Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State

Publication Date: July 2002

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Government

Type:

Coverage: Afghanistan

Abstract:

The U.S.-led effort to end Afghanistan's role as host to Osama bin Laden and other anti-western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could continue to be a potential base for terrorism and a source of regional instability. An important milestone was achieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("grand council"), which confirmed Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun member of the western educated elite with family ties to the former king as head of a Transitional Administration. Karzai, who previously headed an Interim Administration formed in December 2001, is charged with organizing a government, supervising the drafting of a constitution, and preparing for national elections to be held in December 2003.

The Loya Jirga failed to satisfy many of the participants, especially Pashtuns, who feel under-represented in distribution of cabinet ministries, but more than 1,500 Afghans from all ethnic groups and walks of life had an opportunity to vent long pent up feelings and engage in free flowing debate about the country's future. Karzai has gained the nominal support of major regional warlords, but his authority remains dependent on support from the militarily powerful ethnic Tajik minority and his status as a broadly acceptable figure who can attract international assistance.

The Bush Administration and the Congress have indicated strong support for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, but the nature of the longer term U.S. role remains to be determined. As of mid-2002, the Administration remained focused on the military campaign and resistant to extensive participation in "nation building," a stance some in Congress say is too limited. In reality, U.S. forces have repeatedly played a de facto peacekeeping role in defusing conflicts among Afghan allies, and have sometimes become embroiled in local power struggles. Some Afghan warlords have been accused of causing mistaken attacks on civilians or pro-Karzai groups by providing false intelligence to American forces.

Major obstacles to the goal of a stable and ideologically moderate Afghan state include: long-standing power aspirations of rival tribal and ethnic groups; the longterm decline of Afghan state institutions that began with the Communist/Soviet occupation decade of 1979-89, and accelerated under the Taliban; the recent rapid increase in opium production and local power struggles for control of the lucrative drug trade; and the resiliency of politicized Islam, as promoted both by the Taliban and other radical Islamist parties, which retains appeal to many Afghans.

A stable and ideologically moderate Afghanistan is unlikely to be constructed without significant near-term aid to reestablish security, relieve immediate economic distress, and provide alternate employment for former combatants, and extensive and long-term reconstruction support from bilateral and multilateral aid donors. To date, aid actually delivered to the Kabul administration has been much less than promised. A stable Afghanistan also require that neighboring countries play a constructive role, or at a minimum avoid interfering in the country's internal affairs.