China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy -- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
Publication Date: September 2006
Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Author(s):
Research Area: Government
Type:
Coverage: Taiwan China
Abstract:
Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the "one China" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the "one China" policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. vital interests in peace and stability. In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the "one China" policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This report will be updated.
U.S. policy on "one China" has evolved to cover three major issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue. First, the United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, but "acknowledged" the "one China" position of both sides of the strait. President Bush has stated "non-support" for Taiwan independence, but questions have arisen since October 2002 about whether he changed his position to one of "opposition" in closed meetings with the PRC president. Second, successive Administrations have shown opposition to a PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan question. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan in 1996, and President Bush in 2001 initially said he would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself." Third, President Reagan gave "Six Assurances" to Taiwan in 1982, including one that Washington would not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. With intermittent talks and military tensions in the 1990s, President Clinton urged cross-strait dialogue. The Bush Administration has re-emphasized the "Six Assurances." Both Beijing and Taipei have shifted to call for a more active U.S. role in encouraging cross-strait dialogue.
Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in preventing conflict across the Taiwan Strait have been challenged increasingly by the PRC's military modernization and moves by Taiwan perceived in Beijing as provocations that would consolidate an independent status. On August 3, 2002, the President of the Republic of China (ROC), commonly called Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gave a speech on "one country on each side" of the strait, surprising Washington. Leading up to his re-election on March 20, 2004, Chen called for referendums and a new constitution by 2008. PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003, that China would "pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland." Appearing next to visiting Premier Wen on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated opposition to Chen's efforts to change the status quo, indicating concerns about a future military crisis. Critics charged that Bush sided with Beijing's belligerence. The Administration has stated opposition to unilateral changes from Beijing or Taipei to the "status quo."
Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, and the President's management of the Taiwan Strait situation to advance U.S. strategic interests in democracy, peace and stability, and economic growth. A review of policy toward Taiwan could involve a Congressional role. On U.S. arms sales to and defense relations with Taiwan, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan. On current legislation, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, by Kerry Dumbaugh.