Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force

Publication Date: November 1999

Publisher: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

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Research Area: International relations

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Abstract:

This report, originally prepared as a memorandum for Senator William Roth, examines the “lessons learned” of Operation Allied Force, NATO’s effort to make President Milosevic of Yugoslavia yield to its demands over Kosovo. The report analyzes NATO’s political and military objectives; examines why Milosevic accepted NATO’s terms; and evaluates Russia’s role in the conflict. The report also assesses European/Canadian shortcomings in military capabilities made evident by the conflict; reviews the performance of the three new allies and the implications of their performance for possible further enlargement of the alliance; and encapsulates the range of allied viewpoints during the conflict and the political importance of maintaining a unified NATO position. Finally, the report analyzes the implications of the conflict for non-Article V missions for NATO, and the conclusions that potential NATO adversaries might draw from the war. This report may be updated as further information on the conflict becomes available. For additional reading, see CRS Issue Brief 98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy; Issue Brief 10027, Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Operations; and CRS report RL30265, Kosovo: Review and Analysis of Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999.