The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law

Publication Date: October 2004

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

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Research Area: Government

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Abstract:

The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the United States will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead.

The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest -- including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program; oversee the agencies that contribute to it; and have hiring, firing, and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. Although the Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President, the Commission Vice Chairman in testimony before Congress on September 7, 2004, withdrew that portion of the recommendation in light of concerns that the NID would be subject to undue influence. The Commission further recommended that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Commission's recommendation to strengthen management authority over the IC is the latest contribution to an IC structural reform debate that dates at least to 1955, when arguments for stronger IC authority began to surface. OMB deputy director James Schlesinger in 1971 first broached the NID concept.

Congress currently is considering two principal bills, S. 2845, introduced by Senators Collins and Lieberman, and H.R. 10, introduced by Representative Hastert, that would establish the NID position. [For a comprehensive comparison of all recent NID legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600 and CRS Report RL32601].

Reactions to the concept of an NID have been mixed since its inception. Supporters argue that the DCI cannot manage the IC, the CIA and serve as the President's chief intelligence advisor, and do justice to any of the jobs. Other than at the CIA, the DCI also lacks hiring, firing and budget authority. They argue that the absence of strong, centralized leadership has resulted in divided management of intelligence capabilities; lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic intelligence divide; structural barriers that undermine the performance of joint intelligence work; and a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources.

Opponents counter that an NID would lose day-to-day control over the CIA, a natural power base and, as a result, influence. They also contend that an NID will shift the balance of control away from DOD, risking intelligence support to the warfighter. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the NID and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant.