The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2006

Publication Date: August 2006

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: International relations

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Abstract:

The U.S.-led war to overthrow Saddam Hussein virtually ended Iraq's ability to militarily threaten the region, but it has produced new and un-anticipated security challenges for the Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The Gulf states, which are all led by Sunni Muslim regimes, fear that Shiite Iran is unchecked now that Iraq is strategically weak. The Gulf states strongly resent that pro-Iranian Shiite Muslim groups and their Kurdish allies (who are not Arabs) have obtained preponderant power within Iraq. This has led most of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to provide only halting support to the fledgling government in Baghdad and to revive the focus on U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation that characterized U.S.-Gulf relations during the 1990s.

The new power structure in Iraq has had political repercussions throughout the Gulf region, particularly as Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq has come to overshadow direct insurgent violence against U.S. forces as the key threat to Iraqi stability. The Sunni-Shiite tensions in Iraq apparently are spilling over into the Gulf states. Shiite communities, particularly that in Bahrain, have been emboldened by events in Iraq to seek additional power, and Sunni-Shiite tension in the Gulf states is said by observers to be increasing.

Some Shiite communities, which view themselves as long repressed, are attempting to benefit politically from the Bush Administration's focus on promoting democracy and political reform in the region. Domestically, all of the Gulf states are undertaking substantial but gradual economic and political liberalization to deflect popular pressure and satisfy U.S. calls for reform. However, the reforms undertaken or planned do not aim to fundamentally restructure power in any of these states. The Bush Administration advocates more rapid and sweeping political and economic liberalization as key to long-term Gulf stability and to reducing support in the Gulf states for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration is funding civil society programs in the Gulf states -- funding that is not necessarily welcomed by the Gulf leaderships -- but it is also promoting the bilateral free trade agreements that most of the Gulf leaders seek.

The Bush Administration also is working to maintain or improve postSeptember 11 cooperation with the Gulf states against Al Qaeda. Some Gulf states allegedly tolerated the presence of Al Qaeda activists and their funding mechanisms prior to the September 11 attacks. Fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were of Saudi origin, as is Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.

This report will be updated as warranted by regional developments. See also CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations; CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Post-Saddam Issues and U.S. Policy; CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates: Issues for U.S. Policy; CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS Report 95-1013 F, Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RS21534, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy.