Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?

Publication Date: February 2004

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Politics

Type:

Coverage: Iraq

Abstract:

In building a case for invading Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein from power, the Administration asserted that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with the Al Qaeda terrorist network. The Administration stated that the relationship dated to the early 1990s, and was based on a common interest in confronting the United States. The Administration assertions were derived from U.S. intelligence showing a pattern of contacts with Al Qaeda when its founder, Osama bin Laden, was based in Sudan in the early to mid-1990s and continuing after he relocated to Afghanistan in 1996. Another pillar of the Administration argument rested on reports of contacts between Baghdad and an Islamist Al Qaeda affiliate group, called Ansar al-Islam, based in northern Iraq in the late 1990s. Some Administration officials have said there are indications Iraq was involved in the September 11, 2001 plot, although there are major differences within the Administration on this analysis.

Critics maintain that the Administration argument did not demonstrate that the relationship, if it existed, was systematic or institutionalized, and that no hard data has come to light indicating the two entities conducted any joint terrorist attacks. Some major hallmarks of a consistent relationship were absent, and several experts outside and within the U.S. government believe that contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda were sporadic, unclear, or subject to alternate explanations. Others believe there is evidence that Al Qaeda has, at times, been a rival or opponent of Saddam Hussein's regime and its secular outlook.

A related but different issue is whether or not Al Qaeda members or sympathizers are active in the anti-U.S. insurgency in post-Saddam Iraq. U.S. commanders on the ground have expressed different views on the extent of any Al Qaeda involvement in Iraq's insurgency. No U.S. commanders have dismissed outright involvement by Al Qaeda activists, but most U.S. commanders appear to lean toward the view that Iraqi nationals are the driving force behind the resistance campaign.

The issue of whether the war against Iraq weakened or strengthened Arab and Islamic public support for the Al Qaeda organization is a related but much broader issue that will not be covered in this paper. This report will be updated according to developments. For additional information, see CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict.