Homeland Security and the Reserves: Threat, Mission and Force Structure Issues

Publication Date: September 2002

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

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Research Area: Government; Military and defense

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Abstract:

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many have suggested expanding the use of the reserves, particularly the National Guard, for homeland security. If terrorism is a threat which is mostly additive to the threats to U.S. national security which existed before September 11, 2001, then reserve force structure might require few changes. If, however, policymakers believe terrorism should have a higher priority, displacing some existing overseas threats, then some existing force structure might have much less relevance to domestic operations, and would have to be altered. Over the past two decades, the reserves have shifted much of their peacetime effort from training for wartime tasks to participating in current active force missions. Denying the active forces access to these reserve resources, due to a restructuring of reserves toward homeland security missions, most likely would reduce the readiness of U.S. forces, at least in the near term. Also, a force with mostly internal security responsibilities might not be an attractive prospect for potential recruits. At present, some reservists can be enticed to join or remain in the reserves by, among other incentives, real-world missions which are part of real overseas contingencies. On the other hand, homeland security duty could attract some recruits not drawn to foreign travel, but energized by participating in direct defense of American soil. Some have suggested that reorienting the reserve components toward domestic duties could pose troubling questions for civil-military relations. The extent to which this becomes a major issue, now as before, will almost certainly depend on the extent to which the public views such a military presence as necessary and desirable. That, in turn, awaits the constant judging and rejudging of the degree of danger terrorism poses, and how domestic military deployments could mitigate that danger. Adequate homeland security may not need forces of the size of the entire Army National Guard (360,000 personnel), let alone contributions from the other reserve components. It may well be that properly trained and resourced civil organizations will be more useful in such missions. Perhaps only a proportion of reserve forces could be so oriented, leaving the rest geared toward overseas contingencies. Policy issues include the proper balance between the domestic and international aspects of an anti-terrorism war, the reserves' involvement in it, and the related priorities for programs and resources. For instance, transnational Islamic terrorism, although it has just demonstrated its ability to kill thousands of Americans, may well not have the staying power, secure bases, population base, and infrastructure of a potentially hostile nation-state. In coping with such a nation-state, whether it is linked with terrorism or not, the mobilization potential of reserve components configured for intense, modern conventional conflict could well be crucial as it has been for many countries around the world, including the United States, since the era of modern industrial war began in the late 19th Century. This report will not be updated.