Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress

Publication Date: February 2005

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

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Research Area: Military and defense

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Abstract:

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions are principal elements of U.S. defense capabilities, and include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing information needed by national security decisionmakers and military commanders. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are "national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to Washington-area agencies; others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S. intelligence spending that, according to media estimates, amounts to some $40 billion annually.

For some time Congress has expressed concern about the costs and management of ISR programs. With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition has been coordinated by the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community. Although there are longexisting staff mechanisms for reviewing and coordinating ISR programs in the context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congress believe that existing procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps in coverage. Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of information and serve similar customers, but they are acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have been beset by increasing costs and schedule delays.

Recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require that the Defense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and integration of ISR capabilities over the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if developed, could potentially ensure more comprehensive coverage of targets and save considerable sums of money. To establish responsibility for an Intelligence Community-wide effort, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new position of Director of National Intelligence be established to manage the national intelligence program (but not joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which would continue to be managed by the Defense Department). This position was included, after extended debate, in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) that was approved by the President on December 17, 2004. The implications of this legislation for ISR programs are as yet uncertain, but Congress may seek to assess the effectiveness of the statute in addressing long-existing concerns with ISR programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.