Seeking Withdrawal of Congressional Approval of the WTO Agreement: Background, Legislative Procedure, and Practical Consequences

Publication Date: June 2005

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Trade

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Abstract:

The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) legislatively approved the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement and the specialized agreements annexed to it. It also enacted the provisions implementing the many obligations the United States undertook under them, and contains provisions (Section 125) establishing the legislative procedure for Congressional withdrawal of such approval.

Initiation of such withdrawal action is predicated on the transmission by the Administration of a mandatory quinquennial report, next due by March 1, 2005, analyzing the costs and benefits of past U.S. participation in the WTO as well as the value of continued U.S. participation. Thereupon, a privileged joint resolution may be introduced by any Member to withdraw the Congress' approval of the WTO Agreement provided by the URAA.

The legislative procedure for such withdrawal basically follows Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974, which provides for the enactment of joint resolutions disapproving certain trade-related actions, which for this purpose has been modified specifically by Section 125 of the URAA. The procedure provides for a (nonmandatory) introduction of the resolution, with mandatory, nonamendable language, and specific expedited (fast-track) consideration.

Although the immediate function of the withdrawal provision is to create a mechanism that will permit periodic Congressional review of U.S. participation in the WTO and the provision focuses specifically on withdrawing the approval of the WTO Agreement, it has been considered in Congress and in the civil society in the broader context of United States' withdrawal from actual participation (i.e., membership) in the WTO.

On June 9, 2005, the House defeated a resolution (H.J.Res. 27) to withdraw approval of the WTO Agreement by a vote of 338-86. A similar resolution in the year 2000 failed by a wider margin (363-56) in the House, and a withdrawal resolution was not even introduced in the Senate. A resolution offers Congress the opportunity to debate the costs and benefits of U.S. participation in the WTO. In this context, Congressional concern with U.S. trading partners, particularly the European Union and Canada, and various other contentious issues emerged in the floor debate and statements on H.J.Res. 27. Such issues are dealt with in detail in CRS Report RL32918, World Trade Organization (WTO): Issues in the Debate on U.S. Participation, by Ian F. Fergusson and Lenore Sek.

This report, which will be updated as needed, sets out the background of the issue, the functional timetable and requirements for taking the legislative action for such withdrawal, and the related WTO procedure. It also describes past and current activity under the withdrawal provision and suggests the probable consequences of the withdrawal resolution, if enacted and implemented.