Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options

Publication Date: February 2001

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Author(s):

Research Area: Government

Type:

Coverage: Colombia

Abstract:

With the civil conflict in Colombia worsening, in many analysts' perception, some policymakers are again questioning the wisdom and scope of U.S. policy and assistance toward that country. In July 2000, the 106th Congress decided to provide some $860 million in funding for Colombia as part of the $1.3 billion "Plan Colombia" supplemental funding for FY2000 and FY2001 counternarcotics and related efforts primarily in the Andean region. Some foreign observers, U.S. policymakers, and analysts hold this U.S. assistance package responsible in part for escalating violence. The package included funding for the training and equipping of Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions to undertake counternarcotics fumigation missions in two provinces where coca production has spread rapidly since 1995. Although the funding was strictly for counternarcotics and related purposes, the Clinton Administration's stated intent was to cut a major source of revenue to the leftist guerrillas battling the government, who reportedly earn tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars per year from taxing coca production and distribution. The guerrillas have cited that fumigation of crops that began in Putumayo in December 2000 as a rationale for blockading access to that province during late 2000, and for suspending peace talks with the government of Colombian president Andres Pastrana.

As the 107th Congress begins, the situation appears ever more difficult for the peaceful settlement of the decades-old conflict with leftist guerrillas that President Pastrana made a priority when his Administration took office in August 1998. With Pastrana ineligible to run again in the upcoming 2002 presidential elections, with the balance of power between the Colombian military and the two guerrilla groups stalemated at best, and with the Pastrana Administration unable to curb the massacres committed by paramilitary groups, who operate with some level of assistance from members of the military, the likelihood of a peaceful settlement appears to be waning. A February 2001 attempt by President Pastrana to restart negotiations through faceto-face talks with guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda yielded an agreement to resume negotiations and create mechanisms to facilitate them.

The threat to the political and economic stability of not only Colombia, but also of its neighbors, from rapid growth of Colombia's leftist guerrilla groups and paramilitary organizations has also became a source of widespread concern to U.S. policymakers within the past two years. Although the two major guerrilla groups have operated since the mid-1960s, they expanded operations to the point where they influence or control local governments in over half the country's 1,000 municipalities, and have displayed increased strength through widespread actions and attacks on major military targets. President Pastrana's attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the guerrilla conflict are complicated not only by the relatively strong position of the guerrillas, but also by the massacres of suspected guerrilla sympathizers committed by paramilitary groups, and by the ineffectiveness, human rights abuse, and links with the paramilitaries of the Colombian military. Because the United States has a variety of interests in Colombia, which provides some 90% of the cocaine consumed in the United States and an increasing amount of heroin, there is broad agreement that the United States should be engaged there. There is no consensus, however, on the appropriate policy and type of assistance.