Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions

Publication Date: December 2001

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Military and defense

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Abstract:

On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to reduce U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,000 operationally deployed warheads. He noted that he would make these reductions unilaterally, without pursuing a formal arms control agreement with Russia. President Putin welcomed the proposed reductions, but argued that they should be made through a formal treaty. Officials in the Bush Administration have frequently argued that the United States should not be bound by many of the formal arms control treaties considered or signed by previous administrations. It argues that these agreements do too little to limit threats to the United States and go too far in restricting U.S. flexibility in ensuring its national security. But, the absence of formal arms control treaties would bring about changes in the role of Congress; the Senate has a constitutionally-mandated role in giving advice and consent to the ratification of formal treaties but would have no role in approving informal agreements. This approach would also change the role of arms control in the relationship between the United States and Russia.

The United States and Soviet Union used negotiated treaties and unilateral measures to reduce their nuclear forces. The START I Treaty, which reduced strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and START II Treaty, which did not enter into force, are examples of the former; the 1991 Presidential nuclear initiatives, which eliminated non-strategic nuclear weapons, are an example of the latter. A review of these cases highlights relative strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms. Formal treaties allow the participants to understand and predict future changes in forces and threats, allow for transparency in monitoring those forces, and allow for balanced and equitable trades between the forces of the participating parties. On the other hand, the search for balanced trades and the need for detailed definitions tends to lengthen the negotiating process, while the detailed provisions and requirements lengthen and add to the cost of the implementation process. Unilateral measures, on the other hand, can be devised and implemented more quickly, allow for more "sweeping changes," and provide the participants with the flexibility to reverse their reductions, if necessary. However, they often do not provide transparency or predictability, and there is the potential for destabilizing reversals.

The Bush Administration's proposals demonstrates many, but not all of these characteristics. The President announced his proposed reductions relatively quickly, but he plans to implement them at a slow pace, over 10 years. And, although his reductions appear to move well beyond those implemented under START I, they are no more "sweeping" than reductions that have been considered for the past 10 years under START II and a potential START III Treaty. The President did not propose any new monitoring measures, but the United States and Russia are likely to continue to implement the monitoring regime from START I to improve transparency with future reductions. Finally, the President and his advisers have highlighted the fact that these measures will provide the United States with the flexibility to reduce or restore its forces quickly. Russia, on the other hand, may feel threatened by the U.S. ability to reverse its weapons reductions. And, without precise definitions of those weapons that will be eliminated, disputes and suspicion could arise in the future.