Jewish constituencies at home. Jews have formed dozens of local and national political action committees (PACs) and supported direct-mail fund-raising campaigns to elect vocal pro-Israel legislators and defeat those they regard as particularly hostile.

These efforts have sparked a debate among leading Jewish political activists, some of whom, largely liberals, argue that Jews have been far too single-minded in their support of Israel. They are particularly vexed by Jewish support for politically conservative candidates whose principal qualification for such help is their strong pro-Israel voting record. They also fear that Jews are abandoning coalition politics and their interest in a more liberal vision of America for a short-range boost to Israel's current supporters in Congress. Emphasis on pro-Israelism to the exclusion of other concerns, they argue, is not only morally questionable, but in the long run also threatens to deprive pro-Israel Jews of true allies. One manifestation of this view is the newly formed MIPAC (Multi-Issue PAC) which is committed to supporting pro-Israel candidates who share its liberal political position on other items on the national legislative agenda.

Advocates of the more common approach to Jewish activism counterargue that involvement in a variety of causes, conservative and liberal, is a given feature of America's political environment. At this point, they say, Jews need not make special efforts to establish a group interest in general issues; because they are the only group today with a deep abiding concern for Israel, they are obligated to expend their greatest energies to support, elect, and reelect

pro-Israel senators and representatives, even if it sometimes means setting aside other compelling values and interests. Without readiness to back pro-Israel conservatives, they say, Jewish efforts on behalf of Israel would lose credibility.

While most American Jews are unaware of the fine points in this debate, they are quite capable of weighing the choices involved in the tension between their commitment to Israel's security and their domestic political concerns, be they liberal or conservative. To measure the respondents' reaction to these options, they were asked to indicate their order of preference among four senatorial candidates: a "very pro-Israel" liberal Democrat, a "moderately pro-Israel" liberal Democrat and two "conservative Republicans" -- one "very" and one "moderately" pro-Israel (Table 28).

The very pro-Israel liberal Democrat was the first choice of half the respondents and first or second choice of 80 percent, while the moderately pro-Israel conservative Republican was the last chosen of almost two-thirds of the sample, and the first of only 6 percent. In short, Jews' favorite candidate is the very pro-Israel liberal Democrat; their last choice is the moderately pro-Israel conservative Republican. The two other choices, in effect, ran almost neck and neck, depending on how one reads the figures. The very pro-Israel conservative Republican was the favorite of 24 percent of the respondents and the moderately pro-Israel Democrat of only 16 percent, while the Democrat was the first or second choice of 53 percent, slightly more than the Republican 48 percent.

As might have been expected, "very pro-Israel" candidates in both parties outpolled the moderates. A little less than three-fourths of the sample chose a Democrat first, and within this group, the "very" won over the "moderately" pro-Israel candidate by better than three to one. Of the 30 percent who chose a Republican first, four times as many picked the more pro-Israel alternative. This dominance of the stronger pro-Israel position within the respondents' political parties and philosophies was to be anticipated. It is more interesting to see how they decided between moderately pro-Israel candidates who shared their views on domestic politics and those who opposed their domestic politics but were very pro-Israel.

Two measures were used to gauge this tension -- one for left-leaning respondents (those identified as Democrats, liberals and moderates, but not as Republicans) and the other for right-leaning respondents (those identified as Republicans, conservatives and moderates but not as Democrats). For left-leaning respondents, the measure compared preferences for the moderately pro-Israel liberal Democrat with those for the very pro-Israel conservative Republican. For the right-leaning respondents, it compared preferences for the moderately pro-Israel conservative Republican with those for the very pro-Israel liberal Democrat. The measures

Table 28

CHOOSING A SENATOR

Suppose you had your choice of the following four candidates for Senator. Who would be your first choice? Who would be your second choice, your third choice, and your fourth choice? (Select one candidate for each choice.)

	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice	Fourth Choice
	Percent			
A liberal Democrat who is very pro-Israel	56	24	14	6
A liberal Democrat who is moderately pro-Israel	16	37	27	20
A conservative Republican who is very pro-Israel	24	24	43	8
A conservative Republican who is moderately pro-Israel	6	15	14	65

**CHOOSING SENATORIAL CANDIDATES MORE FOR THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
THAN FOR A MARGINAL INCREASE IN PRO-ISRAEL SENTIMENT**

**BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL
(Percent)**

Low	Moderate	High
82	65	60

**BY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(Percent)**

Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	All
80	53	67	67

Table 28 (cont'd)

**BY PARTY AFFILIATION
(Percent)**

Republican	Independent	Democratic
61	64	69

**BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)**

Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish
46	64	71	74

**BY AGE
(Percent)**

21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
70	69	62	61	76

**BY NUMBER OF VISITS TO ISRAEL
(Percent)**

Never	Once	Twice or More
71	60	60

examined relative placement -- first, second, third, or fourth choice -- for the appropriate pair of candidates, so that respondents could be classified according to their choice of "political philosophy over pro-Israelism" or "pro-Israelism over political philosophy."

Two-thirds of the respondents chose loyalty to their broad political views, "political philosophy," over a somewhat stronger support for Israel "pro-Israelism." In other words, for most of the sample the leap from liberal Democrat to conservative Republican (or vice versa) was more important than the difference between "very" and "moderately" pro-Israel; they could accept what they perceived as the small difference in these levels of support for Israel in return for loyalty to their domestic political position. Of course, the choice was heavily influenced by the depth of caring for Israel, and the intensity and nature of the political philosophy.

More Party Loyalists Among Democrats and Liberals

More than four out of five of the respondents least attached to Israel rejected a change of political party, whereas less than three in five of the most attached to Israel remained party loyalists.

Moderates were less likely than either liberals or conservatives to think that a candidate's general political philosophy was more important to support of Israel than his or her pro-liberalism. Moreover, liberals were more likely than conservatives, and Democrats more than Republicans (by about 10 percent) to stick with a candidate of their own political outlook than to choose a political opponent with a stronger tendency to support Israel. Some may argue that these results demonstrate that liberals and Democrats are less committed to Israel than conservatives and Republicans, but the survey results do not necessarily support this view. In fact, liberals scored 11 percentage points higher than conservatives on the index of attachment to Israel, and Democrats somewhat higher than Republicans. If liberal Democrat respondents were less apt than the conservative Republicans to sacrifice political allegiance to a candidate's stronger pro-Israel position, there must be some other reason than a putatively weaker commitment to the Jewish State (Table 29).

It may also be that Jews think that a moderately pro-Israel liberal Democrat presents a lesser risk to Israel than a conservative Republican counterpart. From previous AJC surveys we know that American Jews believe liberals and Democrats are more friendly to Israel and less often anti-Semitic (Cohen 1983c, 1984). To some extent, these images depend on one's political position; liberals see relatively more unfriendliness to Jews and Israel on the right, and Jewish conservatives perceive more hostility on the left. Nevertheless, the overall tendency

Table 29

**ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(Percent)**

Attachment	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	All
High	43	28	32	34
Moderate	28	44	39	38
Low	29	28	29	28
	100	100	100	100

**ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
(Percent)**

Attachment	Republican	Independent	Democratic	All
High	31	27	38	34
Moderate	38	37	38	38
Low	31	37	24	28
	100	100	100	100

is to believe that liberal Democrats are more hospitable to Jews and Jewish interests. Accordingly, some respondents may have reacted to a less threatening stimulus when they thought of a moderately pro-Israel liberal Democrat.

Allegiance to political philosophy over maximal pro-Israelism was weakest among the Orthodox and strongest among Reform and non-denominational Jews (cf. Table 28). Only 46 percent of the Orthodox but 71 percent of the Reform respondents would refuse to switch parties and politics for stronger pro-Israel tendencies. The age differences on this measure were minor and inconclusive.

DENOMINATIONAL CONFLICT AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

About One in Four Side with Israeli Non-Orthodox

Because Jews in this country are sensitive to denominational conflicts in Israel, and this sensitivity may well influence their overall attitudes, respondents were asked: "If Israel changes its 'Who is a Jew?' law to exclude conversions by Conservative and Reform rabbis, American Jews ought to reassess their attitudes toward Israel." A plurality of 40 percent rejected this proposition, but 28 percent agreed, and 32 percent were not sure (Table 30).

A related question asked how fairly or unfairly each of five groups were treated in Israel. As noted in Table 23 the Israeli Arabs were one of only two groups cited by a sizable number of respondents as "somewhat" or "very unfairly" treated. The other group was Conservative and Reform Jews. More than a third of the sample said that such Jews were "very" or "somewhat fairly" treated, almost a third "somewhat" or "very unfairly," and the same proportion were not sure. In sum, far more American Jews thought non-Orthodox Jews in Israel were unfairly treated than the 11 to 13 percent who believed this was true of women, Sephardim, or poor people.

When asked for their impressions of several Israeli groups, almost all respondents who expressed an opinion had a "somewhat" or "very" unfavorable view of the "so-called" ultra-Orthodox -- 62 percent unfavorable versus 8 percent favorable and 31 percent not sure. With "ultras" clearly distinguished from the others, views of "modern Orthodox Israelis" decidedly improved: 43 percent expressed positive opinions, but 20 percent were still unfavorable in some measure, and 37 percent were undecided. In sum, not only are more than a fourth of American Jews sensitive to denominational issues in Israel, but the same proportion feel that Conservative and Reform Jews are mistreated there and, apparently, almost the same proportion find Israeli Orthodoxy less than attractive.

Thus, on the three questions pertaining to the struggle between the Israeli Orthodox rabbins-

Table 30

SYMPATHY WITH ISRAELI ORTHODOXY

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
If Israel changes its "Who Is A Jew?" law to exclude conversions by Conservative and Reform rabbis, American Jews ought to reassess their attitudes toward Israel	28	40	32

What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders or groups?

	Percent				
	Very Favorable	Somewhat Favorable	Somewhat Unfavorable	Very Unfavorable	Don't Know
So-called ultra-Orthodox Israelis	2	6	29	33	31
Modern Orthodox Israelis	12	31	17	3	37
Secular Jewish Israelis	12	31	10	3	44

Sympathy	BY AGE (Percent)					
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	35	29	38	37	46	37
Moderate	35	32	30	35	35	33
Low	30	40	32	29	18	31
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 30 (cont'd)

BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Sympathy	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	61	42	30	28	37
Moderate	31	37	33	31	33
Low	9	21	38	41	30
	100	100	100	100	100

BY VISITS TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Sympathy	Twice or more	Once	Never	All
High	52	53	29	37
Moderate	34	24	36	33
Low	13	23	35	30
	100	100	100	100

BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Sympathy	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	55	35	17	37
Moderate	31	36	32	33
Low	14	29	51	30
	100	100	100	100

ate and non-Orthodox Israelis, somewhere between one-fifth and one-third of the sample were sympathetic with the non-Orthodox or antagonistic to the Orthodox position. True, more were favorable than unfavorable to the Israeli Orthodox, but the favorable views must be seen as a reflection of the general tendency to think well of anything Israeli; the negative views, in this context, are especially significant.

Antagonism to Israeli Orthodoxy a Factor in the Alienation of Reform Jews from Israel

The three questions pertaining directly to sympathy for (or antagonism against) the Orthodox camp in Israel were combined into an index measuring "pro-Orthodoxy." Respondents scored higher on this index if they (1) disagreed that American Jews should reassess their attitudes if Israel changed its "Who is a Jew?" law to exclude conversions by non-Orthodox rabbis, (2) thought Conservative and Reform Jews were being fairly treated there, and (3) had a more favorable impression of modern Orthodox Israelis.

Older respondents were somewhat more sympathetic than the younger to Israeli Orthodoxy. The elderly in particular outscored all the others; but, as one might expect, the deepest divisions were along denominational lines. Fewer than 9 percent of the Orthodox were among the least sympathetic to the Israeli Orthodox, compared with 21 percent of the Conservatives, 38 percent of the Reform and 41 percent of the nondenominational (Table 31).

Sympathy for Israeli Orthodoxy is also a function of the frequency of visits. Among respondents who had been to Israel only once, the more pro-Orthodox outnumbered the least pro-Orthodox by better than two to one, whereas among the majority who had never been there, the more antagonistic slightly outnumbered the more sympathetic.

Given these relationships between measures of Jewish and pro-Israel commitment with pro-Orthodoxy, it follows that pro-Orthodoxy is also closely related to attachment to Israel. Among the most-attached third of the sample, 55 percent scored high on pro-Orthodoxy; for the least-attached third, only 17 percent were high on pro-Orthodoxy.

Obviously, to some extent, attachment to Israel and favorable views of Israeli Orthodoxy grow out of overall commitment to Jewish life; caring about Israel makes one more willing to overlook or deny allegations of unfair treatment of its non-Orthodox citizens, and resentment of the Israeli Orthodox alienates some Jews from Israel. Reform leaders in particular have argued that discrimination against their congregations, rabbis, converts and institutions in the Jewish State has spread disaffection with Israel among their adherents.

A formal testing of the proposition that anti-Orthodoxy reduces pro-Israelism would require data collected from the same individuals at two or more different times. Without data

Table 31

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL AND
SYMPATHY WITH ISRAELI ORTHODOXY ("PRO-ORTHODOXY"),
BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)**

Attachment	Orthodox "Pro-Orthodoxy"				Conservative "Pro-Orthodoxy"			
	Low	Moderate	High	All	Low	Moderate	High	All
High	—	—	68	62	29	42	52	43
Moderate	—	—	27	35	49	40	39	41
Low	—	—	6	4	22	18	10	16
	—	—	100	100	100	100	100	100

[illegible]

over time (the 1983 survey had no comparable measures of pro-Orthodoxy), it becomes necessary to depend on less reliable, though still quite suggestive, statistical methods as utilized here. When the relationship between pro-Orthodoxy and attachment to Israel for each denomination was examined separately, wide variations emerged in the linkage between them. In other words, in all denominations, respondents who were more sympathetic to Israeli Orthodoxy were also more attached to Israel and those more antagonistic were more alienated. However, this relationship did not appear among the Orthodox themselves, in large measure for the obvious reason that hardly any of them were unsympathetic to their Israeli counterparts. The link was far stronger among Conservative Jews; those scoring high on pro-Orthodoxy were almost twice as likely, 52 versus 29 percent, as those scoring low to express a high level of attachment. Most significantly, of the three major denominations, relationship between pro-Orthodoxy and attachment to Israel was strongest among Reform Jews. In other words, among Reform Jews in particular, antagonism to the Israeli Orthodox may play an especially critical role in influencing general feelings about Israel.

Why this should be so is not readily apparent. No doubt, Reform leaders would argue that the loyalty of their constituency to Reform principles, or a more generalized resentment against Orthodoxy, is the root cause of the statistical association between feelings toward Israeli Orthodoxy and feelings toward Israel in general. However, a less charitable explanation might be that only those groups with tenuous ties to Israel would let resentment against the Israeli Orthodox spill over into alienation from the State. Obviously, both explanations have some merit, and just as obviously, data from a single sample survey cannot determine which is more valid or operative.

WIDESPREAD REJECTION OF RABBI MEIR KAHANE

The election of American-born Rabbi Meir Kahane to the Knesset in 1984 raised a furor both in Israel and the United States. Rabbi Kahane advocates banning marriages between Arabs and Jews, expulsion of the Arabs from the Land of Israel (presumably by force, if necessary), and official annexation of the territories administered by Israel since 1967. Israeli observers claim that members of his Kach movement tacitly condone, if not actually commit, violent acts against Arabs living in Israel proper and the territories. His views have been denounced as racist and anti-democratic by a wide variety of the nation's political leaders; President Chaim Herzog, for example, denied him the ceremonial courtesies offered as a matter of course to the 119 other Knesset members, including those from non-Zionist (largely Arab) political parties. After Kahane's election, school authorities instituted special courses and programs on democracy in Israel.

In the United States, Jewish leaders worried that Meir Kahane alienates Americans, Jews and non-Jews, from Israel. Indeed, over a third of the sample agreed that he "makes me feel more distant"; one-fourth disagreed, and as many as two-fifths were not sure (Table 32). Interestingly, many more of the older than of the younger respondents said they felt alienated by Kahane -- 44 percent of those 50 and over versus 10 percent of those under 30 (Table 33). Orthodox Jews were a little less likely than other denominations to feel "more distant," but the approximately 5 percent gap between Orthodox and non-Orthodox averages is neither statistically nor substantively significant.

The findings on the relationship between the Kahane/Israel-alienation question and the level of attachment to Israel are perhaps the most intriguing. Not unexpectedly, the number of respondents who denied that they were somewhat alienated by Kahane increased dramatically with a rise in attachment to Israel, but at the same time, the number of those who said they were alienated rose as well, if only modestly, with increases in attachment. The point here

Table 32
FEELINGS ABOUT MEIR KAHANE

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
The election of Meir Kahane to the Israeli Knesset was good for Israel	12	50	39
Rabbi Meir Kahane makes me feel more distant from Israel	35	26	40

What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders or groups?

	Percent				
	Very Favorable	Somewhat Favorable	Somewhat Unfavorable	Very Unfavorable	Don't Know
Meir Kahane	2	7	14	48	29
David Levy	1	10	4	1	84
Shimon Peres	17	46	5	1	31
Yitzhak Rabin	18	40	4	0	37
Yitzhak Shamir	12	37	8	1	41
Ariel Sharon	11	29	15	9	36

Table 33

ALIENATED FROM ISRAEL BY KAHANE

"Rabbi Meir Kahane makes me feel more distant from Israel."

	BY AGE (Percent)					All
	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	
Agree	10	27	33	44	44	35
Not sure	65	52	45	26	28	40
Disagree	25	22	22	30	28	26
	100	100	100	100	100	100

	BY DENOMINATION (Percent)			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish
Agree	30	39	36	30
Not sure	40	34	41	46
Disagree	30	27	23	23
	100	100	100	100

	BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL (Percent)		
	High	Moderate	Low
Agree	39	33	31
Not sure	24	42	56
Disagree	37	24	14
	100	100	100

is that caring for Israel is only partial insulation against alienation from Israel when unsavory developments occur. Attachment is also associated with being more aware of, interested in, invested in, and sensitive to trends and events in Israeli society. Thus, as many as two-fifths of the most attached respondents agreed that Kahane made them "feel more distant."

These results are consistent with the American Jews' highly unfavorable impression of Kahane. Asked for their impressions of each of several Israeli leaders, about a third of the respondents admitted they didn't know each one, and of those who did have an opinion, favorable responses heavily outweighed the unfavorable. For example, 63 percent thought well of Shimon Peres versus only 6 percent who were in some way unfavorable and only 1 percent "very" unfavorable. Toward Yitzhak Shamir, 49 percent were favorable and only 9 percent unfavorable. In short, American Jews are generally predisposed to think well of Israeli leaders.

The reactions to Rabbi Kahane were sharply different. First, he was the best-known Israeli personality; only 29 percent didn't know him versus 31 percent for then-Prime Minister Peres, and as many as 41 percent for Yitzhak Shamir. More significantly, in sharp contrast to all the other leaders, Kahane's unfavorable answers outnumbered the favorable by more than six to one; almost half checked "very unfavorable," and only 2 percent "very favorable." A similar picture emerged from responses to the statement: "The election of Meir Kahane to the Israeli Knesset was good for Israel"; only 12 percent agreed and 50 percent disagreed, with the remaining 39 percent answering "not sure."

An index of sympathy for Kahane combining replies to the last two questions revealed some interesting variations in distaste for him. Age differences in the proportions most sympathetic to him were minor and inconsistent (Table 34). However, older respondents were far more likely to have strong negative views and far less likely to give "not sure" or contradictory answers. For example, of those under 30, almost a third scored in the moderate range on the sympathy index and only one-fifth in the low or most antagonistic category; among those 50 to 64, antagonists outnumbered the moderates (or ambivalent) by three to two.

Respondents most closely attached to Israel had extreme reactions to Kahane more often than those with the weakest ties. Among the most attached, 17 percent scored high on sympathy for him and 55 percent low, against only 7 percent of the least attached scoring high and 32 percent low. More than twice as many of those least attached to Israel as compared with the most attached had intermediate views. Obviously, the least involved were the most likely to respond "not sure" or "don't know" to questions on Rabbi Kahane for they tend not to keep track of current events and personalities there.

Table 34

SYMPATHY FOR MEIR KAHANE

BY AGE
(Percent)

Sympathy	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	16	13	11	13	19	14
Moderate/Not sure	64	55	49	36	34	45
Low	21	32	41	51	47	41
	100	100	100	100	100	100

SYMPATHY FOR KAHANE BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Sympathy	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	17	15	7	14
Moderate/Not sure	28	48	61	45
Low	55	37	32	41
	100	100	100	100

BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Sympathy	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	30	13	12	10	14
Moderate/Not sure	36	41	48	51	45
Low	34	47	40	39	41
	100	100	100	100	100

As might have been expected, the Orthodox reactions departed drastically from those of the non-Orthodox. Among the non-Orthodox, the relatively anti-Kahane respondents outnumbered the relatively pro-Kahane respondents by better than three to one; but among the Orthodox, the two camps were almost equal -- 30 percent relatively sympathetic to him and just 34 percent antipathetic. Thus, insofar as there is a single reservoir of sympathy for Rabbi Kahane and his views among American Jews, it is principally among the Orthodox.

Meir Kahane frequently tells Israeli audiences, "I say what you think." Certainly one inner fantasy held by Israelis of almost all political persuasions, even on the left, is that the Palestinian problem somehow will go away, and even some Palestinians note that each side wishes the other would simply disappear. However, the problem of Kahane for most Israelis and most American Jews is that he articulates what may be regarded as unqualified, unbridled particularism. On the other hand, Jewish thought, especially in the modern era, has struggled with the pull between particularism and universalism, and most Jews -- certainly most American Jews -- are deeply troubled with belief systems or ideologies that seem to be exclusively one or the other, even when they draw on genuine sentiments in the Jewish psyche.

TRIBAL UNIVERSALISTS

Tension between particularist and universalist views has long been central to Jewish thought. How can a people so committed to solidarity and mutual assistance also maintain a commitment to the welfare of others, it is often asked. The difficulty in resolving this dilemma has confounded observers of American Jews, both inside and outside the subculture. In practice, if not in rhetoric, many Jews have taken one or the other position, unalloyed. Particularist leaders -- political, communal or religious -- assert that with limited resources, Jews ought to concentrate all their energies on helping other Jews and furthering specifically Jewish group interests, narrowly conceived. The universalists (who were often totally assimilated in the past) argue that as individuals, Jews should involve themselves in the larger society and, as a group, balance inward concerns with a genuine commitment to goals important to other groups, even if they do not specifically concern Jews.

The questionnaire was not designed fully to measure and calibrate Jews' involvement in the larger society, so the data cannot offer a comprehensive understanding of the tensions between universalism and particularism. Several questions, however, at least tap a rhetorical, though not practical, commitment to universalist principles (Table 35).

It should be remembered that the respondents in this survey indicated some very strong attachments to Israel, and most expressed strong feelings about a Jewish family loyalty. Nevertheless, they gave at least verbal support to some very universalist statements. Although a vast majority agreed that a Jew has "a special responsibility to help other Jews," almost the entire sample, 96 percent, said that Jews "should be concerned about all people, and not just Jews." Although a two-to-one ratio agreed that "in many ways" Jews are different from non-Jews," they maintained by 75 to 17 percent that "in most ways, they were no better." Despite frequent expressions of solidarity with Israel and Jews all over the world, nine out of ten claimed they get "just as upset by terrorist attacks upon non-Jews as I do when terrorists

Table 35

JEWISH UNIVERSALISM

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
As Jews we should be concerned about all people, and not just Jews	96	3	2
In most ways, Jews are no better than non-Jews	75	17	8
I don't feel as much of a sense of identity with converts to Judaism as with those born Jewish	15	73	13
I feel more concerned about oppression of Jews in certain countries than I do about most instances of oppression of other peoples	41	53	6
I get just as upset by terrorist attacks upon non-Jews as I do when terrorists attack Jews	89	8	3

BY AGE
(Percent)

Universalism	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	All
High	30	40	39	47	46	42
Moderate	41	37	35	35	40	37
Low	30	23	27	18	14	21
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 35 (cont'd)
BY DENOMINATION
(Percent)

Universalism	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Just Jewish	All
High	32	40	43	46	42
Moderate	30	37	37	38	37
Low	38	23	21	15	22
	100	100	100	100	100

BY JEWISH FAMILISM
(Percent)

Universalism	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	30	41	52	42
Moderate	38	38	35	37
Low	31	21	13	21
	100	100	100	100

BY ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL
(Percent)

Universalism	High	Moderate	Low	All
High	38	38	50	41
Moderate	34	40	37	37
Low	27	22	13	21
	100	100	100	100

attack Jews." Given a contrast between oppression of Jews and non-Jews, most of the respondents' replies demonstrated as much, if not more, concern for non-Jews. By a better than five-to-four margin, the sample did not "feel more concerned about oppression of Jews in certain countries than I do about most instances of oppression of other peoples." Finally, as further testimony to their universalist understanding of Jewishness, the sample rejected, by almost five to one, this racial conception of Jewish peoplehood: "I don't feel as much of a sense of identity with converts to Judaism as with those born Jewish."

No Dual Standard for the United States and Israel

One way particularism may be expressed is in a dual standard for judging actions by the United States and Israel, and given their commitment, American Jews might be expected to be more lenient toward an embattled Jewish State to allow it more latitude in the conduct of its foreign affairs. Three pairs of questions on the ethics of foreign policy, each applying to both the United States and Israel, were designed to test this hypothesis (Table 36). While 55 percent of respondents said that Israel should "apply military force only in its own defense," 36 percent said the same for this country; almost as many, 65 percent, agreed that it was "inappropriate for Israel to form alliances with states ruled by people who abuse human rights" as the 71 percent who felt the same about the United States; 51 percent agreed that to defend its security, "it is sometimes necessary for Israel to violate the liberties of innocent bystanders," and 44 percent said the same for America. If some Jews apply a double standard, one for Israel and one for the United States, these replies suggest that the proportion is very small; many American Jews genuinely believe they judge Israel no less harshly than they would this country in analogous circumstances.

This is not to suggest that commitment to tradition, Jews as family or Israel is necessarily totally harmonious with universalism. The number of those who scored high on questions on universalism rises as denominational traditionalism falls (cf. Table 35 for wording). Of the Orthodox, only 32 percent scored high on universalism, compared with 40 percent of the Conservatives, 43 percent of the Reform, and 46 percent of the nondenominational. Similarly, only 30 percent of those who scored high on Jewish familism, but 52 percent of the low scorers on Jewish familism were also high on universalism. Half the respondents least attached to Israel were high on universalism, compared with less than two-fifths of those with moderate or high attachment. In each case, the more "Jewish" the less universal; but the connections were modest, certainly not strong enough to preclude the significant number of responses that combined strong particularist and strong universalist tendencies.

Table 36

STANDARDS FOR U.S. AND
ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICIES

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
The U.S. should apply military force only in its own defense	36	41	23
It is inappropriate for the U.S. to form alliances with states ruled by people who abuse human rights	71	11	18
In defending its security, it is sometimes necessary for the U.S. to violate the liberties of innocent bystanders	44	23	33
Israel should apply military force only in its own defense	55	27	18
It is inappropriate for Israel to form alliances with states ruled by people who abuse human rights	65	14	22
In defending its security, it is sometimes necessary for Israel to violate the liberties of innocent bystanders	51	28	21

Young people were decidedly less universalist than their elders, probably but not only because older Jews feel greater integrationist pressures and anxieties. Younger adults are probably more secure in their Jewishness and Americanness, and therefore feel less obliged to offer "polite" or "genteel" responses that downplay any hint of ethnocentrism or callousness to larger concerns.

While there may be tension between the Jewish and universal commitments, a substantial number of Jews, at least in their rhetoric, feel committed to care about both Jews and non-Jews, as well as to the larger society. Furthermore, most of them believe a large measure of universalism is critical to Judaism. When respondents were offered nine reasons why "being Jewish is important to you," over two-thirds answered "yes" to "Judaism is a major source of liberal and humanitarian values," only 15 percent said "no" and another 15 percent were "not sure."

The respondents seemed to be saying that they care deeply about being Jewish, and therefore about Israel and other Jews, but at the same time and as a direct consequence of their Jewish commitment, they also care deeply about moral responsibilities to the wider community, the larger society, indeed the rest of humanity.

CONCLUSION

The 1986 survey of American Jewish attitudes regarding Israel uncovered a wide range of significant findings. Several are particularly notable, either because they were unexpected or because they have important implications for policymakers.

Large numbers of American Jews report a variety of involvements with Israel and its people. Most proclaim a deep sentimental attachment to the country and a concern for its survival. A substantial minority have visited Israel, have friends and family there, and maintain ongoing contact with Israelis. The number of American Jews who were most passionately committed to Israel appears to have held steady over the past three years. At the same time, however, the involvement of American Jews less attached to Israel appears to have been reduced since our 1983 survey, and the percentage of those least involved has grown at the expense of those with an intermediate level of involvement.

Generally, younger adults reported less attachment to Israel than their elders, although both groups scored about the same on most other measures of Jewish commitment. These differences could not be totally explained by the younger respondents' lack of opportunity to visit Israel or their general lack of involvement in Jewish life.

The Orthodox outscored the non-Orthodox on every measure of involvement with Israel. While Conservative Jews generally scored higher than Reform Jews on these measures, they tended to score more like the Reform than like the Orthodox, especially on measures of the most intensive involvement. Thus, over the past three years the Orthodox have apparently deepened their already intense attachments, the Conservative involvement has remained largely unchanged, and Reform Jews seem to have become even less concerned with Israel than they were earlier. The images of the pervasive influence of Israeli Orthodoxy may well explain these shifts.

Despite their ongoing passionate commitment to Israel, most American Jews displayed a surprising ignorance about the fundamentals of Israeli society and politics. For example, only

a third knew that Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres were from different political parties, and not even a third knew that only Orthodox rabbis can perform Jewish marriages in Israel.

Respondents also reported mixed sentiments regarding Israeli foreign policy issues. They were less likely than before to endorse territorial compromise with the Arabs. Yet they were more accepting of Jewish criticism of Israel, felt more comfortable with Labor than with Likud leaders, and supported Israeli negotiations with Jordanians and Palestinians under certain conditions.

In sum, the findings of this 1986 study highlight even more fully than earlier studies the complexity of American Jewish attitudes toward Israel. The stable aspects of the relationship attest to a deep and durable involvement with the Jewish State. But it is clear that the actions of Israel and its policymakers can play a crucial role in deepening or diminishing the attachment and involvement of specific elements of American Jewry with the Jewish State.

Appendix I
METHODOLOGY

There is no completely satisfactory way to sample American Jews nationwide, and no single method yields a representative group at a reasonable cost. Since Jews comprise less than 3 percent of the population, their incidence on large-scale national surveys usually is no more than 40 to 50 cases. The Random Digit Dialing technique, which entails calls to thousands of artificially created potential phone numbers, would indeed yield a random sample of American Jews, but at enormous expense. Even then, only a fraction of the calls would reach working numbers, only a fraction of these would be residential, and fewer than one in 30 would result in Jewish households. In short, it would cost several hundred thousand dollars to obtain a maximally representative sample of American Jews through Random Digit Dialing.

A far less costly procedure is to use lists of people associated with Jewish institutions -- synagogues, federation campaigns, community centers, and other organizations. However, previous investigations of affiliated Jews demonstrate that they differ markedly from the unaffiliated. The affiliated tend to belong to families with school-age children; they (particularly philanthropic contributors) are also wealthier, more involved in ritual practice and other Jewish activities, and tend to live in established or veteran Jewish areas rather than regions or neighborhoods where Jews have recently settled. Thus, sampling exclusively from such lists would yield a severely distorted image of the Jewish population.

In the past, to minimize costs and avoid the huge bias in Jewish communal lists, AJC national surveys of American Jews have relied on a third alternative: mail-back samples of Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) households listed in the telephone directory. Earlier research has shown that for purposes of social and political attitude research, DJN Jews do not differ substantially from those found in local population studies using the more costly Random Digit Dialing method (Himmelfarb et al. 1983). However, there are several drawbacks in the DJN method which the 1983 mail-back sample illustrates:

1. All DJN samples rely on listings in telephone directories, so they severely undersample Jewish women married to born-non-Jewish husbands -- that is, the female mixed-married.

2. Most of these samples have drawn on Ashkenazi names or their Americanized variants, so they probably underrepresent Sephardi Jews, and have been shown to underrepresent recent Russian immigrants (Ritterband and Cohen 1984).

3. Mail-back questionnaires administered to the general population bring higher response rates among the better-educated. Compared with a composite of several local Jewish population studies, it seems the 1983 sample was no exception to this tendency.

4. Due to error, differential respondent interest in the survey, or some other factor, the 1983 sample contained a disproportionate number of Orthodox (15 percent as opposed to the 10 percent estimated from a composite of several local Jewish population studies).

For these and other reasons, it was decided to experiment with a different technique. The choice for this survey drew on a large existing sample that had been constructed earlier for other purposes.

To elaborate, Market Facts, Inc., a marketing and survey research firm, has recruited over 200,000 households for its "Consumer Mail Panel." Members agree to complete regularly mail-back questionnaires on consumer and public-opinion issues, and generally participate in no more than four or five such surveys per year.

When they first join the panel, and every two years or so thereafter, members complete a three-to-four page questionnaire about their basic social and demographic characteristics. From the responses, Market Facts has determined that over 4,700 of their 200,000 panel households contain at least one Jewish member. (Panel members reported their own religion and that of their spouses, so that those who had been born or raised Jewish but did not currently regard themselves as Jews could not be included).

The company states:

The panel is frequently updated to ensure accurately constructed samples. Through these updating efforts, we are continuously aware of the composition of our panel, and thus, we recruit new households in order to keep a balanced sample. Our recruiting tends to be selective; we concentrate on filling specific voids in the panel to keep it diverse and representative. Of Market Facts' Consumer Mail Panel's 200,000 households, roughly 80 percent continue from one year to the next. This leaves 40,000 households or 20 percent that must be renewed. To keep the sample without bias, a wide variety of sources are used to select new households.

The majority of potential panel members are contacted using lists compiled by various commercial list companies who are able to offer us data on specific demographic groups. For example, if a review of current membership reveals a significant decrease in female heads of households under the age of 30 residing on the West Coast, Market Facts would contact a commercial list company whom we know has this information and purchase a list of names which fit our specifications. The list broker compiles these names from magazine subscriptions, warranty lists, census tract information, etc. Once we obtain information on those who qualify for a par-

ticular demographic group, an informative letter is sent out and, if they are interested in becoming a panel member, they would then complete a standard questionnaire and return it for our review. This qualifying questionnaire collects basic demographic information and enables our staff to determine if this household fills our needs. Consumer Mail Panel recruitment procedures are undertaken as often as necessary. Between 1982 and 1983, more than half of our households moved into a different income category, nearly one in five moved into another household size category, and 5.8% changed marital status category. Thus, recruiting activities concentrate on filling any voids which occurred.

From the total sample of over 200,000 households, Market Facts drew a large subsample whose distributions on five key characteristics matched those reported by the U.S. Census: region, income, population density (or size/type of city/town), age, and household size. Within this demographically balanced subsample, there were over 2,000 Jewish households.

From the Jewish households, the mail-out sample of 1699 was drawn on the basis of several criteria. Households with two Jewish adults (a married couple) were twice as likely to be selected as those with only one (that is, non-married and mixed-married Jews). Those in which the panel member (always the wife in a married couple) was under 40 years of age were also twice as likely to be selected as their elder counterparts. (The latter decision arose from the AJC's interest in obtaining an adequate sample of younger respondents.) Where two Jews were present, the cover letter asked that either the man or the woman in the house complete the questionnaire.

Thus, Jews were recruited in a totally coincidental fashion, that is, without regard to their group identification. While the total national consumer mail panel is "balanced" over the five sociodemographic characteristics, there is no guarantee, but a strong likelihood that any one subgroup -- such as the Jews -- will be similarly balanced with respect to key demographic characteristics.

In fact, as had been expected from a previous study (Cohen 1986), the sample underrepresented the Orthodox. Whereas most local population studies in recent years suggest a national average of about 10 percent Orthodox, they made up less than 5 percent of the Market Facts sample. To compensate for this bias, weights were introduced that, in effect, more than doubled the value of each Orthodox respondent; and to compensate for the double sampling of young people, additional weights effectively halved the statistical importance of each respondent under 40.

Because one important concern was to make valid comparisons with the 1983 survey, weights in the 1983 study analysis were included to adjust for two of its more serious biases. First, the 1983 sample overrepresented not only the Orthodox, but also, relative to local Jewish population studies, the better-educated, a defect common to mail-back surveys of the larger

public. To compensate for these biases, one set of weights was added to diminish the Orthodox proportion, and another to adjust the 1983 education distribution to match the one obtained in 1986. The 1983 weights naturally changed frequency distributions on the Israel-oriented variables, but these were generally too small (e.g., the proportion who identified as Zionists declined from 39 to 36 percent) to affect the substantive conclusions originally drawn from that year's study. However, they were large enough to make a difference in the interpretation of distribution changes from 1983 to 1986.

The representativeness of the 1986 sample can be gauged by comparing its distributions on demographic and Jewish-identity items with those in the 1983 survey. The results demonstrate, by and large, that the two national surveys have strikingly similar characteristics. For example, the differences between the two studies were only 5 percent or less in these characteristics: attendance at a Passover seder; fasting on Yom Kippur; keeping separate sets of dishes for meat and dairy products; belonging to a Jewish organization other than a synagogue or synagogue-related group; having a Christmas tree; identifying as a political liberal, moderate or conservative; type of Jewish education; proportion raised as Jews; proportion of spouses raised as Jews; proportion of spouses who are now Jews; and proportion raising their children as Jews.

Alongside these similarities were some striking differences, most of which suggest that the 1983 sample was slightly more involved in Jewish life than the 1986 group; or, alternatively, the 1986 sample succeeded in reaching a slightly larger number of marginally Jewish respondents. Specifically, whereas local population studies found that about 37 percent of American Jews had visited Israel at least once, the figure was 41 percent in 1983 and only 33 percent in 1986. In 1986 there were many more nondenominational Jews -- 31 percent -- a proportion far closer to the one found in local studies -- and somewhat fewer respondents who reported predominantly Jewish friendships in 1986 than in 1983.

This recitation of sampling problems should underline the need for caution in comparing the two studies. Before drawing conclusions, it is necessary to look at differences within denominational groups, and among people with different histories of prior visits to Israel. Nevertheless, handled with care, the comparisons can be not only suggestive, but illuminating.

However, even if the 1983 sampling problems cast doubt on the precision of comparisons, the 1986 survey stands on its own as a rich collection of data on American Jews, their attitudes to Israel, and related matters. It offers a distinct possibility to learn about mass Jewish public opinion rather than the views of such visible and audible political elites as organization leaders, rabbis, communal professionals and writers of essays.

The Representativeness of the Sample

The representativeness of samples in American population surveys can be measured by comparing their key characteristics with distributions reported by the United States Census, updated through projections and intermediate studies. Unfortunately, no such standard exists against which this 1986 national survey of American Jews' attitudes to Israel may be judged. Instead, it is necessary to rely on a composite portrait of American Jewry garnered from several local community studies.

However, this method carries its own problems. The seven recent local studies used here as a baseline cover a large section of American Jewry, but taken together, are biased in terms of region and size of community. All of them have been done in large metropolitan areas, with heavy concentrations of Jews, in the Northeast quadrant of the United States (Table 37). Moreover, the published studies often use different question-wordings, cutting points and reporting styles, so that even after other thorny issues are resolved, there is no readily apparent way to consolidate them into a single standard for comparison with the 1986 survey.

Since they are relatively resistant to the influence of outlying values, medians for each category of each variable were used (e.g., those aged 20-29 or those with a graduate degree) to represent the composite portrait, as problematic as that choice might be.

With these cautionary notes in mind, one can compare the 1986 sample with the seven local Jewish community studies and extract from them considerable information on certain key social characteristics and measures of Jewish identity. In particular, there are relatively recent data on six of the eight largest Jewish communities, including both suburbs and center cities, the only major omissions being Los Angeles and Boston. There are seven studies but only six metropolitan areas; one, conducted in Queens and Long Island in 1986, covered a population surveyed as part of the more comprehensive Greater New York Jewish population study (Ritterband and Cohen 1984). The combined Jewish population in the six areas is estimated at roughly 2.8 million, or about one-half that of the United States.

This survey used a mail-back questionnaire administered to a consumer mail panel, so the anticipated shortfall in the number of self-identified Orthodox respondents prompted weighting of the sample to increase their proportion artificially. The population studies had relied primarily on telephone surveys that located respondents through a modified Random Digit Dialing technique -- a superior but far more expensive sampling procedure.

On some questions, the seven population studies provided a broad range of results, on others, the variations were minor. By most measures, the 1986 results fell within the range described by the population studies, and despite the many significant differences in the 1986

Table 37

COMPARISON OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 1986 SAMPLE (WEIGHTED)
WITH SEVEN JEWISH POPULATION STUDIES
(Percent)

	1981 NY	1982 Chi	1982 Miami	1984 Phila	1983 Wash	1986 Qu/LI	1985 Balt	Medi- ans	1986 Sample
<i>Average Household Size</i>	2.4	2.6	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.2
<i>Adult Age Distribution</i>									
20-29	21	22	10	21	24	17	16	21	8
30-39	16	22	14	17	28	21	18	17	24
40-49	15	15	9	14	20	19	18	15	19
50-64	26	23	24	20	17	27	24	24	31
65+	21	18	44	17	11	17	24	17	17
<i>Household Income</i>									
LT \$20,000	26	32	45	36	15	19	21	26	23
\$20,000-29,999	23	25	17	19	11	16	21	19	19
\$30,000-39,999	19	14	13	17	13	19	14	14	18
\$40,000+	33	29	25	27	61	46	43	37	40
<i>Educational Attainment</i>									
Some graduate school	20	26	12	22	45	20	23	22	25
College degree	31	25	24	20	24	38	26	25	24
Some college	18	27	23	22	16	18	19	19	30
No college degree	31	22	41	37	15	24	31	31	22
<i>Marital Status</i>									
Never married	15	23	7	23	27	16	19	19	15
Married	65	65	61	61	61	72	68	65	70
Divorced or separated	9	6	8	10	7	6	5	7	9
Widowed	11	6	23	6	4	6	9	6	5
<i>Denomination</i>									
Orthodox	13	6	11	5	3	8	20	8	10
Conservative	36	35	35	42a	36	41	35	35	34
Reform	28	39	24	25	38	34	29	29	25
Other or Just Jewish	23	20	30	28	22	16	16	23	31

Table 37 (cont'd)

	1981 NY	1982 Chi	1982 Miami	1984 Phila	1983 Wash	1986 Qu/LI	1985 Balt	Medi- ans	1986 Sample
<i>Ritual Practices</i>									
Attends Seder	87	85	89	89	85b	91	86c	87	84
Lights Hanukkah candles	78	75	76	78	—	—	—	77	82
Fasts Yom Kippur	67	—	74	67	66	72	75c	67	61
Attends services 1/mo	21	—	17	23	—	—	31	22	25
Has meat/dairy dishes	26	11	24	16	—	29	23	24	20
<i>Synagogue member</i>	41	44	38	41	39	55	55	41	51
<i>Belongs to Jewish Organization</i>	33	37	61	28	34	30	51	33	46
<i>Has Visited Israel</i>	37	30	45	33	35	—	36	36	33

Notes:

- Includes Reconstructionist; "other" category includes "traditional."
- The Washington, D.C. ritual practice figures refer to those who reported they always, usually, or sometimes perform the practices.
- Includes "usually" and "always."

Sources:

1981 Greater New York study, Ritterband and Cohen (1984).
 1982 Chicago study, Tobin and Lipsman (1984); Tobin and Chenkin (1985) based upon Policy Research Corporation (1982).
 For the 1982 Miami study, Sheskin (1982).
 1984 Philadelphia study, Yancey and Goldstein (1984).
 1983 Washington, D.C. study, Tobin and Chenkin (1985); Tobin (1984).
 1986 Queens and Long Island study, Cohen and Ritterband (1987).
 1985 Baltimore study, Tobin (1985).



sampling procedures, the median results were similar on many issues.

If a percentage difference of five points or less is regarded as a resemblance, it may be said that the 1986 survey resembles the median measures from the population study in several categories, including: respondents with graduate or undergraduate degrees; the four marital-status categories (never married, married, divorced or separated, and widowed); three denominational categories (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform); four of the five ritual practices (Passover seder, Hanukkah candles, monthly or more frequent attendance at religious services, and separate dishes for meat and dairy foods); previous visits to Israel; and all four income categories.

The differences in medians are also worth noting. If the population studies can be taken as an accurate portrait of American Jewry, the deviations in the 1986 sample from the medians may be understood as over- or underrepresenting certain population groups. If so, the 1986 sample may have overrepresented those with some college education and commensurately underrepresented those with only high school. It also clearly underrepresented people in their 20s, particularly those under 25, and compensated by overrepresenting those in the 30-to-64 group. In other words, for practical purposes, this study may be regarded as representing adults roughly 25 and over.

This survey's sample differs from the composite of population studies in two other, related respects: the proportion affiliated with synagogues, and the proportion affiliated with a Jewish organization. Although the 1986 percentages exceed the medians in the seven surveys, they fall within their range. Jewish affiliation rates tend to be lower in larger metropolitan areas than in intermediate-size or smaller Jewish communities, so the absence of population studies outside the big cities areas may underestimate affiliation rates for the nation. Thus, the rates in this study may well be closer to the genuine national population proportions.

Finally, the geographic distribution of the sample may be compared with the one reported in the 1986 *American Jewish Year Book*. The estimates of local Jewish population size reported to the *Year Book* each year by federation directors around the country, especially when unsupported by recent population studies, are inevitably crude and impressionistic. Moreover, there is no consensus on whether to count non-Jewish members of Jewish households or how to count college students and military personnel. Nevertheless, they provide the only available basis for constructing estimates of the regional distribution of the Jewish population. Table 38 reports calculations from the *Year Book* for this survey sample, using the U.S. Census standard regional breakdown. The deviations from the *Year Book* are few and minor, none of them exceeding 3 percent.

Table 38

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(Percent)

	<i>American Jewish Year Book</i>	1986 Sample
<u>New England</u> : Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut	7	7
<u>Middle Atlantic</u> : New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania	46	43
<u>East North Central</u> : Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin	9	9
<u>West North Central</u> : Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas	2	1
<u>South Atlantic</u> : Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida	16	16
<u>East South Central</u> : Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi	1	1
<u>West South Central</u> : Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma	2	4
<u>Mountain</u> : Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico	2	3
<u>Pacific</u> : Washington, Oregon, California	14	16
	100	100

In sum, on the basis of these comparisons, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 1986 survey sample is geographically representative of American Jews. Further, based on comparisons with seven Jewish population studies recently conducted in six metropolitan areas, it seems to replicate reasonably most of the anticipated distributions on most sociodemographic and Jewish-identity characteristics. Some of the discrepancies are understandable substantively, but none large enough to call into serious question the results on Israel-related measures described in the body of this report. That is, one would not want to overinterpret results from this sample, nor make too much of small relationships; but broad interpretations based on clear trends in the data, supported by reasonable theoretical underpinnings, are both warranted and defensible.

Appendix II

QUESTIONNAIRE AND FREQUENCIES (Weighted)

Israel and You

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Do you often talk about Israel with friends and relatives?	64%	32%	4%
Do you pay special attention to articles about Israel when you read newspapers or magazines?	85	13	3
Do you have any family in Israel?	34	62	4
Do you have any personal friends in Israel?	30	67	3
Do you have any friends or family members who have moved from the U.S. to Israel?	40	59	2
Do you know anybody in Israel who would invite you to their home for a meal if they knew you were in the country?	51	43	6
<i>Within the last 12 months, have you...</i>			
had any professional or business dealings with anyone in Israel?	7	93	1
corresponded with anyone you know in Israel?	23	77	0
spoken by telephone with someone living in Israel?	10	90	0
Do you intend to visit Israel within three years?	24	42	34
Do you intend to visit Israel ever?	60	10	26
Have you ever seriously considered living in Israel?	14	79	7

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Would you want your children to visit Israel?	77	8	15
Would you want them to spend a year there?	34	35	32
Would you want them to live there?	6	66	28
Have you contributed money to a pro-Israel political fund or candidate?	42	53	6
If you were asked by mail, would you make such a contribution?	23	32	45
Do you consider yourself a Zionist?	27	57	16

Below are four definitions of the word "Zionist." Which one comes closest to your definition?

A Zionist is someone who...

Intends to live in Israel	4%
Believes in the centrality of Israel to the Jewish People	53
Strongly supports Israel	17
Feels deeply Jewish	3
None of the above is even close to my definition of "Zionist"	11
Not sure	13

Have you been to Israel?

Yes 33% No 67%

(If "yes") How many times have you been there? Never 67% Once 19% Twice or more 14%

(If "yes") When was the last time you were there? Median = 1979

Since 1976, have you visited a foreign country other than Israel, Canada, Mexico, or in the Caribbean?

Yes 46% No 54%

Do you have any children?

Yes 78% No 22%

(If "yes") How old is your oldest child?

Median = 25 years

(If "yes") Has this child ever visited Israel?

Yes 20% No 80%

Who Is a Jew?

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis have been arguing over the definition of who is a Jew. Have you heard anything about this dispute?	70%	23%	7%
Traditionally, membership in the Jewish faith was transmitted through the mother. Now, Reform rabbis say that someone who identifies as a Jew, but whose mother was non-Jew and whose father was Jewish, is to be considered Jewish. Orthodox and Conservative rabbis would require such a person to convert. Do you accept the Reform rabbis' definition of a Jew?	59	29	11
Are you upset with the Reform rabbis for advancing this definition of who is a Jew?	18	72	10
Are Orthodox rabbis who refuse to officially recognize Conservative or Reform rabbis right to do so?	16	70	15
Would you be upset if a child of yours were to marry a non-Jew?	42	40	18
Would you be upset if a child of yours were to marry someone who identifies as a Jew, had a Jewish father, but had a non-Jewish mother and does not intend to undergo formal conversion to Judaism?	21	64	15

Issues and Opinions

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
As Jews, we have special moral and ethical obligations.	71%	17%	12%
As Jews we should be concerned about all people, and not just Jews.	96	3	2
In many ways, Jews are different from non-Jews.	61	33	6
In most ways, Jews are no better than non-Jews.	75	17	8
All things considered, I have more in common with American non-Jews than with Israeli Jews.	49	26	25
As a Jew I have a special responsibility to help other Jews.	74	14	12
I see the Jewish people as an extension of my family.	60	23	17

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
When I deal with a Jewish agency -- like a synagogue or a federation agency -- I expect to be treated in a more personal way than I would by a non-sectarian agency.	54	36	10
I don't feel as much of a sense of identity with converts to Judaism as with those born Jewish.	15	73	13
The U.S. government should make sure that Americans act morally and learn to act morally.	45	40	15
The organized Jewish community has both a right and an obligation to promote certain moral values among Jews and among Americans generally.	64	21	15
I get just as upset by terrorist attacks upon non-Jews as I do when terrorists attack Jews.	89	8	3
I feel more concerned about oppression of Jews in certain countries than I do about most instances of oppression of other peoples.	41	53	6
Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.	63	24	14
I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel.	8	84	9
If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.	61	21	18
There's a reasonable possibility that the Arabs will destroy the State of Israel in the next 20 years or so.	13	68	20
When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive.	46	33	21
I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel.	40	43	17
The Jewish history of persecution is one important reason why non-Jews are obligated to support the security of Israel.	46	36	19
Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews.	67	16	18

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews.	26	54	20
Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews.	37	50	13
The current rates of assimilation and intermarriage pose serious dangers to American Jewish survival.	62	25	14
American Jewish life is vital and dynamic.	68	9	23
I feel I can live a fuller Jewish life in Israel than in the U.S.	10	73	17
American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel.	22	63	16
Jews who are severely critical of Israel should nevertheless be allowed to speak in synagogues and Jewish community centers.	72	14	15
Most American Jewish organizations have been too willing to automatically support the policies of whatever Israeli party happens to be in power.	38	27	35
Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in return for credible guarantees of peace.	29	36	35
Israel should not talk with the PLO even if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism.	18	57	25
Israel should not talk with the Jordanians about "giving back" parts of the West Bank even if the Jordanians say they would recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty.	22	49	30
You can never trust the Arabs to make real peace with Israel.	44	23	33
All things considered, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt was bad for Israel.	6	65	29
Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel.	48	21	31
Jews have rights to the land of Israel that are more just and compelling than those of Arabs.	51	23	26

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
Since Israel is a Jewish state, Arab citizens of Israel should not enjoy the same rights and opportunities as Jewish Israelis.	6	84	10
Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character.	11	52	37
Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's Jewish character.	6	63	31
I firmly believe that God promised the entire Land of Israel -- including Judea and Samaria -- to the Jewish people.	33	33	34
I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government.	40	25	35
Shimon Peres and his Labor Party have been too ready to compromise in dealing with the Jordanians and Palestinians.	12	39	49
Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party have been too unwilling to compromise in dealings with the Jordanians and Palestinians.	26	18	56
Israel spends the money it receives from the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) in a very efficient way.	38	6	56
The election of Meir Kahane to the Israeli Knesset was good for Israel.	12	50	39
Rabbi Meir Kahane makes me feel more distant from Israel.	35	26	40
The U.S. should apply military force only in its own defense.	36	41	23
It is inappropriate for the U.S. to form alliances with states ruled by people who abuse human rights.	71	11	18
In defending its security, it is sometimes necessary for the U.S. to violate the liberties of innocent bystanders.	44	23	33
Israel should apply military force only in its own defense.	55	27	18
It is inappropriate for Israel to form alliances with states ruled by people who abuse human rights.	65	14	22

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
In defending its security, it is sometimes necessary for Israel to violate the liberties of innocent bystanders.	51	28	21
If Israel changes its "Who Is a Jew?" law to exclude conversions by Conservative and Reform rabbis, American Jews ought to reassess their attitudes toward Israel.	28	40	32
Internal divisions within Israel are more dangerous to her survival than the external threats posed by the Arabs.	38	27	35
I definitely believe in God.	77	8	15
I believe that God gave the Torah to Moses at Mount Sinai.	62	12	26

Is it more or less dangerous to travel to Israel than to travel to most Western European countries?

More dangerous	20%
Less dangerous	30
No difference	44
Not sure	7

In thinking about traveling to Israel, how concerned do you think you would be about the dangers of terrorist attack, either in Israel or on the way?

Not concerned	11%
A little concerned	30
Somewhat concerned	28
Very concerned	31

Minorities in Israel

In your view, how fairly is each of the following groups being treated in Israel?

	Very Fairly	Somewhat Fairly	Somewhat Unfairly	Very Unfairly	Not Sure
Women	36%	27%	9%	2%	26%
Israeli Arabs	13	29	20	8	30
Sephardim	19	27	11	1	43
Poor people	21	23	11	2	43
Conservative and Reform Jews	14	23	22	9	31

Israel's Future

In the next few years, how do you think each of the following will change?

	Probably Will Grow	Probably Will Decline	Stay About the Same	Not Sure
Israel's economy	42%	7%	27%	24%
Israel's military superiority over her Arab enemies	45	10	31	15
Arab acts of violence against Jews in Israel	47	9	30	14
Jewish acts of violence against Arabs in Israel	23	17	37	17
Israeli support for compromising with the Arabs	31	11	31	27
Israeli support for holding on to all the territories administered since 1967	26	18	33	23
Anti-democratic tendencies in Israel	10	22	31	37
The influence of Orthodox religious groups	16	29	31	24
The influence of Meir Kahane in Israel	10	36	13	41

How close do you feel to Israel?

Very close	20%
Fairly close	42
Not very close	33
Not sure	5

Compared to 3 or 4 years ago, do you feel closer or more distant from Israel?

Closer	24%
More distant	6
Neither	65
Not sure	6

How close do you feel to other Jews?

Very close	31%
Fairly close	54
Not very close	9
Not sure	6

How important would you say being Jewish is in your own life?

Very important	49%	Fairly important	37%
Not very important	13%	Not sure	2%

Facts About Israel

<i>As far as you know...</i>	Yes	No	Not Sure
Are Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres from the same political party?	10%	34%	56%
Can Conservative and Reform rabbis officially marry couples in Israel?	23	34	43
Do Arab Israeli and Jewish Israeli children generally go to the same schools?	19	31	50
Are most major Jewish religious holidays also legal national holidays in Israel?	68	5	27

Israeli Leaders and Groups

What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders or groups?

	Very Favorable	Somewhat Favorable	Somewhat Unfavorable	Very Unfavorable	Don't Know
Meir Kahane	2%	7%	14%	48%	29%
David Levy	1	10	4	1	84
Shimon Peres	17	46	5	1	31
Yitzhak Rabin	18	40	4	0	37
Yitzhak Shamir	12	37	8	1	41
Ariel Sharon	11	29	15	9	36
Peace Now or Israeli "doves"	5	18	15	8	55
The Gush Emunim settlers in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank)	6	14	14	6	60
So-called "ultra"-Orthodox Israelis	2	6	29	33	31
Modern Orthodox Israelis	12	31	17	3	37
Secular Jewish Israelis	12	31	10	3	44

Choosing a Senator

Suppose you had your choice of the following four candidates for Senator. Who would be your first choice? Who would be your second choice, your third choice, and your fourth choice? (Select one candidate for each choice)

	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice	Fourth Choice
A liberal Democrat who is very pro-Israel	56%	24%	14%	6%
A liberal Democrat who is moderately pro-Israel	16	37	27	20
A conservative Republican who is very pro-Israel	24	24	43	8
A conservative Republican who is moderately pro-Israel	6	15	14	65

People Whose Ideas May Be Considered Bad or Dangerous

There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. Below is a list of several sorts of people. In each case, do you think that such a person ought to be allowed to make a speech in your town or neighborhood? And, in each case, do you think such a person ought to be allowed to make a speech in Israel?

Should be allowed to make a speech in...	Your town/neighborhood			Israel		
	Yes	No	Not Sure	Yes	No	Not Sure
A person who believes Blacks are genetically inferior	30%	63%	7%	27%	64%	9%
A Communist	42	49	8	39	50	11
A Nazi sympathizer	24	73	3	20	74	6
An anti-Semite	29	67	4	24	69	7
A PLO sympathizer	34	58	8	27	62	11
A person who believes Israel should expel all Arabs from the Land of Israel	37	48	15	35	49	15
A person who believes the Arabs should expel all Jews from the Land of Israel	33	61	7	29	61	10

Being Jewish

To the extent that being Jewish is important to you, is it important because...

	Yes	No	Not Sure
It gives me a sense of being special	48%	41%	11%
It provides me with a tie with other Jews	78	16	7
Non-Jews respect one if he/she is Jewish	10	67	22
It is my culture	94	4	3
I was born Jewish	94	5	1
It is my way of life	78	15	7
God wants me to be Jewish	39	39	22
It is the foundation for Israel's existence	49	35	16
Judaism is a major source of liberal and humanitarian values	70	15	15

Jewish Background

What is the main type of Jewish education you received as a child? (Select one only)

None	16%
Sunday school	19
Hebrew School or other part-time Jewish school	50
Yeshiva or Day School	5
Private tutoring	7
Any other type	4

Of your three closest friends, how many are Jewish?

None	14%
One	14
Two	24
Three	49

Do you think of yourself as...

Orthodox	10%
Conservative	33
Reconstructionist	1
Reform	25
Just Jewish	31

Do you belong to a synagogue?

Yes 51% No 49

Of the following people, who was raised Jewish and who is Jewish now (or, if deceased, were they Jewish at the time of their death)? Disregard questions that do not apply to you.

	Raised Jewish?		Jewish Now?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
You	95%	5%	100%	0%
Your father	94	6	95	6
Your mother	95	6	96	4
Your spouse (or fiancé)	82	18	86	14
Your oldest child	93	7	92	8
Your oldest child's spouse	56	44	59	41

Do/did you...

	Yes	No
attend a Passover Seder at home or elsewhere in 1986?	84%	16%
fast Yom Kippur this past year?	61	39
attend Sabbath services once a month or more during 1986?	25	75
use separate dishes at home for meat and dairy products?	20	81
belong to a Jewish organization or group aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group now?	46	54
contribute \$100 or more to the UJA/Federation in the past year?	23	77
pay annual dues to a synagogue in the past 12 months?	48	52
light Hanukkah candles in 1985?	82	18
have a Christmas tree in 1985?	13	87

How well do you understand spoken Hebrew?

Not at all	41%
A few words	38
Simple sentences	11
Simple conversations, with some difficulty	6
Most conversations, with relative ease	3
Total fluency (or almost)	1

Demographic and Other Background Information

Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues?

Radical	1%
Liberal	31
Middle-of-the-road	38
Conservative	26
Very conservative	4

You usually think of yourself as a:

Republican 18% Democrat 63% Independent or other 19%

(If Republican) Are you a "strong" Republican? Yes 5% No 13%

(If Democrat) Are you a "strong" Democrat? Yes 28% No 35%

In the 1984 Presidential election, did you vote for Reagan, Mondale, someone else, or did you not vote?

Reagan 43% Mondale 57% Someone else 0% Didn't vote 0%

Your age: Median = 47 years *Your sex:* Male 41% Female 59%

How many children do you have?

None	22%
One	11
Two	38
Three	21
Four or more	9

Have you ever been married?

Yes 85% No 15%

(If yes) When were you first married?

Median = 1958

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