Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-Russian Agenda

Publication Date: June 2001

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Military and defense

Type:

Coverage: Russia (Federation)

Abstract:

The U.S.-Russian arms control process has stalled. The Russian parliament approved the ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) in April 2000, shortly after the newly elected president, Vladimir Putin, expressed his support. Russia will not, however, allow START II to enter into force until the United States approves agreements signed in 1997 that would extend the elimination period in START II and clarify the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Russian Federal Law on Ratification also said that Russia could consider withdrawing from the START II Treaty if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty. This latter provision responds to the U.S. interest in developing and deploying missile defenses that could go beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty and Russian concerns that such a system might eventually undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent.

The Clinton Administration did not submit the 1997 agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, in part out of concern that the Senate could reject them because many Members strongly oppose the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration could have submitted all of the agreements, or it could have submitted only the Protocol to START II, which extends the time frame for reductions under that Treaty. But, if the Senate approved only that single agreement, Russia's Federal Law on Ratification would have to be changed to permit START II to enter into force without approval of the ABM-related agreements. The Bush Administration has taken no action on the 1997 agreements. As an alternative, the United States and Russia could set aside START II and the 1997 agreements and seek to negotiate a START III Treaty that reduced offensive forces to levels favored by Russia and an agreement modifying the ABM Treaty to permit the United States to deploy a limited NMD system. But discussions towards this end have stalled as Russia is unwilling to modify the ABM Treaty and the United States is unwilling to reduce its offensive forces to t he lower levels preferred by Russia. Furthermore, more than 20 Senators have objected to this negotiating strategy and have vowed to block any agreement that permitted the deployment of only a limited NMD system.

In the future, the United States and Russia could continue to negotiate arms control treaties, reduce their forces through informal agreements, or forgo coordinated arms control and size their forces according to their own economic and security interests. Supporters of this latter path acknowledge that the United States would lose the transparency and predictability of formal arms control, but believe the formal arms control process has become less important in the post-Cold War era. Others argue that, regardless of the changes in the international security environment, it would be politically unwise to abandon the formal arms control process at this time. Many in Russia may prefer to continue with arms control, to ensure reductions in U.S. offensive forces, to retain limits on U.S. defenses, and to garner favorable opinions in the international community. But, if the United States continues to pursue limited defenses, Russia, too, may have to pursue alternatives to the formal arms control process.