Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers

Publication Date: January 2003

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Military and defense

Type:

Coverage: Iran

Abstract:

Successive U.S. administrations since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a potential threat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf and in the broader Middle East and have sought to limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderate elements inside Iran since 1997 led the United States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and George W. Bush Administration did not reduce U.S. efforts to deny Iran advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran's moderates appear to see regional threats to Iran as do Iran's hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran's efforts to acquire WMD. Even if moderate leaders had sought to do so, they have been largely outmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal security services, the judiciary, and key decision-making bodies.

In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated conventional arms or independently develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and one of Iran's objectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skills to become self-sufficient. Iran has come a long way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, but in the aggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreign suppliers. This dependence has given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to contain Iran's WMD capabilities. European allies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional weaponry to Iran, and the United States has persuaded its European allies not to sell any technology that could have military applications ("dual use items") to Iranian military or security entities.

To try to thwart U.S. efforts, Iran has cultivated close relationships with foreign suppliers that are not allied to the United States, especially Russia, China, and North Korea. Curtailing arms and technology supplies to Iran has formed an important part of the U.S. agenda with all three of these countries, but more pressing U.S. objectives with each of them have sometimes hampered the U.S. ability to dissuade them from assisting Iran. Iran apparently continues to receive critical technology from all three, but U.S. efforts appear to be limiting their supply relationships with Iran.

Congress and successive Administrations have enacted several laws and executive orders, many of which are similar to each other, that impose sanctions on countries and firms that sell WMD technology to Iran. The most recent measure enacted is the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178), signed in March 2000. The Clinton Administration generally preferred diplomacy and engagement with supplier states, and it used the threat of sanctions to obtain supplier cooperation. The Bush Administration has taken much the same approach, although it has appeared more willing than its predecessor to sanction entities in some supplier states.

This report will be updated as events warrant.