European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy

Publication Date: January 2006

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: International relations; Military and defense

Type:

Coverage: China

Abstract:

The European Union (EU) has been considering lifting its arms embargo on China, which was imposed in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown. France, Germany, and other EU members claim that the embargo hinders the development of a "strategic partnership" with China. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress strongly oppose an end to the EU's arms embargo and urge stronger arms export controls. The United States contends that engagement with China need not send the wrong signals on China's human rights record and military buildup that threatens a peaceful resolution of Taiwan and other Asian issues.

The EU argues that the arms embargo -- which is not legally binding -- is weak and largely symbolic. Indeed, some EU members reportedly have allowed defenserelated exports to China under the arms embargo. While such sales have raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU's arms embargo on China, they also point to the potential for future sales of military equipment or technology to China, particularly without the political restraint of the embargo. EU governments, led by the United Kingdom, stress that if and when the embargo is overturned, its end would be accompanied by a stronger EU arms export control regime -- including an enhanced EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports -- that will improve accountability and better control arms sales to China and elsewhere. U.S. critics, however, remain skeptical that even a tighter EU Code will contain sufficient enforcement and transparency mechanisms to dissuade EU countries from exporting advanced defense technologies that could enhance China's military buildup and ultimately threaten common U.S., European, and Asian interests in peace and stability.

All 25 EU member states must agree before the embargo can be overturned. Although many observers had expected that the EU would lift the embargo in the spring of 2005, some members grew hesitant amid vocal and high-level U.S. opposition, especially since early 2005. Those arguing against lifting the embargo have cited persistent human rights problems in China, including a refusal to reexamine the Tiananmen Crackdown, and China's adoption in March 2005 of its "Anti-Secession Law" warning of a possible use of force against Taiwan. At present, ending the arms embargo on China does not appear to be high on the EU's agenda. Still, the EU is politically committed to overturning the embargo, and many observers believe that its end is ultimately only a matter of time. In the meantime, U.S. diplomacy could be effective, and the disagreement presents a chance for closer coordination of U.S.-European policies, including those dealing with arms export controls and a rising China.

Overall, there are two sets of questions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward the fate of the EU's arms embargo on China. What are the implications for U.S. interests in trans-Atlantic relations and China? If U.S. interests are adversely affected, what are some options for Congress to discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo on China and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S. national security interests in both Asia and Europe? Issues raised by these questions are the subject of this CRS Report. This report will be updated as warranted.