The Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine (DRE) Controversy: FAQs and Misperceptions

Publication Date: December 2005

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Politics

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Abstract:

Most voting systems used in U.S. elections rely on computers in some way. The most computerized is the direct recording electronic voting machine, or DRE. In this system, votes are recorded directly onto computer memory devices. While DREs have been in use since the early 1990s, questions about their security and reliability were previously a relatively minor issue, even following the November 2000 presidential election and the subsequent congressional deliberations leading to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252).

However, at least two factors led to a sharp increase in public concerns about DREs beginning in 2003. First, the voting accessibility provisions in HAVA promote the use of DREs, which have been the only kind of voting system that can meet the HAVA requirements to permit persons with disabilities, including blindness, to vote privately and independently. Second, potential security vulnerabilities with DREs were publicized as a result of several studies. Several bills have been introduced in the 109th Congress that would address these issues in different ways.

In the public debate about DREs, there has been some confusion about what the problems and issues are, arising to a significant degree from the complexity of DREs and of elections in general. This confusion can lead to misperceptions about facts as well as issues and options for resolving them. Points worth noting include the following:

DREs do have unique security concerns and have not been thoroughly tested in the scientific community. However, most election problems in 2004 were not associated with DREs. Security flaws in them are not known to have compromised any elections, and it is not clear how much of a threat those vulnerabilities pose to election integrity in practice, especially in comparison to other kinds of threats. The different models of DREs in current use vary substantially in design, and problems that one model exhibits may not occur in others. Many of those problems are procedural, not weaknesses in the technology itself.

It is not clear whether the unique security problems posed by DREs are best addressed by requiring that they produce paper ballots or by other means. While paper has useful security properties and is well-known, other methods exist that might be superior. Furthermore, paper ballots used with DREs (called voter-verified paper audit trails, or VVPAT) are largely unproven and it is not clear how well they can meet HAVA requirements for accessibility or other goals such as usability.

As Congress considers proposals relating to DREs, salient issues might include the lack of information about DRE security, especially in relation to other systems and other components of election integrity; potential conflicts with HAVA requirements that might be associated with the proposals; how those proposals might impact voter confidence; and what impacts they might have on future innovation. This report will be updated in response to major developments.